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Supreme Court of India

BRIJENDRA SINGHversusSTATE OF U.P. & ORS.

Citation
1980 INSC 227
Decided
25 November 1980
Disposal
Case Allowed

Holding

A transfer is in 'good faith' if it is honest, non‑fraudulent and satisfies the statutory conditions; proof of an impelling necessity is not a prerequisite for the benefit of proviso (b).

Summary

Brijendra Singh, an army officer, owned 44 acres of land in Uttar Pradesh and sold two parcels of 12.5 acres each in 1971 to raise funds for building a house in New Delhi. The Prescribed Authority declared the 25.96 acres surplus under the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling of Land Holding Act, 1960 (as amended). The Appellate Authority and the High Court rejected Singh's claim that the sales were protected by proviso (b) of section 5(6), holding that he had not shown an "impelling necessity" for the sales. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of "good faith" in the proviso and held that it merely requires an honest, non‑fraudulent transfer meeting the statutory conditions of adequate consideration, irrevocable instrument and non‑benami nature, without the need to prove a pressing necessity. Consequently, the two sales were held to fall within the exemption of proviso (b) and the appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

  • Whether a transfer of land made between 24 January 1971 and 8 June 1973, satisfying the statutory conditions of adequate consideration, irrevocable instrument and non‑benami nature, can be held not to be in 'good faith' merely because the transferor fails to prove an impelling necessity for the sale.
  • Interpretation of the expression 'good faith' in proviso (b) to sub‑section (6) of section 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling of Land Holding Act, 1960.

Legislation cited

Subjects

good faithland ceilingUttar Pradesh Ceiling Acttransfer of landbenami transactionadequate considerationirrevocable instrumentimpelling necessityspecial leave petitioncivil appeal

Judgment

    •                                                                             281

                                   BRIJENDRA SINGH                                          A
                                               v.
                                 STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
                                    November 25, 1980
                   fR. S. SARKARJA AND E. S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J                            B

           Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling .of Land Holding Act, 1960 (Act l
         of 1961)-Section 5(6) proviso (b) Effect of the Amending Act 1972 (Act
         18 of 1973) "Good Faith"-True nteaninR and scope of.

            The Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling of Land Holding Act 1960 was
         amended by the Amending Act 1972. Section 5(6) proviso (b) of the Act              C
         States:

,)              "(6) Jn determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-holders,
             any transfer of land made after the t\\'enty-fourth day of January,
             1971, which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus
             land under this act, shall be ignored and not taken into account :
                                                                                            f)
             Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to-

               (a) .........••..•.•
                 (b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the prescribed
             authority to be in good faith and for ndequate consideration and
             under an irrevocable instrument not being a benami transaction or
             for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder of other                E
             members of his family.

         The appellant so1J 25 acres of land for consideration by registered deeds
         dated 2nd January and 9th August, 1971. The Prescribed Authority under·
         the U.P. Itnposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 issued notice to
         the appellant to sho\': cause why 25.96 acres land from his holding be not
         declared surplus. The appellant filed objections stating that (i) the entire       F
         land was unirrigated; (ii) there was no source of irrigation in the fields and
         he had made two sales of 25 acres for acquiring a site and constructing a
         residential house. The Prescribed Authority rejected the ob1ections of the
•    •   appellant and declared the said !and as surplus.

               Aggrieved by the said order the appellant went in appeal before the          G
         Appellate Authority, who, partly allowed the appeal. The appellant filed a
         \Vrit petition in the High Court, which was dis1nissed in limine. By special
         leave petition, the point for consideration was whether a sale made by a
         tenureMholder on a date between January 24, 1971 and June 8, 1973 for
          adequate consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a be~
         nami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure holder
         or other 1nembers of his family, can be held to be not in 'good faith' wi~~in
          the contempiation of proviso (b) to subMsection (6) of section 5 of the_ Ced!ng
          ~-\ct, merely because the tenure-holder ha<l failed to. prove the satisfact1.on
          of the Prescribed Authori'.y or the Appellate Authonty that the purpose Ior
       288                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A     which the sale was made, did not constitute an impelling necessity for the
      saJe.

         Allowing the appeal,
         IIELD : It is clear that the crucial date on or fron1 V.'hich no tenure-tclder
     is enti1'1ed to hold land in excess of the ceiling area is June 8, 1973. Tt is
     n cardinal canon of construction that an exPression which has no uniform
 B   pr.ecisely fixed meaning, takes its colour, light and content from the context.
                                                                         [293E-F, HJ
         The benefit of clause (b) of the proviso to sub·section (6) is availab1e to
     a transfer made in good faith, that is, to a bona fide transfer whereby the
     tcnure·holder genuinely and irrevocably transfers all right, title and interest       )
     in the land in favour of the transferee, in the ordinary course of managen1rnt
C    of his affairs and which is not a co1Iusive arrangement, or device or snbter·
     tuge to enable the tenure-holder to continue to hold the surplus land or any
     reserved interest in presenti or in futuro therein, (or merely to convert it into
     cash), and thus circumvent the ban under section 5(1) of the Ceiling Act,
     In order to be entitled to the benefit of proviso (b) of Sec. 5(6), a tran<fer
     made in good faith, must satisfy the further conditions, (ii) to (iv), enume·
     rated in the proviso (b). [294C-F]
         ()nee it is established by the transferring tenure holder that the transfer
     in question effected in the course of ordinary management of bis affairs, was
     made for adequate consideration and he had genuinely, absolutely and irre·
     vocably divested himself of all right, title and interest (including cultivatory
     possession) in the land in favour of the transferee, the onus under Explana-
     tion II, in the absence of any circumstances suggestive of collusion, or an
     intention or design to defraud or circumvent the Ceiling Act, on the tenure
     holder to show that the transfer was effected in good faith will stand dis.
     charged. It will not be necessary for the tenure to prove further that the
     transfer was made for an impelling need or to raise money for meeting a
     pressing legal necessity. [294G-H, 295AJ
         The other conditions of Proviso (b) to Sec. 5(6) being satisfied, the Appel-
     Jate Authority was not justified in holding that the sales were not in 'good
:F   faith' merely on the ground that the construction of a residential house in
     New Delhi did not in bis opinion constitute a compe11ing necessity for the
     sales. Moreover, in the instant case, the tenure-holder at t'he material time
     was serving in the army in the rank of Brigadier which implies that he \vas
     nearing the age of retirement from army service. It is not shown that he had
     any other house where he could Jive. He had, in fact, borro\.\ed part of the
     cost of construction from the Governmnent. There was therefore nothing sinis·
                                                                                               .   '

{;   ter in his intention if he arranged to sell his lands to other cultivators to raise
     funds to acquire a site and build a residential house in New Delhi where he
     wouJd live in reasonable comfort after retirement from army service.
                                                                    t295G-H, 296A-DJ

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURJSD!CTION : Civil Appeal No. 2726 of
     1980.
H       Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Onkr dated
     23-5-1978 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No.
     4497/78.
             BR!JENDRA SINGH     v. U.P. STATE (Sarkaria, J.)            289
•
        Manoj Swarup and Miss Lalita Kohli for the Appellant.
        O. P. Rana and Mrs. Shobha Dixit for the Respondent.
         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        SARKARIA, J .-This is an appeal by special leave against a judgment
    dated May 23, 1978 of the High Court of Allahabad. The material
    fact• giving rise to this appeal are as under :
         The Prescribed Authority under Section 10(2) of the U.P. Impo-
    sition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 (Act No. 1 of 1961)
    (as amended by U.P. Act 18 of 1973) issued notice to the appellant
    to show cause why 25 .96 acres out of 44 acres of irrigated land from          c
    his holding be not declared surplus. In response to this notice, the
    appellant filed objections stating, inter alia, (i) that the entire land was
    unirrigated; (ii) that there was no source of irrigation in field
    Nos. 1373, 79 and 80; (iii) that the appellant had made two sales of
    12.50 acres each, 25 acres in all, for a valid necessity, namely, to
                                                                                   ()
    rais2 funds for acquiring a site and constructing a residential house in
    New Delhi. (a) The appellant being an Army Officer in the rank of
    Brigadier, had after obtaining permission on January 2, 1971 from
    the Army Headquarters, sold 12.50 acres of the land for a considera-
    tion of Rs. 25,000/- to one Inderjit Singh by a registered deed, dated
     August 9, 1971, and handed over the possession to the vendee; (b)             E
    Similarly, after obtaining the pennission of the Army Headquarters
    on January 2, 1971, he sold 12.50 acres of the land for Rs. 25,000/-
    to one Gurjeet Singh by another registered sale-deed and handed over
    the possession to the vendee. Since the money raised by these sales was
    insufficient to purchase a building site and constructing a house
    then~on, the appellant also raised a loan of Rs. 50,000/- from the Gov-        F
    ernment for that purpose.

        The Prescribed Authority by its order dated June 26, 1977, reject-
    ed the objections of the appellant and declared 25.96 acres of the land
•   as surplus.
                                                                                   G
         Aggrieved by the order of the Prescribed Authority, the appellant
    went in appeal before the Appellate Authority (District Judge, Ram-
    pur), who, by his ·order dated December 8, 1977, partly allowed the
    appeal, holding that the (lntire land was unirrigated and accordingly
    declared 16.94 acres of unirrigated land as surplus.     The District
    Judge has not held that the aforesaid sales made in favour of Inderjit         H
    Singh and Gurjeet Singh by two sale deeds of 12.50 acres each, were
    fictitious or Benami, nor has he found that the vendees were not in
            290                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1981] 2 S.C.R.   •
     A     possession of the said land. The District Judge seems to have denied
          the prot_ection of Proviso (b) of sub-section ( 6) of Section 5 of the
          Ceiling Act to the said two sales, merely for the reason that "the appel-
          lant had failed to prove any impelling necessity for building a house
          and that he could not do without a house in New Delhi'', and there-
          fore, "it could not be held that the sales in question were not effected
          to avoid the Ceiling Law."
              To impugn this decision of the District Judge, in so far as he did
          not uphold the aforesaid sales relating to 25 acres of land, the appel-
          lant filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the
          High Court, which dismissed the same in limine by its order, dated
 ,C       May 23, 1978. Hence this appeal by special leave.
             The question of law that has been mooted before us is, whether a
         sale made by a tenure-holder on a date between January 24, 1971 and
         June 8, 1973 for adequate consideratiou and under an irrevocable ins-
         trument, not being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred
          benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family, can be
         held to be not in 'good faith' within the contemplation of proviso (b)
         to sub-section (6) of Section 5 of the Ceiling Act, merely because
         the tenure-holder had failed to prove to the satisfaction of the Pres-
         cribed Authority or the Appellate Authority that the purpose for
         which the sale was made, did not constitute an impelling necessity for
         the sale.
             Answer to this question tnms on a correct interpretation of the ex-
         pression "good faith" used in the aforesaid proviso (b).
              Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contends that the
          District Judge had committed an error of law inasmuch as he held that
          in order to get t11e protection of the aforesaid Proviso (b), it is essen-
         tial for the tenure-holder to prove that the sale was made for some
          pressing valid necessity. It is emphasised that this is not the require-
         ment of that provision; that the expression "good faith" only means
         that it should not be a benami or fraudulent transaction in which the
         transferor continues to be the beneficial owner or right-holder of the
.G       land on the crucial date, viz. June 8, 1973.
           It is emphasised that in the instant case, it was not disputed that
       the sales were made to raise funds for purchasing a building site and
       constructing a house thereon in New Delhi, that the authenticity of tbe
       documentary evidence produced by the appellant to establish that fact
       W'as not doubted by the Appellate Authorit,y; nor the adequacy of the           .
       sale considerations, nor the fact that the appellant had parted with
      .possession of the sold lands: that in this situation, by no stretch of
                BR!JENJ)RA SINGH   v. U.P. STATE (Sarkaria, I.)            291
•
        reasoning, it could be said that the sale was not bona fide or in good        A
        faith.
            On the other hand, Shri 0. P. Rana stontly dclcnds the finding
        of the Appellate Authority (District Judge), which has been upheld by
        the High Court, that the sale coul<l not be said to be in 'good faith'
        merely because no impelling necessity for making it had been                  B
        established.
           Before <lcaling with these co11tentions, let us have a look at       the
        material part of sub-section (1) of Section 5, which reads thus:

                 .. (l) On and from the conunencement of the Uttar Pra-
             desh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment)
                                                                                      c
             Act, 1972, no tenure-holder shall be entitled to hold in the
             aggregate throughout Uttar Pradesh, any land in excess of
)            the ceiling area applicable to him.
                Explanation !.-In detennining the ceiling area applica-
             ble to a tenure-holder, all land held by him in his own right,           0
             whether in his own name, or ostensibly in the name of any
             other person, shall be taken into account."
                 Explanation II is not material for our present    purpose.
             The Amendment Act, 1972 (Act No. 18 of 1973) (for short call-            E
         ed the Ceiling Act) came into force with effect from June 8, 1973. It
         is clear that the crucial date on or from whifh no. tenure-holder is
         entitled to hold land in excess of the ceiling area is June 8, J 973.
         Keeping this in view, let us now examine sub-section (6), the relevan\
          part of which reads as under : -
              " ( 6) In determining the ceiling area applicable to a tenure-          F
              holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-fourth
              of January, 1971, which but for the transfer would have

-   ~
              been declared surplus land under this Act, shall be ignored
              and not taken into account :
                  Provided that nothing in this   sub-section   shall   apply             G
              to--
                  {a) ........................................ .
                  (b) a transfer proved to the satisfaction of the pres-
              cribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate con-
              ~ideration and under an irrevocable instrument not being a                  H
              benami transaction or for immediate or deferred benefit of
              !he tenure-holder or other members of bis family.
     292                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A        Explanation ! .. ..................... · · ...... · · · · · ·
        Explanation 11.-The burden of proving that a case falls
        within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the party
        claiming its benefit."

B       It will be seen that when sub-section ( 6) of Section 5 provides
    that in determining the ceiling area and surplus area, any transfer
    of land which but for the transfer would have been declared surplus
    land under the Act, shall be ignored, it proceeds on the presumption
    that the tenure-holders being aware of the resolution or manifesto
    adopted by the ruling All India Congress Party on January 24, 1971,
    and of the consensus at the Chief Minister Conference held in July
    1972, to take measures to lower the ceiling on agricultural holdings,
    might make attempts to defraud, defeat and evade the ceiling 1aw,
    then in offing, by making fictitious transfers of land in favour of other    (
    persons.

D        The presumption which underlies the main provision in Section
    ~ ( 6) can be displaced, as the Legislature has itself indicated, on proof
    of the conditions set out in Proviso (b). Although the strength of
    the aforesaid presumption and the nature and quantum required to
    satisfy the conditions of Proviso (b) may vary accon:ling to the
    circumstances of the particular case, yet it can be said as a general
E   proposition that in the case of transfers made prior to the decision
     of the Chief Minister's Conference in July 1972 to lower the ceiling
    the burden under Explanation II on the tenure-holder to establish the
    facts bringing his case within clause (b) of the Proviso, would be
    lighter than the one in the case of a transfer made after the aforesaid
     decision in July 1972.
F
        In order to bring his case within the purview of Proviso (b) , the
    tenure-holder has to show-
            ( i) that the transd'er has been made in 'good faith';
            (ii) that it is a transfer for adequate consideration;
G           (iii) that it has been made under an irrevocable instrument:
                 and
            (iv) that it is not a henami transaction or for immediate
                 or deferred benefit of the tenure-holder or other
                                                                                 •
                 members of bis family.
R        There is no dispute in regard to the connotation, construction and      •
     existence of ingredients (ii), (iii) and (iv) in the instant case. Con-
     troversy, however centres round the true meaning and scope of the
              BRIJENDRA SINGH    v. U.P. STATE (Sarkaria, /.)            293


     expression 'good faith' within the contemplation of clause (b) of the        A
     Proviso. In the instant case, the Appellate Authority appeats to have
 •   taken the view-a view which has been upheld by the High Court-·
     that a transfer cannot be said tO, have been made in 'good faith'
     merely because it has been honestly or genuinely made and satisfies
     the aforesaid conpitions (ii), (iii) and (iv), unless it is proved further
     that it was made for a valid pressing necessity.                             B

         The thrust of the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant
     is that the expression 'good faith' within the contemplation of Proviso
      (b) only means that the transfer is honestly and genuinely made,
     and is not designed to circumvent the Ceiling Act or defeat its object,
     and that this expression cannot be legitimately stretched so as to           C
     import into Proviso (b), as a requirement of law, an additional obli-
     gation to prove that the transfer was made for a pressing necessity,

•    or valid personal need of the transferor. The argument is not devoid
     of merit.
         The expression 'good faith' has not been defined in the Ceiling          D
     Act. The expression has several shades of meaning. Jn the popular
     sense, the phrase 'in good faith' simply means "honestly, without


-    fraud, collusion, or deceit; really, actually. without pretence and with-
     out intent to assist or act in furtherance of a fraudulent or otherwise
     unlawful scheme". (See Words & Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol.
     l 8A, page 91). Although the meaning of "good faith" may vary in             E
     the context of different statutes, subjects and situations, honest intenb
     free from taint of fraud of fraudulent design, is a constant element of
     its connotation. Even so, the quality and quantity of the honesty
     requisite for constituting 'good faith' is conditioned by the context
     and object of the statute in which this term is employed. It is a
     cardinal canon o,f construction that an expression which has no uni-         F
     form, precisely fixed meaning, takes its colour, light and content from
     the context.
         The meaning and scope of the expression 'good faith' is therefore,
-(   to be considered in the light of the scheme and purpose of Section 5,
     in general, and the context of Proviso (b) to sub-section (6), in parti-     G
     cular. We have already noticed that the primary object of the Ceiling
     Act, as adumbrated in the pivotal provision in Section 5 (I) is to
     prohibit and disentitle a tenure-holder from holding land in the
     aggregate in the State of Uttar Pradesh, in excess of the ceiling area,
     in his own right, whether in his own name, or ostensibly in the
     name of any other person. The ceiling area and snrplus land of a             H
     tenure-holder under the Ceiling Act, as already mentioned, are to
     be determined as on June 8, 1973 when the U.P. (Amendment) Act.
     3-57 SCI/81
      294                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1981j 2 S.C.R.

A    No. 18 of 1973 came into force. A transfer, therefore, made after
     January 24, 1971 which is designed to serve as a cloak for retention
     of a right or interest of the transferor in the ostensibly transferred
     land in excess of the ceiling area, even on or after June 8, l 973,
                                                                                 •
     will be patently not in 'good faith'. But the Proviso (b) to sub-
     section ( 6) of Section 5 extends the negative aspect of the concept
B    'good faith' a little further by indicating, that even if the transfer is
     not an ostensible transfer and the transferor divests himself of all
     interest and rights in presenti in the transferred land, bnt reserves
     some benefit in futuro for himself or other members of his family,
     then also the transfer will be not in 'good faith'. A transfer solely
     for the purpose of converting surplus land into cash without any kind
 c   of need (not to be confused with legal necessity) may also lack good
     faith.

        Broadly speaking, the benefit of clause (b) of the Proviso to sub-
   section. ( 6) is available to a transfer made in good faith, that is, to
   a bona fide transfer whereby the tenure-holder genuinely and irrevo-
                                                                                 •
 D cably transfers all right, title and interest in the land in favour of
   the transferee, in the ordinary course of management, of his
   affairs and which is not a collusive arrangement, or device or
   subterfuge to enable the tenure-holder to continue to hold the surplus
   land or any reserved interest in presenti or in futuro, therein (or               •
   merely to convert it into cash), and thus circumvent the ban under
E Section 5 (1) of the Ceiling Act. In order to be entitled to the bene-
   fit of Proviso (b), a transfer made in good faith, must satisfy the
   further conditions, (ii) to (iv), enumerated in the Proviso (bl. The
   positive conditions laid down in Proviso (b) are : that the transfer
   should be for adequate consideration; that it should have been made
 F under an irrevocable instrument. The negative conditions set out
   in clause (b) of the Proviso are : that it must not be a benami
   transaction; that it must not be for immediate or deferred benefit of
   the transferring tenure-holder or other members of his family. These
    tests or conditions (ii), (iii) and (iv) provided in Proviso (b) may

 G
    not by themselves be conclusive to bold that the transfer was in
    'good  faith'. For instance, another important test for judging the
    genuineness or otherwise of a sale would be whether or not cultivatory
                                                                                 '   -
    possession and enjoyment of the land has passed under the sale to
    the vendee.        Even so, once it is established by the transferring
    tenure-bolder that the transfer in question effected in the course of
    ord!nary management of his affairs, was made for adequate considera-
 H tion and he bas genuinely, absolutely and irrevocably divested himself
    of all right, title and interest (including cultivatory possession) in the
   land in favour of the transferee, the onus under Explanation TI. in
                   BRIJENDRA SINGH    v. U.P. STATE (Sarkaria, J.)           295


           the absence of any circumstances suggestive of collusion, or an inten-
           tion or design to defraud or circumvent the Ceiling Act, on the tenure.    A
           holder to show that the transfer was effected in 'good faith', will
           stand discharged, and it will not be necessary for the tenure-holder
            to prove further that the transfer was made for an impelling need
           or to raise money for meeting a pressing legal necessity. Although
            proof of the fact that a transfer was made for a valid pressing
                                                                                      B
           necessity, may highlight or strengthen the inference in favour of the
           genuineness of the transfer, it is not an indispensable constituent o~
           'good faith', nor is the proof of legal necessity requisite, as a matter
           of law, to enable a tenure-bolder to avail of the br,nefit of clause (b)
            of the Proviso. It may be remembered that at the time when such
           a transfer was made, there was no legal restriction on his power to        c
           alienate the whole or any part of his holding. In other words, at
            the time when such a transfer was made it was not unlawful, even
)
            if it were made without any pressing necessity. It became unlawful
            by the subsequent enactment of a legal fiction introduced in Section
             5 (6) of the O~iling Act (No. 18 of 1973) with retrospective effect
            from January 24, 1971. Even so, under this statutory fiction, a           D
            transfer of land made after January 24, 1971 does not become wholly
             void for all purposes; it can be ignored and would not be taken into
             account in determining the ceiling area of the transferring tenure-
            holder for purposes of the Ceiling Act, and that too, if the following
             two conditions are satisfied:
                   (a) that the land but for the transfer would have been             E
                       declared surplus land under tbe U.P. Act 18 of
                       1973; and
                   (b) that the transfer is not of a kind covered by Pro-
                       viso (b) to Section 5(6) of the Act.
                                                                                   F
     -~-   This being the position, once a transfer is shown to be bo11a fide and
           further satisfies all the other positive and negative conditions laid
           down in the Proviso (b) to Section 5 ( 6), there is no justification
    ,      in law to stretch the legal fiction further and to spell out from the . /
           expression 'good faith' an additional requirement of proving pressing
           necessity for the transfer before the enture-holder is entitled to the  G.
    ·1     benefit of the aforesaid Proviso (b).
               In the instant case, the two sales in question have not only been
           found to be genuine and for adequate consideration, but it has been
           further accepted that the sales were made by the tenure-holder to meet
           an ordinary need of every house-holder i.e. for raising funds for con-

-          structing a residential house in New Delhi. The sales have been held
           by the Appellate Authority to be not in 'good faith' merely on the




                                                     ..   ,
     296                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1981] 2 S.C.R.

A   ground that the construction of a residential house in New Delhi bv
    the tenure-holder could not, in the opinion of the Authority, be said
    to be an "impending" (impelling?) necessity. This approach and
    finding is manifestly erroneous.
        As discussed above, in order to get the protection of Proviso (b)
B   to Section 5 ( 6), it is not legally necessary to proviso, in addition to
    the conditions set out in the Proviso (b), that the sales were for
    valid pressing necessity. Even so, in the instant case, it had been
    shown that the sales were made to raise funds for building a resi-
    dential house in New Delhi which was obviously a valid necessity.
    The necessity and its urgency was to be judged from the tenurc-
c   hnlder's point of view. The tenure-holder at the material time was
    serving in the Army in the rank of Brigadier which implies that he
    was nearing the age of retin;ment from Army Service. It is not shown
    that he had any other house where he could live. He had, in fact,           (
    borrowed part of the cost of construction from the Government.
    There was therefore nothing sinister in his intention if he arranged
D   to sell his lands to other cultivators to raise funds to acquire a site
    and build a residential house in New Delhi where he would live in
    rea~onable comfort after retirement from Army service.

        For all the foregoing reasons, we allow this appeal, set aside the
    orders of the High Court and of the Appellate Authority and the Pres-
E   crihcd Authority in so far as they relate to these two sales in question
    of 12.5 acres each, and hold that both these sales were entitled to
    the exemption of Proviso (b) to Section 5 ( 6) of the Ceiling Act.
    The Prescribeµ Authority is, therefore, directed not to ignore these
    two transfers, but after taking them into account determine afresh the
    ceiling area of the appellant. We make it clear that the Prescribed
F   Authority shall determine the ceiling area and surplus area of the.
    appellant on the basis that the whole of the land held hy the tenure-
    holder (appellant) on the crncial date was unirrigated land, as the
    decision of the Appellate Authority (which was upheld by the High
    Court) on that issue has become res iudicata.
G      In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs
    of this appeal.
       These, then, are the reasons for our Order dated November 13,
    1980, whereby we had allowed this appeal.

H                                                            Appeal allowed.
    N.K.A.


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