Supreme Court of India
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGHversusM/S. JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2008 INSC 390
- Decided
- 24 March 2008
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- C K THAKKER
Holding
The AAIFR did not breach natural justice in refusing adjournment and hearing the appeal, and the High Court was in error in setting aside its orders; the matter is remitted to the AAIFR with specific directions.
Summary
The case concerned the winding up of Jaipur Udyog Ltd. (JUL), a sick cement company, and the dispute over workmen's dues and a settlement entered between the workers' union and the company. JUL appealed a BIFR winding‑up order before the AAIFR, which imposed a condition to deposit Rs.10 crore; the High Court stayed that interim order and later set aside both the AAIFR's interim and final orders on the ground of breach of natural justice. The AAIFR, however, proceeded to hear and dispose of the appeal without granting an adjournment, despite the High Court's stay, prompting the High Court's displeasure. The Supreme Court held that the AAIFR was within its rights to refuse the adjournment and that no audi alteram partem violation occurred, and that the High Court erred in overturning the AAIFR's orders. Consequently, the Supreme Court remitted the matter to the AAIFR with directions to restore the appeal upon deposit of the stipulated amount and to determine the workmen's dues, while also appointing an arbitrator for that purpose.
Issues considered
- Whether the AAIFR violated the principles of natural justice by proceeding with the appeal without granting an adjournment after the High Court stayed its interim order.
- Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the AAIFR's interim and final orders on the ground of breach of audi alteram partem.
- Whether the delay in disposal of the appeal prejudiced creditors and workmen, warranting fresh hearing.
- Whether the settlement between the workers' union and JUL/GDCL is valid, enforceable, and binding on all workmen.
- Whether the workmen's dues can be authoritatively determined and incorporated into a revival or winding‑up scheme.
Legislation cited
- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 10-B, s. 10-F, s. 17
- Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985s. 20, s. 22(3), s. 22(4)(b)(i), s. 33, s. 34
Subjects
natural justiceaudi alteram partemadjournmentAAIFRBIFRsick industrial companies actworkmen's duesrevival schemewinding upsettlementindustrial dispute
Judgment
[2008] 5 S.C.R. 276
A CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH
v.
M/S. JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS.
· (Civil Appeal No. 2076 of 2008)
MARCH 24, 2008
B
[C.K. THAKKER AND AFTAB ALAM, JJ.] '
-+
Principles of natural justice: Adjournment - Refusal to
grant - Mistake in recording interim order by High Court -
c According to counsel, apart from staying operation of the
interim order coming under challenge before it, High Court
stayed further proceedings before AA/FR - AA/FR observed
from the copy of the High Court order produced before it that
what was stayed was not proceedings in appeal but operation
of interim order-Adjournment requested by counsel objected
D
to by the other side and consequently - Declined by AA/FR -
..,
AA/FR proceeded with the hearing of appeal and disposed of
the appeal - High Court strongly expressed displeasure over
."
fact that AA/FR proceeded with hearing of appeal without giving
opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner - Held: AA/FR did
E not err in disallowing prayer for adjournment - Counsel
declined to make submissions even though repeatedly asked
by AA/FR - Strong displeasure expressed by High Court was
uncalled for - There was no breach of principles of natural
;ustice.
F
Dues of workmen central to the issue of rehabilitation or
winding up of a company- Sick Industrial Companies (Special
Provisions) Act - s. 20 - Delay in disposal of appeal against
winding up order causes great prejudice to creditors and deep
distress to the workmen - But in the facts of the case, Held:
G
Justice should not only be1 done but also seen to be done -
The sick company should be afforded one chance to place
their case before AA/FR - Directions passed - Delay and
:latches.
I
I
H 276
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI $ANGH v. M/S. 277
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS.
-+ In 1987, respondent no.1 company was declared A
sick. GDCL made proposal for revival of the company,
which was sanctioned by BIFR. In order to make revival
possible, employees made sacrifices and settled for much
smaller amount of Rs.3 crores in place of 12 crores being
their lawful dues, giving 314th of their dues in hope that B
• new promoter (GDCL) would give them jobs. These hopes
i
were, however, belied. GDCL commissioned the unit but
declared a lock out after 7 months. BIFR reviewed the
matter and finally ordered winding up. JUL filed appeal
before AAIFR. c
On August 3, 2001, the AAIFR directed JUL to deposit
an amount of Rs.10 crores as the condition precedent for
admission of the appeal. JUL challenged this interim order
by filing writ petition. In the writ petition, High Court issued
notice of stay. On September 6, 2001, a prayer was made D
y on behalf of JUL before AAIFR for adjournment on the
.,, ' plea that further proceedings in the appeal were stayed
by the High Court. The prayer was strongly opposed by
the counsel representing the State Bank of India and the
other parties. The AAIFR observed that from the copy of E
the High Court order, it was evident that what was stayed
was not the proceedings in the appeal but the operation
of the order dated August 3, 2001 and commented that
even that order was passed with the consent of the parties.
The AAIFR proceeded to hear the counsel for the State F
Bank of India and then adjourned the hearing to be taken
up after lunch when submissions might be made on behalf
of JUL. In the post lunch session, a lawyer's certificate
was produced stating that apart from staying operation
of the order dated August 3, 2001, the High Court had in
G
fact stayed further proceedings before the AAIFR. The
AAIFR did not accept the certificate and asked the counsel·
to make submissions. The counsel declined and in these
-1- circumstances the AAIFR proceeded to dispose of the
appeal on merits. JUL then filed application in writ petition
H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
A bringing to notice of Higlh Court the development taking
place in AAIFR. High Court strongly expressed its
displeasure over the fact that the AAIFR had proceeded
with the hearing of the appeal without giving opportunity
of hearing to parties. Hiuh Court set aside both interim
B order and final orders of AAIFR and remitted matter for )
fresh decision after providing opportunity of hearing. -+
Appellant-workers union filed SLP before this Court.
However during pendency of the proceedings, on August
26, 2006 while SLP giving rise to this appeal was pending,
c workers-Union and respondent no.1 entered into
settlement of their dues. This gave rise to protests by other
sections of workers. On December 4, 2006, when SLP was
taken up, Court permitt1~d settlement agreement to be
implemented subject to 1rights of other unions. On April
10, 2007, it was represented before the Court that a large
D
number of employees had received payments in terms of
the settlement. The claim made on behalf of the appellant
and respondent No.1 was disputed by others. Hence, this
'y
' .
Court felt the need for some investigation on certain issues
of facts and as agreed by the counsel for the parties
E appointed a former Judge of High Court, to make an
enquiry. He gave a detailed report.
DispC>sing of the appeal and remitting the matter to
AAIFR with certain obsen1ations and directions, the Court
F HELD: 1. The AAIFR cannot be blamed for proceeding
with the hearing of the appeal on September 6, 2001. If
there was a communicatiion gap between the High Court
and the AAIFR it was due to the omission to correctly
record the interim order <>f the High Court. The order that
G was produced before the· AAIFR did not indicate that the
proceeding of the appeal before it was stayed. The parties
(creditors of the company) were strongly opposed to any
adjournment. Under the circumstances, the AAIFR was -;-
within its rights to disallow the prayer for adjournment on
H pehalf of JUL and to ask its counsel to make submissions
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. M/S. 279
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS.
~ on merits. [Para 34] [299-B, C, D] A
2. The strong displeasure against the AAIFR
expressed by the High Court in its order of September
12, 2001 was quite uncalled for. Since the counsel for the
appellant declined to make submissions in support of the
appeal even though repeatedly asked by the AAIFR, after B
1 the request for adjournment was turned down, there was
no breach of the principles of natural justice. Having
regard to the communication gap resulting from the
mistake in recording its interim order, the High Court might
have been justified in asking the AAIFR to pass a fresh c
order after giving the appellant JUL an opportunity of
hearing. But the High Court was clearly in error in setting
aside the final order passed by the AAFIR on the ground
' that it was passed in breach of the audi alteram partem
rule. [Para 34] [299-D, E, F] D
...,. 3. There is substance in the grievance raised by the
# '
respondent creditors and the workmen in regard to the
delay in the final disposal of the matter. It is true that the
delay only benefits JUL/GDCL and causes great prejudice
to the creditors and deep distress to the workmen. Seven E
years have passed by while the matter lay pending, first
before the High Court and then before this court. Had the
appeal not come to this court, the matter in all probability
would have been concluded by now. However, JUL/GDCL
were practically denied the remedy of appeal against the F
winding up order passed by the BIFR. Justice should not
only be done but it should also appear to have been done.
Therefore at least one chance should be afforded to JUL/
GDCL to place their case before the AAIFR [Paras 35, 36] .
[299-G; 300-A, B, C]
G
4. The dues of all other creditors are ascertainable
without difficulty. But in case of the workmen's dues there
is great divergence between the claim of the workmen and
~-
what is accepted by the company's management. It is,
therefore necessary to get the workmen's dues H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
A authoritatively determined. Once the workmen's dues too 1...-
are known precisely that c:an be factored into a realistic
revival scheme or accounted for in the winding up
process, in case the eventuality arises. [Para 37] [300-
C, D, E]
B CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2076
>
of 2008. -+
From the Judgment and Order dated 2.8.2004 of the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in SB
CWP No. 43,80/2001.
c
Aruneshwar Gupta, S.K. Khesote, Dr.AM. Singhvi, Mukul
Rohatgi, K. Radhakrishnani, Prem Kishan Sharma, Jyoti
Mendiratta, Manish Kumar, Ansar Ahmed Chaudhary, Babita
Yadav, R.C. Kohli, Dr. Manish Singhvi, Naresh Kumar, Barun K
D Sinha, Pratibha Sinha, B.K. Satija, Gopal Jain, R.N.
Karanjawala, Ruby Singh Ahuja, Debmalya Banerjee, Manik
Karanjawala, Anil Kumar San!~al, Nalin Sangal, Bhakti Pasrija,
M.T. George, Naveen Kumar Singh, Shashwat Gupta,
Madhurima Tatia, Rachna Joshi lssar, Pradeep Mishra, Dileep
Kr. Dhayani, Krishnanand Pandey, S.N. Terdol, Vikas Mehta,
E Neeraj Kumar Jain, Bharat Singh, Sanjay Singh, Sandeep
Chaturevedi, Umang Shankar, U.S. Prasad, PuneetJain, Christi
Jain, Sushi! Kumar Jain, Piyush Jain, Shobha, Harish Sharma,
V.J. Francis, Anupam Mishra,. Malvika Trivedi, Reena Singh,
Amit Pratap, T. Mahipal, Navin Prakash, G. Prakash and B.V.
F Balramdas, for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
AFTAB ALAM, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal was filed against the order, dated August
G 2, 2004 by which a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High
Court set aside both the interim and final orders, dated August
3 and September 6, 2001 passed by the Appellate Authority for
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction, New Delhi (AAIFR) and
remitted the matter to it for passing fresh order after giving an
H opportunity of hearing to all the concerned parties. The AAIFR
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. M/S. 281
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.)
--.> order (that was set aside by the High Court) had dismissed the A
-
appeal filed by Mis.Jaipur Udyog Ltd., respondent No.1, and
affirmed the order of its winding up passed by the Board for
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction Bench-II (BIFR) on
November 24, 2000 in Case No.17 of 1987. The High Court
took the view that the AAIFR had dismissed the appeal of B
respondent No.1 without giving it a reasonable opportunity of
·~
hearing and, accordingly, gave direction for fresh hearing of the
matter. The order passed by the High Court was brought before
this Court in appeal by a workers' union, namely, Cement
Workers Karamchari Sangh. The appeal was based on the plea c
that the remand to the Ml FR would not serve any useful purpose
but would lead to an unnecessary and unreasonable
prolongation of the matter causing great prejudice and distress
to the workers who had already suffered much due to non-
payment of their dues for a very long time. Thus the appeal at its
D
inception appeared to present for consideration the simple and
'( limited issue as to whether the High Court was justified in taking
r •
the view that the order passed by the AAIFR was in breach of
the principles of natural justice and for that reason remitting the
proceeding to it.
E
3. However, during the pendency of the proceeding before
this Court certain developments took place that tend to
somewhat shift the focus from the limited issue as indicated
above. On August 26, 2006, while the Special Leave Petition
giving rise to the appeal was pending before the Court, the F
appellant-workers' union entered into a bipartite agreement with
respondent No.1, Mis.Jaipur Udyog Limited (JUL) in purported
settlement of the dues of the workers/employees at Sawai
Madhopur, Phallodi Quarries, Jaipur, Delhi and Chandigarh
offices represented by the Sangh. A copy of the agreement was
G
brought on record as Annexure 'A' to l.A.No.8 of 2006 filed in
the Special Leave Petition on August 31, 2006. The settlement
between the appellant-union and JUL gave rise to a chorus of
4- protests by other sections of workers who alleged that the
settlement was fraudulent, collusive and a sell out to the
H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 5 S.C.R.
A management of JUL. A number of impleadment applications ~
were filed (vide l.A.Nos.9 & ·10 of 2006, 12 of 2007) on behalf ...
of different Unions claiming to represent the workmen of JUL at
Jaipur and at Kanpur. •
4. On December 4, 2006 when the Special Leave Petition
B was taken up the settlement was brought to the notice of the
,
Court and a joint prayer was made by the appellant and JUL -f.
that the dispute between the employees and the employer may
be permitted to be settled in terms of the agreement and the
AAFIR be directed to monitor the implementation of this
c settlement in letter and spirit. The other Unions seeking
impleadment in the proceedings before this Court raised strong
objections to the settlement. The Court, however, permitted the
agreement to be implemented in terms of prayer (b) in th~
application (l.A.No.8 of 200EI) subject, of course, to the rights of
D those Unions who had filed applications for impleadment and/
or had approached the La1bour Commissioner (against the
. settlement in question). On April 10, 2007, it was represented .'
'f
before the Court that a large number of employees had received
payments in terms of the settlement. The claim made on behalf
E of the appellant and respondent No.1 was disputed by others.
Hence, the Court felt the need for some investigation on certain
issues of facts and as agn~ed by the counsel for the parties,
appointed Mr. Justice N.l\J.Mathur, a former Judge of the
Rajasthan High Court, to make an enquiry on points indicated
F in the order as follows:
"(a) How many of the employees have opted for settlement
with respondent No.1 Company and/or respondent No. 7.
"(b) It i.s stated by Mr.Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel
that about 1700 employees have already accepted the
G
settlement. In case, necessary materials and records are
produced to justify the claim, Mr.Justice N.N.Mathur need
not ascertain the views of those who have opted for
settlement. So far as others are concerned, the views of ·j-
individual workers shall be ascertained."
H'
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. MIS. 283
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS. [AFTAB ALAM , J.]
As requested by the Court, Mr.Justice Mathur made the A
enquiry and submitted his report dated August 9, 2007. It is a
detailed report and it considerably helped the Court to
appreciate the main features of the controversy.
5. These developments taking place after the filing of the
Special Leave Petition compel us to take note of certain facts B
l and circumstances antecedent to the immediate cause that
brought this matter to this Court.
6. All the controversies in the case, as may be gathered
from the above, revolve around the attempts at the rehabilitation/ c
revival, or conversely the winding up of Mis.Jaipur Udyog Limited
(JUL). JUL was incorporated in May 1948 as a private limited
company. It set up a cement factory at Sawai Madhopur for which
the supply of raw material, i.e., limestone came from Phallodi
Quarry at a distance of about 25 kms. In the year 1955, it was
D
converted into a public limited company. In 1967, it acquired a
jute mill in Kanpur with a view to manufacture cement bags for
captive consumption in the cement unit at Sawai Madhopur. After
going through many ups and downs over a period of about forty
years the cement factory of the company came to be closed
down in the year 1987. And finally JUL was declared a sick E
company by the order, dated August 26, 1987 passed by the
BIFR that came to find and hold that the company was not in a
position to make its net worth positive on its own within a
reasonable time. At that time the company had on its hands,
apart from a number of very onerous financial liabilities, large F
bodies of workmen both at Sawai Madopur and at Kanpur.
7. After some initial attempts at the revival/rehabilitation of
JUL failed, another company Mis.Gannon Dunkerley Company
Ltd. (GDCL) came on the scene. In 1991 a proposal for the
G
revival of JUL came up before the BIFR. GDCL was the main
party to the revival plan. The BIFR sanctioned the revival scheme
~·
by order, dated July 21, 1992 and it was called 'SS-92'. Under
the sanctioned scheme GDCL was to take over JUL, for its
revival, along with all assets and liabilities. The cut off date for
H
284 SUPHEME COURT REPORTS (2008] 5 S.C.R.
A the restructuring of capital and liabilities was fixed as March
).--
31, 1992. The IRBI was appointed as the monitoring agency.
The scheme stipulated that GDCL would take over of the
management of JUL from its erstwhile promoters. The cost of
the scheme (SS 92) was Rs.38.41 crores, out of which Rs.18.12
B was to come from the promoters (GDCL) as contribution/
unsecured loans, Rs.10 crores by sale of assets and the
~
remaining Rs.10.29 crores by sales tax deferment. The liability +
of JUL was restructured and after substantial waivers the
restructured liabilities of Rs.53.86 crores were rescheduled for
c payment. In order to meet the pressing liabilities , an amount of
Rs.2.54 crores was marked for immediate disbursement. In the
scheme (SS 92) it was stated that the strength of workers at the
time of the closure of the unit was 3515, including 1030 workers
employed in the quarry. The company (JUL) had also employed,
on an average, 150 workers on casual basis and 200 workers
D
on contract basis.
8. At that time (as we shall see later) JUL had many "f
creditors, including government departments, statutory bodies,
' '
banks and private parties but the dues of the employees need
E to be specially mentioned. In the sanctioned revival scheme in
regard to the employees it was provided as follows:
"Employees:
(i) Shall accept settlement of arrear wages/salaries/
F bonus (including the same during the period
operation of JUL was under suspension) (amounting
to Rs.1241 lacs approximately) for Rs.300 lacs
payable on deferred basis in 3 equal annual ....
installments.
G (ii) Shall agree for labour rationalization programme as
would be implemented, with higher productivity
norms."
Later on, in the proceedings both the BIFR and the AAIFR ,...
had ·the occasion to comment that in order to make the revival
H
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. MIS. 285
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
of JUL possible under SS-92 the employees had made great A
sacrifices and had settled for the much smaller amount of only
Rs.3 crores (payable in three installments) in place of Rs.12.41
crores being their lawful dues. The workmen had given up three-
fourth of their dues in the hope and trust that the new promoter
(GDCL) would start the unit and they would be able to keep B
\ their jobs. Their hope was, however, completely belied and the
workmen were left 'in a very pathetic situation.'
9. On January 9, 1996, GDCL commissioned the unit only
to declare lock out seven months later on August 12, 1996. It
was alleged that the commissioning was an eye wash and the C
promoters had no intent to run the unit on a sustained basis. No
repairs were made in the plant lying idle for a long time ; no raw
materials were brought and no supervising, managerial or
technical staffs were engaged. The lock out declared by the
management was prohibited by the state government by order, D
dated May 25, 1999, issued under section 10(3) of the Industrial
Disputes Act. On August 11, 1997 the management of GUL
entered into a revised tripartite settlement with the
representatives of the workers. But the revival of JUL remained
as illusive as ever before. E
10. When no head way was made towards the
rehabilitation of the company even after eight years of the
passing of the revival scheme (and passing of thirteen years
since it lay sick!) the BIFR held the review hearing on July 12,
2000 and found that GDCL not only did not carry out the F
+ directions given to it but had also failed to keep its own
commitments under the sanctioned scheme for rehabilitation .
The BIFR, accordingly, gave directions inter alia, to (i) issue a
notice to the company and other interested parties under Section
20(1) of The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) G
Act (SICA) to show cause why it should not be wound up, (ii) a
separate notice to the promoters (GDCL) under Section 33 of
• SICA to show cause why they should not be prosecuted for non-
payment of labour dues and failure to comply with other
provisions of SS-92. At the same time, it allowed the workers to H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
A file suits in Labour Courts to enforce payment of their dues. It )-
also directed the Rajasthan Finance Corporation to take over
possession of the assets of the_ company under section 29 of
the State Financial Corporation Act and the State Bank of India
to insure the company's assets.
B 11. In pursuance of the' directions, the show cause notice
under Section 33 of the SICA was issued to GDCL and JUL on
November1, 2000.
12. Finally, the BIFR passed the order, dated November
c 24, 2000, giving direction for the winding up of JUL with a number
of ancillary directions. Here, it would useful to extract paragraph
29 of the order that sums up the facts and circumstances that
finally led the BIFR to pass the order of winding up of JUL:
"After hearing various submissions made and on the basis
D of the material on record, the Bench noted that all
. . ....
concerned secured creditors, unsecured creditors, the ...,
representatives of all concerned State Governments
Department of GOI, Chandigarh Housing Board, etc., were
for winding up of the company; except from the
E representatives of the company and its promoters, to the
proposed winding up of the company. As regards the
company's objections, the Bench further noted that the
company had failed to submit their audited/provisional
balance-sheet as on ,June 30, 2000, which would have
F enabled the Bench to appreciate the correct picture of the
accounts at the time of the hearing. The company's
representative had also not given any specific answer to
the query regarding treatment of the liability on account of
various decrees obtainied by secured-unsecured creditors.
The Consultant for the company was also asked to submit
G
their modified proposal, but no updated proposal was
forthcoming, and he only indicated that their modified
proposal submitted in May 1998 was still pending with llBI
(MA). It was also stated that an OTS proposal was pending
H , with SBI. However, the representative of SBI present during
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. MIS. 287
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
the hearing categorically stated that the proposals A
submitted by the company for OTS of the bank's dues
were found unacceptable to the b~nk and as on date, no
proposal was pending with the bank. The Bench further
noted that such an OTS proposal, if any, could have been
considered by the Bench only if the company had obtained B
prior consent of all con~erned parties, as required under
Section 19 of SICA; however, no such consents were
obtained by the company. Further, the company had not
renewed their MOU with the workers. After consideration
of all these facts and circumstances, the Bench came to c
the conclusion that no acceptable and viable proposal
had been submitted by the company under which the
company could be revived within a reasonable period of
time, while meeting all its financial obligations. The
company has been with the BIFR for over 13 years as to
D
now and the company had not submitted any modified
revival scheme even after issue of the Show Cause Notice
for winding up. The Bench, therefore, confirmed its prima
facie-opinion that it is just, equitable and in public interest
that the company viz. Jaipur Udyog Ltd. is wound up as
the company was unlikely to revive and make its net worth E
positive within a reasonable period of time white
discharging its due financial obligations and directed that
this opinion be forwarded to the concerned High Court
along with the proceedings of this hearing and all the
previous proceedings of Bench hearings/orders, for further F
.,.. necessary action by the honourable High Court, in
accordance with the provisions of the Companies Act."
The BIFR left it open to the many creditors of JUL to file
suits before the appropriate courts/ORT for recov~ry of their
G
dues and to take further steps in that connection as it had
confirmed its opinion for winding up the company JUL.
~ 13. Against the winding up order passed by the BIFR, JUL
filed Appeal No.22 of 2001 before the AAIFR. On August 3,
2001, the AAIFR directed the appellant-JUL to deposit an H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
A amount of Rs.10 crores as the condition precedent for admission \-
of the appeal. It would be useful to reproduce the order in full:
"Arguments. heard. The appellant/promoter (Cannon
Dunkerley & Co.Ltd.) shall negotiate OTS terms with SBI
and also come to an und1:!rstanding with Cement Works
B Karamchari Union (CWKS) about the settlement of the
dues of the workers and make a deposit of Rs.10 crores 1
(Rs.5 er in two weeks from today and Rs.5 crores in another
two weeks) in a no-lien account with SBI. No adjustment
or payment shall be made from this amount except with
c prior orders of this Authority.
The appellant company and the CWKS shall immediately
prepare a statement of the retired workers showing the
terminal dues of each of them. An amount of Rs.3 crores ·
out of the no-lien deposit of Rs.10 crores shall be utilized
D
for part payment of the terminal benefits to the retired
workers.
Failure to deposit the amount of Rs.1 O crores, as stated
above, will result in dismissal of this appeal. To come on
E 6.9.2001."
JUL challenged the interim order passed by the AAIFR
before the Rajasthan High Court and from this stage the matter
becomes somewhat confused and murky.
F 14. In S.B.Civil Writ Petition No.4380/2001 filed by JUL
the prayers were made in the following manner:
"a) pass a writ, order or direction in the nature of
mandamus, to quash thH impugned order of the AAIFR
dated 3.8.2001 in Appeal No.22 of 2001;
G
b) Pass a writ, order or direction to call for a summon the
records of the case frorn the AAIFR/BIFR of Reference
No.17, 1987;
c)xxx xxx xxx xxx
H
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. M/S. 289
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
d)xxx )()()( )()()( xxX.' A
The writ petition was taken up before the High Court on
September 4, 2001 and the order of the High Court was
recorded in the follows terms:
..._ "Heard. Admit. Issue Notice. Rule is made returnable within B
__.,. six weeks. Notice be given Dasti apart from usual service.
Notice of stay application be also issued, returnable within
six weeks and be given Dasti apart from usual service.
Pending service of notice on the Respondents, there shall c
be stay of ex-parte (sic) impugned order dated 3.8.2001.
(Annexure-5) passed by AAIFR in Appeal 22/2001.
List thereafter along with compliance report."
15. Two days later on November 6, 2001, the appeal was
0
.... ~- fixed for hearing before the AAIFR. On that date, on behalf of
JUL a prayer was made for adjournment on the plea that further
proceedings in the appeal were stayed by the High Court. The
prayer was strongly opposed by the counsel representing the
State Bank of India and the other parties. TheAAIFR observed
that from the copy of the High Court order, it was evident that E
what was stayed was not the proceedings in the appeal but the
operation of the order dated August 3, 2001 and commented
that even that order was passed with the consent of the parties.
The AAI FR proceeded to hear the counsel for the State Bank of
India and then adjourned the hearing to be taken up after lunch F
when submissions might be made ,on behalf of JUL. In the post
lunch session, a lawyer's certificate was produced stating that
apart from staying operation of the order dated August 3, 2001,
the High Court had in fact stayed further proceedings before
the AAIFR. The AAIFR did not accept the certificate and asked G
the counsel to make submissions. The counsel declined. And
in those circumstances the AAIFR proceeded to dispose of the
appeal on merits. It took into consideration the material facts
and circumstances and came to hold as follows:
H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 5 S.C.R.
A "The workers and the secured creditors had expressed
their loss of confidence in thE~ management. The dues of
the workers had not been paid. BIFR also took note of the
fact that the cement plant of JUL was based on old wet
process technology which was no longer economically
B viable. Moreover, according to the modified scheme, even
50% of the dues of SBI would not have been serviced by
2002, which was the terminal year in SS92 and the net
worth would have continued to remain less than the
accumulated losses."
C The AAIFR further observed as follows:
"We have particularly concerned about the non-payment
of even the amount of Rs.3 er to the workers which was
part of the restructured liabilities in 1992. We had therefore
given time to JUUpromoters for OTS negotiations with
D
SBI afresh and for arriving at understanding with workers'
union and asked them to deposit Rs.10 er in no-lien account
in two installments out of which Rs.3 er was to be utilized·
for part payment of terminal dues to retired workers. A
large number of workers have retired and have died and
E their families are in indigent circumstances. However, every
person who is aggrieved by orders of this Authority has a
right to seek redress from superior courts. The appellants
have chosen to approach the Hon'ble High Court of
Rajasthan at Jaipur and obtained stay of the order dated
F 3.8.2001. This shows that they are not prepared to make
the deposit of Rs.10 er and make payment of Rs.3 er out
of that to the workers."
'
16. Having made the observations and come to the
G findings, as noted above, the AAIFR dismissed the appeal and
granted permission to the creditors for initiating proceedings
for recpvery of their dues and for execution of the decrees
alreaqy obtained by them.
17. JUL then filed an application in the pending writ petition '-·
H (No.7~80/2001) bringing to the notice of the High Court the
I
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. M/S. 291
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
development taking place before theAAIFR. The court observed A
-+ that while admitting the writ petition on September 4, 2001 "it
was directed that there would be stay of ex-parte impugned
order dated August 3, 2000 passed by the AAIFR". It then
expressed its displeasure rather strongly over the fact that the
AAIFR had proceeded with the hearing of the appeal and had B
~
finally disposed it of on merits and by order, dated September
~ 12, 2001 stayed the operation of the final order passed by the
AAIFR on September 6, 2001.
18. It may be noted here that the High Court did not say
that it had actually stayed further proceedings in the appeal c
before the AAIFR but that part of the order was by mistake
omitted to be recorded. It seems to have taken the view that the
AAIFR should have refrained from proceeding with the appeal
in view of its direction staying the operation of the interim order
of the AAIFR, more so, as the counsel for the petitioner/appellant D
personally intimated it that further proceeding before it was
)I-
stayed by the High Court.
••
19. Be that as it may, the writ petition was finally disposed
of by the High Court by order, dated August 2, 2004. The order
began with the observation that the writ petition was filed against E
the interim order dated.August 3, 2001 passed by theAAIFR in
Appeal No.22/2001; it then spoke eloquently about the great
value and importance of the rule of audi alteram partem; it
proceeded to extract a passage from the final order oftheAAIFR
to note that the petitioner's appeal was dismissed even without F
giving it an opportunity of hearing and it finally observed as
..4 follows:
"Since fair opportunity of hearing was not provided to the
petitioners the order dated September 4 (sic 6) 2001 of
G
AAIFR dismissing the appeal is vitiated being opposed
to the principles of natural justice. Although, the order dated
September 4 (sic 6) of 2001 has been passed during the
--I pendency of the writ petition and it has not been impugned
in the writ petition but this court can take notice of
H
292 SUPREME COURT HEPORTS (2008] 5 S.C.R.
A subsequent events. Article 226 covers a much wider
ground of jurisdiction. The High Court while hearing a
petition under Article 226 should keep in mind the interest
of justice as paramount and appropriate relief may be
granted even if the petitioner has not asked for it or has
B asked for a wrong relief. Petition under Article 226 will not
be thrown out on the ground that no proper writ or direction
has been prayed for."
(Emphasis added)
The High Court accordingly set aside both the interim and
C final orders passed by the AAIFR dated August 3, 2001 and
September 6, 2001 and remitted the matter for a fresh decision
on merits after providing an opportunity of hearing to all the
parties who were impleaded in appeal and who had sought .
impleadment in the writ petition.
D
20. The Cement Workers Karamchari Sangh, a workers'
union, sought to challenge the order passed by the High Court
by filing this special leave petition before this Court. But as noted
above, during the pendency of the SLP the petitioner-Sangh
entered into an agreement with JUL/GDCL.
E
21. As result of the intentening development, at the time of
hearing of the case for its final disposal, the petitioner was
content to take a seat on the sidelines and the space left by it
was sought to be occupied by some of the respondents (creditors
F of the company) and some workers groups/unions seeking to
intervene in the matter either to oppose the settlement or to press
for the winding up of JUL in terms of the order of AAIFR.
22. Among the company's creditors who took the stand
that the orders of its winding up passed by the BIFR and AAIFR
G may not be interfered with by his court were respondent No.12
(Chandigarh Housing Bo.ard), respondent No.15 (Shaziabad
Development Authority), respondent No.21 (Deputy
Commissioner Income Tax), respondent No.26 (Jaipur Vidyut
Yitran Nigam Ltd.), respondent No.30 (The Employees' State
H Insurance Corporation) and respondent No.31 (The Provident
I
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. M/S. 293
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
Commissioner). According to the respective counsel the A
aforesaid respondents had their dues against the company as
follows:
I. The Chandigarh Housing Board had a decree
against JUL for a sum of Rs.49,60,569/- which with
the accrual of interest has swelled upto 8
\l Rs.2,06,81,009/-.
II. The Ghaziabad Development Authority had a decree
against the company for a sum of Rs.60, 83,600/-
and it was pending for execution before the Civil c
Judge, Ghaziabad.
Ill. The IT department has (unquantified) dues against
the company.
IV. The JaipurVidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. has dues against
0
the company amounting to Rs.4549.28 lakh.
V. The ESI Corporation has dues against the company
amounting to Rs.37,78,881/-
VI. The PF department has dues against the company E
amounting to Rs.81 lakh. (approx.).
23. Among the interveners, Bhartiya Cement Mazdoor
Sangh (l.A.No.9) and Kanpur Jute Workers (l.A.No.12) assailed
the settlement arrived at between the petitioner Cement Workers
Karamchari Sangh and JUL/GDCL. Learned counsel appearing F
for the two proposed interveners submitted that the settlement
,..i., was collusive and fraudulent; it was made in breach of a number
of statutory provisions and it was unenforceable as finally
determining the lawful dues of the workmen. Counsel appearing
for Kanpur Jute Workers referred to passages from the report G
of Mathur,J. and submitted that a number of workers of Kanpur
Jute Mill had not accepted any payment in terms of the
agreement and, therefore, the agreement was, in any event, not
binding on them.
24. Ms. Rachna Joshi lssar, learned counsel appearing H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
A for The Chandigarh Housing Board, strongly supported the
winding up order passed by the BIFR and confirmed in appeal
by the AAIFR. Learned counsel submitted that the High Court
had completely misdirecti3d itself in setting aside the final order
dated September 6, 200'1 passed by the AAIFR on the ground
B that it was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.
Learned counsel submitt13d that in the facts and circumstances J
of the case, the refusal to grant adjournment could not be viewed
as a violation of the principles of natural justice. From the copy
of the High Court order that was produced before the AAIFR, it
c was evident that the High Court had stayed the operation of the
interim order but not the~ proceedings in the pending appeal.
The AAIFR was, therefore, justified in refusing to grant
adjournment in view of the strong opposition by the other parties.
At that stage the counsel for the company declined to make
submissions on the merits of the appeal even though repeatedly
0
asked by the Chairman. Hence, there was no question of any
violation of the principles of natural justice and the very premise ~ ..
of the High Court order was, therefore, unfounded. She further
submitted that, as a matter of fact, it was the order of the High
Court that was completely without jurisdiction inasmuch as it
E purported to set aside an order that was not even brought to it
under challenge. She submitted the High Court was conscious
that the writ petition was filed against the interim order passed
by the AAIFR asking the company to deposit Rs.10 crores as
pre-condition for the admission of the appeal. Nonetheless, it
F proceeded to set aside the final order of the AAIFR. The High
Court was thus plainly in error in going beyond the scope of the ;..,
writ petition and granting relief that was not even prayed for by
the writ petitioner-company.
G 25. Mr.Manish Singhvi, counsel appearing forthe proposed
intervener Sarvadaliyai Shramik Sangarsh Samiti (l.A.No.10)
was equally vehement in opposing both the settlement and the
order of the High Court remanding the matter to the AAIFR.
Learned counsel submitted that any remand to the AAIFR would
: H be an exercise in futility because the AAIFR would be legally
I
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. MIS. 295
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
bound to reaffirm the order of winding .up of JUL. Mr. Singhvi A
submitted that the revival scheme SS 92 was sanctioned over
a decade and half ago in the year 1992. From the conduct of
GDCL during the past more than fifteen years it was evident
that it had no interest in the revival of JUL but it simply intended
to appropriate the vast assets of the company. Learned counsel B
stated that the company was already facing prosecution
launched by the BIFR under section 33 of the Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) for making
false statements before it and was also issued a notice for
prosecution under section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act for c
indulging in unfair labour practice
26. Mr.M.Singhvi further submitted that in view of Section
22(3) proviso and Section 22(4)(b)(i) of the SICA and the circular
of the Reserve Bank of India any revival scheme was dead and
inoperative after the expiry of seven years. At present, therefore, D
there was no revival scheme. The company had lost the statutory
x immunity it enjoyed while SS 92 was alive and the only course
•
open was the winding up of the Company as provided under
Section 20(1) and (2) of the SICA. Learned counsel submitted
the BIFR had passed the winding up order of the company (on E
Nov.24, 2000) after expiry of eight years from the date of
sanctioning the scheme precisely under the aforesaid
provisions. He further submitted that now after more than fifteen
years the dues against the company had further mounted up
and there was no scheme or a revised scheme in existence for F
its revival. In these facts and circumstances the AAIFR would
,.z be legally bound to reiterate the order of winding up of the
company. Any remand to the AAIFR would, therefore, be quite
futile and it would only delay the inevitable. The delay, however,
would greatly benefit JUL/GDCL by giving it the opportunity for
G
further tiers of litigation. At the same time the inherent delay in
remand would cause great prejudice to the workmen and it may
even break their fragile capacity to sustain. In support of his
-I submissions, Mr. M.Singhvi relied upon the decisions of this
Court in Megha/ Homes Pvt.Ltd. vs. Shree Niwas Girni
H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
A K.K. Samiti [(2007) 7 SCC 753] and International Finance
Corporation & Anr. Vs. Bihar State Industrial Development
Corporation & Ors. [(2005) 10 SCC179].
27. In regard to the settlement arrived at between the
petitioner, Cement Workers Karamchari Sangh and the JULI
B GDCL Mr. M.Singhvi submitted that it was collusive and illegal
and unjust and unfair to the workmen. He referred to Rule 58 of J
the Industrial Disputes Rules and submitted that the so-called
settlememt was not drawn up in Form-Hand a copy of it was not
sent to the appropriate government and the authorities as
c provided under sub-rule (4) of Rule 58. The so-called settlement
was thus in breach of the statutory provisions and it was clearly
unenforceable. It could not be held to determine the rights of
even those workmen who had received any payments under it
and it would certainly not affect the rights of the workmen who
D had not received any payment under it.
28. On the other hand Dr. A.M.Singhvi, learned senior --;- "'
counsel appearing for re,spondent No.1 (JUL) and Mr. Mukul
Rohatgi, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 7
(GDCL) contended that after entering into the settlement with
E the company the petitioner- Sangh no longer wished to press
the special leave petition . This court should, therefore, dismiss
it and leave the order of the High Court undisturbed.
29. In reply to the submissions made by Ms.lssar,
F Mr.Rohatgi submitted that theAAIFR was not right in disallowing
the prayer for adjournment and dismissing the appeal without
giving an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. Learned
counsel stated that, as a matter of fact, the High Court in its
interim order passed on September 4, 2001 had also stayed
further proceedings in the appeal before the AAI FR but that part
G
of the order was, by mistake, omitted to be recorded. Counsel
for the appellant intimated the fact to the AAIFR but the AAIFR
disregarded the lawyer's certificate and unjustly proceeded with
the hearing of the appeal. He further submitted that on
September 11, 2001 the company filed a petition in the High
H
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. MIS. 297
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
Court stating all this and prayed for clarification of its order A
-+ passed on September 4, 2001. On the same day it filed another
petition bringing on the High Court's record the final order
passed by the AAIFR and sought to amend the writ petition and
prayed for leave to challenge the final order of the AAIFR as
well. He submitted that unfortunately the High Court's orders 8
did not refer to those petitions. In support of the statement,
' \ copies of those petitions were filed as additional documents
after the hearing of the case was concluded on February 7, 2008.
30. In response to the submissions made by Mr.Manish
$inghvi, Mr.Rohatgi submitted that Sarvdaliya Shramik c
Sangharsh Samiti was not a party to the proceeding before this
court and, in any event, the submissions made by Mr. Singhvi
were completely at variance with the prayers made in l.A.No.10
filed on behalf of the proposed intervener.
D
31. Further, Mr.Rohatgi stoutly defended the settlement
entered into between the petitioner-Sangh and JUL/GDCL. He
.....X' stated that Justice Mathur had noted in his report that 1384
employees of the cement factory at Sawai Madhopur and 578
workmen at Phallodi Quarry had accepted the settlement and
the company had paid to them the sums of Rs.8.67 crores and E
Rs.3.44 crores respectively. Similarly, at Kanpur 1198 workmen
had accepted the settlement and the company had paid to them
the aggregate sum of Rs.3.74 crores. Thus, altogether 3160
employees had accepted the settlement and the company had
paid to them the total sum of Rs.15.18 crores. The report further F
noted that according to the list furnished by the company 1173
A.. workmen of the cement factory, 457 at Phallodi Quarry and 136
at Kanpur had not accepted the settlement and the total amount
due to them under the settlement was Rs.10.23 crores. (Here it
may be stated that before Justice Mathur one of the workmen's G
union claimed that the lawful dues of the workers amounted to
Rs.86 crores but the settlement was made for only 20-25 crores).
~
32. Mr.Rohatgi strongly contended that all the workmen
who had received payment had done so in full and final settlement
H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
A of their claims and they could no longer question the agreement.
Those who had not accepted payments under the settlement
were free to raise their claims in accordance with law but they
too could not object to the settlement between the company and
the other workmen who had accepted payments.
B 33. Interestingly, after the hearing of the case was closed
yet another petition (I .A.No.15) was filed on behalf of GDCL on
February 21, 2008 which was listed before the Court on
February 29, 2008. In this petition, the company, making a
complete departure from its earlier stand in regard to the
C settlement, stated as follows:
"The applicant submits that while the judgment has been
reserved in the captioned matter, the applicant wants to
put the controversy at rest and submits that, the applicant
is ready and willing to get the dues of the workers, including
D
those who have singed the settlement with the
Respondent No.1 - Jaipur Udyog Ltd., to be adjudicated
upon by any statutory authority appointed by this Hon'ble
Court. The applicant is filing the present application without
prejudice to the arguments made before this Hon'ble Court
E on 07.02.2008.
The applicant submits that the present application is being
made bona fide and in the interest of justice and in the
interest of workers".
F Following the above statement, the prayer is made as
follows: ).-.
"(a) Direct any statutory authority to adjudicate on the dues
of the said workers, including those who have signed the
settlement with the Respondent No. 1 - Jaipur Udyog
G
Ltd. within a period of two months; and
(b) Pass an order as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and
proper considering the facts and circumstances of the
present case."
H
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. MIS. 299
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
...+
By filing this petition JUUGDCL, of its own accord, opens A
r up the claims of all the workmen and makes a positive gesture
in an attempt to satisfy the court that it has no intent to run away
with the lawful claims of the workmen.
34. On hearing counsel for the parties and on a careful
'·
-l consideration of the materials on record, including the affidavits B
and documents filed by the different parties, we are of the opinion
that the AAIFR can hardly be blamed for proceeding with the
hearing of the appeal on September 6, 2001. If there was a
communication gap between the High Court and the AAIFR it
was due to the omission to correctly record the interim order of c
the High Court. The order that was produced before the AAIFR
did not indicate that the proceeding of the appeal before it was
stayed. The parties (creditors of the company) were strongly
opposed to any adjournment. Under the circumstances, the
AAIFR was within its rights to disallow the prayer for adjournment D
Joi-
'* , on behalf of JUL and to ask its counsel to make submissions on
merits. We, therefore, feel that the strong displeasure against
theAAIFR expressed by the High Court in its order of September
12, 2001 was quite uncalled for. We are further of the view that
since the counsel for the appellant GUL declined to make E
submissions in support of the appeal even though repeatedly
asked by the AAIFR, after the request for adjournment was
turned down, there was no breach of the principles of natural
justice. Having regard to the communication gap resulting from
the mistake in recording its interim order, the High Court might F
have been justified in asking the AAIFR to pass a fresh order
after giving the appellant JUL an opportunity of hearing. But the
High Court was clearly in error in setting aside the final order
passed by the AAFIR on the ground that it was passed in breach
· of the audi alteram partem rule.
G
35. We find much substance in the grievance raised by
the respondent creditors and the workmen in regard to the delay
in the final disposal of the matter. It is quite true that the delay
only benefits JUL/GDCL and causes great prejudice to the
creditors and deep distress to the workmen. We are. also H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
A conscious that seven years have passed by while the matter lay
pending, first before the High Court and then before this court.
Had the appeal not come to this court, the matter in all probability
would have been concluded by now.
36. But for all this we are unable to overlook that JUL/GDCL
B were practically denied the remedy of appeal against the
winding up order passed by the BIFR. We recall here the _.i
hackneyed but very useful maxim: justice should not only be done
but it should also appear to have been done. We are, therefore,
of the view that at least one chance should be afforded to JUL/
C GDCL to place their case before the AAIFR.
37. We are further of the view that central to the issue of
rehabilitation or winding of the company is the question of the
workmen's dues. The dues of all other creditors are
ascertainable without difficulty. But in case of the workmen's
0
dues there is great divergE!nce between the claim of the workmen
and what is accepted by the company's management. It is, ""
therefore necessary to gi3t the workmen's dues authoritatively
determined. Once the workmen's dues too are known precisely
that can be factored into a realistic revival scheme or accounted
E for in thE! winding up process, in case the eventuality arises.
38. We accordingly make the following directions which
we consider, in the totality of the facts and circumstances of the
case, would meet the ends of justice:
F A. Re. The proceedings before the BIFR/AAIFR.
I. The matter is remitted to the AAIFR and it is directed to
restore Appeal No.22/2001 filed by JUL against the winding up
order, dated November 2.4, 2000 passed by the BIFR, provided
G the deposit of Rs.10 crores, as directed by the AAIFR by its
order dated August 3, 2001 is made within two months from
today.
II. In case the appellant JUL fails to make the deposit within
, the specified time, the appeal shall stand dismissed and the
H earlier order passed by the AAIFR on September 6, 2001 shall
CEMENT WORKERS KARAMCHARI SANGH v. MIS. 301
JAIPUR UDYOG LIMITED AND ORS. [AFTAB ALAM, J.]
-+ stand restored. A
Ill. In case, however, the deposit is made within the
specified time, the AAIFR will proceed to dispose of the appeal
after hearing the appellant and any of the parties to this appeal
before this court (including the proposed interveners) or the
parties to the appeal before theAAIFR who may appear before B
i it. The judgment of this court is deemed sufficient notice to all
concerned and the AAIFR need not issue any further notices to
any of the parties.
IV. In case the appellant makes the deposit within the c
specified time it will be open to it to file before the AAIFR a
revised rehabilitation scheme. It will also be open to any other
parties, including the workmen to file before the AAIFR a
rehabilitation scheme for the sick company. In case a revised
scheme is filed the AAIFR will consider it and pass appropriate
D
orders in accordance with law.
.... ~-
V. Most importantly, theAAIFR shall make all endeavours
to dispose of the matter as early as possible and in any event
not later than four months from the date of deposit of Rs.10 crores
by the appellant. E
B. Re. Determination of the lawful dues of the
Workmen:
I. Mr.Justice N.N.Mathur (a retired judge of the Rajasthan
High Court) is appointed Arbitrator under Section 10-B F
_....._
(Rajasthan Amendment) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7.
II. Justice Mathur shall hear representatives of the
management and the workmen and determine the arrears of
wages and other lawful dues payable to the different categories
of workmen of JUL employed in the cement factory, Sawai G
Madhopur, at Phallodi Quarries and in Kanpur Jute Mill (U.P.).
Justice Mathur will take into account, apart from the legal
provisions, the various settlements, arrived at between the
management and the workmen and consider to what extent and
upon whom those settlements are binding. He will then work out H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 5 S.C.R.
+-
A a principle on the basis of which the dues of every individual
workmEm may be fixed and the total dues of all the workmen .
may thus be reckoned.
Ill. Justice Mathur shall make his award and sign it as
provided under Section 10-F within four months from the date
B of receipt/production of a copy of this order. He shall forward a J.,
copy of the award made by him to the parties, the
Commissioner of Labour, the Registrar and the State
Government as provided under Section 10-1. The Registrar shall
enter it in the register kept for the purpose and the State
c Government shall publish the award under Section 17 of the Act
without any delay.
IV. JUL/GDCL shall pay to Mr.Justice N.N.Mathur within
one month from to day a sum of Rs.2 lakh as his honorarium
and an additional sum of Rs.1.5 lakh to meet the salary of the
D
staff ~ind other incidental expenses, including traveling ')<
...
expenses.
V. The Commissioner-cum-Secretary Industries (GR-I)
Department, the Labour Commissioner, Government of
E Rajasthan, the Labour Commissioner Government of U.P.. and
the Collector(s) of the district(s) where the cement factory and
Phallodi Quarry are situate and the Collector, Kanpur shall extend
all help and assistance to Mr.Justice Mathur as may be required
by him in connection with the proceedings.
F 39. The appeal is disposed of with the above observations _).,
and directions. No Costs.
D.G. Appeal disposed of.
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