Holding

The High Court’s revisional jurisdiction under Section 14(8) is confined to verifying that the eviction order is in accordance with law and does not allow re‑appraisal of evidence or treatment of the revision as an appeal.

Summary

The landlords filed an eviction suit under Section 11(1)(c) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982, claiming that the premises were needed in good faith for their own use and for a clinic of the son‑in‑law. The trial court, after examining the evidence, held that the requirement was bona fide and ordered eviction. The High Court, on a revision petition filed under the proviso to Section 14(8) of the same Act, set aside the trial‑court order, stating that the landlords’ motive was merely a desire to open a clinic and that the requirement was not reasonable. The Supreme Court held that the revisional jurisdiction under Section 14(8) is limited to checking whether the order is "in accordance with law" and does not permit a re‑appreciation of evidence or a substitution of the trial‑court findings. Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was reversed, the trial‑court order restored, and the appeal allowed, with a deadline for the tenant to vacate the premises.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court, exercising revisional jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 14(8) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982, can re‑appreciate evidence and set aside a trial‑court finding on bona‑fide requirement.
Whether the scope of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 14(8) is limited to ensuring the order is "in accordance with law" and not equivalent to a full‑fledged appeal.

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 25B

Subjects

evictionbona fide requirementrevisional jurisdictionrent controlBihar Building ActSection 14(8)landlord‑tenant dispute

Judgment

CHANDRIKA PRASAD (D) THR. LRS. AND ANR. A
v.
UMESH KUMAR VERMA AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 7, 2001

[R.P. SETHI AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.] B

Rent Control and Eviction :

Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982-Section
14(8) proviso-Revisional Jurisdiction-High Court-Scope and power o.f-
Held: High Court hus to sati~fy itse(f whether the order ~f eviction is in
c
accordance with law-Though revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the
appellate jurisdiction, it cannot be equated with that ~fa fullJledged appeal.

The appellant-landlords filed a snit for eviction of the respondent-
tenant from the suit premises nnder Section ll(l)(c) of the Bihar Building D
(Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 on the grounds that the suit
premises was reasonably and in good faith required by the appellants-
landlords for their use and occupation and that the suit premises was also
required for starting a clinic for the son-in-law of appellant No. 2.
E
The trial court held that suit premises was genuinely and bona .fide
required by the appellants and accordingly ordered eviction. However,
High Court allowed the application filed by the respondent-tenant under
Section 14(8) of the Act on the ground that it was only a desire of appellant
No. 2 to open a clinic in the ground floor of the suit premises for his son-in-
F
law and, therefore, the appellants-landlords did not require the suit premises
reasonably and in good faith for occupation of the son-in-law. Hence this
appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court ·
G
HELD: 1. Section 14 of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction)
Control Act, 1982 is a special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction
on the ground of bona fide requirement. In a revision petition filed under
proviso to Section 14(8) of the Act, the High Court has to satisfy itself as to
whether the order of eviction passed under Section 14 of the Act was in H

173
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A accordance with law. The scope of the revisional jurisdiction depends on
the language of the statute. Though revisional jurisdiction is only a part of
the appellate jurisdiction, it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged
appeal. (176-E]

B Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222,
relied on.

2. The High Court did not take into consideration the finding of the
trial court, which is based on evidence on record. The finding of the High
Court that it is a mere,pesire of the appellant to open a clinic in the suit
c premises is not acceptable as the son-in-law has already started practice in
one room of the suit premises. (177-GJ

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 157 of 1999.

D From the Judgment and Order dated 11.2.98 of the Patna High Court in
C.R. No. 231 of 1997.

Amrendra Sharan, Sarnir Ali Khan and lrshad Ahmad for the Appellants.

A.N. Bardiyar for the Respondents.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

PHUKAN, J. This appeal by special leave is from the order of the
learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Civil Revision
F No.231of1997. The High Court allowed the application filed under Section
14(8) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (for
short 'the Act') by setting aside the order of eviction dated 10.0 l.1997 passed
by the Munsif !st, Begusarai in Title (Eviction) Suit No.15 of 1995.

The appellants-landlords filed a suit for eviction of the respondents-
G tenants from the suit premises under Section ll(l)(c) of the Act i.e. on the
ground that the suit premises was reasonably and in good faith required by the
landlords for use and occupation.

The appellant No. I, since deceased was the father of the appellant No.2.
H The eviction suit was filed by both the above two appellants and during the
CHANDRIKA PRASAD v. U.K. VERMA [PHUKAN, J.] 175
pendency of the civil revision before the High Court, the appellant No. I died A
and the name of his wife was substituted. The appellant No.2 has two daugh-
ters and the eldest daughter was married to Dr. Sanjeev Kumar Singh and has
"'-- no son. The ground for eviction was that the suit premises was required for
starting a clinic for the said son-in-law of the appellant No.2, who has been
living with his father-in-law since his marriage in 1992. It was alleged that the B
son-in-law was unemployed though he was a medical graduate and registered
as a Medical Practitioner. The suit was filed against three tenants out of which
two tenants agreed to vacate the suit premises and only the defendant No.3,
Umesh Chandra Verma, who is respondent No.I in this appeal, contested the
suit after obtaining leave to defend. The contesting respondent No. I pleaded C
that son-in-law of the appellant No.2 being a post graduate student in Surgery
was residing in the hostel and further contended that the said son-in-law has
his own house wherein he could set up the proposed clinic. It was denied that
the landlord was in bo11a.fide need of the suit premises. Further case of the
respondent No. I was that since his 'business flourished very much' the appel-
D
lant asked for enhanced rent to which he refused and, therefore, he was asked
.--, to vacate the suit premises.

The Trial Court after scrutinising the evidence on record held that the suit
premises was genuinely and bona.fide required by the landlord and accordingly
ordered eviction. The High Court inter alia held that it was only a desire of E
the appellant No.2 to open a clinic in the ground floor of the suit premises for
his son-in-law and, therefore, held that the landlords did not require the suit
premises reasonably and in good faith for occupation of the son-in-law. The
High Court also came to the finding that as the premises owned by father of
the son-in-law was lying vacant and in the absence of any positive evidence F
that the said building was not suitable for a clinic, the order of eviction was
not sustainable.

The main contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that by exercis-
ing powers under proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 14 of the Act, the High G
Court by the impugned order reversed the finding of the Trial Court by re-
appreciating the evidence on record which is not permissible under the.law.

• Section 14 is a special procedure for disposal of cases for eviction on
ground of bonafide requirement. This summary procedure for recovery of H
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2001] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
A possession of any premises is available on the ground specified in clause (c)
or clause (e) of sub-section (!),,of Section II of the Act. We are concerned
in the case in hand with clause (c) which is a ground for passing decree for
eviction where the building is .reasonably and in good faith required by the
landlord for his own occupatio~ or for the occupation of any person for whose.
B benefit building is held by. the landlord. Sub-section (8) of Section 14 .is
quoted below:
. "
"14(8). No appeal or ~cond appeal shall lie against an order for the
recovery of possession of any premises made in accordance with
procedure specified in: this section:
c
Provided that on an application being made within sixty days of the
date of the order of eJiclion the High Court may for the purpose of
satisfying itself that aii order under the.Section is according 10 law,
call for the records of the case and pass such order in respect thereto
D as ii thinks fit." ·1

In a.revision petition filed under proviso lo above sub-section (8) of
Section 14 of the Act, the High Court has to satisfy itself as to whether the
order of eviction passed under' Section 14 of the Act was in accordance with
law. The scope of the revisioital jurisdiction depends on the language of the
E
statute. Though, revisional jurisdiction is only a part of the appellate juris-
diction, it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal.

An identical provision contain in proviso lo Section 25B of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 came up for consideration of this Court in Shiv Sarup
F Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999] 6 SCC 222. The Court held that
the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under this proviso
is "for the purpose of satisfying if an order made by the Controller is accord-
ing to law". The Court further held that the revisional jurisdiction exercisable
under the said proviso is not so limited as is under Section 115 CPC nor so
G wide as that of an appellate court and the High Court cannot enter into
appreciation or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to
lake a different view of the facts as if ii were a court of facts. The court further
held that the High Court, however, is obliged to lest the order of the Rent
Controller on the touchstone of "whether it is according to law" and for that
H limited purpose may enter into reappraisal of evidence for the purpose of
CHANDRIKA PRASAD v. DK VERMA [PHUKAN, J.] 177
ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived ~t by the Rent Controller is wholl{ · A
unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person acting with objectivity could
have reached on the material available ..
" -- ;

In the lightoi abo~e· rati~ let us now ex'aminc \vhether by the impllgried
judgment the High Cour( has exceeded· its jurisdiciion by setting aside"' the
B
order 'df Trial "Court.

The High Court has recorded a finding that there is no pleading that the
son-in-law after completing studies is sitting idle or unemployed and has no
place other than the suit premises where he could start his clinic. This finding
is contriiry to ihe record inasmuch as in the application for eviction it was C
specifically stated that the said son-in-law, who was a registered medical
practitioner was unemployed and the suit premises was required for starting
a clinic for him. The Trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that the
son-in-law who has obtained MBBS degree is a registered medical practi-
tioner and has started his medical practice two days in a week in one room D
of the part of the suit premises, which was vacated by one of the tenants. This
finding of the Trial Court was based on evidence on record but was not
noticed by the High Court. Regarding the house belonging to the father of
the son-in-law of the appellant, the High Court recorded a finding that the said
house was lying vacant and no positive evidence was adduced to sho\V that
E
it was not suitable for medical practice. Relying on the evidence of the son-
in-law, PW-2, the Trial Court has recorded a clear finding that the said house
was away from the main road and was not suitable. It has come out from the
evidence of PW-2 and one of the witnesses for the respondent-tenant that the
suit premises being situated by the side of main road where there are many
clinics of other doctors, is better suitable place in comparison with the house F
·- of the father of the son-in-law for starting a clinic. The High Court also did
not take into consideration this finding of the Trial Court, which is based on
evidence on record. The finding of the High Court that it is a mere desire
of the appellant to open a clinic in the suit premises is not acceptable as the
son-in-law has already started practice in one room of the suit premises. G
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court not only over-
looked the findings of the Trial Court which were based on evidence but
treated the revision petition as an appeal and did not test the order of the Trial
Court on the touchstone of whether it is according to law. The finding of the H
178 SUPREME C,C>URT REPORTS·. (200 I J SUPP. 5 S.C.R
A High Coun is erroneous and accordingly we hold that the impugned judgment
is not sustainable in law.

We, therefore, find merit in the present appeal and accordingly allow it
by setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Coun and restoring the
judgment of the Trial Coon. Cost on the panies. However, as the respondent'
B tenant is residing in the suit pre;Jises since June, 1992, to meet !he ends. of
justice and make alternative anangement, we grant him time to vacate the suit
premises by 31st December, 2002 subject to filing of usual undertaking within
four weeks from today.

v.s.s. Appeal .allowed.

-