Holding

The phrase "status quo as in the High Court" means the state of affairs existing while the matter was pending before the High Court, and therefore no contempt was made out.

Summary

Bharat Coking Coal Limited filed a contempt petition alleging that Ram Nath Singh and his son, after the Supreme Court ordered maintenance of the "status quo as in the High Court" on 19‑12‑1986, deliberately concealed this order, approached the Patna High Court and obtained a favourable order on 3‑1‑1987 to lift sludge from the disputed land. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of "status quo as in the High Court" and held that it refers only to the state of affairs while the matter was pending before the High Court, i.e., until the High Court delivered its judgment. Consequently, the respondents were deemed to be bound by the earlier High Court order of 15‑1‑1985 and no contempt was established. The Court vacated the High Court's 3‑Jan‑1987 order, restrained the respondents from removing sludge, and dismissed the contempt petition.

Issues considered

What is the scope and effect of the Supreme Court's order directing maintenance of "status quo as in the High Court"?
Does filing a petition before the High Court and obtaining an order, while suppressing the Supreme Court's status‑quo order, constitute contempt of court?

Legislation cited

Subjects

contempt of courtstatus quointerpretation of ordersSupreme CourtHigh CourtCoal Bearing Areas Actmining leaseprocedural law

Judgment

,..~ BHARAT COKING COAL LIMITED A
v.
STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.

NOVEMBER IO, 1987

[A.P. SEN AND B.C. RAY, JJ.] B
'~

- \
The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: Section 2-0rder for mainte-
nance of status quo as in the High Court-Passed by Supreme Court-
Suppression of the order from the High Court and obtaining of another
order-Whether amounts to contempt-Scope and effect of status quo
order. c
Words & Phrases: 'Status quo'-Meaning of.

It was alleged, in the petition for initiating proceedings for con-
tempt, that despite the fact that this Court passed an order on 19.12.86
directing maintenance of 'status quo as in the High Court' in the pre- D
sence of the counsel for respondent No. 4 on December 22, 1986 respon-
dent No. 4 and his son filed a miscellaneous petition before the High
Court, deliberately and wilfully suppressing from it the fact that this·
Court had directed maintenance of status quo, and obtained an order
y dated January 3, 1987 in their favour, and had thus wilfully and
flagrantly disobeyed and violated the status quo order of this Court. E

-- This Court on September 23, 1987 vacated the aforesaid order of
the High Court and restrained respondent No. 4 and his son and their
agents and servants from lifting sludge/slurry from the lands in ques-
tion. This Court was of the view that there was no contempt.
,..... Giving reasons for its decision,
F
'
HELD: The expression 'status quo' is undoubtedly a term of
ambiguity and at times gives rise to doubt and difficulty. According
to the . ordinary legal connotation the term implies existing state of
things at any given point of time. The qualifying words 'as in the G

_,, High Court' clearly limit the scope and effect of the status quo
order. [872F-GI

In the present case, the High Court determined only one question,
namely, that slurry was not coal or mineral. The impugned judgment
does not adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. It is, therefore, H

869
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 1 S.C.R.

A obvious that status quo as in the High Court cannot mean anything else T .,
except status quo as existing when the matter was pending in the High
Court before the judgment was delivered. Both the parties understood
the scope and effect of the status quo order as meaning the state of
things existing while the writ petition was still pending i.e. till the
delivery of the judgment by the High Court. [872G-H; 873A-B)
B
No case for contempt is made out on the plain terms of the status
quo order. The parties were relegated back to the position that obtained
while the writ petition was pending. They were, therefore, subject to
the order passed by the High Court dated January 15, 1985. [873C-D]

The conduct of respondent No. 4 for having approached the High
-
C Court and obtained the impugned order by suppressing the fact that
this Court had passed the status quo order, is highly deprecated. The
proper course for him was to have approached this Court for clarifica-
tion, if he had any doubt as to the meaning and effect of the status quo
order. [873C)
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Misc. Petition
No. 4673 of 1987. (Jn C.A. No. 4521of1986).

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.1985 of the Patna
y_
High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1133 of 1984.
E
L.N. Sinha and M.L. Verma for the Petitioner.

S.N. Kacker, S.B. Upadhyay, M.M. Kashyap and Smt. Asha
Upadhyay for the Respondents.

F The following Order of the Court was delivered:

ORDER

This is an application made by the appellant for initiating pro-
ceedings for contempt against respondent no. 4 Ram Nath Singh and
G his son Vijendra Singh. It is alleged that despite the fact that this Court
had on 19th December 1986 after hearing learned counsel for the
parties granted special leave and also passed an order directing
maintenance of status quo as in the High Court in the presence of
learned counsel for respondent no. 4, three days after i.e. on 22nd
December, 1986 respondent no. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son
H Vjjendra Singh filed a criminal miscellaneous petition no. 4841/86 (R)
BHARAT COKING COAL v. STATE OF BIHAR 871

•'y" before the Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court alleging inter alia
A
that respondent no. 4 had the right to collect slurry, deliberately and
wilfully suppressed from the High Court the fact that this Court had
f directed maintenance of status quo, and thereby obtained an order
<
from the High Court dated 3rd January, 1987 in the said proceedings
by which respondent no. 4 was allowed to transport briquettes from
the area in question i.e. lands covered by the notification issued_ under B
-~
s. 9 of the Coal bearing Areas (Acquisition & Development) Act, 1957

-
including the disputed plot no. 370, and bad thus wilfully and
flagrantly disobeyed and violated the status quo order of this Court.

After hearing learned counsel for the parties at quite some
~- length, we were satisfied that the High Court was not justified in
passing the impugned order. We accordingly by order dated 23rd c
September, 1987 vacated the aforesaid order of the High Court dated
3rd January, 1987 and also allowed the application made by the apel-
!ant for grant of a prohibitory order and restrained respondent no. 4
Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh and their agents and
servants from lifting sludge/slurry from the lands covered by the notifi- D
cation under s. 9 of the Act, in terms of the registered indenture of
lease dated October 20, 1984 executed by the State Government in
favour of respondent no. 4 and further directed that all operations
carried on by them shall stop forthwith. There was a further direction
- y made with regard to the withdrawal of the amounts deposited by
respondent no. 4 and his son towards the price of slurry collected by E
them in pursuance of the order passed by the High Court dated 15th
January, 1985 on furnishing bank guarantee. As the conclusion of the
hearing we were inclined to the view that there was no contempt. The
reasons therefor follow.

The question whether respondent no. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his F
r son Vijendra Singh are guilty of contumacious and wilful disregard of
this Court's order must depend on the precise meaning of the words
~ 'status quo as in the Hi~h Court'. There is not much of a controversy as
to the scope and effect of the status quo order passed by this Court.
Shri L.N. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submit-
ted that the words 'status quo as in the High Court' mean status quo as G
prevailing between the parties when the matter was pending in the
High Court and not after the High Court had passed the impugned
'i judgment and disposed of the writ petition. The learned counsel con-
tends that same meaning must be given to these words as otherwise,
the application for grant of prohibitory order would be infructuous and
the order passed by this Court meaningless. He placed emphasis on the H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 1 S.C.R.

A word 'in' in the collocation of the words 'status quo as in the High
Court' to define the scope and effect of the status quo order. Accord-
ing to him, the word 'in' must mean status quo while the matter was in
the High Court; it was in seisin of the High Court till the moment
before the delivery of the final judgment. Once the judgment had been
delivered, the matter came to an end in the High Court. In substance,
a the contention is that the status quo as prevailing between the parties
w.hen the matter was pending in the High Court had to be maintained.

In reply Shri Kacker, learned counsel for respondent no. 4 Ram
Nath Singh and his son Vi jendra Singh submitted that the words 'status
quo as in the High Court' must be interpreted to mean that the parties
were relegated back to the position that obtained between them when
-
C the writ petition was still pending. Upon that basis he submitted that
the contemnors were governed by the terms of the earlier order passed
by the High Court dated 15th January, 1985 permitting them to collect
sludge/slurry from public land. It is urged that the disputed plot
no. 370 is such public land from which respondent no. 4 in terms of the
D registered indenture of lease dated October 20, 1984 executed by the
State Government in his favour, was entitled to remove sludge/slurry
from the lands covered by the lease. The learned counsel points out
that although respondent no. 4 had been restrained by the High Court
by its earlier order dated 19th October, 1984 from removing sludge/
slurry from the disputed plot of land, it had by the subsequent order Y-
E dated 15th January, 1985 permitted him to collect sludge/slurry on
certain conditions. One of the conditions was that respondent no. 4
was required to deposit Rs.10,000 in the High Court and that had been
done. He also drew our attention to cl.(B) of that order which directed
respondent no. 4 to deposit the price of slurry in court along with
monthly returns and it is said that several lakhs of rupees are in deposit
F in the High Court on that account.

The expression 'status quo' is undoubtedly a term of ambiguity
and at times gives rise to doubt and difficulty. According to the ordi-
nary legal connotation, the term 'status quo' implies the exis.ting state
of things at any given point of time. The qualifying words 'as in the
G High Court' clearly limit the scope and effect of the status quo order.
In the present case, the High Court determined only one question,
namely, that slurry was not coal or mineral. It refrained from entering
into the question of right or title of the parties on the ground that it
involved investigation into disputed questions of facts. Therefore,
apart from the abstract question that slurry was not coal or mineral,
H the impugned judgment does not adjudicate upon the rights of the
BHARAT COKING COAL v. STATE OF BIHAR 873

parties. Viewed from that angle, it is obvious that status quo as in the
A
High Court cannot mean anything else except status quo as existing
when the matter was pending in the High Court before the judgment
was delivered. Both the parties understood the scope and effect of the
status quo order as meaning the state of things existing while the writ
petition was still pending i.e. till the delivery of the judgment by the
High Court. Respondent no. 4 moved the High Court in Cr!. M.P. B
No. 4841/86 {R) without impleading the appellant herein and obtained
the impugned order from the High Court dated 3rd January 1987
... which we have vacated. The proper course for respondent no. 4 to
have adopted was to have approached this Court to seek clarification,
if he had any doubt as to the meaning and effect of the status quo
order. We highly deprecate the conduct of respondent no. 4 for having
approached the High Court and obtained the impugned order by c
suppressing the fact that this Court had passed the status quo order.
Even so, strictly speaking, no case for contempt is made out on the
plain terms of the status quo order. The parties were relegated back to
the position that obtained while the writ petition was pending. They
were therefore subject to the order passed by the High Court dated D
15th January, 1985. No other conclusion is possible looking to the
terms of the status quo order.

We must add that there is no merit in the contention that the
y' disputed plot no. 370 was public land and the State Government was
entitled to grant a lease for removal and collection of sludge/slurry E
despite the notification issued ooder s. 9 of the Act. It is quite clear
upon the terms of the notification issued that the Central Government
has made the requisite declaration under s. 9( 1) of the Act for acquisi-
tion of the lands measuring 778.45 acres as specified in Schedule 'A'
and it specifically includes the disputed plot no. 370 in Village
Sudamdih. The appellant in paragraph 11 of the application for con- F
tempt has averred that on the publication in the official gazette of such
declaration by the Central Government under s. 9{ 1) of the Act, the
aforesaid lands vast absolutely in it free from all encumbrances. The
aforesaid declaration by the Central Government under s. 9( 1) further
specifies as enjoined by cl.(b) of sub-s(2) thereof that the acquisition
of the right in or over lands measuring 778.45 acres describe in G
Schedule 'A' also carries with it the right to mine, quarry, bore, dig
"f. and search for, win, work and carry away minerals in the lands. It is
•'
I

i pertinent to observe that respondent no. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son
Vijendra Singh have not in the counter-affidavit denied the aforesaid
averment made in paragraph 11 except to say that they are a matter of
I record. It is plain upon the terms that the area in question i.e. plot H

~
I
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 1 S.C.R.

A no. 370 has been acquired under s. 9(1) of the Act together with the
right to mine, quarry, bore, dig and search for, win, work and carry
away the minerals thereon. It is idle to contend that the disputed plot
no. 370 was open land. It is nothing but an afterthought and is ill-
conceived.
B It is unfortunate that the appellant rested itself content by
obtaining the status quo order in terms in which it was passed. It
should instead have for safeguarding its interests insisted upon a pro-
hibitory order. In the meanwhile, we are informed that respondent
no, 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh have been taking
advantage of the qualified status quo order by removing sludge/slurry
C or briguettes worth about Rs.50,000 per day. The appellant is at
liberty to take recourse to such legal remedy as is available for the
prqtection of its rights. We have tried to secure its interests to some
extent by permitting withdrawal of the moneys deposited by respon-
dent no. 4 Ram Nath Singh and his son Vijendra Singh in the High
Court on furnishing bank guarantee.
0
C.M.P. is disposed of accordingly.

N.P.V. Petition disposed of.

y