Holding

A dispute involving enforcement of rights under Certified Standing Orders and the Industrial Disputes Act is an industrial dispute, so civil courts lack jurisdiction and any decree they pass is a nullity.

Summary

The respondents, who were work‑charge employees on the Anandpur Sahib Hydel Project, were terminated after the project’s completion under Rule 20(1) and Rule 3‑A of the Certified Standing Orders. They filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that the termination was illegal, reinstatement and back‑wages. The trial court and the High Court decreed in their favour, holding that the employer had violated the ‘last‑come‑first‑go’ principle. The employers appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the dispute fell within the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and that civil courts therefore lacked jurisdiction, and that the jurisdiction objection could not be raised for the first time at this stage. The Court held that the relief sought (reinstatement and back‑wages) is enforceable only under the Industrial Disputes Act, making the matter an industrial dispute; consequently, the civil courts were statutorily barred from hearing it and any decree they passed is a nullity under the doctrine of coram non‑judice. The Court also held that a jurisdictional objection may be raised even if not raised earlier. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the lower courts’ judgments, with no order as to costs.

Issues considered

Whether the claim for reinstatement and back‑wages is covered by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus falls outside the jurisdiction of civil courts.
Whether a jurisdictional objection not raised in the first and second appellate courts can be raised before the Supreme Court.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100, s. 80, s. 9
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 25-G, s. 2-A, s. 2(k), s. 33C

Subjects

industrial disputejurisdictioncivil courtIndustrial Disputes Actcoram non-judicereinstatementback wagesCertified Standing Orderswork-charge employees

Judgment

[2008] 1 S.C.R. 1121

A CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT & ORS.
v.
RAVINDER NATH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 658 of 2008)
JANUARY 24, 2008
B
(S.B. SINHA AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.)
-+-
Labour Law:

Certified Standing Orders:
c
r20 rlw r3(9) - Workers engaged on work-charge basis
for a specific project - Termination of services of workers on
completion of project - Challenged in a civil suit for declaration
and claiming reinstatement with back wages - Specific plea
D of exclusion ofjurisdiction of civil court raised before Supreme
Court - HELD: Keeping in view the claim of workers and
defence of employers, the dispute fell in the area of Industrial
Disputes Act and was clearly outside the jurisdiction of civil
court - A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction would
continue to be a nullity as the same is hit by doctrine of coram
E
non-judice - Such a decree cannot be upheld merely on the
ground that objection to jurisdiction was not taken at the initial,
first appellate or second appellate stage - Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - ss. 9 and 100 - Jurisdiction of civil court -
Substantial question of law - Practice and Procedure -
F Doctrine - Coram non-judice - Applicability of.

The plaintiff-respondents filed a civil suit praying for
a declaration that the orders of termination of their
services/retrenchment passed by the defendant-
appellants were illegal, and claimed reinstatement with
G
back wages. It was stated that the principle of 'last come +
first go' was not followed and the action of the employer
was based on pick and choose policy, which was
discriminatory and amounted to victimization. The
defendant-appellants contended that engagement of the
H 1121
CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT & ORS. v. 1122
RAVINDER NATH & ORS.

plaintiffs was purely temporary on work-charge basis, and A
after the completion of the project their services were
terminated as per Rule 20(1) read with Rule 3(9) of the
Certified Standing Orders. The trial court decreed the suit
holding that the principle of 'last come first go' was not
followed in effecting the retrenchment. The trial court also B
directed that in case by virtue of the seniority the workers
were not found entitled to be retained in the project in
... question, they would be absorbed in other projects under
the defendant. The appeal of the employers was
dismissed. In the second appeal filed by the employers, c
the High Court first granted an interim stay but later
vacated the same which led to filing of a Special Leave
Petition before the Supreme Court wherein a ground was
raised that the civil court had no jurisdiction in the matter
as the relief of reinstatement was available only under the
D
Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court at that stage
only directed expeditious disposal of the second appeal.
Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the second appeal
and affirmed the decree.
In the instant appeal, it was contended for the E
appellant-employers that the matter fell within the ambit
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the jurisdiction
of the civil court stood impliedly excluded. For the
respondent-workers it was contended that the issue of
jurisdiction was not raised before the courts below and, F
~~
therefore, the same could not be allowed to be raised at
such a late stage.
The questions for consideration before the Court
were: (i) whether the issue regarding reinstatement and
·· - paymenf of back-wages could be said to be covered G
under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act; and (ii)
.. ~
whether the plea of jurisdiction was not raised either
' before the first appellate court or in the second appeal
and could the same be allowed to be raised before the
Supreme Court in the instant appeal? H
1123 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 1 S.C.R.

A Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. In the instant case, the dispute clearly fell
outside the jurisdiction of civil court. There is no dispute
that there are Certified Standing Orders in vogue. The
plaintiffs-respondents were temporarily engaged on
8 work-charge basis till the completion of the Project. After
the completion of the Project as the plaintiffs were no
more required, admittedly, their services were terminated
by an order under Rule 20(1) read with Rule 3-A of the
Certified Standing Orders as applicable to work-charge
C staff. The plaintiffs-respondents alleged that the principles
under the provisions of the Certified Standing Orders were
completely ignored and a highly arbitrary, discriminatory
approach was adopted by the empk>yer by picking and
choosing the plaintiffs for the purposes of termination. It
D is also not disputed that they were paid gratuity,
retrenchment compensation as also the compensation for
notice and that they had duly accepted the order. [para
13 and 15] [1135-B, C, D; 1136-C]
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. v.
E Krishna Kant & Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 74; and Rajasthan State
Road Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Zakir Hussain (2005) 7
SCC 447; Dhulabhai v. State of M.P (1968) 3 SCR 662: AIR
1969 SC 78; B.S. Bharti v. IBP Co. Ltd. (2004) & sec 550
and Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal Corporation
F of Ahmedabad (2002) 2 sec 542 - relied on. ,..
The Premier Automobiles Ltd. & Ors. v. Kamlekar
Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & Ors. (1976) 1 SCC 496;
Jitendra Nath Biswas v. Mis.Empire of India & Gey/one Tea
G Co. & Anr. (1989) 3 SCC 582 - referred to.
2.1 In the civil suit it was prayed that a decree be
passed for declaration to the effect that the orders of ••
termination/retrenchment of services of the plaintiffs were
null and void and that they should be reinstated with back-
H wages. A mandatory injunction to that effect was sought
CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT & ORS. v. 1124
RAVINDER NATH & ORS.

for. It was urged before the trial court that the defendants- A
appellants have not maintained a proper seniority list and
that had resulted in the breach of the principle of 'last come
first go' and, therefore, their termination was bad in law.
Thus, the plaintiffs-respondents had averred the breach
of Section 25-G of the Industrial Dispute Act, in that they B
had alleged that the employer had shown discriminatory
attitude and the plaintiffs-respondents were picked and
chosen for being terminated and thus were victimized.
[para 13] [1135-D, E, F]
2.2 In the written statement the defendants-appellants C
have raised a plea, though not specifically and there is a
clear reference to Rule 20(1) read with Rule 3-A of the
Certified Standing Orders for the work-charge staff on the.
Project. It is stated, as is apparent from the judgment of
the trial court, "since the services of plaintiffs have already D
been terminated on payment of necessary gratuity etc.,
they have no cause of action and that the present suit is
not maintainable in the present form and is also not
competent without notice under Section 80 CPC besides
being barred by limitation". The question of tenability of E
the suit was, therefore, raised and by Issue No.3, the trial
court also considered the tenability of the suit in the
present form. The trial court did not, however, advert to
the jurisdiction aspect as has been highlighted before this
Court. Same is the case with the first appellate court and F
the High Court. (para 16] (1136-E, F, G, H; 1137-A]
2.3 It is not as if the issue was not raised altogether.
Atleast a notice of it was given to the respondents in the
earlier SLP which was filed on behalf of the appellants to
challenge the dismissal of their application for stay by the G
·-"" High Court. It was very specifically raised therein ~tating
' that the relief of reinstatement was available only under
the Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court was expressly barred. Therefore, it is
not that the respondents had no notice of such an H
1125 SUPREME COURT REPOR"rs (2008] 1 S.C.R.

A objection. This Court only directed the High Court to
dispose of the appeal before it expeditiously. However, it
does not seem that the question was raised before the
High Court in the present form. On the other hand, the
High Court has very specifically held that there was no
B substantial question of law involved in the matter. It cannot
be said that there was no question of law involved as the
issues squarely fell in the area covered by the Industrial
Disputes Act and was, therefore, specifically barred. [para
...
16 and 17] [1137-A, B, C, D, E, F, G]
c Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal Ltd. & Anr.
(2005) 7 SCC 791; Hasham Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas
Sayyad & Ors. (2007) 2 SCC 355; Chief Justice of A. P v. L. II.A.
Dixitulu (1979) 2 SCC 34; Zila Sahakari Kendrya Bank
Maryadit v. Shahjadi Begum (2006) 11 SCC 692; and
D Shahabad Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Special Secretary
to Govt. of Haryana (2006) 12 SCC 404 - relied on.
3. A decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction
would continue to be a nullity. Once the original decree
itself has been held to be without jurisdiction and hit by
E the doctrine of coram non judice, there would be no
question of upholding the same merely on the ground that
the objection to the jurisdiction was not taken at the initial,
first appellate or the second appellate stage. The civil
court, in the instant case, had no jurisdiction to deal with
F the suit and resultantly the judgments of the trial court, .~

first appellate court and the High Court are set aside for
that reason alone. However, it is made clear that this Court
has not, in any manner, commented upon the rights of
the plaintiffs-respondents, if any, arising out of the Labour
G Jurisprudence. [para 17 and 19] [1139-B, G, H; 1140-A, BJ
Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. PJ. Pappu (1966) 1 SCR ..'
461:AIR1966 SC 634; and Kiran Singh v. Chaman Pawan
(1955) 1 SCR 117: AIR 1954 SC 340 - relied on.
H Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. AIR 1987 SC 1801;
CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT & ORS. v. 1126
RAVINDER NATH & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

and Piara Singh v. State of Haryana 1989 PLR (1) 396 - cited. A
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 658
of 2008.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 27.04.2005 of
the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular B
Second Appeal No. 2286 of 1991.

Harinder Mohan Singh and Kaushal Yadav for the
Appellants.

Prem Malhotra for the Respondents. c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. Chief Engineer, Superintending Engineer (Construction
Circle) and Personnel Officer, Anandpur Sahib Hydel Project D
have filed this appeal to question the correctness of the judgment
of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Regular Second
Appeal confirming the judgment passed by the Additional
District Judge, Ropar and Senior Sub Judge, Ropar, basically
'
on the ground that there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in E
the above three Civil Courts since the issues squarely fall within
the ambit of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such the
remedy for the 9 respondents-workmen, who are workmen under
the Industrial Disputes Act, lies with the authorities thereunder
and not with the Civil Court. F
BASIC FACTS
3. Nine respondents herein filed a Civil Suit before the
Senior Sub Judge, Ropar for the relief of (i) declaration to the
effect that the orders of their termination/retrenchment from G
• ~-'< service were illegal and (ii) that they were entitled to
reinstatement in service with back-wages. It was pleaded that
the plaintiffs-respondents were skilled workers and were working
on the Anandpur Sahib Hydel Project (hereinafter called "the
Project") in various capacities such as T. Mate, Mixer Operator,
H
1127 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1 S.C.R.

A Beldar, etc. for more than 5 years and, therefore, as per the
Standing Orders and Ru las they were regular employees of the
defendants. It was alleged that the defendants did not maintain
any seniority-list of the workers and various categories of
services on the said Project and they arbitrarily removed the
B plaintiffs-respondents from service on the dates mentioned in
Annexure A to the plaint by obtaining their signatures on papers
·under coercion and force and also forced them to accept
payments. It was further alleged that while removing the plaintiffs-
respondent, the defendants-appellants did not observe the
c seniority, meaning thereby while the juniors were retained in
service, the seniors were retrenched. It was alleged that action
was based on pick and choose policy and was discriminatory
and amounted to victimization. It was also alleged that those
workers who had completed service for 1000 days, could not
have been retrenched (as was held by the Punjab & Haryana
0
High Court in Mehanga Ram v. Punjµb State- Civil Writ No. 718
of 1986).

4. This claim was contested by the State of Punjab. It was
firstly urged that the suit was bad as common suit could not
E have been filed since the cause of action of each defendant
was distinct and separate. It was urged that the plaintiffs-
respondents were appointed on purely temporary basis as work-
charged employees and after the completion of the project, their
services were validly terminated as per Rule 20(1) read with
F Rule 3(a) of the Certified Standing Orders for the work-charged
staff on the said Project. Since the termination was complete
on payment of necessary gratuity etc., there can be no cause of
action and as such the present suit was not maintainable in the
present form. It was also urged that notice under Section 80
G CPC was not given and the suit was also barred by limitation. It
was reiterated that the principle of first come last go was strictly
observed since there was a regular seniority-list maintained for
the Project as a whole and that there was no discrimination or
victimization. On merits also the suit was opposed on the ground
that since the plaintiffs-respondent were work-charged
H
CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT & ORS. v. 1128
RAVINDER NATH & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

employees for a work of temporary nature, on completion of the A
project their services were terminated as per the Rules which
governed their service conditions (the Certified Standing
Orders). The following issues were framed in between the
parties by the Court:
"1. Whether the impugned orders of termination B
retrenchment of the plaintiffs are illegal, unauthorized,
·"
ultrc;ivires and ineffective as alleged? OPP

2. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties? OPP

3. Whether the suit is maintainable in the present form? c
Opp

4. Whether no valid notice u/s 80 CPC has been served
by the plaintiff on the defendants? OPP

>» 5. Whether the suit is within limitation? D

6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration
and injunction prayed for? OPP
7. Relief."
E
5. The Trial Court, on the basis of the evidence, came to
the conclusion that the defendants-appellants had not observed
the principle of last come first go in making the retrenchments.
The Trial Court also relied on the judgment of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in Piara Singh & Ors. \/. State of Haryana
[1989 PLR 396] and one another judgment, the copy of which F
was filed Vide Exhibit D-13 wherein the High Court had given
directions that the workers so retrenched should be
accommodated somewhere-else in some other projects and
such appointments in the new projects would be treated as new
~ appointments for the purpose of seniority and that the relief given G
)'
to such workers would be without prejudice to the retrenchment
and any other compensation that such workers would be entitled
to under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Relying on these observations, the impugned orders of
termination were held ille.gal. As regards issue regarding H
1129 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1 S.C.R.

A tenability of the suit, all that was said by the Trial Court was that
the Government Pleader could not point out any defect in the
form of the suit except that the plaintiffs had not challenged any
specified orders regarding the termination of their services.
(That is the only discussion in respect of the tenability). Though
B it was held that there was no evidence to hold that the persons
junior to the plaintiffs-respondents were retained in service, there
was no evidence on record to show that as to what would be the
position of the plaintiffs in overall seniority-list when finalized
vis-a-vis the other employees who have been retained or
c retrenched and, therefore, it was held that the plaintiffs were
entitled to declaration and mandatory injunction only to the extent
that they had right to be taken back in service and in case it was
found that they were entitled to be retained on the project on the
basis of the seniority, they would be entitled to be absorbed on
other projects of the defendants according to their qualifications
0
and fitness within a period of six months from the date of the
judgment. A curious relief was granted in the following terms:
"17. In view of my foregoing findings, the suit of the plaintiffs
partly succeeds. Accordingly, I pass a decree in favour of
E the plaintiffs and against defendants no.1, 3 to 5 for
declarations to the effect that the plaintiffs are entitled to
be taken back in service. However, in case it is found that
by virtue of their overall seniority in their respective
categories of workers at the time of their retrenchment,
F they were not entitled to be retained on the APS Project,
then they shall be absorbed in othe~r projects under the
defendants within a period of six months from the date of
this judgment. .... "
6. This order of the Trial Court was appealed against by
G the defendants-appellants before the Additional District Judge,
Roparwhich appeal was dismissed. In its judgment the Appellate
Court has referred to the arguments advanced by the appellants
relying on Rule 20(1) of the Standing Orders governing the work-
charged staff of the Project as also to the contention raised on
H behalf of the plaintiffs-respondent that the defendants-appellants
CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT & ORS. v. 1130
RAVINDER NATH & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
had not violated principle of last come first go. The Appellate A
Court accepted that such principle was not strictly adhered to
and further held that the Anandpur Hyde! Project was a "State"
and the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to the protection
contained under the Constitution of India and CSR which
provided that the work-charged employees could not be allowed B
to remain as such for more than six months. Relying on the
-~
decision of this Court reported in Union of India v. Cynamide
India Ltd. (AIR 1987 SC 1801) and Piara Singh v. State of
Haryana (1989 PLR (1) 396), the Appellate Court confirmed
the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. c
7. The matter was taken before the High Court by way of a
Second Appeal on various grounds. To begin with the High Court
granted stay of the operation of the otders passed by the courts
below. However, by the subsequent order, the stay application
was dismissed and the said order granted on 20.12.1991 was D
vacated. This came to be challenged by way of a Special Leave
Petition before this Court. In the Special Leave Petition a
contention was raised by way of Ground (8) that the Civil Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the relief of
reinstatement in the present case was available only under the E
Industrial Disputes Act. This Court, however, did not interfere at
that stage and directed the High Court to dispose of the Second
Appeal as expeditiously as possible. The High Court dismissed
.,,. the Second Appeal necessitating the present appeal before us .
CONTENTIONS F

8. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants
urged that since the issues squarely fell within the ambit of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and since there is a specific
remedy available to the plaintiffs-respondents under that Act,
..
~
the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was impliedly excluded and all
G
the courts below erred in entertaining and deciding upon the
issues much less adverse to the appellants. Learned counsel,
., relying on this Court's judgments in The Premier Automobiles
. Ltd. & Ors. v. Kamlekar Shantaram Wadke of Bombay & Ors.
H
1131 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2008) 1 S.C.R.

A [(1976) 1 SCC 496], Jitendra Nath Biswas v. Mis.Empire of
India & Gey/one Tea Co. & Anr. [(1989) 3 SCC 582]; Rajasthan
State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. v. Krishna Kant &
Ors. [(1995) 5 SCC 74]; and Rajasthan State Road Transport
Corporation & Ors. v. Zakir Hussain [(2005) 7 SCC 44 7] urged
B that the legal position in this behalf was settled. On the other
hand the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents urged
that firstly this issue relating to jurisdiction was not raised by the
respondents before any courts be.low and it is only for the first
time that the objection to the jurisdiction has been raised before
c this Court. Learned counsel for the respondents also urged that
the issue was not covered under the labour jurisprudence and
under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
the jurisdiction of the Civil Court could not be said to be barred.
DISCUSSIONS
D
9. We would take into account the objection to the effect
that the contention regarding the jurisdiction was not raised and,
therefore, it could not be allowed to be raised at this late stage,
for that it will have to be found as to whether the issue regarding
the reinstatement and the payment of back-wages could be said
E to be covered under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act.
The question of the Civil Court's jurisdiction being excluded
came, for the first time, before this Court in The Premier
Automobiles's case (supra). In that case the court culled out
following four principles:
F
(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it
relate to enforcement of any other· right under the Act
the remedy lies only in the civil court.
(2) 1f the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a
G right or liability under the general or common law r

and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court •
is alternative, leaving it to the election of the senior
concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which
is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.
H
CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT & ORS. v. 1132
RAVINDER NATH & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
... (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of A
a right or an obligation created under the Act, then
the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an
adjudication under the Act.
(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right
created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the B
remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or
the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may
be."
10. The second decision came in Jitendra Nath Biswas's c
case (supra), wherein this Court specifically held, interpreting
Section 9 of the CPC that the Civil Court shall have no
jurisdiction where its jurisdiction is ~xpressly or impliedly barred.
The Court held:
"It could not be disputed that a contract of employment D
"- for personal service could not be specificf!llY enforced
and it is also clear that except the industrial law, under the
law of contract and the civil law, an employee whose
services are terminated could not seek the relief of
reinstatement with back wages. At best he could seek the E
relief of damages for breach of contract. The manner in
which the relief has been framed by the appellant plaintiff
· in this case, although he seeks a declaration and injunction
but in substance it is nothing but the relief of reinstatement
_.. and back wages. The relief could only be available to a F
workman under the Industrial Disputes Act."
The Court, therefore, proceeded to hold that the civil court's
jurisdiction was barred. In this case very peculiarly it was not
disputed that the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act
was also applicable to the workman and an inquiry for G
~
...,- misconduct was cond.ucted against the appellant in accordance
with the standing orders. It was argued before the court, however,
that since it was solely the discretion of the Conciliation Officer
to proceed with the conciliation proceedings and since even
after the report given by the Conciliation Officer it was the H
1133 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1 S.C.R.

A discretion of the State Government to make a Reference or not,
the civil court's jurisdiction was not barred. This Court repelled
that contention after discussing the duties of the Conciliation
Officer and held that the civil court's jurisdiction was barred.
11. On its heels came the case of Krishana Kant (supra).
8 This was a case where, pursuant to the disciplinary inquiry held
against some of the workers on charge:s of misco.nduct, their
services were terminated. The suits wen:i filed for a declaration
that the orders terminating their services were illegal and invalid
and for further declaration that they must be deemed to have
C continued and still continuing in the service of the Corporation
with all consequential benefits. This Court elaborately
considered the law laid down earlier in the cases of Premier
Automobiles's case and Jitendra Nath Biswas's (supra) and
after considering the concept of "industrial dispute" as covered
D under Sections 2(k) and 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
came to the conclusion that the disputes not covered under
Section 2(k) or 2-A could be determined by Civil Court or by
· arbitration but disputes relating to right or obligation created by
the Industrial Disputes Act can be adjudicated only by the forum
E created by the Industrial Disputes Act. This was a case where
the Corporation was armed with the Certified Standing Orders.
The Court held that the Certified Standing Orders are not in the
nature of delegated or subordinate legislation. It was held that
the Certified Standing Orders were statutorily imposed
F conditions of service and the complaint made by the workman
relating to breach thereof could only be tried under the machinery
and the procedure provided by the Industrial Disputes Act and
the civil court's jurisdiction was impliedly barred to that extent.
The Court while referring to the seven principles culled out by
G this Court in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P [(1968) 3 SCR 662: AIR
1969 SC 78] further explained the decision in Premier
Automobile (supra) to hold that not only the disputes under the
Industrial Disputes Act were barred but the disputes arising out
of the sister enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing
H Orders) Act also stood outside the jurisdiction of the civil court
CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT & ORS. v. 1134
RAVINDER NATH & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

since they did not provide a special forum of their own for A
enforcement of the rights and liabilities created by them. The
Court, therefore, held:
"Thus a dispute involving the enforcement of the rights
and liabilities created by the certified standing orders has
8
necessarily got to be adjudicated only in the forums created
by the Industrial Disputes Act within the meaning of
Sections 2(k} and 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or such
enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated
as an industrial dispute or shall be adjudicated by any of
· the forums createdby the Industrial Disputes Act. The civil C
j• ,; •• • '

· court have no jurisdiction to entertain such suits."

The Court further went on to say that the enforcement of
the Industrial Employment Standing Orders is an industrial
dispute and if it satisfies the requirement of Section 2(k) and/or
0
Section 2-A of the Industries Disputes Act, it must be adjudicated
in the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act alone.
12. Though there are number of other cases followed, we
would choose to consider the decision in Zakir Hussain's case
(supra). This case also arose out of the termination simpliciter E
effected by the Corporation of the conductor who was appointed
on probation basis for a period of two years and since his
services were not found satisfactory, the same were terminated,
Ofcourse with necessary compensation prescribed as per the
··Rules of the Corporation. The court after considering all the F
earlier cases cited above and referring to the seven principles
culled out in the case of Krishan Kant, came to the conclusion
as arrived at in Krishan Kant's case. Two other cases were
referred to, they being B.S. Bharti v. IBP Co. Ltd. [(2004) &
SCC 550] and Chandrakant Tukaram Nikam v. Municipal
G
Corporation of Ahmedabad [(2002) 2 SCC 542]. It was held by
the court that the reliefs craved in the said cases squarely fell
within the arena of Industrial Disputes Act and, therefore, civil
court's jurisdiction was clearly barred. On the question of the
adhoc appointment of the employee, the court came to the H
1135 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1 S.C.R.

A conclusion that the respondent was a probationer and did not
have any substantive right to hold the post and was not entitled
to a decree of declaration which was erroneously granted by
the lower courts.
13. Now coming to the facts of the .present case, there is
B no dispute that there are Certified Standing Orders in vogue.
The nine plaintiffs-respondents were engaged on work-charged
basis till the completion of the Project. Their services came to +
be terminated after the completion of the Project in January,
1985 as they were not required due to the completion of the
c Project and since they were engaged temporarily. It was pointed
out before us and not disputed that the services were terminated
vide order dated 6.7.1985 under Rule 20(1) read with Rule 3-A
of the Certified Standing Orders for work-charged staff. It is also
not disputed that they were paid gratuity, retrenchment
D compensation as also the compensation for notice and that they
had duly accepted the order. In the civil suit it was prayed that a >
decree be passed for declaration to the effect that the orders of
termination/retrenchment of their service were null and void and
that they should be reinstated with back-wages. A mandatory
E injunction to that effect was sought for. It was urged before the
trial court that the defendants-appellants have not maintained a
proper seniority list and that had resulted in the breach of the
principle of last come first go and, therefore, their termination
was bad in law. In short, the original plaintiffs-respondents had
F averred the breach of Section 25-G of the Industrial Dispute
Act, in that, they had alleged that the employer had shown
discriminatory attitude and the plaintiffs-respondents were
picked and chosen for being terminated and thus were
victimized. On the other hand defence raised was that there
were certain cut-off dates fixed for the retention of the employees
G
and all the plaintiffs-respondent had actually joined the service
after that cut-off date and, therefore, they were terminated in
T
....
terms of Rule 20(1) read with Rule 3-A of the Certified Standing
Orders relating to work-charged staff.
H 14. From the above discussion there is no doubt that the
CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT & ORS. v. 1136
RAVINDER NATH & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

dispute and the main issue fell squarely under the premise of A
.. Industrial Disputes Act. Further as specifically held in Krishna
Kant's case that where the Certified Standing Orders were
applicable and where the breach thereof was complained of,
such issues fell in the exclusive area of the machinery provided
by the Industrial Disputes Act and as such the civil court's B
jurisdiction was specifically barred. We are left with no doubt
that the situation is identical in the present case.

15. In the present case while the employers-appellants
claimed that the termination simpliciter was effectedjn the light
of the Rules under the Certified Standing Orders, the plaintiffs- c
respondents alleged that the principles under the provisions of
the Certified Standing Orders were completely ignored and a
highly arbitrary, discriminatory approach was adopted by the
employer by picking and choosing the plaintiffs for the purposes
of termination. The dispute, therefore, clearly fell outside the civil D
·court's jurisdiction as per the decisions of this Court relied upon
earlier.
16. However, the question is that this issue of jurisdiction
was not raised either before the. before the First Appellate Court
or the Second Appellate Court. Learned counsel for the E
respondents very voc!ferously argued before us that for the
reasons best known to the appellants, this objection regarding
. the jurisdiction was never raised specifically. We have seen the
written statement. In the written statement the defendants-
t
appellants have raised a plea though not specifically but there F
is a clear reference to Rule 20(1) read with Rule 3-A of the
Certified Standing Orders for the work-charged staff on the
Project. It is stated, which is apparent from the judgmen~ of the
trial court that "since the services of plaintiffs have already been
terminated on payment of necessary gratuity etc., they have no G
cause of action and that the present suit is not maintainable in
"'!
the present form and is also not competent without notice under
Section .80 CPC besides being barred by limitation". The
tenability of the suit was, therefore, raised and vide Issue No.3,
the trial court also considered the tenability of the suit in the H
1137 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1 S.C.R.

A present form. The trial court has not, however, adverted to the
jurisdiction aspect as is being presently highlighted before us. •
Same is the story about the First Appellate Court and the Second
Appellate Court. However, it is not as if this issue was not raised
altogether. Atleast a notice of this issue was given to the
B respondents in SLP (C) 11086of1992 which was filed on behalf
of the appellants to challenge the dismissal of the said
application by the High Court. It is very sp~cifically raised therein
in Ground No.8, which is reproduced as under: t·

"Because the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the
c suit. The relief of reinstatement in the present case was
available only under the Industrial Disputes Act and
therefore the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was expressly
barred. [(1991) 1 RSJ 770}. The declaration claimed by
the plaintiffs in his suit could be granted by the' Labour
D Court under the Industrial Disputes Act and consequential
relief was also exclusively outside the jurisdiction of the
civil court. The plaintiff respondents are basing their case ~

mainly on the provision of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
and thus the claim of the plaintiffs/respondents could only"
E be adjudicated by the Labour Court. The proposition of
law is now well settled by repeated pronouncement made
by the Apex Court."
Therefore, it is not that the respondents herein had no
notice of such an objection. This Court only directed the High
F Court to dispose of the appeal before it expeditiously. However,
it does not seem that the question was raised by the counsel of
the appellants before the High Court in the present form. On the
other hand the High Court has very specifically held that there
was no substantial question of law involved in the matter.
G
17. In our considered opinion, it cannot be said that there
was no question of law involved as we have pointed out that the r ....
issues squarely fell in the area covered by the Industrial Disputes
Act and was, therefore, specifically barred. The question is
whether this issue regarding the jurisdiction could be allowed
H
CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT & ORS. v. 1138
RAVINDER NATH & ORS. [VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]

to be raised before us. The question of jurisdiction came up A
before this Court in Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v. DLF Universal
Ltd. & Anr. [(2005) 7 SCC 791]. The Court therein was
considering the question raised whether the court had jurisdiction
under Section 16(d) CPC to deal with the matter in question. In
short the court was considering whether the amendment could B
have been allowed raising objection to the territorial jurisdiction.
This Court in para 30 observed as under:

"We are unable to uphold the contention. The jurisdiction
of a court may be classified into several categories. The
important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; C
(ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the
subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary
jurisdiction are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction
has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in
any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well D
settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the
earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent
stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally
distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court
has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by E
reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or
commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An
order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity."
The Court then proceeded to rely on the case in Bahrein
Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. PJ. Pappu [(1966) 1SCR461:AIR1966 F
SC 634] and observed in para 32 that neither consent nor waiver
nor acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a court, oth~rwise
incompetent to try the suit. The Court further observed that"
"It is well settled and needs no authority that 'where a co·urt G
takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not
....
. . '1
possess, its decision amounts to nothing'. A decree
passed by a court having no jurisdiction is non est and its
invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced
as a foundation for a right, even at the stage execution or H
1139 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1 S.C.R.

A in collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a court ...
without jurisdiction is a coram non Judice."
The Court also relied upon the decision in Kiran Singh v
Chaman Pawan ((1955) 1 SCR 117: AIR 1954 SC 340] and
quoted therefrom:
8
"It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree
passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that
its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is
sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of
c execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of
jurisdiction ... strikes at the very authority of the court to
pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even
by consent of parties."
Though in the aforementioned decision these observations
D were made since the defendants before raising the objection
to the territorial jurisdiction had admitted that the court had the •
jurisdiction, the force of this decision cannot be ignored and it
has to be held that such a decree would continue to be a nullity.
18. The aforementioned decision was followed again in
E Hasham Abbas Sayyad v. Usman Abbas Sayyad & Ors. 1.._'
((2007) 2 sec 355] where one of us, Sinha, J. was a party.
Ofcourse while following this decision the Court referred to the
decisions in Chief Justice of A.P v. L. VA. Dixitulu ((1979 2
SCC 34]; Zila Sahakari Kendrya Bank Maryadit v. ShahJadi
F Begum ((2006) 11 SCC 692] as also Shahabad Cooperative ~

Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Special Secretary to Govt. of Haryana
[(2006) 12 sec 404J.
CONCLUSION
G 19. Once the original decree itself has been held to be
.
-
without jurisdiction and hit by the doctrine of coram non Judice, " '
there would be no question of upholding the same merely on
the ground that the objection to the jurisdiction was not taken at
the initial, First Appellate or the Second Appellate stage. It must,
H therefore, be held that the civil court in this case had no
CHIEF ENGINEER, HYDEL PROJECT & ORS. v. 1140
RAVINDER NATH & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]

jurisdiction to deal with the suit and resultantly the judgments of A
the Trial Court, First Appellate Court and the Second Appellate
Court are liable to be set aside for that reason alone and the
appeal is liable to be allowed. In view of this verdict of ours, we
have deliberately not chosen to go into the other contentions
raised on merits. We, however, make it clear that we have not, B
in any manner, commented upon the rights of the plaintiffs-
respondents, if any, arising out of the Labour Jurisprudence.
20. In the result the appeal is allowed but without any order
as to costs.
c
R.P. Appeal allowed.