CHADAT SINGHversusBAHADUR RAMA AND ORS.

A                              CHADAT SINGH
                                       v.
                        BAHADUR RAMA AND ORS.

                               AUGUST 3, 2004

B              [ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.]

         Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section JOO-Second appeal-
    Disposal of by High Court without formulating substantial question of
    law-Justification of-Held : It is for the High Court to formulate a
C   substantial question of/aw and hear the appeal on the questionformulated-
    In absence of the same, such judgment cannot be maintained and matter
    is remitted back to High Court for fresh decision.

         In these appeals, the issue involved was as to whether the High
D   Court was justified in disposing of the second appeal without formulating
    the substantial question of law, as mandated by Section 199 CPC.

         Disposing of the appeals, the Court

         HELD: 1.1. In view of Section 100 CPC, 1908, the memorandum
E   of appeal shall precisely state substantial question or questions of law
    involved in the appeal as required under sub-section (3) of Section 100.
    Where High Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial question
    of law is involved it shall formulate that question under sub-section (4)
    and the second appeal has to be heard on the question so formulated
F   as stated in sub-section (5) of Section 100. (300-A-B(

         1.2. In the instant case, a perusal of the impugned judgment
    passed by High Court does not show that any substantial question of
    law has been formulated or that the second appeal was heard on the
    question, if any, so formulated and as such the judgment cannot be
G   maintained. The matters are remitted back to High Court for disposal
    in accordance with law. [300-H; 301-A; 302-B]

        Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, (2000) 1 SCC 434; Roop Singh v.
    Ram Singh, [20001 3 SCC 708 and Kanahaiyalal and Ors. v. Anupkumar
H   and Ors., JT (2002) 10 SC 98, referred to.
                                       298
       CHADAT SINGH v. BAHADUR RAMA [PASAYAT, J.]                    299

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 4903- A
4905 of 2004.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 29.4.2002 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in C.M. No. 29-C/2002, C.M. No. 2070-C of 2002
and order 10.8.2001 passed in RSA No. 594 of 1995.                 B
      Mahabir Singh, Rakesh Dahiya, Ms. Madhusmita Bora and Nikhil
Jain, for the Appellant.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                           c
     ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.: Leave granted.

      As the only point on which notice was issued related to the desirability
of disposing of the Second Appeal in tenns of Section 100 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the 'Code') without fonnulating the D
substantial question of law by the High Court, it is not necessary to deal
with the factual aspects in detail. The second appel!l and two miscellaneous
petitions were disposed of by a common judgment which fonn matrix of
the present appeals.

     Respondent-Bahadur Ram filed a suit for specific perfonnance E
against 9 defendants. The suit was decreed by the trial Court. However,
the same was upset by learned Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra
Bahadur Ram filed Second Appeal No. 594/1995 against the judgment of
learned Additional District Judge. By the impugned judgment the trial
Court's judgment and decree have been restored and that of the first F
Appellate Court was reversed.

     Thought various points were urged by learned counsel for the
appellant it is not necessary to go into those aspects in view of the limited
scope of the present appeals in view of the notice issued. There is no G
appearance on behalf of the respondents.

     Mr. Mahabir Singh, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that
the High Court was not justified in disposing of the Second Appeal without
formulating the substantial question or questions of law as mandated by
Section JOO of the Code.                                                   H
    300                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A         In view of Section JOO of the Code the memorandum of appeal shall
    precisely state substantial question or questions of law involved in the
    appeal as required under sub-section (3) of Section I 00. Where the High
    Court is satisfied that in any case any substantial question oflaw is involved
    it shall formulate that question under sub-section (4) and the second appeal
B   has to be heard on the question so formulated as stated in sub-section (5)
    of Section 100.

         Section 100 of the Code deals with "Second Appeal". The provision
    reads as follows :

C                 "Section 100-{I) Save as otherwise expressly provided in
             the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in
             force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree
             passed in appeal by any Court subordinate to the High Court, if
             the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial
D            question of law.

             (2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree
             passed ex parte.

             (3) In an appeal under this Section, the memorandum of appeal
E            shall precisely state the substantial question oflaw involved in the
             appeal.

             (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question
             of Jaw is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.

F            (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and
             the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to
             argue that the case does not involve such question :

                   Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to
             take away or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons
G            to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question oflaw,
             not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such
             question."

         A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does
H   not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that
       CHADAT SINGH v. BAHADUR RAMA [PASAYAT, J.]                       301

the second appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That A
being so, the judgment cannot be maintained.

     In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal, [2000] I SCC 434 this Court in
para I 0, has stated thus :

        "I 0. Now under Section I 00 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it
                                                                               B
        is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question
        oflaw and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first
        appellate Court without doing so."

     Yet again in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, [2000] 3 SCC 708 this Court C
has expressed thatthe jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals
involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:

        "7. It is to be reiterated that under section I 00 CPC jurisdiction
        of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only D
        to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and
        it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere
        with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under
        section I 00 CPC. That apart, at the time o disposing of the matter
        the High Court did not even notice the question oflaw formulated E
        by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is no
        reference of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact
        findings courts after appreciating the evidence held that the
        defendant entered into the possession of the premises as a batai,
        that is to say, as a tenant and his possession was permissive and
        there was no pleading or proof as to when it became adverse and F
        hostile. These findings recorded by the two courts below were
        based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on
        record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in
        those findings. If the defendant got the possession of suit land as
        a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the permissive G
         possession it is for him to establish by cogent and convincing
        evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the
         knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for a long time
         does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse
         possession (Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar, [1994] 6 sec H
    302               SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2004] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A           591 ). Hence the High Court ought not to have interfered with the
            findings of fact recorded by both the courts below."

        The position has been reiterated in Kanahaiyalal and Ors. v.
    Anupkumar and Ors., JT (2002) I 0 SC 98.

B        In the circumstances, the impugned judgment is set aside. We remit
    these matters to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. The
    appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.

    N.J.                                               Appeals disposed of.