Holding

The Court held that the applicant failed to demonstrate sufficient cause for the 610‑day delay and therefore dismissed the application for condonation of delay.

Summary

The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of a 610‑day delay in filing a first appeal under Section 85 of the Employees' State Insurance Act against an order of the ESI Court, Vadodara dated 28‑12‑2023. The corporation claimed the delay was caused by the in‑cognizance of the order by the then‑officer, his transfer, and the time taken to obtain the certified copy of the order. The Employees State Insurance Corporation opposed, contending that no sufficient cause was shown. The High Court examined the statutory requirement of "sufficient cause" and held that the explanations offered were mere excuses, not a credible justification for such a long delay. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the Court dismissed the condonation application and refused registration of the first appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the delay of 610 days in filing the first appeal can be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether the reasons given by the applicant constitute "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay.

Legislation cited

Employees State Insurance Acts. 75, s. 85
Limitation Act, 1963s. 5

Subjects

condonation of delayLimitation Actsufficient causeEmployees' State Insurance Actfirst appealjudicial discretionprocedural law

Judgment

C/CA/5582/2025 ORDER DATED: 09/06/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 5582 of
2025

In F/FIRST APPEAL/32983/2025

==========================================================
M/S. OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD.
Versus
EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION & ANR.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR AKSHAT KHARE(5912) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR SACHIN D VASAVADA(3342) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 2
==========================================================

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI

Date : 09/06/2026

ORDER
1. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties.

2. The present application, invoking Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963, seeks condonation of an inordinate delay
of 610 days in preferring the captioned First Appeal filed u/s
85 of the ESI Act against the impugned order dated
28.12.2023 passed by the learned ESI Court No.2 at Vadodara
in ESI Application No.13 of 2011.

3. Learned advocate appearing for the applicant in order to
explain the delay, would mainly argue that the officer in
charge of the appellant did not take any cognizance of the
order within the stipulated time period and it has caused
immense loss to the appellant. He would further submit that

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two contradictory orders have been passed on identical facts;
one by ESI Court at Vadodara which is impugned in this
matter and another the ESI Court at Ahmedabad, which has
accepted the application filed by the appellant u/s 75 of the
ESI Act and therefore, to clear the anomaly or inconsistency
in the orders, first appeal is required to be filed. He would
further submit that therefore, this Court should take liberal
approach by condoning the delay and thereby, should give
chance to the applicant to put its case on merit.

3.1 Merely upon above submission, learned advocate for the
applicant prays to allow this application by condoning the
delay and to register the First Appeal.

4. Learned advocate appearing for the respondent No.2 did
not appear despite rule is served.

4.1 Learned advocate Mr. Vasavada for the respondent No.1
heavily opposed the application by arguing that there is no
reason much less sufficient reason to condone the delay. He
would further submit that except para 2 of the application, no
other reasons are pleaded which could be considered as
sufficient reasons. He would further submit that if the officer
of the appellant in his lame lethargy did not take any
cognizance, it would not be a reason to condone the delay. To
meet with the submission that two ESI courts have passed two
different and contradictory orders, learned advocate Mr.
Vasavada would submit that the ESI Court at Ahmedabad did
not accept the application filed by the appellant, but rather
remanded the matter back for fresh consideration, which,

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nonetheless, cannot be considered as a matter in connection
with the impugned order.

4.2 Upon above submissions, learned advocate Mr.
Vasavada prays to dismiss the petition.

5. Having heard learned advocates for both the sides and
applying thoughtful consideration to the present application,
what could be noticeable that except para 2 of the application,
no other paragraphs demonstrate any reason much less
sufficient reason to condone the delay. Para 2 reads as
under:-

“2. The Applicant states that that the impugned
common judgment was passed by the Ld. Employees
State Insurance Court No.2, Vadodara, on 28.12.2023
and the certified copy of the order was applied on
15.04.2024. The said certified copy of order was ready
on 23.04.2024. Thereafter, the said order was
forwarded to the applicant by its advocate. It is
specifically stated that the concerned officer who was
the then in-charge of subject matter had not taken
any cognizance of impugned order. Thereafter, the
said officer was transferred in June 2025 and the
charge was taken over by present officer [who has
deposed in present affidavit being authorized by
Competent Authority]. When the respondent ESIC had
sent reminder letter dated 21.08.2025 for compliance
of impugned order, then only present officer had got
knowledge of impugned order. It is then present
officer has forwarded the case papers to its concerned
department and legal office and other competent
authority at headquarters and then the applicant has
decided to file present appeal against the said order
before the High Court of Gujarat. Thereafter, the said
case papers was sent to the concerned Advocate in
25/09/2025 for filing appeal before Hon'ble Gujarat

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High Court. Further time is consumed for retrieving
old records of office files as well as from the court.
Thus the applicant had filed present First Appeal
within application for condonation of delay in filing
First Appeal.”

6. As far as delay has been sought to be condoned, under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, let refer section 5 as
under:-

“5. Extension of prescribed period in certain
cases.—
Any appeal or any application, other than an
application under any of the provisions of Order
XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908), may be admitted after the prescribed
period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the
court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring
the appeal or making the application within such
period.

Explanation.—The fact that the appellant or the
applicant was misled by any order, practice or
judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or
computing the prescribed period may be sufficient
cause within the meaning of this section.”

7. The applicant was obliged to satisfactorily demonstrate
and explicate the colossal delay and to convince the Court
that sufficient cause existed for not preferring the appeal /
application or moving the requisite application within the
statutorily prescribed period. Ordinarily, the Courts adopt a
liberal approach while considering applications for
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
provided that the delay is duly attributable to sufficient cause.
Delay cannot be condoned by a mere invocation of “liberal

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approach,” “justice-oriented approach,” or “substantial
justice.” These oft-quoted expressions cannot be deployed to
jettison or emasculate the substantive law of limitation.

8. Rule of limitation is based upon principles of sound
public policy and principles of equity. Indeed expression
'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to
advance substantial justice. This proposition comes into
picture when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is
imputable to party seeking condonation of delay. Whether
explanation furnished would constitute 'sufficient cause' or
not will depend on facts of each case and there cannot be
straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation
furnished for delay caused in taking steps. While considering
the matter, the Court is also required to consider all the fact
that why party has not taken steps within time prescribed.
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking
steps within the time prescribed time, valuable right has
accrued to other party which should not lightly be defeated by
condoning delay in routine like manner.

9. Theory of liberal approach should be adjudicated on
theory of due diligence. In the present case, length of delay is
610 days. It is quite long delay and on going through
application as well as arguments, it remains unexplained.
They are propelled by the applicant, it does not seem to be
germane one and none of the reasons prevented the applicant
from filing FA within time period. It is to be remembered that

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pleadings and reasons are not backed out by any documentary
evidence.

9.1 If we go through para 2 of the application, it pleaded
that certified copy of the impugned order was ready on
23.4.2024, which was forwarded to the applicant by its
advocate. However, the officer in charge of the subject
matter has not taken any cognizance of the impugned order
and therefore, said officer was transferred in June, 2025 and
charge was taken over by present officer. Nonetheless, even
if, it is accepted, the new officer has taken charge in June
2025 and the application is preferred only on 16.10.2025 and
there is no explanation that why even further 04 months’ time
has been taken.

10. According to this Court, the applicant has failed to
establish any sufficient reasons which has prevented them to
file FA within stipulated time period.

11. Recently, in the case of State of Odisha & Ors. Vs
Managing Committee of Namatara Girls High Schools
2026 INSC 148, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring
to various authorities on the subject matter in paras 17 to 21
21 are held as under :-
“17. Indeed, one of us [Dipankar Datta] in Sheo Raj
Singh v. Union of India 14 authoring the judgment
for a coordinate Bench adopted the view taken in
Katiji (supra), Ramegowda (supra) and a host of
other decisions following the same while not
interfering with an order of condonation of delay
passed by the relevant high court. However, it was

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observed that a distinction ought to be drawn
between an 'explanation' and an 'excuse' that is
proffered as cause for condonation of delay. It was
also emphasized that a different approach has to be
adopted while this Court is considering an
application for condonation of delay in presentation
of an appeal/application and when it sits in appeal
over a discretionary order of the high court
granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the
case of the former, whether to condone or not
would be the only question whereas in the latter,
whether there has been proper exercise of
discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for
condonation has to be examined.
18. However, what perhaps remained unnoticed
in any of the decisions post Katiji (supra) and
Ramegowda (supra) adopting a liberal approach is
the exasperation and consequent lament expressed
by none other than Hon'ble M.N. Venkatachaliah,
CJI. in course of authoring a brief order in
Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bombay v. Amateur
Riders Club, Bombays and admonishing officers of
the "revenue" in not acting with promptitude. This
order was made within six years of the decision in
Ramegowda (supra). We can do no better than
quoting the same in its entirety hereunder:
1. We have heard Shri S.C. Manchanda,
learned senior counsel for the Revenue.
2. This special leave petition filed on
November 16, 1993 is delayed by 264 days.
For quite some time in the past, this Court has
been making observations as to the grave
prejudice caused to public interest by appeals
brought on behalf of the Government being
lost on the point of limitation, Such
observations have been made for over a few
years in the past. But there seems to be no
conspicuous improvement as is apparerit in
the present petition which is flied in November
1993. The explanation for the delay, had better
be set out In petitioner's own words:

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"(g) The Advocate-on-Record got the special
leave petition drafted from the drafting
Advocate and sent the same for approval to the
Board on June 24, 1993 along with the case
file.
(h) The Board returned the case file to the
Advocate-on-Record on July 9, 1993 who re-
sent the same to the Board on September 20,
1993 requesting that draft SLP was not
approved. by the Board. The Board after
approving the draft SLP sent this file to CAS
on October 1, 1993."
3. This explanation is incapable of furnishing a
judicially acceptable ground for condonation of
delay. After the earlier observations of this
Court made in several cases in the past, we
hoped that the matters might Improve. There
seems to be no visible support for this
optimism, There is a point beyond which even
the courts cannot help a litigant even if the
litigant is Government which is itself under the
shackles of bureaucratic indifference. Having
regard to the law of limitation which binds
everybody, we cannot find any way of granting
relief. It is true that Government should not be
treated as any other private litigant as, indeed,
in the case of the former the decisions to
19. Reading Ramegowda (supra) and Amateur
Riders (supra), one after the other, leaves none in
doubt that it did not take much time for this Court
to lose hope. It is absolutely clear that the law was
laid down in Ramegowda (supra), following Katiji
(supra), with much optimism that matters would
improve. Their Lordships, however, found no
visible support for such optimism and the Court's
patience having been tested to the extreme limit,
held that there is a point beyond which even the
courts cannot help a litigant even if the litigant
labouring under the shackles of bureaucratic
indifference is the Government.
20. We have found the State of Odisha to be utterly

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lethargic, tardy and indolent not only before the
High Court but also before this Court.
Notwithstanding that its appeal was dismissed as
time-barred by the High Court, this Court has been
approached by the State of Odisha four months
after expiry of the period of limitation.
21. Condonation of delay cannot be claimed as a
matter of right. It is entirely the discretion of the
Court whether or not to condone delay. Despite all
the latitude that is shown to a "State", we are of
the clear opinion that the cause sought to be
shown here by the State of Odisha is not an
explanation but a lame excuse. No case for exercise
of discretion has been set up.”

12. Thus in the facts and in circumstances, this Court is of
the opinion that applicant was not diligent in availing remedy
of appeal / application. The averments made in the application
seeking condonation of delay in filing application do not
inspire any acceptable cause much less sufficient cause to
exercise discretion in its favour.

13. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and upon a
meticulous application of the ratio decidendi adverted to
hereinabove, this Court finds that, in absence whereof, the
very foundation of the allegations crumbles, there is no cogent
or credible explanation forthcoming for the inordinate and
colossal delay of 610 days. The application, being sans
merits, inexorably merits dismissal and is, accordingly,
DISMISSED.

14. Consequently, the prayer for registration of the First
Appeal also stands rejected.

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15. Consequently, CA/s, if any, does not survive and stands
disposed of accordingly.

(J. C. DOSHI,J)
SHEKHAR P. BARVE

Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge.
Digitally signed by: SHEKHAR PRAFULBHAI BARVE(HC00200), Principal Pvt. Secretary, at High Court of Gujarat on 09/06/2026 14:32:27

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