Holding

The employee was not deprived of his right of appeal; the mercy petition was validly treated as an appeal and its rejection, being final, did not cause prejudice.

Summary

M. Kurmi Naidu, an Assistant Engineer of the A.P. State Electricity Board, was charged with misconduct and, after an enquiry, the Chairman (the Board's appellate authority) imposed compulsory retirement. Naidu filed a mercy petition, which the Board treated as an appeal and rejected. He contended that he was denied a proper forum of appeal because the disciplinary authority (the Member Secretary) did not impose the punishment, alleging a violation of natural justice and Article 14. The High Court dismissed his writ petition, but the Supreme Court held that the mercy petition, under Regulation 7(e) of the Board's Discipline Appeal Regulations, constituted a valid appeal and its rejection was final and unchallenged. Consequently, no deprivation of the right to appeal or prejudice was found, and the order of compulsory retirement was upheld. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgments and allowed the appeal.

Issues considered

Whether the employee was deprived of his statutory right of appeal when the punishment was imposed by the appellate authority instead of the disciplinary authority.
Whether a mercy petition filed under the Board's regulations can be treated as an appeal under Regulation 7(e).
Whether the lack of concurrence of the committee, as required by the proviso to Regulation 10, renders the compulsory retirement order invalid and prejudicial.
Whether the Board's order rejecting the appeal had attained finality and could be reviewed.

Subjects

service lawdisciplinary actioncompulsory retirementright of appealnatural justiceRegulation 7(e)mercy petitionprejudiceappellate authoritydisciplinary authorityArticle 14

Judgment

A CHAIRMAN, A.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ORS.
v.
M. KURMI NAIDU

SEPTEMBER 13, 2006 ..
B [H.K. SEMA AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, JJ.]

Service law:

C Departmental appeal-Deprivation-Punishment to delinquent
employee not given by Disciplinary Authority but by Appellate Authority--
Mercy petition thereagainst by the employee treated as appeal and dismissed-
Dismissal of appeal not assailed-Writ petition on the ground that employee
was deprived of forum of appeal-The claim of employee denied by Single
Judge as well as Division Bench of High Court-In appeal, held: Employee
D was not deprived of right to appeal as the mercy petition was treated as
appeal petilion-A.P.S.E. Board Employees Discipline Appeal Regulations,
/99J-Regulation 7(e).

Charge memo was issued against the respondent-employee. On report
E of the Enquiry Officer holding that the charge was proved against him,
Chairman of the Board (the appellate authority) inflicted the punishment of
compulsory retirement from service. The respondent then filed mercy petition,
which was treated as an appeal and the same was rejected by the Board.

Respondent filed Writ Petition alleging that he was deprived of right to
F appeal as Disciplinary Authority being competent to impose punishment did
not exercise its right and the same was exercised by the Chairman (Appellate
Authority) thereby depriving forum of appeal before the Chairman. Single
Jude dismissed the petition of the respondent. Writ appeal thereagainst was
also dismissed by Division Bench of High Court. Hence the present appeal.

G Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. There i~ no dispute that the Member Secretary of the Board
was the disciplinary authority. Show cause notice was issued under the
signature of the Member Secretary, the disciplinary authority. However, the
H penalty of compulsory retirement from service was inflicted by the Chairman
34
CHAIRMAN, A.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD v. M. KURMI NAIDU[H.K. SEMA, J.] 35

of the Board, who is the Appellate Authority. Both the Single Judge and the A
Division Bench have failed to notice that despite the aforesaid facts, the
respondent was not deprived of the right of appeal An appeal lay to the Board.
Ultimately, the respondent has filed before the Board a detailed petition styled
as mercy petition. Though it was styled as mercy petition, the Board has
treated the petition as an appeal petition. The Board after considering the B
appeal rejected the same. The order passed by the Board rejecting the appeal
of the respondent has not been assailed either before the Single Judge or
before the Division Bench. Uhas attained finality. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the appellant was deprived of the remedy of appeal, which caused
prejudice to him. 138-G; 39-Dl

2. It cannot be said that since the imposition of compulsory retirement
c
was inflicted by the Chairman, the case of the respondent has been prejudiced
as the order passed by the Chairman was not subjected to concurrence. All
the grievances were considered by the Board, and were rejected. Hence, in
the given facts of this case, no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the
respondent. The respondent has not taken grievances of the Board's order of D
dismissal of appeal. This would show that he was satisfied with the appellate
order of the Board. 139-F-Hl

Surjit Ghosh v. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial
Bank, [1995] 2 SCC 474 and Balbir Chand v. Food Corporation of India
Ltd, 11997) 3 sec 371, referred to. E
• ,ctVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3632 of2003.

From the Judgment and Order dated 8.10.2001 of the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in W.A. No. 1507/200 I.
F
G. Umapathy and Rakesh K. Sharma for the Appellants.

L.N. Rao, R. Santhann Krishnan, K. RadhaRani, P. Vijay Kumar and D.
Mahesh Babu for the Respondent.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

H.K. SEMA, J. l.A.No.3 for substituting the name of Transmission
·Corporation of Andhra Pradesh limited (APTRANSCO) in place of Andhra
Pradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB) is allowed. The appellants shall now
H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {20061 SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

· A be read as Chairman. Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Limited
(APTRANSCO).

The challenge in this appeal is to the order dated 8.10.200 I passed by
the Division Bench in Writ Appeal No.1507 of 200 I affirming the order dated
27.4.200 I passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.16332 of
..
B 1996, whereby the appeal tiled by the appellants was dismissed with costs.

Briefly stated, the facts are as follows:-

The respondent at the relevant time was working as Assistant Engineer
under the Board. He was served with a charge memo dated 18.10.1993. The
C charge reads:-

"Sri M Kurmi Naidu, Asst.Engineer/ Operation/Sakur reported to have
released unauthorized agricultural pumpsets by violating set norms,
rules and regulations which constitute misconduct as per A.P.S.E.
Board (Revised) Conduct Regulations".
D
The respondent submitted his explanation to the charge. Not being
satisfied with the explanation, an Enquiry Officer was appointed, who submitted
the Repurt holding the charge found proved against the respondent. After
being satisfied with the inquiry Report, the Chairman of the Board, admittedly
E the Appellate Authority inflicted the punishment of compulsory retirement
from service. It is not disputed that the disciplinary authority is the Member
Secretary of the Board. However, the punishment of compulsory retirement
from service was inflicted upon the respondent by the Chairman of the Board
who is the Appellate Authority.

F The controversy raised before the learned single Judge as well as
before the Division Bench was that the disciplinary authority is the Member
Secretary of the Board who is competent to impose punishment upon the
respondent but the punishment was inflicted by the Chairman who is the
Appellate Authority, thereby the respondent was deprived of the forum of
appeal before the Chairman and prejudice has been caused to the respondent
G and the same is violative of the principles of natural justice.

The Division Bench of rhe High Court after referring to the decision
rendered by this Court in Swjit Ghosh v. Chairman & Managing Director,
United Commercial Bank, (1995] 2 SCC 474 distinguished by this Court in

H
CHAIRMAN, A.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARDr. M. KURMI NAIDU[H.K. SEMA, J] 37
Balbir Chand v. Food Corporation of India Ltd., (1997) 3 SCC 371 arrived A
at the following conclusion:-

"There cannot be, having regard to the several decisions of the Apex
Court any doubt whatsoever that a valuable right cannot be taken
away except by or in accordance with statute. When a right of appeal
has been provided to a delinquent employee such a right in our B
opinion except for just cause cannot be taken away nor a delinquent
Officer cai1 be deprived thereof. Regulation 7 (e) is in general terms.
However, as indicated hereinbefore the Proviso appended to clause
(2) of Regulation I0 specifically states that punishment of compulsory
retirement, which comes within the pro lisions of clause 6 to Explanation C
(I) of Regulation 5, shall be imposed by the competent authority with
the concurrence of the committee constituted thereunder. An order
passed by the Chairman of the Board is, however, not subject to
concurrence. A valuable safeguard has, therefore, been provided in
favour of a delinquent officer to the effect that only the disciplinary
authority is required to apply its mind as regards the finding of guilt D
arrived at by the Enquiry Officer, but also such findings are subject
to a further scrutiny by a competent authority."

Regulation 7(e) of A.P.S.E. Board Employees Discipline Appeal
Regulations 1990 (in short the Regulation) provides that powers vested in an
authority may be exercised by a superior authority in its discretion. It reads: E

"7(e) Powers vested in an authority may be exercised by a superior
authority in its discretion.
A
"Note (I): powers vested in an authority may be exercised by a
superior authority in its discretion vide Regulation 7(e) of A.P.S.E. F
Board Employees Discipline Appeal Regulations".

The question is as to whether the respondent was at all deprived of his
right of appeal in the present case. In Surjit Ghosh (supra) this Court held
at sec p.4 77 as under:
G
"However, when an appeal is provided to the higher authority
concerned against the order of the disciplinary authority or of a lower
authority and the higher authority passes an order of punishment, the
employee concerned is deprived of the remedy of appeal which is a
substantive right given to him by the Rules/Regulations. An employee
H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A cannot be deprived of his substantive right. What is further, when
there is a provision of appeal against the order of the disciplinary
authority and when the appellate or the higher authority against
whose order there is no appeal, exercises the powers of the disciplinary
authority in a given case, it results in discrimination against the ...
employee concerned".
B
It is to be noted that in Surjit Ghosh (supra) there was no further appeal
provision provided against the order of the higher authority and no appeal
could be preferred and, therefore, the appellant was deprived of the appeal
provision. It is in those circumstances the above observation was made.
C Surjit Ghosh 's case was reconsidered and distinguished again by this Court
in Balbir Chand's case (supra). It was pointed out at sec p.373 as under:-

"It is now well settled legal position that an authority lower then the
appointing authority cannot take any decision in the matter of
disciplinary action. But there is no prohibition in law that the higher
D authority should not take decision or impose the penalty as the
primary authority in the matter of disciplinary action. On that basis.
it cannot be said that there will be discrimination violating Article 14
of the Constitution or causing material prejudice. In the judgment
relied on by the counsel, it would appear that in the Rules, officer
lower in hierarchy was the disciplinary authority but the appellate
E authority had passed the order removing the officer from service.
Thereby, appellate remedy provided under the Rules was denied. In
those circumstances, this Court opined that it caused prejudice to the
delinquent as he would have otherwise availed of the appellate remedy
and his right to consider his case by an appellate authority on question •
of fact was not available. But it cannot be laid as a rule of law that
F in all circumstances the higher authority should consider and decide
the case imposing penalty as a primary authority under the Rules, In
this case, a right of second appeal/revision also was provided to the
Board. In fact, appeal was preferred to the Board. The Board elaborately
considered the matter through the Chairman. It is not violative of
G Article 14 of the Constitution".

Reverting back to the facts of the given case there is no dispute that
the Member Secretary of the Board was the disciplinary authority. Show
cause notice was issued under the signature of the Member Secretary, the
disciplinary authority. However, the penalty of compulsory retirement from
H
CHAIRMAN, A.P. STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD i·. M. KURMI NAIDUlH.K. SEMA, J.] 39

service was inflicted by the Chairman of the Board, who it is not disputed, A
is the Appellate Authority. What both the learned Single Judge and the
Division Bench have failed to notice was that despite the aforesaid facts the
respondent was not deprived of the right of appeal. An appeal lay to the
Board. Ultimately, the respondent has filed before the Board a detailed petition
styled as mercy petition on I. I0. J995 questioning the order of show cause B
dated 9.1.1995 and his explanation submitted to final show cause notice dated
7.2.1995 and challenged the final order passed by the Chairman on 6.9.1995.
Though it was styled as mercy petition, the Board has treated the petition as
an appeal petition. The Board after considering the appeal rejected the same
by an order dated 31.8.1996.

It appears that the order dated 31.8.1996 passed by the Board rejecting
c
his appeal has not been assailed either before the learned Single Judge or
before the Division Bench. It has attained finality. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the appellant was deprived of the remedy of appeal, which caused
prejudice to him.
D
Mr. L.N. Rao, learned senior counsel, however, contended that prejudice
has been caused to the respondent as the punishment of compulsory retirement
imposable under the proviso appended to clause (2) of Regulation I 0 provides
that punishment of compulsory retirement which comes within.the provision
of clause 6 to Explanation (I) of Regulation 5 shall be imposed by the
competent authority with the concurrence of the committee, constituted E
thereunder. According to him the order passed by the Chairman of the Board
is not however subject to concurrence of the committee. It is his further say
that if the order inflicting compulsory retirement would have been passed by
the disciplinary authority, such order could have been subjected to concurrence
of the committee. However, in the present case, since the imposition of p
compulsory retirement was inflicted by the Chairman, the case of the respondent
has been prejudiced as the order passed by the Chairman was not subjected
to concurrence. We are unable to accept this contention. As already noticed
all the grievances laid by the respondent in detail in his appeal memo dated
1.10.1995 were considered by the highest hierarchy, namely the Board, and
was rejected. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in the given facts of this G
.. case, no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the respondent. As
already noticed, the respondent has not taken grievances of the Board's order
dated 31.8.1996. This would show that he was satisfied with the appellate
order of the Board.
H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A In the view that we have taken the order of the learned Single Judge
dated 27.4.2001 passed in W.P. No.16332of1996 and the order of the Division
Bench dated 8.10.2001 passed in Writ Appeal No.1507 of 2001 are not
sustainable in law. They are, accordingly. set aside. The appeal is allowed.
Writ Petition filed by the respondent stands dismissed. Patties are asked to
bear their own costs.
B
K.K.T. Appeal allowed.

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