Holding

Employees who acquiesced in their retirement and filed writ petitions after a considerable delay are barred by laches from obtaining the relief granted to those who challenged their retirement while still in service.

Summary

The Supreme Court considered a batch of appeals filed by the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam against High Court orders that had allowed retired employees, who had retired at the statutory age of 58, to continue service up to 60 years and claim two years' salary. The Court noted that a prior decision (Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer) had established the right to such relief for employees who challenged their retirement while still in service. However, many of the appellants had accepted their retirement, collected post‑retirement benefits and only filed writ petitions years later. Relying on the doctrine of delay and laches, and on the potential financial collapse of the Nigam, the Court held that such belated claimants were not entitled to relief. Relief was limited to those who had filed petitions before retirement or obtained interim orders. The appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court orders for the late claimants.

Issues considered

Whether employees who retired at 58 and filed writ petitions after the Harwindra Kumar judgment are entitled to continuation of service up to 60 years and salary for the intervening period.
Whether the doctrine of delay and laches bars discretionary relief under Article 226 in such cases.
Whether the financial burden on the employer justifies denial of relief to belated claimants.
Whether relief should be confined to petitioners who were vigilant and filed writ petitions while still in service or obtained interim orders.

Subjects

Article 226writ petitiondelaylachessuperannuationretirement agepublic sector employeefinancial burdendiscretionary relief

Judgment

A CHAIRMAN, U.P. JAL NIGAM AND ANR.
v.
JASWANT SINGH AND ANR.

NOVEMBER I 0, 2006

B [DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN AND A.K. MATHUR, JJ.]

Constitution of India-Article 226-Writ Petitions by employees
challenging their age of superannuation at 58 years on the ground that the
age ofsuperannuation ofthe State Government employees is 60 years-Supreme
C Court in Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik & Ors., [2005) 13 SCC
300 held the superannuation age to be 60 years-Writ Petitions by employees,
who retired long time back and accepted post-retirement benefits, claiming
payment ofsalary for the two years in the light ofthe Supreme Court judgment-
High Court allowed the Writ Petitions -Correctness of-Held, employees are
D not entitled to any relief because of delay and !aches.

Some of the employees of appellant-organisation, who retired on
attaining the age of superannuation at 58 years, filed Writ Petitions before
High Court challenging the retirement age on the ground that the
retirement age of State Government employees was 60 years and hence
E they should also be allowed to continue to work upto the age of 60 years.
The High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions. This Court, in a batch of
cases, in Harwindra Kumar. v. Chief Engineer, Karmik & Ors. [2005) 13 SCC
300 held that the employees are entitled to continue to work upto the age
. of 60 years. This Court further held that in case of those employees who
F have not been allowed to continue to work by the appellant after
completing the age of 58 years, they would be entitled to payment of salary
for the remaining period upto the age of 60 years. On the basis of this
Court's judgment in Harwindra Kumar, a number of writ petitions were
filed by the respondents, who had retired long back and accepted the post-
retirement benefits without challenging the retirement age earlier. The
G High Court disposed of the Writ Petitions in the light of the judgment in
Harwindra Kumar.

In appeal to this Court, the appellant-organisation contended that
the respondents are guilty of delay and laches and hence they should not

H 916
... CHAIRMAN, U.P. JAL NIGAM v. JASWANT SINGH 917
be granted any relief; that, if the celief is granted at this belated stage, it A
will cause a huge financial burden; that there is no sufficient fund for
incurring the huge ·financial burden and it will completely ruin the
financial condition of the organisation; and that the relief should be
confined to those persons who were continuing in service and filed lheir
writ petitions in time.
B
Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1. The respondents are guilty since they have acquiesced
in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they
were vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in C
the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants did not rise
to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, Court
should be very slow in granting the relfof to the incumbent. (923-D-EJ

~ Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik & Ors., (20051 13 SCC
300; Mis Rup Diamond & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (198912SCC356; D
State of Karnataka & Ors. v. S.M. Kotrayya & Ors., [1996) 6 SCC 267;
Jagdish Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 538; Union of
India & Ors. v. CK. Dharagupta & Ors., (199713 SCC 395; Government of
W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy & Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 347 and Dayal Singh & Ors. v.
Union of India & Ors., [2003) 2 SCC 593, referred to.
E
1.2. If the respondents had challenged their retirement in time,
perhaps the appellant would .have taken appropriate steps to raise funds
to meet the liability. [923-F)
In case, at this belated stage, if similar relief is given to the
respondents, that will unnecessarily overburden the appellant-organisation F
and the organisation will completely collapse with the liability of payment
to these persons in terms of two years' salary and increased benefit of
pension and other consequential benefits. Therefore, this Court is not
inclined to grant any relief to the persons who have approached the Court
after their retirement age. Only those persons who have filed the writ G
petitions when they were in service or who have obtained interim order
for their retirement should be allowed to stand to benefit and not others.
[924-F-HJ
Krishena Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc. (1990) 4 SCC 207
referred to.
H
918 SUPRRME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R. ...
A CIVIL APPEL LA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4790 of 2006.

From the Final Judgment and Order dated 31.1.2006 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in C.M.W.P. No. 5753/2006.

P.P. Rao, Dr. Sumant Bhardwaj, LP. Singh Sheshadri Shekhar, Shamba
B Dutta, Mridula Ray Bharadwaj for the Appellants~
Rachna Gupta, Indra Pratap Singh, Syed Ali Ahmad, Syed Tanweer
Ahmad, S.S. Bandyopadhyay, Shivpati B. Pandey, Shahanawaz Hasan and
Mohan Pandey for the Respondent No. I.

C Shoba Dikshit, D.K, Goswami for the State of U.P.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A.K. MATHUR, J. Leave granted.

D All this batch of appeals involve similar questions of Jaw :and fact,
therefore, they are disposed of by this common order.

All these respondents are the employees of the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam
(hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Nigam ') and they were retired on attaining
the age of superannuation at 58 years. Some of them filed writ petitions in
E the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad challenging the retirement of the
employees of the Nigam on attaining the age of 58 years whereas the State
Government employees were allowed to continue up to the age of 60 years
and therefore, they should also be allowed to continue up to the age of 60
years. The writ petitions filed before the High Court failed and against that
Civil Appeal No. 7840 of 2002 and batch of other appeals were filed before
F this Court. This Court disposed of the case of Harwindra Kumar along with
other appeals and held that employees of Nigam are entitled to continue up
to 60 years. This has been reported in [2005] 13 SCC 300. The operative
portion of the said judgment reads as under :

"10. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that so Jong
G as Regulation 31 of the Regulations is not amended, 60 years which
is the age of superannuation of government servants employed under
the State of Uttar Pradesh shall be applicable to the employees of the
Nigam. However, it would be open to the Nigam with the previous
approval of the State Government to make suitable amendment in
H Regulation 31 and alter the service conditions of employees of the
CHAIRMAN, U.P. JAL NIGAM v. JASWANT SINGH [A.K. MA THUR, J. ] 919

Nigam, including their age of superannuation. It is needless to say A
that if it is so done, the same shall be prospective.

11. For the foregoing reasons, the appeals as well as writ petitions
are allowed, orders passed by the High Court dismissing the writ
petitions as well as those by the Nigam directing that the appellants
of the civil appeals and the petitioners of the writ petitions would B
superannuate upon completion of the age of 58 years are set aside
and it is directed that in case the employees have been allowed to
continue up to the age of 60 years by virtue of some interim order,
no recovery shall be made from them but in case, however, they have
not been allowed to continue after completing the age of 58 years by
virtue of erroneous decision taken by the Nigam for no fault of theirs, C
they would be entitled to payment of salary for the remaining period
up to the age of 60 years which must be paid to them within a period
of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order by the
/
Nigam. There shall be no order as to costs."
D
It appears that during the pendency of the appeals and writ petitions
before this Court and after disposal of the same by this Court, a spate of writ
petitions followed in the High Court by the employees who had retired long
back. Some of the petitions were filed by the employees who retired on
attaining the age of 58 years long back. However, some were lucky to get
interim orders allowing them to continue in service. Number of writ petitions E
were filed in the High Court in 2005 on various dates after the judgment in
the case of Harwindra Kumar (supra) and some between 2002 and 2005. All
those writ petitions were disposed of in the light of the judgment in the case
of Harwindra Kumar (supra) and relief was given to them for continuing in
service up to the age of 60 years. Hence, all these appeals arise against
various orders passed by the High Court from time to time.
F

So far as the principal issue is concerned, that has been settled by this
Court. Therefore, there is no quarrel over the legal proposition. But the only
question is grant of relief to such other persons who were not vigilant and did
not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same but filed G
writ petitions after the judgment of this Court in the case of Harwindra
Kumar (supra). Whether they are entitled to same relief or not ? Therefore,
a serious question that arises for consiJeration is whether the employees who
did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same, collected
their post retirement benefits, can such persons be given the relief in the light
H
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2-006) SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A of the subsequent decision delivered by this Court ?
The question of delay and !aches has been examined by this Court in
a series of decisions and !aches and delay has been considered to be an
important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of
the Constitution. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces
B with the situation, can his writ petition be heard after a couple of years on
the ground that same relief should be granted to him as was granted to person
similarly situated who was vigilant about his rights and challenged his
retirement which was said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A
chart has been supplied to us in which it has been pointed out that about 9
C writ petitions were filed by the employees of the Nigam before their retirement
wherein their retirement was somewhere between 30.6.2005 and 31.7.2005.
Two writ petitions were filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed.
They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate of writ petitions followed
in which employees who retired in the years 200 I, 2002, 2003, 2004 and
2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 & 2006 much after their retirement.
D Whether such persons should be granted the same relief or not ?

Learned senior counsel for the appellants has invited our attention to
various decisions to impress upon that persons who are guilty of such !aches
and acquiesced with the situation should not be granted any relief because it
is going to cost the Nigam a heavy financial burden to the tune of Rs.17 ,80,
E 43, I 08/-. Therefore, relief should be confined to those persons who were
continuing in service and filed their writ petitions in time but not to all and
sundry who woke up to file the writ petitions much after their retirement. In
this connection, our attention was invited to a decision of this Court in the
case of Mis. Rup Diamonds & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., reported in
F [1989) 2 sec J56, wherein their Lordships observed that those people who
were sitting on the fence till somebody else took up the matter to the court
for refund of duty, cannot be given the benefit. In that context, their Lordships
held as follows :

"Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they had not pursued for
G several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be
dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came
to be decided. Their case cannot be considered on the analogy of one
where a law had been declared unconstitutional and void by a court,
so as to enable persons to recover monies paid under the compulsion
of a law later so declared void. There is also an unexplained, inordinate
H
CHAIRMAN, U.P. JAL NIGAM v. JASWANT SINGH [A.K. MATHUR, J.] 921

delay in preferring the present writ petition which is brought after a A
year after the first rejection. As observed by the Court in Durga
Prashad case, the exchange position of this country and the policy of
the government regarding international trade varies from year to year.
In these matters it is essential that persons who are aggrieved by
orders of the government should approach the High Court after
exhausting the remedies provided by law, rule or order with utmost B
expedition. Therefore, these delays are sufficient to persuade the Court
to decline to interfere. If a right of appeal is available, this order
rejecting the writ petition shall not prejudice petitioners' case in any
such appeal."

Our attention was also invited to a decision of this Court in the case of C
State ofKarnataka & Ors. v. S.MKotrayya & Ors., reported in [1996] 6 SCC
267. In that case the respondents woke up to claim the relief which was
granted to their colleagues by the Tribunal with an application to condone the
delay. The Tribunal condoned the delay. Therefore, the State approached this
Court and this Court after considering the matter observed as under : D
"Although it is not necessary t~ give an explanation for the delay
which occurred within the period mentioned in sub-section (1) or (2)
of Section 21, explanation should be given for the delay which
occasioned after the expiry of the aforesaid respective period applicable
to the appropriate case and the Tribunal should satisfy itself whether E
the explanation offered was proper. In the instant case, the explanation
offered was that they came to know of the relief granted by the
Tribunal in August 1989 and that they filed the petition immediately
thereafter. That is not a proper explanation at all. What was required
of them to explain under sub-sections (1) and (2) was as to why they F
could not avail of the remedy of redressal of their grievances before
the expiry of the period prescribed under sub-section (l) or (2). That
was not the explanation given. Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly
unjustified in condoning the delay."

Similarly, in the case of Jagdish Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. G
reported in [1997] 6 SCC 538, this Court reaffirmed the rule if a person
chose to sit over the matter and then woke up after the decision of the Court,
then such person cannot stand to benefit. In that case it was observed as
follows :

H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

'A " The delay disentitles a party to discretionary relief under Article
226 or Article 32 of the Constitution. The appellants kept sleeping
over their rights for long and woke up when they had the impetus
from Vir Pal Singh Chauhan case. The appellants' desperate attempt
to redo the seniority is not amenable to judicial review at this belated
stage."
B
In the case of Union of India & Ors. v. C.K. Dharagupta & Ors.,
reported in [1997] 3 sec 395, it was observed as follows :

" We, however, clarify that in view of our finding that the judgment
of the Tribunal in R.P.Joshi gives relief only to Joshi, the benefit of
c the said judgment of the Tribunal cannot be extended to any other
person. The respondent C.K.Dharagupta (since retired) is seeking
benefit of Joshi case. In view of our finding that the benefit of the
judgment of the Tribunal dated 17-3-1987 could only be given to
Joshi and nobody else, even Dharagupta is not entitled to any relief."
D In the case of Government of WB. v. Tarun K. Roy & Ors. reported in
[2004) 1 SCC 347, their Lordships considered delay as serious factor and
have not granted relief. Therein it was observed as follows :

" The respondents furthermore are not even entitled to any relief
on the ground of gross delay and !aches on their part in filing the writ
E petition. The first two writ petitions were filed in the year 1976
wherein the respondents herein approached the High Court in 1992.
In between 1976 and 1992 not only two writ p~titions had been
decided, but one way or the other, even the matter had been considered
by this Court in Debdas Kumar. The plea of ·delay, which
F Mr.Krishnamani states, should be a ground for denying the relief to
the other persons similarly situated would operate against the
respondents. Furthermore, the other employees not being before this
Court although they are ventilating their grievances before appropriate
courts of law, no order should be passed which would prejudice their
cause. In such a situation, we are not prepared to make any observation
G only for the purpose of grant of some relief to the respondents to
which they are not legally entitled to so as to deprive others there
from who may be found to be entitled thereto by a court of law."

The statement of law has also been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of
H England, Para 911 , pg. 395 as follows :
CHAIRMAN, U.P. JAL NIGAM v. JASWANT SINGH [A.K. MATHUR, J.] 923

" In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount A
to !aches, the chief points to be considered are :

(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and

(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's
part.
B
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the
violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has
been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust
to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that
which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or C
where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he
has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable
to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such
cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these
considerations rests the doctrine of !aches. "
D
In view of the statement of law as summarized above, the respondents
are guilty since the respondents has acquiesced in accepting the retirement
and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant
enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter.
Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and
did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such E
cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent.
Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence
or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be
prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents
would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of F
the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds
so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents
have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed
writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require
the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussion
on the financial management of the Nigarn. Why the Court should come to G
the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and

- acquiescence.

As against this, our attention was invited to a decision of this Court in
the case of Dayal Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. reported in [2003]
2 SCC 593. In that case their Lordships observed that when the High Court H
924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 8 S.C.R.

A exercised discretion and condoned the delay, it is notproper for the Supreme
Court at the SLP stage to set aside the High Court's order on that ground
alone and more so, where the impugned judgment is legally sustainable. This
case does not provide any assistance to the respondents.

Learned counsel for the appellants has also pointed out that at this
B belated stage if the relief is given to the respondents who have retired and
accepted the retirement, that will cause a huge burden to the Nigam to the
tune of Rs.17,80,43, I 08/- and there is no sufficient funds for incurring such
a huge amount at this belated stage. This will completely ruin the financial
condition of the Nigam if all the persons who were not vigilant and did not
C take up their cause before the Court, it would prove a great set back to the
Nigam. In this regard, a reference was made to a decision of this Court in the
case of Krishena Kumar v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc. reported in [ 1990]
4 SCC 207. In that case the question was to grant pensionary benefit to the
provident fund holders of the railways. A submission was made if the Court
feels that a positive direction cannot be given to the government, it was
D prayed that at least an option should be given to the respondents either to
'withdraw the benefit of switching over to pension from everyone or to give
it to the petitioners as well, so that the discrimination must go. This Court
negatived the submission and it was observed as follows :

" We are not inclined to accept either of these submissions. The
E PF retirees and pension retirees having not belonged to a class, there
is no discrimination. In the matter. of expenditure includible in the
Annual Financial Statement, this Court has to be loath to pass any
order or give any direction, because of the division of functions
between the three co-equal organs of the government under the
F Constitution."

Therefore, in case at this belated stage -i£ similar relief is t~ be given to the
persons who have not approached the Court that will unnecessarily overburden·
the Nigam and the Nigam will completely collapse with the liability of payment
to these persons in terms of two years' salary and increased benefit of pension
G and other consequential benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any
relief to the persons who have approached the Court after their retirement.
Only those persons who have filed the writ petitions when they were in
service or who have obtained interim order for their retirement, those persons
should be allowed to stand to benefit and not others. We have been given a
chart of those nine persons, who filed writ petitions and obtained stay & are
H
'\
CHAIRMAN, U.P. JAL N!GAM ''· JASWANT SINGH [A.K. MATHUR, J.] 925

continuing in service. They are as follows: A
I. Shri Bhawani Sewak Shukla
2. Shri Vijay Bahadur Rai
...
.). Shri Girija Shanker
4. Shri Yogendra Prakash Kulshersht
B
5. Shri Vinod Kumar Bansal
6. Shri Pradumn Prashad Mishra
7. Shri Banke Bihari Pandey
c
8. Shri Yashwant Singh
9. Shri Chandra Shekhar

And the following persons filed Writ Petitions before retirement but no
stay order granted.
D
I. Shri Gopal Singh Dangwal (W/P No. 35384/05 vide order dated
5.5.2005)
2. Shri R.R. Gautam (W/P No. 45495/05 vide order dated 15.6.05)

The benefits shall only be confined to above mentioned persons who
have filed writ petitions before their retirement or they have obtained interim E
order before their retirement. The appeals filed against these persons by the
Nigam shall fail and the same are dismissed. Rest of the appeals are allowed
and orders passed by the High Court are set aside. There would be no order
as to costs.
F
It is submitted that contempt petitions were filed before the High Court.
In view of the order passed in this batch of appeals, the contempt petitions
will not survive and the same are dismissed.

B.S. Appeals disposed of.
G