CHAUDHARY CHARAN SINGH HARYANA AGRICULTURAL UNIVERSITY, HISAR & ANR.versusMONIKA & ORS.

                 [2024] 11 S.C.R. 954 : 2024 INSC 911

                 Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana
                 Agricultural University, Hisar & Anr.
                                  v.
                            Monika & Ors.
                      (Civil Appeal No. 10800 of 2024)
                             29 November 2024
             [Dipankar Datta* and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Issue arose as regards the correctness of the order passed by the
       Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court in treating
       the first respondent as qualified for consideration and consequent
       appointment; and whether the first respondent, in terms of the
       Advertisement, was eligible to be awarded half a mark (0.5) under
       the category of ‘experience’ vis-à-vis her engagement as outsourced
       manpower for the concerned time period, in light of the Rules and
       Circulars of the State as adopted by the University.

                                  Headnotes†
       Service Law – Appointment – Selection process – Candidate, if
       eligible for marks under the category of experience vis-a-vis her
       engagement as outsourced manpower for the concerned time
       period – First respondent appointed under the Outsourcing
       Policy by service provider as clerk-cum-typist in the University,
       when no sanctioned post exists – Service provider awarded
       certificate of experience countersigned by the University –
       Thereafter, the University invited applications for direct
       recruitment to various Group-C (non-teaching) posts – First
       respondent applied and scored 75 marks in written test, falling
       short of selection – Claim of 0.5 marks for her experience for
       the service rendered when employed by service provider –
       Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High
       Court held that the respondent was eligible for 0.5 marks for
       the service rendered – Interference:
       Held: Refusal to award any mark for experience to the first
       respondent would go against the constitutional duty of ensuring
       equality and securing social justice for the deprived – Non-grant
       of mark for experience to the first respondent not proper and
* Author
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                           955

       Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,
                   Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.

     legal – It has not been shown that either the Recruitment Rules or
     the Advertisement specifically bars aspirants from securing marks
     for experience gained from contractual/outsourced employment –
     Primary concern is the nature of work performed by the candidate
     has any nexus with the purported work to be undertaken during
     the course of regular service – First respondent rendered service
     for a statutory body in excess of six months and thus, had valid
     claim for securing 0.5 mark for experience – It is not open for the
     University to now deny marks on the basis of a technical procedural
     deviation that the experience certificate was not issued by the
     University, but rather by the service provider – It is accepted that
     the certificate was per se not issued by the University, the fact
     that it was countersigned by the Head of the Department validates
     the first respondent’s claim that she had indeed gained certain
     experience which deserved to be given credit – First respondent,
     thus, cannot be denied the benefit of mark for experience merely
     because at the time of appointment as outsourced manpower,
     she was not appointed on a sanctioned post – It would occasion
     a failure of justice to exclude such individual – If said was the
     requirement, it had to be made explicitly clear in the Advertisement
     without any ambiguity so as not to generate false hopes in the
     minds of individuals aspiring for public employment – Any other
     view would be against both the principles of equality and non-
     arbitrariness enshrined in the Constitution as well as principles of
     natural justice – Tested on the touchstone of Arts. 14 and 16, the
     impugned decision of the University cannot sustain – Whenever
     a conflict arises between the powerful and the powerless, social
     justice commands the Courts to lean in favour of the weaker
     and poorer sections where the scales are evenly balanced –
     Thus, interference with the impugned judgment of the Division
     Bench not called for, though on different reasons – Constitution
     of India – Arts 14, 16. [Paras 20, 22, 25-30]

                              Case Law Cited
     Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [2006] 3 SCR 953 :
     (2006) 4 SCC 1 – distinguished.
     Sachivalaya Dainik Vetan Bhogi Karamchari Union v. State of
     Rajasthan & Ors. (2017) 11 SCC 421; Dr. Kumar Bar Das v.
     Utkal University [1998] Supp. 3 SCR 315 : (1999) 1 SCC 453;
     Dr. (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar [2019] 15 SCR 273 :
     (2019) 20 SCC 17; Union of India v. M. Bhaskar [1996] Supp. 2
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       SCR 358 : (1996) 4 SCC 416; P Kumaraswamy v. State Transport
       Appellate Tribunal, Madras [1976] 2 SCR 214 : (1976) 1 SCC
       373 – referred to.

                                  List of Acts
       Haryana and Punjab Agricultural Universities Act, 1970.

                               List of Keywords
       Appointment; Eligible to be awarded marks of experience;
       Engagement as outsourced manpower; Outsourcing Policy by
       service provider; Sanctioned post; Service provider; Certificate
       of experience; Direct recruitment; Group-C (non-teaching) posts;
       Recruitment Rules; Advertisement; Contractual/outsourced
       employment; Mode of employment; Benefit of mark for experience;
       Security of service; Public employment; Principles of equality
       and non-arbitrariness; Principles of natural justice; Social justice;
       Constitutional duty; Non-grant of mark for experience.

                              Case Arising From
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10800 of 2024
       From the Judgment and Order dated 06.12.2023 of the High Court
       of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in LPA No. 562 of 2022

                           Appearances for Parties
       Manu Mridul, Pratap Singh Rawat, Jitin Chaturvedi, Advs. for the
       Appellants.
       Jayprakash Bansilal Somani, Nishant Verma, Rajnish Kumar,
       Manoj Kumar Chowdhary, Ms. Shisba Chawla, Ms. Ekta Verma,
       Advs. for the Respondents.

                  Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                   Judgment

       Dipankar Datta, J.

       The Appeal
1.     The present appeal assails the judgment and order dated 6 th
       December, 2023 passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                          957

            Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,
                        Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.

       Haryana High Court at Chandigarh1 in LPA No. 562/2022 (O&M),
       affirming the decision of the Single Judge whereby the first respondent
       was directed to be considered and offered appointment in the first
       appellant-Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University2
       on the post of Clerk.

       The Question
2.     The short question arising for decision in the appeal is, whether the
       Single Judge and then the Division Bench of the High Court were
       in error in treating the first respondent as qualified for consideration
       and consequent appointment.

       Resume of facts
3.     The relevant facts essential to decide the present appeal are as
       follows:
       I.      In 1970, the University was established upon enactment of the
               Haryana and Punjab Agricultural Universities Act, 1970.
       II.     In 2009, the second respondent-State of Haryana3 vide Circular
               No. 43/5/2001-IGSI introduced an outsourcing policy relating
               to engagement of persons on contract basis through service
               providers.4 This circular was adopted by the University vide
               memo dated 24.02.2010.
       III.    In 2014, the SoH issued a further Circular bearing No.
               43/5/2001-3GSII relating to issuance of experience certificates
               to persons engaged under the aforementioned outsourcing
               policy. This circular too was adopted by the University on
               25.06.2014.5
       IV.     In 2017, the University invited tenders for the purpose of
               providing manpower relating to office/hospitality and lab/
               technical under Part I of the Outsourcing Policy. Vide Office
               Order dated 29.03.2017, the contract was awarded to two


1    High Court, hereafter
2    University, hereafter
3    SoH, hereafter
4    Outsourcing Policy, hereafter
5    Circular dated 25.06.2014, hereafter
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              service agencies by the University. The first respondent was
              engaged by one of the service agencies, namely, M/s Lavnya
              Enterprises,6 to work as a clerk-cum-typist as outsourced
              manpower for the time period between 05.05.2017 and
              31.03.2018 in the University.
       V.     A certificate of experience was awarded to the first respondent
              by Lavnya dated 01.04.2018. This certificate was countersigned
              by the Professor and Head of the Department of Soil Science
              of the University.
       VI.    Vide an advertisement,7 the University invited applications for
              direct recruitment to various Group-C (non-teaching) posts.
              Under the criteria for selection, the advertisement prescribed
              a maximum of five (5) out of hundred (100) marks for
              ‘Experience’. It specified that half a mark (0.5) would be given
              for experience in the same or higher post in any department /
              board / corporation / company / statutory body / commission /
              authority of the Government of Haryana, for each year or part
              thereof which exceeds six months but limited to a maximum
              of ten (10) years.
       VII. In pursuance of the advertisement, the first respondent had
            applied and offered her candidature. Admittedly, the first
            respondent scored 75 marks in the written test and was,
            accordingly, placed in Sl. No 103 and ranked Gen-92 in the
            merit list, and fell short of selection.
       VIII. Aggrieved, the first respondent invoked the writ jurisdiction of
             the High Court by filing WPC No. 4402/2020 (O&M)8 impleading
             the University, the SoH and two selected candidates as the first,
             second, third and fourth respondents, respectively.
       IX.    A Single Judge of the High Court by his judgment and order
              dated 24.05.2022 ruled that the first respondent was eligible for
              0.5 mark for the service rendered by her between 05.05.2017
              and 31.03.2018. As noted above, this decision was affirmed
              by the Division Bench.


6   Lavnya, hereafter
7   Advertisement, hereafter
8   Writ Petition, hereafter
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                           959

          Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,
                      Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.

     Impugned Judgments
4.   Since the first respondent had admittedly worked in the University for
     a period exceeding six months, her Writ Petition was allowed by the
     Single Judge directing allotment of 0.5 mark to the first respondent.
     The University was directed to consider her for appointment as well
     as to offer appointment, without disturbing any selected candidate.
     Aggrieved, the University carried the judgment and order allowing
     the Writ Petition in a Letters Patent Appeal. The Division Bench
     dismissed the appeal presented by the University on the ground
     that the order of the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any
     illegality, thereby leaving the University still aggrieved.
5.   Having perused the judgment and order of the Single Judge, since
     affirmed by the Division Bench, we have found the judgment and
     order of both the writ court as well as the appellate court to be rather
     cryptic. Exception cannot be taken to any judgment merely on the
     ground of its brevity but if the judgment is cryptic and conclusions are
     reached without proper analysis of facts and materials on record, the
     party aggrieved would be justified in seeking setting aside of such
     judgment. It is, perhaps, for such reason notice had been issued by
     a coordinate Bench pursuant whereto the first respondent appeared;
     and, thereafter, the parties argued their cases fully. However, since
     focused consideration, due application of judicial mind and clarity
     of reasoning are the imperatives of a proper judicial decision, we
     have thought it fit to reflect on the issue arising for decision with the
     seriousness the same deserves.

     Contentions
6.   The impugned judgment has been assailed by the University on the
     grounds that:
     I.      Paragraph 1 of Part I of the Outsourcing Policy stipulates that
             services may be outsourced as and when required partly or
             completely by the departments where posts have not been
             sanctioned. Part II deals with engagement of persons on contract
             basis where the regular posts exist. In the instant case, the first
             respondent was deputed in one of the universities through a
             service provider under Part I of the Outsourcing Policy.
     II.     Since the first respondent was engaged in the University by
             the service provider, Lavnya, under the Outsourcing Policy
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              for the requirements of office work and not appointed on any
              regular or sanctioned post of clerk, the experience acquired
              by her cannot be equated with the experience of working on a
              sanctioned post of clerk.
       III.   Considering that the post was not a regular or sanctioned
              post, the first respondent cannot be deemed to have gained
              experience of working in the same or higher post, as required
              by the Advertisement.
       IV.    Experience Certificate was not issued by the University but
              rather by Lavnya. Merely because it was countersigned by the
              Head of the Department does not make it a certificate issued
              by the University. Attention was drawn to the Circular dated
              25.06.2014, which prohibits issuance of an experience certificate
              by any authority where persons are engaged through a service
              provider, i.e., under Part I of the Outsourcing Policy.
       V.     The High Court overlooked the fact that the first respondent’s
              application described her engagement for the concerned time
              period as contractual employment and that her employer was
              the University, which is incorrect as the first respondent was
              neither appointed by the University nor ever worked with the
              University on any temporary or permanent post.
       VI.    The first respondent has not submitted the valid experience
              certificate issued by the department / board / corporation /
              company / statutory body / commission / authority of the
              Government of Haryana; therefore, the scrutiny committee has
              not considered the so-called experience of the first respondent
              and allotted her marks which is justified on facts and in the
              circumstances.
       VII. The last candidate who was selected (securing 75 marks) is
            still 8 ranks higher than the first respondent. If the relief granted
            by the High Court is upheld, then the seniority of the appointed
            candidates will have to be disturbed. Moreover, the select list
            having been exhausted, the appointment cannot be given to
            the first respondent.
7.     Based on these grounds, interference with the impugned judgment
       and order of the Division Bench was claimed by the University.
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                           961

           Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,
                       Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.

8.    Representing the first respondent, her learned counsel contended
      that the judgment and order of the Single Judge is well-considered
      and well-reasoned; hence, it is unexceptionable and no interference
      is warranted.
9.    It was further contended that:
      I.      The first respondent though had rendered services to the
              University on contract, she had done the work like other similarly
              situated persons working under either the outsourcing policy
              or on regular basis.
      II.     As per the Policy, the essential requirement of experience is
              that the candidate must be working in any department of the
              Government of Haryana irrespective of the mode of recruitment
              because government institutes can hire manpower in any of
              the two modes and in both the cases, work is done in the
              government department.
      III.    The University did not disclose the fact that the post of Clerk-
              cum-Typist is a sanctioned post.
      IV.     Denying marks of experience to the first respondent is
              unreasonable, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 15, 16, 19
              and 21 of the Constitution of India.
      V.      The last candidate selected in the general category secured
              76 marks and if the mark (0.5) for experience is granted to
              the first respondent, she would enter the zone of selection for
              appointment on the post of clerk.
      VI.     There are 13 posts lying vacant and the selection list is valid
              for one year.
      VII. That in the case of Sachivalaya Dainik Vetan Bhogi
           Karamchari Union v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.,9 this Court
           upheld the policy of the State of Rajasthan for giving weightage
           to the services rendered by the employees, where services
           were used by the State either temporarily or on ad-hoc basis.



9    (2017) 11 SCC 421.
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       VIII. The University has also issued 2nd Appointment List wherein,
             two candidates who have secured 75 marks have been selected
             and appointed for the said post, i.e., the third and the fourth
             respondent.
10. Learned counsel concluded by submitting that the University read
    words in the Advertisement to exclude the first respondent from the
    zone of consideration, which was rightly interdicted by the Single
    Judge and the Division Bench in its concurrent findings. As a sequel
    thereto, the appeal deserves outright dismissal.

       Analysis And Reasons
11. The crux of the dispute is whether the first respondent, in terms of
    the Advertisement, was eligible to be awarded half a mark (0.5) under
    the category of ‘experience’ vis-à-vis her engagement as outsourced
    manpower for the concerned time period, in light of the Rules and
    Circulars of the SoH as adopted by the University.
12. It is an admitted fact that the first respondent was appointed under
    Part I of the Outsourcing Policy, which relates only to employment
    made when no sanctioned post exists. Although the first respondent
    has urged that the University has not disclosed the existence of a
    sanctioned post either before the High Court or this Court, nothing turns
    on it. It is not in dispute that the first respondent was never directly
    appointed by the University on any sanctioned post of Clerk. Having
    regard to the Outsourcing Policy, through which the first respondent
    came to be appointed, we shall proceed with our analysis resting on
    the premise that no sanctioned post of Clerk existed at the time when
    the first respondent was first engaged in the University through the
    service provider or, even if one existed, the first respondent could
    not have been accommodated there at the relevant time.
13. The point that would engage our consideration in this case is whether
    the noun ‘post’ in the subject advertisement would invariably mean a
    sanctioned post and whether a candidate would not be eligible for mark
    for experience if he/she has not worked on a regular/sanctioned post.
14. We have not been referred by the parties to any precedent having
    a direct bearing on the question arising for decision here. However,
    prior to looking at the Advertisement, it would be worthwhile to bear
    in mind what this Court held in the decisions noted below.
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                              963

         Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,
                     Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.

15. In Dr. Kumar Bar Das v. Utkal University,10 a case concerning the
    provision of marks for experience in connection with recruitment, a
    3-Judge Bench of this Court noted that one must not apply the words
    in the advertisement in a technical sense but must rather give effect
    to the words mentioned in the advertisement:
             “29. No doubt, in clause 9 of the endowment, it was stated
             that the procedure for selection would be the same as
             followed for a Professor’s selection. This, in our view, was
             referable merely to the procedure. If the advertisement
             stressed on the research experience also and not merely
             the teaching experience, the column in the pro forma for
             awarding marks when it referred to ‘teaching experience’
             has to be treated as one meant to cover teaching and
             research experience. The Selection Committee and the
             Syndicate followed the right procedure but the Chancellor
             went wrong in confining himself to the actual language of
             the pro forma and in omitting to give effect to the words ‘and/
             or research experience’ contained in the advertisement and
             the UGC Regulations. This, in our view, is a clear illegality
             in the order of the Chancellor. The High Court ought to
             have, therefore, come to the rescue of the appellant and
             set right the illegality.”
                                                     (emphasis supplied)

16. Dr. (Major) Meeta Sahai v. State of Bihar11 arose out of a case
    where the advertisement provided for the grant of marks for work
    experience after appointment on a regular/contract basis in the
    government hospitals. In the advertisement, it was also stated that
    only work experience in government hospitals of the Government
    of Bihar would be counted for this purpose. This Court, therefore,
    in interpreting the term “government hospital” held:
             “20. It is a settled canon of statutory interpretation that
             as a first step, the courts ought to interpret the text of the
             provision and construct it literally. Provisions in a statute
             must be read in their original grammatical meaning to give


10   [1998] Supp. 3 SCR 315 : (1999) 1 SCC 453.
11   [2019] 15 SCR 273 : (2019) 20 SCC 17.
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           its words a common textual meaning. However, this tool of
           interpretation can only be applied in cases where the text
           of the enactment is susceptible to only one meaning. [Nathi
           Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta, (2005) 2 SCC 271, para 13.]
           Nevertheless, in a situation where there is ambiguity in
           the meaning of the text, the courts must also give due
           regard to the consequences of the interpretation taken.
           …
           23. …The phrase ‘government hospital’ therefore cannot
           be construed to exclude other non-private hospitals which
           are otherwise run exclusively with the aid and assistance
           of the Governments. Additionally given the difference in
           common usage wherein ‘government hospital’ refers to
           all non-private hospitals and not hospitals established by
           a particular Government, Rules 5 & 6(iii) would not be
           bound by Rule 2(a).”
                                                   (emphasis supplied)

17. The first respondent has also referred us to the decision of Sachivalaya
    Dainik Vetan Bhogi Karamchari Union (supra). It would be
    appropriate to delve into the facts in that case before deciding the
    applicability of the law laid down therein in this present dispute. In that
    case, the members of the Workers Union were Class-IV employees.
    The employees filed a writ petition seeking regularisation of service.
    When the writ petition came up for hearing, it was represented that
    the dispute was settled out of Court and the terms were reduced to
    writing. Thereafter, the respondent issued an advertisement inviting
    tenders from contractors for the supply of Class IV employees. The
    Workers Union approached the High Court once again by way of a
    writ petition challenging the advertisement on the ground that those
    conditions were contrary to the settlement. During the pendency of this
    writ petition, another advertisement was invited and the respondent
    decided to provide some weightage in favour of the members of the
    Union by taking a decision to accord certain bonus marks in favour
    of those who had been working with the Department on a temporary
    basis. This decision of the respondent was once more challenged
    and the High Court ruled that the grant of these marks was arbitrary
    and directed that a lower weightage be given. Aggrieved, the State
    of Rajasthan carried the matter to this Court. During its pendency
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                         965

         Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,
                     Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.

      before this Court, an Hon’ble Division Bench of the Rajasthan High
      Court ruled in the pending writ petition [WP No. 3235/2004] that the
      settlement entered into between the parties cannot be enforced due to
      the decision of the Supreme Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka
      v. Umadevi (3).12 While this Court, no doubt, upheld the settlement
      deed wherein the respondent awarded bonus marks to the candidates
      for working in certain ad-hoc positions, it did so in the background of
      the complex and labyrinthine facts and circumstances that had played
      out before the Rajasthan High Court. There is no doubt in our mind
      that this case must be distinguished from the instant case as it does
      not lay down a general rule regarding the provision of experience
      marks while working in a contractual/non-regular post, but rather is
      limited to the enforcement of an already existing settlement agreement
      between the State and the concerned contractual employees.
18. In a different context, where promotion was the matter of concern
    before this Court in Union of India v. M. Bhaskar,13 it was held that:
             “15. The aforesaid decision has been challenged in this
             appeal by the Union of India by contending that 2 years’
             period of experience has to be reckoned, not from 11-
             10-1988, but from 21-9-1989. There is no dispute that
             the eligibility condition is 2 years’ experience in Grade
             II. Now, this respondent having really started working in
             Grade II pursuant to the order of 21-9-1989, he could not
             have gained experience prior to the date he had joined
             pursuant to this order. The mere fact that his promotion
             in Grade II was notionally made effective from 11-10-
             1988 cannot be taken to mean that he started gaining
             experience from that day, because to gain experience one
             has to work. Notional promotions are given to take care of
             some injustice, inter alia, because some junior has come
             to be promoted earlier. But we entertain no doubt that the
             person promoted to higher grade cannot gain experience
             from the date of the notional promotion; it has to be from
             the date of the actual promotion.”
                                                  (emphasis supplied)



12   [2006] 3 SCR 953 : (2006) 4 SCC 1
13   [1996] Supp. 2 SCR 358 : (1996) 4 SCC 416
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19. Also, while not a decision related to service jurisprudence, in
    P Kumaraswamy v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Madras,14
    this Court held that the rule that prescribes marks to applicants who
    have business or technical experience in the road transport service,
    did not make any distinction between passenger transport or lorry
    transport. Upon a perusal of the decision, it is clear that a literal
    reading of the applicable framework is essential for any determination.
20. Taking a cue from the aforesaid decisions, our observation is this. It
    cannot be gainsaid that even though the modalities for engagement
    of two individuals for executing similar nature of work could differ,
    there can be no quarrel that none can gain experience without being
    asked to work. One vital difference in working on a sanctioned post
    as a permanent employee and being employed in the exigencies
    of administration without having a right to post is that in the former,
    the appointee enjoys procedural safeguards bringing in a sense of
    security of service in him while in the latter the individual concerned
    may not have any such sense of security. But, in case, both perform
    the work of clerks, the experience gained would not be much at
    a variance subject, of course, that the job requirement is not too
    different. It would also be relevant to bear in mind stipulations in
    the advertisement if, at all, they call for any special requirement for
    marks to be secured for experience, viz. previous service rendered
    on a sanctioned post or if salary, as is specified, has to be received
    for service rendered in order to be eligible to apply.
21. Moving on to the Advertisement in this case calling for our attention,
    we find that it required:
             “(d) Experience: One half (= 0.5) mark for each year or
             part thereof exceeding six months of experience, out of
             a maximum of 10 years, on the same or a higher post in
             any Department/Board/ Corporation/Company/Statutory
             Body/Commission/Authority of Government of Haryana. No
             marks will be awarded for a period less than six months.
                                               (a maximum of 5 marks)”

22. A literal reading of the terms relating to experience confirms that
    marks could be secured by an aspirant for experience gathered


14   [1976] 2 SCR 214 : (1976) 1 SCC 373
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                        967

       Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,
                   Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.

     while working in the enumerated departments of the Government
     of Haryana; however, while referring to ‘same or a higher post’,
     the term ‘sanctioned’ as a prefix is conspicuous by its absence.
     Additionally, neither the Outsourcing Policy nor the Advertisement
     defines the word “post”. What follows is that an aspirant, to secure
     mark for experience, must prove with documents that he/she has
     been employed for performing work of the nature required by the
     same or a higher post. Importantly, it has not been shown that
     either the Recruitment Rules or the Advertisement specifically bar(s)
     aspirants from securing marks for experience gained from contractual /
     outsourced employment. Thus, we have no hesitation to hold that
     the mode of employment is not the primary concern. To our mind,
     the primary concern is the nature of work performed and whether the
     work undertaken by the candidate has any nexus with the purported
     work to be undertaken during the course of regular service. That the
     first respondent had rendered service for a statutory body in excess
     of six months and is, therefore, covered by the last part of clause
     (d) does not admit of any doubt and hence, she had a valid claim
     for securing 0.5 mark for experience.
23. The state policy, specifying that the individual must have worked
    on a post equal to or higher than the advertised posts in any of the
    enumerated departments to secure marks for experience, also reflects
    the state’s belief that the experience in such departments is directly
    relevant to the advertised posts. It is not open for the University to
    now deny marks on the basis of a technical procedural deviation
    that the experience certificate was not issued by the University,
    but rather by the service provider. While we accept the contention
    raised by the University that the certificate was per se not issued by
    it, the fact that it was countersigned by the Head of the Department
    validates the first respondent’s claim that she had indeed gained
    certain experience which deserved to be given credit.
24. We also do not agree with the contention of the University that the first
    respondent did not work on the post of Clerk and rather performed
    “office work”. The certificate awarded to her evidently mentions that
    the work she was required to undertake is the work of Clerk-cum-
    Typist. Moreover, the certificate also mentions that her work was
    found quite satisfactory. The first respondent has also brought on
    record a memo by the Professor and Head of the Department which
    specifically acknowledges that she has been designated as a Clerk-
    cum-Typist during her tenure.
968                                                         [2024] 11 S.C.R.

                      Digital Supreme Court Reports


25. The first respondent, thus, cannot be denied the benefit of mark for
    experience merely because at the time of appointment as outsourced
    manpower, she was not appointed on a sanctioned post.
26. The true thrust of every selection process ought to be to find out
    and select suitable candidates, having experience in the related work
    and fulfilling other criteria, from among eligible candidates and to go
    ahead with appointing the more meritorious of those found suitable. If
    indeed an individual without having any security of service performs
    up to the mark and receives commendation from none other than
    the Head of the Department, who must have closely watched his/her
    performance, it would occasion a failure of justice to exclude such
    individual for no better reason than that he/she did not work on a
    sanctioned post. If indeed such be the requirement, it had to be made
    explicitly clear in the Advertisement without any ambiguity so as not
    to generate false hopes in the minds of individuals aspiring for public
    employment. Any other view would be against both the principles of
    equality and non-arbitrariness enshrined in the Constitution as well
    as principles of natural justice. Tested on the touchstone of Articles
    14 and 16, the impugned decision of the University cannot sustain.
27. An underlying current throughout the Constitution is the theme of
    “social justice”. The Preamble, as well as Article 38 of the Constitution,
    enjoins upon the State instrumentalities the duty to promote the
    welfare of the people by securing and protecting, as effectively as it
    may, a social order, in which justice – social, economic and political –
    shall inform all the institutions of national life and endeavour to
    eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities. Whenever
    a conflict arises between the powerful and the powerless, social
    justice commands the Courts to lean in favour of the weaker and
    poorer sections where the scales are evenly balanced.
28. In this case, for the foregoing reasons, refusal to award any mark
    for experience to the first respondent would go against the grain
    of the constitutional duty of ensuring equality and securing social
    justice for the deprived.

       Conclusion
29. Bound as we are to apply the Constitutional mandate prescribed
    in Articles 14 and 16 read with the preambular promise of securing
    social justice, we hold that non-grant of mark for experience to the
    first respondent was not proper and legal.
[2024] 11 S.C.R.                                                   969

          Chaudhary Charan Singh Haryana Agricultural University,
                      Hisar & Anr. v. Monika & ors.

30. For reasons somewhat different from those assigned by the High
    Court, we concur with the ultimate conclusion and hold that the
    impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of the High
    Court warrants no interference. The same is, thus, affirmed.
31. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed without any order for costs.

     Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.



     †
         Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain