CHAIRMAN, TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD, MADRASversusT.N. GANAPATHY

     CHAIRMAN, TAMIL NADU HOUSING BOARD, MADRAS
A
                          v.
                   T.N. GANAPATHY
                                                                                   )...
                              FEBRUARY 7, 1990

B      [LALIT MOHAN SHARMA AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.]

          Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order I Rule 8 -Suit filed in
    representative capacity--Interest to be common or common grievance
    to be redressed-Persons need not have same cause of action.

           In pursuance of a Housing Scheme the Tamil Nadn Housing
                                                                                   '
c   Board, Madras had allotted residential plots over the land acquired
    ynder the Land Acquisition Act, to. different groups of applicants
    including the low-income group on terms and conditions stipulated in
    the lease deed Exh. B-3 sometime in the year 1963. Aller a lapse of more
    than a decade of the allotment, fresh demands were made from the               ).
D   allottees in 1975. Objecting to the same, the respondent herein tiled a
    snit for self and on behalf of all the allottees of low-income group settled
    in the Colony named Ashok Nagar, praying for a permanent injunction
    restraining the Board from enforcing the demand.


E
           The defendant-Board questioned the very maintainability of the
    snit in a representative capacity and also pleaded that it was entitled to
    finally determine the correct prices for the plots after taking into
                                                                                   J
    account the final award of the compensation for acquired land and
    until then the prices were tentative. The trial court negatived the objec-
    lion to the maintainability of the snit but dismissed it on merits. The
    first appellate court confirmed the decree. On second appeal, the High
F   Court reversed the finding on merits. The High Court held that it was



                                                                                   ~
    open to the Board to determine within a reasonable time what portion of
    the demand included the excess on account of compensation awarded by
    the courts for acquisition of the land and realize the same after serving
    fresh demand notices. But since the impugned demand included both
    the excess amount of compensation as also the additional developmental
0   charges injunction was granted in regard to the entire demand as the
    two amounts were not separately mentioned. Dismissing the appeal of
    the Board, this Court,

          HELD: The provisions of Order I of Rule 8 have been included in
    the Code in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of litigation.
                                                                                   r
H   Tiie condition necessary for application of the provisions is that the

                                      272
         HOUSING BOARD v. T.N. GANAPATHY {SHARMA, J.]               273

persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must have the same       A
interest. In other words either the interest musi be' common or they
must have a common grievance which they seek to get redressed. [276C-D I

     The Court, while considering whether leave under the Rule
should be granted or not, should examine whether there is sntlicient
community of interest to justify the adoption of the procedure provided B
under the Rule. [276E]

     Persons who may be represented in a suit under Order I, Rule 8
need not have the same cause of action. [277FJ

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3002 C
of 1983.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 20.8.1982 of the Madras
High Court in S.A. No. 83of1982.

    G. Ramaswamy (N.P.), Mrs. Anjani and K. Ramkumar for the D
Appellant.

      P .S. Pgti and K. V. Sreekumar for the Respondent.

      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      SHARMA, J. This appeal by special leave arises out of a suit
filed by the respondent in representative capacity for permanent
injunction against the appellant Tamil Nadu Housing Board from
demanding and collecting from the allottees any additional amount for
settlement of lands with buildings in the colony Ashok Nagar fully
des~ribed in the plaint.                                              F

      2. In pursuance of a Housing Scheme the. appellant-Board pro-
ceeded to settle a large number of residential plots to different groups
of applicants including one described as low-income group. A number
of allottees, including the plaintiff-respondent, were selected and set-
tlement in their favour was made in 1963. J,.. oopy of the document G
executed separately in respect to the plots is on the record of this case
as Exh. B-3, setting out the terms and conditions of the lease. The
term as mentioned in the 15th clause, which is quoted below, has been
referred to by the parties in support of their respective cases:

            "15. The Lessor agrees to sell the property more particu- H
    274                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1990) 1 S.C.R.
                larly described in the schedule hereunder to the Lessee for
A
                such price as the Administrative Officer of the Lessor may
                at any time in his sole discretion fix, and at which time the
                Administrative Officer of the Lessor is entitled to consider
                details regarding development charges, cost of amenities,
                cost of buildings, etc., and whether the price of the land
B               acquired under the Land Acquisition Act together with
                suitable modifications thereto by the local laws has become
                final by a conclusive adjudication thereon by the concerned
                Tribunals and Courts. The final decision of the Administra-
                tive Officer of the Lessor. as to the final price of the pro-
                perty as determined under these presents is conclusive and
                binding on the Lessee and the Lessee agrees to purchase
c               the property from the Lessor at the said price on the terms
                and conditions hereinafter mentioned.

                       Excepting the fixation of price with reference to the
                claim or compensation adjudicated or awarded by courts
D               finally and conclusively with regard to the lands acquired
                under the scheme, the Lessor shall fix the price of the
                property after taking into consideration the development
                charges, cost of amenities and buildings etc .. within a
                period of three years from the date of allotment and which
                price is subject only to a revision on account of excess
E               compensation if any awarded by courts for the lands as
                aforesaid.··

    Tentative' price for the property was fixed, subject to a final deter-
    mination within a stipulated period under the agreement and the allot-
    tees occupied the properties on that basis. After a lapse of more than a
F   decade fresh demands were made in 1975 threatening dispossession in
    case of non-payment, which led to the filing of the suit. It is stated in
    the plaint that the cases of all the allottees in low-income group of
    Ashok N agar made under the lease deeds are identical and the plaintiff
    was representing them in asking for permanent injunction restraining
    the Board from enforcing the belated supplementary demands.
G
          3. Besides, objecting to the maintainability of the suit, the
    defendant-Board pleaded that it was entitled in law to finally deter-
    mine the correct price for the settlement of the properties even            )
    belatedly, and the challenged demands were perfectly valid. It was
    stated that the land for the scheme had been acquired under the provi-
H   sions of the Land Acquisition Act, and until the final award of the
                 HOUSING BOARD v. T.N. GANAPATHY [SHARMA, J.]               275·

        compensation for the acquired lands was made, the value of the lands .A
.I_     was not capable of being ascertained. The trial court overruled the
   '·   technical pleas, but, dismissed the suit on merits. The first appellate
        court confirmed the decree.

               4. The plaintiff filed a second appeal to the Madras High Court,
        and the Housing Board a cross-objection against t.he adverse findings. ·B
        The High Court while confirming the maintainability of the suit
        reversed the finding on merits and passed a decree. The impugned·
        demand included the excess compensation awarded by courts for
        acquisition of the land as also the development charges, cost of
        amenities and buildings, etc., without splitting up the two demands.
        The High Court held tha.t it was open to the Board to determine within
        a reasonable time what portion of the additional demand represented C
        the excess compensation awarded for the lands and to take steps for its
        realisation after service of a demand notice on the allottee, but,
   \    granted a decree for injunction in regard to the entire demand at the
        present stage as the two amounts have not been separately mentioned.
                                                                                   D
               5. The learned counsel for the appellant has pressed two points
        in support of the appeal, namely, the decision of the High Court on the
        merits of the dispute is erroneous and that the provisions of Order I,
        Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure in any event are not applicable to
        the case and the suit, as a representative suit, is not maintainable.
                                                                                   E
               6. The second paragraph of clause 15 of the lease deed explicitly
        directs the Board to assess the final amount on account of the develop·
        ment charges, cost of amenities and buildings, etc. within a period of
        three years from the date of the allotment, and there does not appear
        to be any reason for constr11ing the provisions differently. The High
        Court at considerable length considered this aspect, pointing out the F
        unexplained long delay of about a decade after completion of the
        constructions, etc. on the part of the Board. There was no difficulty at
        all in making the final calculation in time, and taking steps for recovery
        of the same. We entirely agree with the view of the High Court. The
        Court was also right in permitting the Board to make a fresh additional
        demand in regard to the enhancement in the compensation for the G
        acquired lands and the respondents do not have any objection to that
(       part.

              7. On the question of maintainability of the suit in a representa-
        tive capacity under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it
        has been contended that since the injury complained of is in regard to H
      276                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1990] 1 S.C.R.

 A   demand of money and that too by a separate demand against each of
     lhe allottees, giving rise to different causes of action, the Rule 1 has
     no application. The learned counsel proceeded to say that it is not           ',
     known whether each of the allottees in Ashok Nagar had been even
     served with an additional demand before the suit was filed; and further
     emphasised that those who had been so served are interested in defeat-
 B   ing only the demand individually referable to each of them. Each one
     of them is not interested in what happens to the others. It is, therefore,
     suggested that only such of the allottees who have already been served
     with additional demands are entitled to maintain an action in court,
     and they also should do it by filing separate suits. We do not find any
     merit in the argument. The provisions of Order l of Rule 8 have been
     i.ncluded in the Code in the public interest so as to avoid multiplicity of
 c   lillgation. The condition necessary for application of the provisions is
     that the persons on whose behalf the suit is being brought must have
     the same interest. In other words either the interest must be common
     or they must have a common grievances which they seek to get redres-          J
     sed. In Kvdia Goundar and Another v. Ve/andi Goundar and others,
.o   lLR 1955 Madras 339, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court
     observed that on the plain language of Order. 1, Rule 8, the principal
     requirement to bring a suit within that Rule is the sameness of interest
     of the numerous persons on whose behalf or for whose benefit the suit
     is instituted. The Court, while considering whether leave under the
     Rule should be granted or not, should examine whether there is suffi-
 E   cient community of inte.rest to justify the adoption of the procedure
     provided under the. Rule. The object for which this provision is enac-
     ted is really to facilitate the decision of questions, in which a large
     number of persons are interested, without recourse to the ordinary
     procedure. The provision must, therefore, receive an interpretation
     which will subserve the object for its enactment. There are no words in
 F   the Rule to limit its scope to any particular category of suits or to
     exclude a suit in regard to a claim for money or for in junction as the
     present one.

            8. Coming to the relevant circumstances in the present case it
     will be seen that all the allotments in Ashok Nagar were made under
 G the same Scheme and all the relevant facts are common. The basis of
     the impugned demand of the appellant is equally applicable to all the
     allottees and the plea of the plaintiff is available to all of them. The
     trial court was, therefore, perfectly right in permitting the plaintiff to
     proceed under Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
     Nobody in this situation can complain of any inconvenience or
 H . injustice. On the other hand, the appellant is being saved from being
                                                      '
              HOUSING BOARD v. T.N. GANAPATHY [SHARMA, J.]                  277

    involved in unnecessary repeated litigation.                                   A

          9. It is true that each of the allottees is interested individually in
    fighting out the demand separately made or going to be made on him
    and, thus, separate causes of action arise in the case, but, that does
    not make Order 1, Rule 8 inapplicable. Earlier there was some doubt            B
    about the Rule covering such a case which now stands clarified by the
    Explanation introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment)
    Act, 1976, which reads as follows:                                         ·

                "Explanation-For the purpose of determining whether
                the persons who sue or are sued, or defend, have the same
                interest in one suit, it is not necessary to establish that such C
                persons have the same cause of action as the persons on
                whose behalf, or for whose benefit, they sue or are sued, or
                defend the suit, as the case may be."

    The objects and reasons for the amendment were stated below:
                                                                                   D
                "OBJECTS AND REASONS: Clause 55; sub-clause
                (iv),-Rule 8 of Order l deals with representative suits.
                Under this rule, where there are numerous persons having
                the same interest in one suit, one or more of them may,
                with the permission of the Court, sue or be sued, on behalf E
                of all of them. The rule has created a doubt as to whether
                the party representing others should have the same cause
                of action as the persons represented by him. The rule is
                being substituted by a new rule and an explanation is being
                added to clarify that such persons need not have the same
                cause of action."                       ·
                                                                            F
    There is, therefore, no doubt that the persons who may be represented
    in a suit under Order I, Rule 8 need not have the same cause of action.
    The trial court in the present case was tight in permitting the respondem
    to sue on behalf of all the allottees of Ashok Nagar. We, therefore. do
    not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed with costs. Before G
    closing, however, we would like to point out that the plaintiff has
    represented only those in the low income group in Ashok Nagar who
    will be governed by this judgment, and nothing what has been said or
{   decided in this case is applicable to any other group or colony.

    R.N.J.                                                   Appeal dismissed.
                                                                                   H