Holding

The tenancy was a joint/composite one as evidenced by the lease deed and admissions, and the decree of eviction under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC was proper.

Summary

The landlord, Smt. Kamal Saroj Mahajan, leased a showroom to four brothers jointly under a lease deed dated 4 September 1977 for Rs. 2,500 per month, later increased to over Rs. 3,500, causing the Delhi Rent Control Act to cease applying. She served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy and filed a suit for possession, arrears, and mesne profits. The defendants admitted the landlord‑tenant relationship but contended that each brother was a separate tenant liable only for his share of rent, arguing that the termination notice should have been served individually. The trial court dismissed the landlord’s application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC, but the Delhi High Court allowed it, holding that the lease deed created a joint/composite tenancy and passing a decree for eviction on the basis of admissions. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s view, finding the lease deed and the parties’ admissions clearly indicated a joint tenancy, and upheld the use of Order XII Rule 6 to expedite the decree. Consequently, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the lease deed created a joint/composite tenancy or individual tenancies for each brother.
Whether the landlord could invoke Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC to obtain a decree on the basis of admissions without a full trial.
Whether the rent exceeding Rs. 3,500 per month removed the applicability of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
Whether a single notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act suffices to terminate a joint tenancy.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 12 Rule 6
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 3(C), s. 6(A)
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 106

Subjects

joint tenancycomposite tenancyOrder XII Rule 6evictionlease deedadmissionDelhi Rent Control ActTransfer of Property Actcivil procedurespecial leave petition

Judgment

CHARANJIT LAL MEHRA AND ORS. A
v.
SMT. KAMAL SAROJ MAHAJAN AND ANR.

MARCH I I, 2005

[P. VENKATARAMA REDDI AND A.K. MATHUR, JJ.] B

Civil Procedure Code, 1908-0rder 12, Rule 6-Transfer of Property
Act, 1882-Section 106-Suit for recovery of possession-Claim of tenants
C
- that there were four individual tenancies-As per Lease deed on record tenancy
in question was joint and not individual-Relationship of landlord and tenant
and rate of rent admitted by tenant-Application for passing judgment on
admission made in pleading-Dismissed by trial court-High Court passed
decree on admission-On appeal, Held: On the basis of terms of lease deed
and admissions made in pleadings, it can be inferred that tenancy was joint
and tenant liable to eviction by civil court-Purpose of Order 12, R. 6 is to D
expedite the matter, hence decree ofeviction rightly passed on admitted claims...:_
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958--Sections 3(C),6(A).

Plaintiff-landlord had rented out the demised premises @ Rs. 2500 p.m.
to the defendants. The rent was enhanced from time to time. In Sept., 2001,
the monthly rent of the demised premises became Rs. 3659. Since rent E
exceeded Rs. 3500, the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ceased to
apply to the demised premises. Plaintiff then terminated tenancy of defendants
by legal notice under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act. Thereafter, he
filed suit for recovery of possession of demised premises and for arrears of
rent and mesne profit. In the Written Statement defendants admitted the F
existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between them, the rate of rent
and service of notice of termination. The defence put forth by defendants was
that tenancy was not a joint one but a separate, independent and distinct
tenancy of the four individuals and they were liable to pay rent individually;
that plaintiff himself treated them as separate tenants which fact is proved
by letter dt.17.9.92 by plaintiff in which he had refused to accept a cheque of G
Rs. 42,000 tendered by 'Yash Pal Mehra' one of the defendants and later on
accepted the cheque for the sum of Rs. 60,000 tendered on behalf of all four
defendants; that the individual share of rent never reached the figure of Rs.
3500 p.m. and hence the question of non applicability of provisions of the Delhi
661 H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A Rent Control Act did not arise.
At the stage of e\'idence, plaintiff filed application under 0.12, R. 6, CPC
for passing a judgment on admissions made in the Written Statement Trial
Court dismissed the application. On revision, Single Judge of High Court held
that there was a common composite tenancy and passed the decree for eviction
B on admission made. Hence the present SLP.

Dismissing the SLP,· the Court
HELD: 1. A perusal of the lease deed clearly shows that the demised
premises was taken on monthly rent of Rs. 2500 by the defendants. This lease
C deed has been executed in favour of all the defendants jointly and it is a
composite one and not individual one. The rent stipulated in the lease deed is
Rs. 2500 in toto and the total rent now payable is more than Rs. 3500. It cannot
be split up in four portions so as to bring the building within the fold of Rent
Act Therefore, the tenancy in question was a joint/composite one and is not
an individual lease of the demised premises. The Single Judge rightly
D commented that the letter did not indicate that there were separate tenancies.
In fact, in the said letter, Yashpal Mehra was described as a co-tenant A
cheque for a sum of Rs. 60,000 sent on behalf of 4 brothers was accepted by
the landlady. The letter exchanged, therefore, in no way demolish the
admissions flowing from the lease deed which is the primary document.
--·
E [667-H; 668-A-C]
2. The purpose of enactment of Order 12, Rule 6, CPC is to expedite
the trials. If there is any admission on behalf of the defendants or an admission
can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case without any
dispute, then, in such a case in order to expedite and dispose of the matter
F such admission can be acted upon. There is clear admission on behalf of
defendants that there existed a relationship of landlord and tenants, the rent
is more than Rs. 3500 and tenancy is joint and composite one. As such on
these admitted facts, the view taken by Single Judge of High Court was
correct. [668-D-E, 669-BI
G Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd v. United Bank of India and Ors., (20001
7 sec 120, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) No.
20914 of 2004.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.8.2004 of the Delhi High Court
H
C.L. MEHRA v. KAMAL SAROJ MAHAJAN (A.K. MATHUR, J.] 663

in C.R.P. No. 132 of 2004. A
Harish N. Salve, A.M. Singhvi, Pankaj Singh, Bhargava V. Desai, Sanjay
Kr. Singh and Rishi Kesh for the Petitioners.

R.F. Nariman, Jayant Bhushan, B.S. Maan and M.A. Chinnasamy for
the Respondents. B
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A.K. MATHUR, J. This Special Leave Petition is filed again~t an
order dated August 25,2004 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi whereby learned Single Judge has set aside the C
order dated February 13,2004 passed by the trial court whereby the trial court
declined to pass an order of eviction moved by the plaintiff under Order XII
Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter to be referred to as
"C.P.C. ") and observed that the application made at this stage is not
maintainable and the suit shall be decided recording necessary evidence of
the parties in order to do complete justice and dismissed the application of D
the plaintiff filed under Order XII Rule 6, C.P.C. Hence the present revision
was filed before the High Court. The said revision application came to be
disposed of by the learned Single Judge of the High Court on August 25,
2004.

In order to dispose of the present petition, brief facts may be detailed E
herein. Respondent No. I filed a suit for eviction, arrears of rent and damages/
mesne profit against the defendant-petitioners alleging therein that the premises
in question was let out to the defendant- petitioners jointly on a monthly rent
of Rs. 2500 vide agreement dated September 4, 1977. The tenancy commenced
with effect from October l, 1977. The rent was increased from time to time F
at the rate of 10 per cent per month. For the period from September 1, 1998
to August 31, 200 l the defendant- petitioners paid rent at the rate of Rs. 3327
per month. On July 28,2001 the plaintiff-respondent No. I served a notice on
the defendant- petitioners under Section 6A read with Section 8 of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred to as '' the Act''), notifying
therein that the rent would be increased by l 0 per cent with effect from G
September 1,2001. Since the monthly rent of the demised premises became
Rs. 3659 which is more than Rs. 3500with effect from September 1,2001, the
provisions of the Act ceased to apply to the demised premises. The plaintiff-
respondent No. I then terminated the tenancy of the defendant-petitioners by
separate legal notice dated October 8,200 I. The said notice was duly served H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A on the defendant- petitioners by registered post with acknowledgment due on . _
October 11,2001. The plaintiff-respondent No. I thereupon filed the suit (or
recovery of possession as well as for recovery of arrears of rent for the month
of September & October, 2001 and pendente lite and future interest and
mesne profit/ damages at the rate of Rs. 40,000.

B The suit was contested by the defendant- petitioners by filing written
statement. The defendants did not dispute the existence of relationship of
landlord and tenant between the parties. It was also admitted that the tenancy
commenced from October 1,1977 on a monthly rent of Rs. 2500 under rent
note dated September 4, 1977. The rent was increased from time to time by
C serving notice under Section 6A of the Act. Service of notice dated July
28,200 l under Section 6A of the Act and. notice dated 8th October, 2004
under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not denied. The t
''
defence put in by the defendant-petitioners was that the tenancy was not a
joint one but it was a separate, independent and distinct tenancy of the four
individuals and they were liable to pay rent individually. In their written
D statement they also made a reference to letters dated August 3,1992 and
September 17, 1992, which according to the defendants, supported their version
that they were separate, independent and distinct tenants. It was pointed out
that in the .communication made by the plaintiff on September 17, 1992 the
plaintiff refused to accept the cheque for a sum of Rs. 42,000 as it was
E tendered on behalf of on~ of the defendants only. But later on the plaintiff
. accepted the cheque on Ma,rch 24, 1994 for a sum of Rs. 60,000 which was
tendered on behalf of all four defendants. This according to the defendants,
indicated that the plaintiff herself treated the defendants as separate tenants.
It was also contended that the defendants' individual share of rent never
reached. the figure of Rs. 3,500. Therefore, the question of non-applicability
F . of the provisions of the Act does not arise. The defendants did not dispute
their lia_bility to pay the ~rrears of rent from September, 2004 but they denied
the liability to pay damages/ mesne profits. ·

The main thrust of the defendants was that this tenancy which was
entered into between the plaintiff and the four defendants namely; Sh Charanjit
G Lal Mehra, Sh. Ashok Kumar Mehra, Sh. Aswini Kumar Mehra ·and
Sh.Yashpal Mehra was not a joint tenancy but it was an individual tenancy
and each one of them had to pay his share towards the rent. Therefore, it was
not a joint/ common tenancy and as such the quantum of rent of each individual
tenant did not exceed Rs. 3500 per month. It was also contended that the
H notice under Section l 06 of the Transfer of Property Act has been taken to
C.L. MEHRA v. KAMAL SAROJ MAHAJAN [A.K. MATHUR, J.J 665
be one whereas there should have been four separate notices for four separate A
tenancies and this single notice cannot terminate the four tenancies.

From the pleadings of the parties the trial court framed certain issues
and when the case was at the stage of evidence an application under Order
XII Rule 6 was filed by the plaintiff on April 26,2002 for passing a judgment
on the admission made in the pleadings. This application was opposed by the B
defendants by filing a detailed reply and a plea taken was that it was not a
joint tenancy and it was individual tenancy and each one of the tenants has
to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 625. However, learned trial court did not decide
this issue and felt that the same be decided after evidence was adduced and
therefore, dismissed the said application. Aggrieved against the said order, a C
revision application was filed before the High Court and the learned Single
Judge of the High Court after hearing the parties and examining the matter
in detail came to the conclusion that the admitted facts are that (i) there
existed the relationship of landlord and tenants between the parties which is
created by the lease deed executed on 4th September I 997; (ii) notice of
tennination under Section I 06 of the Transfer of Property Act has been duly D
served and notice for enhancement of rent from time to time under Section
6A of the Act had also been served; (iii) the rate of rent exceeded Rs. 3500
per month when the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
was served; (iv) the rent was always tendered on behalf of all four brothers
and not individually on behalf of any of them. Learned Single Judge of the E
High Court examined the matter in detail and found that in fact there was a
common/ composite tenancy and not individual tenancy created in favour of
four defendants each. Learned Single Judge also referred to certain
communications referred to by appellants. One of the communications was of
the date August 19, I 992 when a cheque for a sum of Rs. 42,500 as arrears
of rent was tendered to the .respondent No. I- plaintiff for the period from F
April I, I 991 to August 3 l, 1992 and the cheque was signed by only one
person i.e. Yashpal Mehra. In this connection, the plaintiff wrote a letter on
September 17, 1992 that Yashpal Mehra is one of the tenants and he is not the
only tenant. From this letter an argument was sought to be raised that this
was not a composite tenancy but it was an individual tenancy. The learned
Judge rightly commented that the letter did not indicate that there were separate G
tenancies. In fact, in the said letter, Yashpal Mehra was described as a co-
tenant. Subsequently when a cheque for a sutn of Rs. 60,000 was sent as rent
for the period from April 1, 1991 to May 31, 1993 the same was accepted
by the landlady vide receipt dated May 24, 1993. This cheque was tendered
on behalf of the four brothers. Therefore, the argument is advanced on the H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] 2 S.C.R.

A basis of the letter dated September 17, 1992 that it is not a case of admission
as the plaintiff herself treated it as a separate tenancy. The learned Single
Judge examined the matter and found that this subsequent cheque of Rs.
60,000 was sent on behalf of four brothers. Therefore, one isolated letter
does not change the character of the tenancy and accordingly, learned Single
Judge found that there is admission on the part of the defendants that there
B is a joint tenancy and the rent exceeded more than Rs. 3500. Therefore, on
the admission of the defendants, learned Single Judge accepted the application
under Order XII Rule 6 C'.P.C. and passed a decree for eviction. Aggrieved
against the said order, the present Special Leave Petition has been filed.

c both ~he
A caveat was filed on behalf of plaintiff- respondent No. I. Therefore,
parties were heard at length. They have also filed their written
submissions.

The only question that needs to be determined in the pesent case is
whether there was a joint tenancy or an individual tenancy. In order to decide
D this basic question we have to peruse the lease deed which has been filed by
the parties in the. Court, the execution and contents of which are not in
dispute. The lease deed recital reads as under :

"LEASE DEED

This lease dee&made this 4th day of Sept.1977 between Smt. Kamal
E
Saroj Mahajai;i wife of Shri Madan Mohan Mahajan, r/oAsandh Road,
Panipat, hereinafter called the lessor (which expressions.hall include
unless repugrtant to the context 'its heirs, successors, executors,
administrators and assigns of the one part.

AND
F
S/Shri Charanjit Lal Mehra, Ashok Kumar Mehra, Ashw~ni Kum~r
Mehra ahd Yash Pal Mehra all sons of late Shri Devi Dass Mehra
rlo G-25, N.D.S.E.I, New Delhi (hereinafter called the le~sees) which
exp~ession shall include unless repugnant to the context its heirs,
G successors, executors, administrators and assigns and shall include
partnership firms and private limited companies in formation by the
partners of the above said firms of the other part.

Whereas the Lessor· has agreed to let out of the "Showroom-on-
Westem side on the ground from together with the entire lot on the
H verandah of the commercial building No.E-1 and E-2 (facing main
C.L. MEHRA v. KAMAL SARO.I MAHAJAN [A.K. MATHUR, J.] 667

Ring Road) in the New Delhi South Extension Part-II, Market, New A
Delhi known as Mahajan House, measuring about 1200 sq.ft and
bounded as under:-
North Main Ring Road
South Shop No.E-3
East- Showroom of Escorts & Modelle B
West Verandah and Road.
Hereinafter referred to as the "Deemed Premises."
And whereas the Lessees have agreed to take the demised premises
on lease on the covenants and conditions mutually agreed to and
appearing hereinafter:
c
NOW THIS DEED OF LEASE WITNESSETH AS UNDER :

In consideration of the rent hereby reserved and the covenants
hereinafter contained to be observed and performed, the "Lessor" do
hereby grant to the Lessees ALL THAT the aforesaid demised premises
more particularly shown in the plap annexed hereto on a monthly rent D
of Rs. 2500 ( Rs. Two thousand five hundred only).

The above stipulated rent will include the ground rent ( if any) house
tax and all other Government and Municipal Corporation rates, 9'iarges
and taxes of all kinds which are payable by the lessor as owner or E
which may be levied by any Authority hereinafter on the Lessor as
owner. All the taxes and all other Govt. and Municipal rates, charges
and taxes of all kinds shall be payable by the Lessor.

Xx xx xx."

A perusal of the lease· deed clearly shows that the demised premises was F
taken on monthly rent of Rs. 2500 by the sons of Late Devi Dass Mehra i.e.
all the four brothers and it further says as follows :

"And whereas the Lessees have agreed to take the demised premises
on lease on the covenants and conditions mutually agreed to and G
appearing."

Therefore, it clearly stipulates that this lease deed has been executed in favour
of all the brothers jointly and it is a composite one and not individual one.
Detailed perusal of the lease deed leaves no manner of doubt in the matter
that this was a composite and joint tenancy and i_t was executed on behalf of H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A the landlady on the one side and all the four brothers on the other side. The
rent stipulated in the lease deed is Rs. 2500 in toto. It is not disputed that the
total rent now payable is more than Rs. 3500. It cannot be split up into four
portions so as to bring the building within the fold of Rent Ac~. Therefore,
we are of opinion that the tenancy in question was a joint/ composite one and
B it is not an individual lease of the demised premises whic~ is a ~how room
and the defendants had to pay the rent jointly. This was the only basic
question which needed to be determined and the learned Single Judge of the
High Court has correctly appreciated the matter. The letters exchanged do not
in any way demolish the admissions flowing from the lease deed which is the
primary document.
c Learned counsel made an alternative submission that the revision petition
....
was not maintainable and the lease deed is not registered one and therefore,
it is not maintainable. None of these objections were raised by the defendants
before the learned Single Judge. Even before the trial court, the non-registration
of lease deed (which did not prescribe any term) was not put in issue. It is
D only devised now to some how defeat and delay the eviction and possession
of the premises to the landlady. In fact, Order XII Rule 6, C.P.C. is enacted
for the purpose of and in order to expedite the trials if there is any admission
on behalf of the defendants or an admission can be inferred from the facts
and circumstances of the case without any dispute; then, in such a case in
E order to expedite and dispose of the matter such admission can be acted
upon. In the present case, looki.ng at the terms of lease deed, there can be no
two opinions that the tenancy was joint/ composite and not individual one.
Thereforej on these admitted facts the view taken by learned Single Judge of
the High Court appears to be justified. In this connection, a reference may be
made to a decision of this Court in the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co.
F ltd v. United Bank of India and Ors., reported in [2000] 7 SCC 120. Their
Lordships have held as follows:

"In the Objects and Reasons set out while amending Rule 6 of
Order 12 CPC it is stated that "where a claim is admitted, the court
has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a
G decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the
party to ob~in a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief
to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is
.entitled."

The Supreme Court should not unduly narrow down the meaning
H of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obt.ain speedy
C.L. MEHRA v. KAMAL SAROJ MAHA.JAN [A.K. MATHUR . .I.] 669
judgment." A
Therefore, in the present case, as appearing to us, there is a clear
admission on behalf of the defendants that there existed a relationship of
landlord and tenants, the rent is more than Rs. 3500 and the tenancy is joint
and composite one. As such on these admitted facts, there is no two opinion
in the matter and the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the High B
Court appears to be correct and there is no ground to interfere in this Special
Leave Petition and the same is dismissed;

D.G. SLP dismissed.