Holding

Section 69 creates a rebuttable presumption of State ownership, not of culpable mental state, and the prosecution must prove the accused’s knowledge of illicit origin beyond reasonable doubt; therefore the conviction was set aside.

Summary

The appellant, a sandalwood oil manufacturer, was convicted under Section 27(1)(d) of the Kerala Forest Act for allegedly possessing forest produce illicitly removed from a reserved forest. The High Court upheld the conviction, treating the presumption under Section 69 as creating a reverse burden of proof on the accused’s knowledge of the illicit origin. The Supreme Court held that Section 69 only presumes ownership by the State, not a culpable mental state, and that the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant knowingly possessed illegally removed forest produce. The Court found that the State failed to discharge this burden and that the appellant’s documents rebutted the presumption. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was set aside and the appeal allowed.

Issues considered

Whether sandalwood oil qualifies as ‘forest produce’ under Section 2(f) of the Kerala Forest Act
Whether Section 27(1)(d) requires proof of the accused’s knowledge of illicit origin of the forest produce
Whether the presumption under Section 69 creates a reverse burden of proof on the accused’s mens rea
Whether seizure of forest produce ipso facto establishes the accused’s knowledge of its illicit nature
Whether the prosecution proved the requisite mens rea beyond reasonable doubt

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 378
Essential Commodities Acts. 10E
Income Tax Act, 1961s. 278E
Kerala Forest Acts. 27, s. 2(f), s. 69
Kerala Forest Produce Transit Ruless. Rule 23, s. Rule 3

Subjects

forest producesandalwood oilmens reapresumption of ownershipSection 27Section 69Kerala Forest Actburden of proofcriminal lawappellate jurisdiction

Judgment

[2021] 8 S.C.R. 671 671

BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL A
v.
STATE OF KERALA
(Criminal Appeal No. 834 of 2009)
OCTOBER 06, 2021 B
[INDIRA BANERJEE AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.]
Kerala Forest Act – ss.2(f), 27, 69 – Appellant convicted and
sentenced by Trial Court u/s.27 (1) (d), u/r.3(iii) r/w r.23 of the Transit
Rules – Acquitted by Sessions Court – Acquittal reversed by High
C
Court – On appeal, held: Sandalwood oil in question is a forest
product – However, High Court erred in holding that its seizure ipso
facto meant that the appellant had conscious knowledge about its
illicit nature or origin; or the inability to account for a transit pass
implied that it was procured illegally, thus attracting s.27 – Appellant
furnished documents explaining how they had sourced the D
sandalwood oil – Evidence furnished to the State was not even
produced in Court – State did not discharge its burden of proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant had knowledge of the
fact that the goods were illicit in origin – High Court concluded
incorrectly that the result of s.69 is a presumption that places the
E
reverse burden of proof in respect of an offence – Impugned
judgment set aside – Kerala Forest Produce Transit Rules – rr.3
(iii), 23 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.378.
Criminal Law – Mens rea – Held: Generally, there is a
presumption that mens rea is an essential ingredient in every offence
F
– That presumption can be displaced either by the phraseology of
the law creating the offence or by the subject matter with which it
deals; both must be considered – Kerala Forest Act – Income Tax
Act, 1961 – s.278E – Essential Commodities Act – s.10E.
Kerala Forest Act – s.69 – Presumption under – When not
applicable – Discussed. G

Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Rule 3 of the Kerala Forest Produce Transit
Rules prescribes that no one can import or export timber or other
forest produce or transport it, unless a pass as prescribed by the H
671
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A Rules, accompanies its movement. Rule 3 (3) prescribes the
procedure for obtaining such a pass. Rule 23 of the Rules,
prescribes that any contravention of the rules would attract a
punishment for a term that can extend to six months or fine that
can extend to rupees five hundred, or both. [Para 16][683-D-E]
B 1.2 The impugned judgment, so far as it proceeded on the
assumption that sandalwood oil is forest produce, is based on a
correct appreciation of law. In the present case, the appellant did
not dispute ownership of the articles seized. Section 69 of the
Act enacts presumption, that when possession of a forest produce
is found with someone, that it is deemed to belong to the state
C (or central) government. Now, this presumption is a rebuttable
one; several decisions of this court have said that the burden of
proving the foundational facts, which will give rise to the
presumption, is upon the prosecution. In the present case, there
is no contest about the fact that the goods were seized from the
D premises of the appellant, and belonged to him. The goods seized
from the airport, were to be shipped to overseas destinations. In
these circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the
foundational facts, i.e., possession of the forest produce, were
proved by the State. [Paras 20, 21][688-E-H; 689-A]
E Noor Agha v. State of Punjab (2008) 16 SCC 417; Bhola
Singh v. State of Punjab (2011) 1 SCC 653; Gangadhar
@ Gangaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh Decision of
Supreme Court dtd. 05.08.2020 in Cr. A. No. 504/2020
– relied on.

F 1.3 Sandalwood oil is a forest product. However, Section
27 (1) (d)- which enacts the offence- and which has been applied
in this case, points to the offender’s conscious mental state when
it enacts that whoever “knowingly receives or has in possession
any major forest produce illicitly removed from a Reserved Forest”
would be subjected to the prescribed punishment. The
G presumption under Section 69 is with respect to not a conscious
mental state, or a direction by the legislature that a certain state
of affairs is deemed to exist, but with respect to ownership of the
property i.e., that it “belongs to the state, unless the contrary is

H
BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL v. STATE OF KERALA 673

proved.” This is a significant aspect, because unlike some A
statutes, the Act in the present case, does not create a
presumption about a culpable mental state of the alleged offender.
Instead, the nature of the presumption is that it relates to the
ownership of the forest produce. This important aspect has a
bearing on the matter. Generally, there is a presumption that mens B
rea is an essential ingredient in every offence. Yet, that
presumption can be displaced either by the phraseology of the
law creating the offence or by the subject matter with which it
deals; both must be considered. Therefore, in the present case,
C
the State had to show, that the forest produce was illicitly removed,
or was illicitly in the possession of the accused, and in either
case, that the same was within his knowledge. This foundational
fact has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the
accused has to establish, a credible or reasonable explanation.
D
[Paras 23-25][689-G-H; 690-A-D; 692-F-G]
Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1966 SC 43;
Umashanker v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 642
: [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 646; Raghunath Singh v. State
of M.P. 1967 JLJ 234 (SC) – relied on. E
1.4 The State no doubt led evidence to show that the goods
seized bore the labels of the appellant’s firm and further that no
transport licence was available. However, this per se does not
establish illicit possession of forest produce within his knowledge.
It is here, that the presumption under Section 69 cannot apply; it F
merely directs a presumption that the forest produce belongs to
the government. The appellant had produced documents (in the
form of 45 invoices and receipts) to show the origin of the goods,
and where they were purchased from, to say that they were
procured in 104 transactions. The question, therefore, is whether G
by operation of Section 27 (1) (d), the initial presumption was
established. The evidence on record showed that the cartons
seized from the airport were bound to destinations in Germany,

H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A France, Spain, etc. The receipts, or primary evidence produced
by the appellant, was not exhibited in the court; nor was any
evidence led to show that in fact, such effort to trace the sellers
of the oil was made by the State, and that the evidence furnished
by the appellant was unbelievable. The State had not discharged
B its burden of proving beyond any doubt, that the appellant had
knowledge of the fact that the goods were illicit in origin. [Paras 26,
27][692-G-H; 693-A, C-F]
1.5 The High Court fell into error, in holding that the
presumption that the seizure of forest produce belonging to the
C
State, automatically can result in a presumption of culpable mental
state of the accused- in other words, that seizure of the goods
ipso facto meant that the appellant had conscious knowledge about
their illicit nature or origin, or that the accused’s inability to account
for a transit pass, implied that they procured the goods illegally,
D thus attracting Section 27. Such a leap of reasoning is not justified,
given that the appellants had furnished a series of documents
explaining how they had sourced the oil in question. The State’s
absence of diligence in producing those materials (which were in
its possession) and proving that they were without credibility,
cannot result in a conviction. Nor could the court have concluded
E
adversely that the appellant’s participation in the auction of the
seized goods and their purchase, implicated them. There can be
several reasons for such a conduct, including their wish to fulfil
contractual obligations. The interference by the High Court with
the acquittal recorded by the Sessions Court, in this case, is not
F warranted. The High Court concluded incorrectly that the result
of Section 69 is a presumption that places the reverse burden of
proof in respect of an offence - no such inference can be drawn
from the plain text of that provision; and Section 27 (1) (d) requires
conscious knowledge, of the nature of the goods, i.e., their illicit
origin, which compels proof by the prosecution, beyond reasonable
G
doubt. The materials on the record show that the evidence in the
possession of the defence and furnished to the State, was not
even produced in court, nor was the primary evidence to

H
BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL v. STATE OF KERALA 675

substantiate the state’s contentions in that regard, proved. A
The impugned judgment is in error and set aside. [Paras 28-
30][693-F-H; 694-A-E]
Suresh Lohiya v. State of Maharashtra (1996) 10 SCC
397: [1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 130 – held inapplicable.
Forest Range Officer v. P. Mohammed Ali 1993 Supp B
(3) SCC 627; Standard Essential Oil Industries v. Forest
Range Officer (2018) 16 SCC 180 :[2018] 3 SCR 532
– relied on.
Ghure Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC
450 : [2008] 11 SCR 499 – referred to. C
Case Law Reference
[2008] 11 SCR 499 referred to Para 6
[1996] 5 Suppl. SCR 130 held inapplicable Para 7
[2018] 3 SCR 532 relied on Para 7 D
[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 646 relied on Para 24
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No.834 of 2009
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.12.2008 of the High Court
of Kerala at Ernakulam in Criminal Appeal No.556 of 2001. E
Ranjeet Kumar, Sr. Adv., Rajiv K. Garg, Ashish Garg, T. L. Garg,
Advs. for the Appellant.
C. K. Sasi, Adv. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. This appeal by special leave, questions a judgment of the Kerala
High Court1 reversing the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge and
consequently, restoring the conviction and sentence (of 3 years’
imprisonment) for the offence punishable under Section 27 of the Kerala G
Forest Act (hereafter “the Act”).
2. The first appellant is a partner of the appellant’s firm, and claims
to be manufacturer and trader of sandalwood oil. On 4 January 1994,

1
Dated 19-12-2008, in Crl. A No. 556/2001 H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A upon receipt of information, officials of the Kerala Forest Department
seized 37 cartons containing 460 kgs of sandalwood oil at Karipur airport,
belonging to the appellants. Later a criminal complaint was filed by the
State, wherein it was alleged that the appellants’ premises were searched
in the course of investigation, which in turn yielded in seizure of another
73.6 kgs of sandalwood oil. The appellant resisted the charges of illegal
B
possession of forest produce, and its movement, stating that they
processed and manufactured sandalwood oil, which was then exported
to four different countries. The complaint filed by the Kerala Forest
Department, alleged that sandalwood oil was a forest produce and without
a transit licence, its movement too was illegal.
C 3. In the criminal proceedings which ensued after initiation of the
complaint, the appellant denied criminal responsibility arguing, among
others, that sandalwood oil was not a forest produce and rather, that
sandalwood was. It was urged, that regardless of this, a valid and
subsisting licence authorized the appellant to manufacture sandalwood
D oil. The prosecution examined four witnesses; the appellant relied on the
testimony of two defense witnesses. After considering the materials on
record, the Judicial Magistrate Thamarasserry (hereafter “the trial court”)
by judgment2 convicted the appellant as charged and sentenced him to
pay Rs. 2000 as fine and undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years
under Section 27 (1) (d) of the Act and six months, under Rule 3 (iii)
E read with Rule 23 of the Kerala Forest Produce Transit Rules (hereafter
“the Rules”).
4. Aggrieved by the conviction recorded and sentence imposed
on him, the appellant approached the Court of Session, Kozhikode
Division (hereafter “the Sessions Court”) which by its judgment 3, upset
F the findings of the trial court. The Sessions Court accepted the appellant’s
plea and held that in view of the certificate issued by the Central Excise
authorities, his possession of sandalwood oil in the factory could not be
termed as illegal and that a conviction under Section 27 could be recorded
only if it was found that sandalwood oil was removed illegally, or without
G authorization from any reserve forest, or area proposed to be constituted
as reserve forest.
5. Aggrieved by the appellant’s acquittal and in view of the findings
of the learned Sessions Judge, the State appealed. The High Court, which
2
dated 19.08.1997
H 3
dated 20.11.2000
BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL v. STATE OF KERALA 677
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

considered this appeal reversed the judgment of the Sessions Court on A
two counts. It was held by the impugned judgment that though the
appellants held a licence to manufacture sandalwood oil, nevertheless
they failed to account for possession of such a large quantity of
sandalwood oil. When charged with commission of the offence in
question, the accused concerned or individual was bound to show a proper
B
account of the raw materials collected and used to manufacture
sandalwood oil. Relying upon the testimony of PW-4, who had stated
that the accused failed to furnish the dates and details regarding
procurement of crude sandalwood and crude sandalwood oil (popularly
known as ‘red oil’), the court held that during the trial too, the appellant
had failed to give any particulars with respect to persons from whom C
purchase of these raw materials were made. The failure of the defence
to explain this vital aspect rendered the findings of the Sessions Court,
vulnerable. Taking note of Section 69 of the Act, which mandated a
presumption of culpability in the event possession was found in any given
case, the High Court held that the accused should have given an account D
regarding the raw materials collected and used. Noting the state’s
submission that to manufacture 5430 kilos of sandalwood oil at least
5600 kilograms of crude sandalwood oil was required, which in turn
needed to be extracted from at least 200 metric tons of sandalwood, the
High Court concluded that the reliance on the manufacturing licence
alone to explain the possession of sandalwood oil did not in any manner E
absolve the appellant of criminal responsibility.
6. The High Court also relied upon a decision of this court in
Ghure Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh4 to say that the appellate court
can interfere with the order of acquittal only for substantial and compelling
reasons. It was held that there were no compelling or substantial reasons F
justifying interference by the Sessions Court of the appellant’s conviction.
The High Court thereafter concluded by observing that a purposive
interpretation of the Act had to be given in view of the underlying objects
which were for the general public good.
G
7. It is argued on behalf of the appellant by Mr. Ranjit Kumar,
learned senior counsel, that the High Court failed to appreciate that an
offence is said to be committed only when the article in question is “forest
produce”. Relying on the definition of that term in the Act, it was

4
(2008) 10 SCC 450 H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A submitted that Section 2(f)(i)5 specifically states that sandalwood is one
such produce. The reference to wood oil cannot, therefore, be said to
include “sandalwood oil”. The appellants’ counsel relied on the decisions
of this court in Suresh Lohiya v. State of Maharashtra6 and the recent
ruling in Standard Essential Oil Industries v. Forest Range Officer7
to urge that courts cannot expand the scope of a legislation, departing
B
from its text, especially if it entails fastening of criminal liability.
8. It was argued that as the appellant proved that he held a valid
licence to manufacture sandalwood oil out of red oil, no offence was
made out. It was argued that acquisition of raw materials was established
through the documents maintained by the appellant, in accordance with
C
the procedure prescribed by the Central Excise Rules, 1944.There could
resultantly have been no inference of illegality committed in the possession
of sandalwood oil. Mr. Ranjit Kumar said that the High Court fell into
the error in not appreciating that the appellants had duly maintained the
register containing information as to where and how raw material required
D for manufacture of the sandalwood oil was obtained; and that in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary by the individuals or firms which
had supplied such raw material, no presumption could be drawn that the
finished product originated from illegally procured sandalwood or red oil
extracted from sandalwood. It was pointed out that the appellants had in
the course of their business relied on the licence to manufacture
E
sandalwood oil and had been exporting it through proper channels for
several years. This resulted in valuable acquisition of foreign exchange
to the country. Had there been any illegality, such exports would have
ceased a long time back.
9. Learned counsel submitted that the High Court failed to consider
F the distinction between Section 27 and Section 69 of the Act. It was
5
Section 2 (f) reads as follows:
(f) “forest produce” includes- (i) the following whether found in or brought from a
forest or not that is to say.- timber, charcoal, wood-oil, gum, resin, natural varnish
bark lac, fibres and roots of sandal wood and rosewood; and (ii) the following when
found in, or brought from, a forest, that is to say,- (a) trees and leaves, flowers and
G fruits, and all other parts or produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees; (b) plants
not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds and moss) and all parts or produce of
such plants; and (c) silk cocoons, honey and wax; (d) peat, surface soil, rock and
minerals (including limestone, laterite, minerals oils and all products of mines or
quarries);”
6
(1996) 10 SCC 397
7
H (2018) 16 SCC 180
BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL v. STATE OF KERALA 679
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

emphasised that Section 69 refers to only forest produce whereas Section A
27 refers to forest produce illegally removed from a reserve forest. The
High Court convicted the appellant holding that the presumption under
Section 69 applied. The appellant had in fact, discharged the burden
placed upon them by producing registers maintained regarding details of
individuals and firms from whom they had purchased the red oil.
B
Therefore, the prosecution was under a duty to prove that such entries
were false. Having been maintained in the ordinary course of business,
the courts, especially the trial court and the High Court, failed to consider
that the prosecution was unable to establish that the source of the
sandalwood oil and therefore, the basis for its possession was illegal.
10. Highlighting that Section 27 applied only where the court found C
that when a firm or concern knowingly receives, or has possession of
any forest produce illicitly removed, learned senior counsel urged that
the prosecution in this case failed to prove either. The prosecution never
alleged that the appellant had knowingly received or were in possession
of any forest produce illicitly removed from the reserve forest. Likewise, D
it was not its case that any forest produce had been illegally removed
from the reserve forest and that any proceedings were pending for that
purpose. Learned counsel submitted that the courts below failed to
appreciate that the complaint did not allege illicit removal of forest produce
from the reserve forest. Likewise, the evidence of the four witnesses
showed, that none of them remotely suggested that the forest produce E
found had been illicitly removed from the reserve forest. Accordingly,
the elements making up the offence under Section 27 (1) (d) of the Act
had not been proved.
11. It was urged that Section 69 enacts a presumption that forest
produce is deemed to be a property of the government, where ownership F
is disputed. At the same time, Section 27 (1)(d) makes it an offence
where anyone is in conscious possession of forest produce which is
illicitly removed from a reserve forest. In this context, it was argued that
the appellant’s firm holds a valid L-4 licence issued by Central Excise
authorities to manufacture sandalwood oil. Registration of the appellant’s G
firm under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 and Central Sales
Tax Act, 1956 was established. The firm had no infrastructure to
manufacture sandalwood oil from sandalwood. Therefore, it is apparent
that the department did not lead any evidence to prove that the forest
produce involved was in fact illicitly removed. The firm was entitled to
possess and deal with sandalwood oil in its godown and elsewhere. By H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A no stretch of imagination therefore, could it be said that possession of
sandalwood oil in the firm’s godown, as well as in the airport was illegal
or unauthorised. Furthermore, the learned senior counsel submitted that
if the appellant had indulged in any illegality with respect to procurement
of the raw materials, their exports would not have been permitted.
B 12. The State argues that this court should not interfere with the
findings and conviction recorded by the impugned judgment. Its counsel,
Mr. C. Sashi, submits that there can be no debate as to whether
sandalwood oil is a forest produce. Learned counsel relied upon the
judgment of this court reported as Forest Range Officer v. P.
Mohammed Ali 8 and submitted that the decision later rendered in
C Standard Essential Oil Industries (supra), in fact, emphatically states
that “forest produce”, as defined in the Act, includes sandalwood oil.
Learned counsel for the State submits that once there is no dispute with
respect to possession of sandalwood oil – as in this case –the onus
clearly lay upon the appellant to prove that such possession was lawful,
D that the forest produce was procured through legitimate sources and not
in a manner contrary to law.
13. Learned counsel argued that the mere statement on the part
of the appellant that they used to deal in sandalwood oil, processed or
produced from red oil as the raw material (which in turn was extracted
E from sandalwood), was insufficient to discharge the initial burden placed
upon them by law. Counsel highlighted that once their possession of the
forest produce was established the appellant relied upon certain entries
in the central excise registers and other records, to explain that the source
of such articles were legitimate. By themselves, such documents were
insufficient. The presumption under Section 69 operated firstly after the
F State established possession of forest produce. In this case, sandalwood
oil is a forest produce. The seizure of the appellant’s sandalwood oil at
the airport and the subsequent search and seizure of 73.6 kgs of
sandalwood oil from their premises, resulted in the discharge of the
foundational onus that lay upon the State. Therefore, Section 69 and the
G presumption enacted by it were attracted. The burden was then shifted
to the appellant to establish that the forest produce was sourced
legitimately and that they had a lawful right to the articles. It was
reiterated that this burden could not be simply discharged by stating that
some traders had supplied varying quantities of red oil. The traders, or

H 8
1993 Supp (3) SCC 627
BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL v. STATE OF KERALA 681
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

some of them should have stepped into the witness box and proved that A
the statements made by the appellant was correct. The appellant only
relied on the invoices and the registers, which were inadequate and did
not provide all the details for a proper verification. The trial court observed
that these facts were established by the deposition of the investigating
officer. In the circumstances it could not be said that the appellant had
B
discharged the burden of proving that the forest produce was legitimately
secured or sourced by them and that its possession was legal.
14. Learned counsel relied upon the ruling of this court in Ghure
Lal (supra)to argue that if the appellate court reverses the conviction
unreasonably without any compelling reason, and contrary to record,
based upon a misappreciation of evidence or the law, the High Court C
can interfere with such findings. On the basis of all these submissions,
the state urges that this court should dismiss the appeal and confirm the
conviction recorded by the trial court.
Relevant provisions of the Act
D
15. Section 2 (f) defines “forest” and states:
“2. ….(f) “forest” includes:
(i)the following whether found in or brought from, a forest
or not that is, to say-
E
timber, charcoal, wood-oil, gum, resin, natural varnish,
bark, lac, fibres and roots of sandalwood and rosewood;
and
(ii) the following when found in or brought from a forest,
that is to say-
F
a) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other parts
or produce not here-in-before mentioned, of trees.
b) plants not being trees including grass, creepers, reeds
and moss and all parts or produce of such plants;
c) silk cocoons, honey and wax, and G

d) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including lime-
stone, laterite), mineral oils and all products of mines or
quarries”.
Section 27 reads as follows:
H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A “27. (1) Any person who-
(a) does any act prohibited by section 7; or
(b) sets fire to a Reserved Forest or kindles or leaves
burning any fire in such manner as to endanger the same;
or
B
(c) sets fire to jungles or forests, other than Reserved
Forests and a land proposed to be constituted a Reserved
Forest, without taking precautionary measures to prevent
the spread of fire into Reserved Forest and land proposed
to be constituted a Reserved Forest; or
C
(d) knowingly receives or has in possession any forest
produce illicitly removed from a Reserved Forest; or a land
proposed to be constituted a Reserved Forest; or
(e) in a Reserved Forest or in a land proposed to be
D constituted a Reserved Forest-
(i) cultivates or clears or breaks up any land for cultivation
or for any other purpose or puts up any shed or other
structures or plant trees; or
(ii) damages, alters or removes any wall, ditch embankment,
E fence hedge or railing; or
(iii) cuts of fells any trees or girdles, marks, lops, taps,
uproots burns, saws, converts or removes any tree
including fallen or felled, or strips off the bark or leaves
from or otherwise damages the same;
F (iv) trespasses or pastures cattle or permits or causes cattle
to trespass; or
(v) quarries stones, burns lime or charcoal or collects or
subject to any manufacturing process or removes any forest
produce; or
G
(vi) causes any damage by negligence in felling any tree,
reed or cutting or dragging any timber,
shall be punished with imprisonment for a team which shall
not be less than one year but may extend to five years and
with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees
H
BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL v. STATE OF KERALA 683
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

but may extend to five thousand rupees in addition to such A
compensation for damage done to the forest as the
convicting court may direct to be paid.”.
***************** **********
Section 69 is in the following terms:
B
“69. When, in any proceedings taken under this Act, or
in consequence of anything done under this Act, a question
arises as to whether any forest produce is the property of
the Central or State Government, such produce shall be
presumed to be the property of the Central or State
Government, as the case may be, until the contrary is C
proved.”
16. Rule 3 of the Rules prescribes that no one can import or export
timber or other forest produce or transport it, unless a pass as prescribed
by the Rules, accompanies its movement. Rule 3 (3) prescribes the
procedure for obtaining such a pass. Rule 23 of the Rules, prescribes D
that any contravention of the rules would attract a punishment for a
term that can extend to six months or fine that can extend to rupees five
hundred, or both.
17. In Forest Range Officer v. P. Mohammed Ali (supra) the
provisions of the Act, which this court is concerned with in this case, i.e. E
the Kerala Forest Act, were interpreted in the context of a submission
that, sandalwood oil was not “forest produce” and that the expression
“wood oil” was referrable to items other than those enumerated (such
as sandalwood, rosewood, roots, etc.) and further that wood oil referred
to natural products and not those derived through processing. This court F
repelled such an interpretation and held that:
“6. … It must be noted in this context that there are several
types of essential oils in India, the important ones being
sandalwood oil, agar-wood oil, deodar oil and pine oil, apart
from oleo-resin and wood oil derived from exudation from
G
living trees in the forest area. These essential oils are obtained
from any forest wood. Sandalwood as observed by the High
Court is forest produce. Even its roots thereof are also included
as forest produce. They are also timber within the meaning of
Section 2(k) of the Act. The purpose of the Act is to conserve
forest wealth which is very dear for preservation to maintain H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A ecology. Forest produce defined under Section 2(f) is an
inclusive definition. It is settled law that the word ‘include’ is
generally used as a word of extension. When used in an
interpretation clause, it seeks to enlarge the meaning of the
words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute. Craies
on Statute Law, 7th Edition at p. 64 stated the construction to
B
be adopted to the meanings of the words and phrases that
“The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament
is that they should be construed according to the intention
expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute
are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can
C be necessary than to expound those words in their ordinary
and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a
case best declare the intention of the law giver”.
At p. 214 it is stated that an interpretation clause which
extends the meaning of a word does not take away its ordinary
D meaning. An interpretation clause of the inclusive definition
is not meant to prevent the word receiving its ordinary, popular
and natural sense whenever that word would be properly
applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act, when
there is nothing in the context or the subject-matter to the
E contrary, to be applied to somethings to which it would not
ordinarily be applicable…. An interpretation clause should
be used for the purpose of interpreting words which are
ambiguous or equivocal, and not so as to disturb the meaning
of such as are plain. At p. 216 it is stated that another
important rule with regard to the effect of an interpretation
F clause is that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as
substituting one set of words for another, or as strictly defining
what the meaning of the term must be under all circumstances,
but rather as declaring what may be comprehended within
the term where the circumstances require that it should be so
G construed.
****************** **************
8. The word include in the definition under Section 2(f) would
show that it did not intend to exclude what would ordinarily
and in common parlance be spoken of as wood oil. The
H expression being technical and being part of an inclusive
BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL v. STATE OF KERALA 685
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

definition has to be construed in its technical sense but in an A
exhaustive manner, it cannot be restricted in such a manner
so as to defeat the principal object and purpose of the Act.
The process by which the oil is extracted is not decisive as oil
may be extracted by natural process of exudation or it may
be extracted by subjecting to chemical or mechanical process
B
and sandalwood (Santalum album) is cut into pieces. Its
heartwood and roots of sandalwood trees removed from the
forest are used as a raw material at a factory level that too by
mechanised process to extract sandalwood oil. The purpose
for which the oil is used is not decisive. Therefore, the word
wood oil used in the Act will require purposive interpretation C
drawing upon the context in which the words are used and its
meaning will have to be discovered having regard to the
intention and object which legislature seeks to subserve. The
restricted meaning sought to put up by the accused would
frustrate the object and the literal interpretation would defeat
D
the meaning. The legislature does not intend to restrict the
word wood oil nor do we find any compelling circumstances
in the Act to give restricted meaning that only oil derived from
Dipterocarpus trees to be wood oil as contended for the
accused and which found acceptance by the learned Single
Judge. The purposive interpretation would aid conservation E
of sandalwood, a valuable forest wealth, prevent illicit felling
and transportation of them and make the manufacturers of
sandalwood oil accountable for the possession of sandalwood
trees or chips or roots etc. Incorporation of sandalwood oil ex
abundenti cautela in Karnataka Act and absence thereof in
F
sister Acts operating in South India does not detract from
giving it its due meaning. The expert opinion is only an opinion
evidence on either side and does not aid us in interpretation.
This Court in Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [(1988) 4
SCC 315] did not adopt the dictionary meaning as it may be
to some extent delusive guide to interpret entries in Central G
Excises and Salt Act. In Kishan Lal v. State of
Rajasthan [1990 Supp SCC 742] of which one of us, Sahai,
J. was a Member, this Court was to consider the word ‘sugar’
whether under Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Marketing Act,
1961 an agricultural produce. It was contended that the
H
686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A Khandsari Sugar was not an agricultural produce. Repelling
that contention, this Court held that the word agricultural
produce includes all produce whether agricultural,
horticultural, animal husbandry or otherwise as specified in
the Schedule. The legislative power to add or include and
define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is
B
not exhaustive but inclusive neither excludes any item produced
in mills or factories nor it confines its width to produce from
soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal
husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks the
expression “or otherwise as specified in the Schedule”.
C Accordingly it was held that Khandsari Sugar is an agricultural
produce under that Act….”
18. In the other judgment, relied on by both parties, i.e. Standard
Essential Oil Industries (supra), the issue was whether sandalwood
oil could be confiscated by virtue of provisions of Section 61A of the
D Kerala Forest Act.9 This court held that sandalwood oil, though a forest
produce, could not be the subject matter of Section 61A in view of its
restrictive wording:
“21. A perusal of the definition of forest produce, as given
by Section 2(f) of the Act, shows that other than timber,
E charcoal, firewood it includes wood oil, gum, resin, natural
varnish bark, roots of sandalwood, etc. However, the use of
the specific words “timber, charcoal, firewood and ivory”
under Section 61-A instead of “any forest produce or ivory”
makes it clear that the intention of the legislature in providing
armoury under Section 61-A is only with regard to certain
F
9
That provision, i.e Section 61A, was inserted in 1975 by the State Assembly, and
prescribed inter alia, the procedure to be followed in cases where the state, apart from
seizing the forest produce, also intended to confiscate the property and the articles
used for commission of the offence. The material part of Section 61A reads as follows:
“61A Confiscation by Forest Officers in certain cases.-(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, where a forest offence is
G believed to have been committed in respect of timber, charcoal, firewood or ivory
which is the property of the Government, the officer seizing the property under sub-
section (1) of section 52 shall, without any unreasonable delay, produce it, together
with all tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing such
offence, before an officer authorized by the Government in this behalf by notification
in the Gazette, not being below the rank of an Assistant Conservator of Forests
H (hereinafter referred to as the authorized officer).”
BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL v. STATE OF KERALA 687
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

category specified therein and not for every forest produce A
as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act. Undoubtedly,
sandalwood oil is a forest produce but Section 61-A of the
Act is limited only to the categories specified therein and does
not give power of confiscation of sandalwood oil.
22. Further, we find force in the contention of the appellants B
that Section 69 of the Act is only a rule of evidence which
raises a mandatory presumption that a forest produce, unless
proved otherwise, is a property of the Government in case
where any proceedings are going on under the Act or anything
is done under the Act. The section operates only as a tool to
help the Government in proving its title to the property but C
the said section cannot be read as to give any power of
confiscation of the property.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. In Suresh Lohiya (supra), this court struck a discordant note, D
drawing a distinction between “nature’s gifts” such as charcoal, mahua
flowers, or minerals and, article “produced with the aid of human
labour” which, according to it, was not included in the definition of
“forest produce” under the Act:
“7. The legislature having defined “forest-produce”, it is not E
permissible to us to read in the definition something which is
not there. We are conscious of the fact that forest wealth is
required to be preserved; but, it is not open to us to legislate,
as what a court can do in a matter like at hand is to iron out
cresses; it cannot weave a new texture. If there be any lacuna
in the definition it is really for the legislature to take care of F
the same.
8. We may also state that according to us the view taken by
the Gujarat High Court in Fatesang’s case is correct, because
though bamboo as a whole is forest produce, if a product,
commercially new and distinct, known to the business G
community as totally different is brought into existence by
human labour, such an article and product would cease to be
a forest-produce. The definition of this expression leaves
nothing to doubt that it would dot take within its fold an article
or thing which is totally different from, forest-produce, having
H
688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A a distinct character. May it be stated that where a word or an
expression is defined by the legislature, courts have to look
to that definition; the general understanding of it cannot be
determinative. So, what has been stated in Strouds’ Judicial
Dictionary regarding a “produce” can not be decisive.
Therefore, where a product from bamboo is commercially
B
different from it and in common parlance taken as a distinct
product, the same would not be encompassed within the
expression “forest-produce” as defined in Section 2 (4) of
the Act, despite it being inclusive in nature. that bamboo mat
is taken as a product distinct from bamboo in the commercial
C world, has not been disputed before us and rightly.”
20. It is noteworthy that in Suresh Lohiya (supra) this court made
no reference and did not advert to Forest Range Officer v. P.
Mohammed Ali (supra). In Suresh Lohiya also, we notice this Court
sought to interpret the interplay between “forest produce”, “timber”
D and “tree” and concluded that articles or products created by human
toil are not per se forest products. This court is of the opinion that the
distinction sought to be made defeats the purpose of the Act, because
illegally procured forest produce, such as sandalwood, rosewood, or other
rare species, and then worked upon, resulting in a product -predominantly
based on the essential forest produce, would escape the rigors of the
E Act. Therefore, Suresh Lohiya cannot be considered a binding authority;
its dicta should be understood as confined to the facts of that case. For
these reasons, it is held that the impugned judgment, so far as it proceeded
on the assumption that sandalwood oil is forest produce, is based on a
correct appreciation of law.
F 21. In the present case, the appellant did not dispute ownership of
the articles seized. Section 69 of the Act enacts presumption, that when
possession of a forest produce is found with someone, that it is deemed
to belong to the state (or central) government. Now, this presumption is
a rebuttable one; several decisions of this court have said that the burden
of proving the foundational facts, which will give rise to the presumption,
G
is upon the prosecution.10 In the present case, there is no contest about
the fact that the goods were seized from the premises of the appellant,
and belonged to him. The goods seized from the airport, were to be
10
Noor Agha v. State of Punjab (2008) 16 SCC 417; Bhola Singh v. State of Punjab
(2011) 1 SCC 653 and Gangadhar @ Gangaram v. State of Madhya Pradesh, judgment
H dated 5 th August, 2020 in Cr. A. No. 504/2020.
BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL v. STATE OF KERALA 689
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

shipped to overseas destinations. In these circumstances, this court is of A
the opinion that the foundational facts, i.e. possession of the forest produce,
were proved by the State.
22. The next question is whether the appellant proved that the
produce was procured properly. Their case was twofold: one that as
holder of a Central Excise licence to manufacture sandalwood oil, the B
prosecution had to fail. The appellant had sought to rely on the statutory
registers which they were bound to keep. It was also submitted that the
oil was produced by the appellant from the raw materials, i.e. red oil,
which they had purchased from many traders for which some 45 invoices
were relied upon. According to the statement made to the forest
authorities, at the time of the search and seizure, these raw materials C
were obtained in the course of 104 transactions, where smaller quantities
of red oil were purchased. PW-2, the flying squad officer of the forest
department who deposed during the trial, in the course of cross
examination stated that the cartons were kept in the open in the airport
and bore the labels of the appellant firm. The witness further stated that D
the goods were seized because it was not known where they originated
from, nor where they were bought. He also stated that the goods, i.e.
sandalwood oil cartons “were seized for the reason that documents to
show from where they came were not produced.” The appellants had
alleged that the red oil was purchased for processing from several persons,
and that particulars had been furnished to the forest authorities. PW-4 E
was silent about verification of these details; he stated in cross
examination, generally, that the addresses of the traders who sold the oil
to the appellant were provided, but incomplete. Secondly, it was urged
that the prosecution did not produce any material to support the plea that
the appellant’s information was suspect, or lacked credibility. PW-4 had F
further stated that the appellant purchased the seized goods when they
were auctioned by the state, after the applications for their release (to
the accused/appellants) were dismissed by the court. This witness also
stated that the yield of sandalwood oil is to the extent of 4% from
sandalwood.
23. There can be no dispute that sandalwood oil is a forest product. G
However, Section 27 (1) (d)- which enacts the offence- and which has
been applied in this case, points to the offender’s conscious mental state
when it enacts that whoever “knowingly receives or has in possession
any major forest produce illicitly removed from a Reserved Forest”
would be subjected to the prescribed punishment. The presumption under H
690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A Section 69 is with respect to not a conscious mental state, or a direction
by the legislature that a certain state of affairs is deemed to exist, but
with respect to ownership of the property i.e. that it “belongs to the
state, unless the contrary is proved.”
24. This is a significant aspect, because unlike some statutes11,
B the Act in the present case, does not create a presumption about a culpable
mental state of the alleged offender. Instead, the nature of the
presumption is that it relates to the ownership of the forest produce.
This important aspect has a bearing on the matter. Whether an offence
can be said to have been committed without the necessary mens rea
has often arisen for consideration. Generally, there is a presumption that
C mens rea is an essential ingredient in every offence. Yet, that presumption
can be displaced either by the phraseology of the law creating the offence
or by the subject matter with which it deals; both must be considered. 12
This court, in Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh13, in that context,
observed as follows:
D “Mens rea is an essential ingredient of a criminal offence.
Doubtless a statute may exclude the element of mens rea, but
it is a sound rule of construction adopted in England and
11
For example, Income Tax Act, 1961:
“Section 278E. (1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a
culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the court shall presume the existence of
E
such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no
such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution.
Explanation - In this sub-section, ‘culpable mental state’ includes intention, motive or
knowledge of a fact or belief in, or reason to believe, a fact.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the court
believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established
F by a preponderance of probability.”
Section 10E of the Essential Commodities Act is as follows:
“10E. Presumption of culpable mental state.
(1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental
state on the part of the accused, the court shall presume the existence of such mental
state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental
state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution.
G Explanation. In this section, “culpable mental state” includes intention, motive,
knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe, a fact.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a fact is said to be proved only when the court
believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established
by a preponderance of probability.”
12
Sherras v. De Rutzen (1895) 1 QB 918; State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George
1965 (1) SCR 123.
H 13
AIR 1966 SC 43
BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL v. STATE OF KERALA 691
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

also accepted in India to construe a statutory provision A
creating an offence in conformity with the common law rather
than against it unless the statute expressly or by necessary
implication excluded mens rea. The mere fact that the object
of the statute is to promote welfare activities or to eradicate a
grave social evil is by itself not decisive of the question
B
whether the element of guilty mind is excluded from the
ingredients of an offence. Mens rea by necessary implication
may be excluded from a statute only where it is absolutely
clear that the implementation of the object of the statute would
otherwise be defeated. The nature of the mens rea that would
be implied in a statute creating an offence depends on the C
object of the Act and the provisions thereof.”
Umashanker v. State of Chhattisgarh14 underlined the existence
of mens rea, as follows:
“7. Sections 489-A to 489-E deal with various economic
offences in respect of forged or counterfeit currency notes or D
banknotes. The object of the legislature in enacting these
provisions is not only to protect the economy of the country
but also to provide adequate protection to currency notes and
banknotes. The currency notes are, in spite of growing
accustomedness to the credit card system, still the backbone E
of the commercial transactions by the multitudes in our
country. But these provisions are not meant to punish unwary
possessors or users.
8. A perusal of the provisions, extracted above, shows that
mens rea of offences Under Sections 489-B and 489-C is F
“knowing or having reason to believe the currency notes or
banknotes are forged or counterfeit”. Without the
aforementioned mens rea selling, buying or receiving from
another person or otherwise trafficking in or using as
genuine forged or counterfeit currency notes or banknotes,
is not enough to constitute offence Under Section 489-B G
Indian Penal Code. So also possessing or even intending to
use any forged or counterfeit currency notes or banknotes is
not sufficient to make out a case Under Section 489-C in the
absence of the mens rea, noted above.”
14
(2001) 9 SCC 642 H
692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A In Raghunath Singh v. State of M.P.15 this court held that use of
the word “know” would mean that mens rea of the offender has to be
established:
“Section 368 speaks of “knowledge” when it says, “Whoever
knowing that any person has been kidnapped or has been
B abducted, wrongfully conceals or confines such person...”
The Indian Penal Code uses two different expressions in its
different parts. Sometimes the gist of the offence is dependant
on knowledge and the words “knowing” or “knowingly” are
used to indicate that knowledge as such must be proved either
by positive evidence or circumstantially before mens rea can
C be established. Sometimes (see for example Sections 212, 411,
etc), the expression “has reason to believe” is used. The words
“knowing” or “knowingly” are obviously more forceful than
the words “has reason to believe” because they insist on a
greater degree of certitude in the mind of the person who is
D said to know or to do the act knowingly. It is not enough if
the evidence establishes that the person has reason to suspect
or even to believe that a particular state of affairs existed.
When these words are used, something more than suspicion
or reason for belief is required. Before an offence under
Section 368 could be brought home it must be established
E that accused knew that the person had been kidnapped or
abducted.”
25. Therefore, in the present case, the State had to show, that the
forest produce was illicitly removed, or was illicitly in the possession of
the accused, and in either case, that the same was within his knowledge.
F This foundational fact, as previously discussed, has to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the accused has to establish, a credible
or reasonable explanation.
26. The state no doubt has led evidence to show that the goods
seized bore the labels of the appellant’s firm and further that no transport
G licence was available. However, this per se does not establish illicit
possession of forest produce within his knowledge. For a court to so
conclude, the prosecution had to, in addition, prove beyond reasonable
doubt, the foundational fact that the accused had knowingly removed
the forest produce illicitly. It is here, that the presumption under Section
H 15
1967 JLJ 234 (SC)
BHARATH BOOSHAN AGGARWAL v. STATE OF KERALA 693
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.]

69 cannot apply; it merely directs a presumption that the forest produce A
belongs to the government.
27. In the opinion of the court, the impugned judgment, by reversing
the decision of the Sessions Court, is in error. The Sessions Court had
clearly recorded that the appellant’s explanation that as L-4 Central
Excise licence holders they were absolved of any responsibility in relation B
to observance of any other law, was misplaced and wholly inadequate.
The appellant could legitimately bring into existence an excisable produce
but that did not absolve them of the liability to follow other obligations in
regard to procurement of regulated or controlled commodities, or even
other aspects relating to them, such as licensing or permissions to store,
transport them, etc. The appellant had produced documents (in the form C
of 45 invoices and receipts) to show the origin of the goods, and where
they were purchased from, to say that they were procured in 104
transactions. The question, therefore, is whether by operation of Section
27 (1) (d), the initial presumption was established. The evidence on record
showed that the cartons seized from the airport were bound to destinations D
in Germany, France, Spain etc. The State’s main argument is that there
was no prior permission, or clearance as required by the rules. Apart
from stating that the invoices and other documents could not be verified,
the State made no effort to establish, independently, in its evidence that
any such effort was made. The receipts, or primary evidence produced
by the appellant, was not exhibited in the court; nor was any evidence E
led to show that in fact, such effort to trace the sellers of the oil was
made by the State, and that the evidence furnished by the appellant was
unbelievable. In these circumstances, it could not be said that the State
had discharged its burden of proving beyond any doubt, that the appellant
had knowledge of the fact that the goods were illicit in origin. F
28. The High Court, in our opinion, fell into error, in holding that
the presumption that the seizure of forest produce belonging to the State,
automatically can result in a presumption of culpable mental state of
the accused- in other words, that seizure of the goods ipso facto meant
that the appellant had conscious knowledge about their illicit nature or G
origin, or that the accused’s inability to account for a transit pass, implied
that they procured the goods illegally, thus attracting Section 27. Such a
leap of reasoning is not justified, given that the appellants had furnished
a series of documents explaining how they had sourced the oil in question.
The State’s absence of diligence in producing those materials (which
H
694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 8 S.C.R.

A were in its possession) and proving that they were without credibility,
cannot result in a conviction. Nor could the court have concluded adversely
that the appellant’s participation in the auction of the seized goods and
their purchase, implicated them. There can be several reasons for such
a conduct, including their wish to fulfil contractual obligations.
B 29. This court is of the opinion that the interference by the High
Court, with the acquittal recorded by the Sessions Court, in this case, is
not warranted. Ghure Lal (supra) no doubt, reviewed the consistent
law declared that an appellate court should not interfere with the findings
of the trial court merely because it prefers a plausible view, unless there
are compelling reasons for it to do so. It is precisely in such cases,
C where appellate interference is unwarranted, that the State is entitled to
appeal to the High Court under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. 16
However, the facts reveal otherwise: one, the High Court concluded
incorrectly that the result of Section 69 is a presumption that places the
reverse burden of proof in respect of an offence - no such inference can
D be drawn from the plain text of that provision; and two, Section 27 (1)
(d) requires conscious knowledge, of the nature of the goods, i.e. their
illicit origin, which compels proof by the prosecution, beyond reasonable
doubt. As explained earlier, the materials on the record show that the
evidence in the possession of the defence and furnished to the state,
was not even produced in court, nor was the primary evidence to
E substantiate the state’s contentions in that regard, proved.
30. In view of the above discussion, this court is of opinion that
the impugned judgment is in error. It is accordingly set aside. The appeal
succeeds and is allowed, but with no order on costs.

F
Divya Pandey Appeal allowed.

G 16
The relevant provision is as follows:
“378. Appeal in case of acquittal.
(1) Save as otherwise provided in sub- section (2) and subject to the provisions of sub-
sections (3) and (5), the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor
to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal
passed by any Court other than a High Court or an order of acquittal passed by the
H Court of Session in revision.”