Holding

The Supreme Court held that the three‑month period for preliminary assessment is directory, the terms ‘Children’s Court’ and ‘Court of Sessions’ are interchangeable with primary jurisdiction in the Children’s Court, an appeal under s.101(2) must be filed within 30 days (condonable for sufficient cause), all orders must name the presiding officers and record adjournments, and the Board’s order of 05‑04‑2022 is final but appealable.

Summary

The appeal was filed by a child in conflict with law (CCL) challenging a High Court order that set aside a Juvenile Justice Board's order directing his trial as an adult in a Children’s Court. The key issues were whether the three‑month period for completing a preliminary assessment under s.14(3) of the Juvenile Justice Act is mandatory, whether the terms ‘Children’s Court’ and ‘Court of Sessions’ are interchangeable, the time limit for filing an appeal under s.101(2), and procedural requirements for orders of quasi‑judicial bodies. The Supreme Court held that the three‑month period is directory and can be extended, that the two courts should be read alternately with primary jurisdiction in the Children’s Court, and that an appeal must be filed within 30 days, with condonation possible for sufficient cause. It also clarified that all orders must name the presiding officers and record adjournments, and that the Board’s order of 05‑04‑2022 was final but subject to appeal. Consequently, the appeal was disposed of with directions for future compliance.

Issues considered

Whether the period for completion of preliminary assessment under s.14(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is mandatory or directory
Whether the expressions ‘Children’s Court’ and ‘Court of Sessions’ in the Act and the 2016 Rules are to be read interchangeably
What is the time period for filing an appeal under s.101(2) of the Act against a Board order passed under s.15
Whether orders of Courts, Tribunals, Boards and quasi‑judicial authorities must mention the names of the presiding officer and/or members who sign the orders
Whether presiding officers/members must record the presence of parties or counsel, the purpose of adjournment and the party on whose behalf the adjournment was sought
Validity of the Board’s order dated 05‑04‑2022 and the effect of the dissenting view recorded by another member
Exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under s.102 of the Act

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 397, s. 399
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015s. 101(1), s. 101(2), s. 102, s. 14(3), s. 15, s. 17, s. 18(3), s. 2(10), s. 2(13), s. 2(20), s. 2(22), s. 2(23), s. 4, s. 7, s. 7(4)
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016s. Rule 10, s. Rule 10A, s. Rule 11, s. Rule 13
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012s. 4, s. 5, s. 6, s. 7, s. 8

Subjects

Child in Conflict with LawJuvenile JusticePreliminary AssessmentJuvenile Justice BoardAppeal Time LimitChildren’s CourtCourt of SessionsOrder Signing RequirementAdjournment RecordingRevision Jurisdiction

Judgment

[2024] 5 S.C.R. 761 : 2024 INSC 387

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother
v.
The State of Karnataka and Another
(Criminal Appeal No. 2411 of 2024)
07 May 2024
[C.T. Ravikumar and Rajesh Bindal,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether the period provided for completion of preliminary
assessment u/s. 14(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2015 is mandatory or directory; (ii) Whether the
words ‘Children’s Court’ and ‘Court of Sessions’ in Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and the 2016 Rules
shall be read interchangeably; (iii) What is the time period to file
an appeal u/s. 101(2) of the Act against an order of the Board
passed u/s. 15 of the Act; (iv) Whether all the orders passed by
the Courts, Tribunals, Boards and the Quasi-Judicial Authorities,
the names of the Presiding Officer and/or the Members who sign
the orders shall be mentioned; (v) Whether the Presiding Officers
and/or Members, while passing the order shall properly record
presence of the parties and/or their counsels, the purpose for which
the matter is being adjourned and the party on whose behalf the
adjournment has been sought and granted.

Headnotes†
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 –
s. 14(3) – Whether the period provided for completion of
preliminary assessment u/s.14(3) of the 2015 Act is mandatory
or directory:
Held: The preliminary assessment into the heinous offence by the
Board in terms of Section 15(1) of the Act has to be concluded
within a period of three months in terms of Section 14(3) of the
Act – The Act as such does not provide for any extension of time
and also does not lay down the consequence of non-compilation
of inquiry within the time permissible – In the absence thereof the
provision prescribing time limit of completion of inquiry cannot be
held to be mandatory – Thus, the provision of Section 14(3) of
the Act, providing for the period of three months for completion
of a preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Act, is not
* Author
762 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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mandatory – The same is held to be directory – The period can be
extended, for the reasons to be recorded in writing, by the Chief
Judicial Magistrate or, as the case may be, the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate – As in the process of preliminary inquiry there is
involvement of many persons, namely, the investigating officer,
the experts whose opinion is to be obtained, and thereafter the
proceedings before the Board, where for different reasons any
of the party may be able to delay the proceedings, the time so
provided in Section 14(3) cannot be held to be mandatory, as no
consequences of failure have been provided as is there in case
of enquiry into petty offences in terms of Section 14(4) of the Act.
[Paras 9.13, 9.14, 18(i)]
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 –
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model
Rules, 2016 – Whether the words ‘Children’s Court’ and
‘Court of Sessions’ in Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2015 and the 2016 Rules shall be read
interchangeably:
Held: From a conjoint reading of the provisions of the Act and the
2016 Rules, wherever words ‘Children’s Court’ or the ‘Sessions
Court’ are mentioned both should be read in alternative – In the
sense where Children’s Court is available, even if the appeal is said
to be maintainable before the Sessions Court, it has to be considered
by the Children’s Court – Whereas where no Children’s Court is
available, the power is to be exercised by the Sessions Court – The
words ‘Children’s Court’ and ‘Court of Sessions’ in Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and the 2016 Rules
shall be read interchangeably – Primarily jurisdiction vests in the
Children’s Court – However, in the absence of constitution of such
Children’s Court in the district, the power to be exercised under
the Act is vested with the Court of Sessions. [Paras 12.2, 18(ii)]
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 –
What is the time period to file an appeal u/s. 101(2) of the Act
against an order of the Board passed u/s. 15 of the Act:
Held: Appeal, under Section 101(2) of the Act against an order of
the Board passed under Section 15 of the Act, can be filed within
a period of 30 days – The appellate court can entertain the appeal
after the expiry of the aforesaid period, provided sufficient cause
is shown – Endeavour has to be made to decide any such appeal
filed within a period of 30 days. [Para 18(iii)]
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 763

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 –
Whether all the orders passed by the Courts, Tribunals,
Boards and the Quasi-Judicial Authorities, the names of the
Presiding Officer and/or the Members who sign the orders
shall be mentioned:
Held: In all the orders passed by the Courts, Tribunals, Boards and
the Quasi-Judicial Authorities the names of the Presiding Officer
and/or the Members who sign the orders shall be mentioned – In
case any identification number has been given, the same can also
be added. [Para 18(vii)]
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 –
Whether the Presiding Officers and/or Members, while passing
the order shall properly record presence of the parties and/
or their counsels, the purpose for which the matter is being
adjourned and the party on whose behalf the adjournment
has been sought and granted:
Held: The Presiding Officers and/or Members while passing the
order shall properly record presence of the parties and/or their
counsels, the purpose for which the matter is being adjourned
and the party on whose behalf the adjournment has been sought
and granted. [Para 18(viii)]
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 –
ss. 7, 3 – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Model Rules, 2016 – An FIR was registered against the Child
in Conflict with Law (CCL) u/ss. 376(i), 342 IPC and ss. 4, 5, 6,
7 and 8 POCSO Act – Arguments regarding whether the CCL
is to tried by the Board or as an adult by the Children’s Court
were heard by the Principal Magistrate and the Member of the
Board – Matter was adjourned to 05.04.2022 for order – On
05.04.2022, the Principal Magistrate of the Board passed an
order holding that as per preliminary assessment report and
the social investigation report, the CCL is to be tried as an
adult by the Children’s Court – However, when the file was
put up before the Member of the Board for signatures, he
recorded that he was having a dissenting view and would
pass a detailed order – No separate order was passed – On
12.04.2022, the matter was heard afresh by two Members of
the Board without there being the Principal Magistrate – Order
was passed that as per the preliminary assessment report
and the social investigation report, the enquiry regarding the
764 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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alleged offence committed by the CCL has to be conducted
by the Board as a juvenile – Correctness:
Held: Section 7 of the Act deals with the procedure in relation to
the Board – Sub-Section 3 thereof provides that the Board may
act notwithstanding absence of any member of the Board – No
order passed by the Board shall be invalid by reason only of
absence of any member during any stage of proceedings –
The proviso thereto provides that at the time of final disposal
of the case or making an order under Section 18(3) of the Act,
there shall be at least two members including the Principal
Magistrate – Section 7(4) of the Act provides that in case there
is any difference of opinion in the interim or the final disposal,
the opinion of the majority shall prevail – Where there is no such
majority, the opinion of the Principal Magistrate shall prevail – A
perusal of the record shows that after the order was reserved on
29.03.2022, the matter was listed on 05.04.2022 for orders – The
Principal Magistrate recorded his opinion that the CCL is to be
tried by the Children’s Court – The other member of the Board
recorded his dissent though, no detailed reasons were given as
such – In such a situation the opinion of the Principal Magistrate
will prevail – In the case in hand the order was signed by the
Principal Magistrate – Even if the other member of the Board had
not signed the order and had merely mentioned that he had a
dissenting view, without any reasons being recorded, the order
of the Principal Magistrate will prevail – Thus, order passed by
the Board as signed by the Principal Magistrate on 05.04.2022
was final. [Paras 15.2, 15.4, 15.5]

Case Law Cited
Topline Shoes Ltd. v. Corporation Bank [2002] 3 SCR 1167 :
(2002) 6 SCC 33 : 2002 INSC 287; Kailash v. Nanhku and Others
[2005] 3 SCR 289 : (2005) 4 SCC 480 : 2005 INSC 186; State of
Bihar and Others v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti [2018]
7 SCR 1147 : (2018) 9 SCC 472 : 2018 INSC 648; C. Bright v.
District and Others [2020] 7 SCR 997 : (2021) 2 SCC 392 : 2020
INSC 633 – relied on.
Bhola v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019) SCC OnLine MP 521;
Neeraj and Others v. State of Haryana (2005) SCC OnLine P&H
611; X v. State (2019) SCC OnLine Del 11164; CCL v. State (NCT)
of Delhi (2023) SCC OnLine Del 5063 – approved.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 765

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

Balaji Baliram Mupade and Another v. State of Maharashtra and
Others (2021) 12 SCC 603; Barun Chandra Thakur v. Master
Bholu & Anr. [2022] 10 SCR 595 : 2022 INSC 716; Shilpa Mittal
v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2020] 2 SCR 478 : (2020) 2 SCC 787 :
2020 INSC 25; SCG Contracts (India) (P) Ltd. v. K.S. Chamankar
Infrastructure (P) Ltd. [2019] 3 SCR 1050 : (2019) 12 SCC
210 : 2019 INSC 187; Afcons Infrastructure Limited and Another
v. Cherian Varkey Construction Company Private Limited and
Others (2010) 8 SCR 1053 : (2010) 8 SCC 24 : 2010 INSC 431;
Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India and Another [1991] 1 SCR
364 : (1991) 2 SCC 87 : 1991 INSC 36; Rajbir Singh Dalal (Dr.)
v. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa and Another [2008] 11
SCR 992 : (2008) 9 SCC 284 : 2008 INSC 913; Central Bureau
of Investigation, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell v. Ramesh Gelli
and Others [2016] 1 SCR 762 : (2016) 3 SCC 788 : 2016 INSC
134 – referred to.

Books and Periodicals Cited
Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 9th
Edn., pp.71-76 – referred to.

List of Acts
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015;
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules,
2016.

List of Keywords
Child in Conflict with Law (CCL); Juvenile Justice; Principal Magistrate
of the Board; Preliminary assessment report; Social investigation
report; Preliminary assessment u/s. 14(3) of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Children’s Court’ and
Court of Sessions; Time period to file an appeal u/s. 101(2) of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015;
Recording presence of the parties and/or their counsels.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 2411
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.11.2023 of the High Court of
Karnataka at Bengaluru in CRLRP No. 1243 of 2023
766 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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Appearances for Parties
S. Nagamuthu, Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Advs., Ms. Sakshi Kakkar, Shakti
Singh, R Karthik, T Hari, Advs. for the Appellant.
Aman Panwar, A.A.G., V. N. Raghupathy, Manendra Pal Gupta,
Shivam Singh Baghel, Harsh Gattani, Advs. for the Respondents.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Rajesh Bindal, J.
Leave granted.
BRIEF FACTS
2. The present appeal has been filed by Child in Conflict with Law1
impugning the order2 passed by the High Court3.
3. Vide aforesaid order, the High Court set aside the order dated
10.04.2023 passed by the Board4.
4. Briefly, the facts as available on record are that FIR5 was registered
against the CCL for commission of offences under sections 376(i),
342 IPC and sections 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Protection of Children from
Sexual Offences Act, 20126. After his apprehension on 03.11.2021,
the CCL was produced before the Board. On 09.11.2021, he was
released on bail. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was
filed. The Board was called upon to decide the issue as to whether
the CCL is to be tried by the Board or as an adult by the Children’s
Court. The arguments in the matter were heard on 29.03.2022 by
the Principal Magistrate and a Member of the Board. The matter
was adjourned to 05.04.2022 for order.
4.1 On 05.04.2022, the Principal Magistrate of the Board passed
an order holding that as per preliminary assessment report

1 Hereinafter referred to as “CCL”.
2 Order dated 15.11.2023 passed in Criminal Revision Petition No. 1243 of 2023.
3 High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru.
4 Additional Juvenile Justice Board, Bangalore City.
5 Crime No. 239/2021 dated 03.11.2021.
6 Hereinafter referred to as “2012 Act”.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 767

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

and the social investigation report, the CCL is to be tried as
an adult by the Children’s Court. The record was directed to
be transferred to the Court concerned. However, when the file
was put up before the Member of the Board for signatures, he
recorded: “I am having a dissenting view to abovesaid order. I
will pass detailed order on next date of hearing.”. The matter
was adjourned to 12.04.2022. No separate order, as recorded
by the Member of the Board on 05.04.2022, was passed by
him. On 12.04.2022 the matter was apparently heard afresh
by two Members of the Board without there being the Principal
Magistrate. Order was passed that as per the preliminary
assessment report and the social investigation report, the
enquiry regarding the alleged offence committed by the CCL
has to be conducted by the Board as a juvenile.
4.2 An application under Section 19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 20157 dated 18.10.2022 was
filed by the complainant/mother of the victim before the Board
for termination of proceedings and transferring the matter to
the Children’s Court, to which objections were filed by the CCL.
4.3 Vide order dated 10.4.2023, the Board dismissed the application.
4.4 Impugning the aforesaid order, revision petition8 was filed by
the Complainant before the High Court, which was allowed.
The impugned order dated 10.04.2023 passed by the Board
was set aside. The Board was directed to transmit the record
to the Children’s Court for trial.
4.5 The aforesaid order is under challenge before this Court by
the CCL.
ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT
5. Mr. Sidharth Luthra and Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel
appearing for the CCL, submitted that the practice of passing order
while stating that the reasons will follow has been deprecated by
this Court. It deprives the party concerned to avail of his appropriate

7 Hereinafter referred to as “the Act”.
8 Criminal Revision Petition No. 1243 of 2023.
768 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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remedy, when no reasons are available. In the case in hand, firstly
the Principal Magistrate mentioned that the order was being passed
by him and another Member of the Board. However, the Member
of the Board did not sign the same. He only mentioned that he dis-
agrees with the views of the Principal Magistrate and will pass a
detailed order on the next date. The matter was kept for 12.04.2022.
In support of the arguments, reliance was placed upon the judgment
of this Court in Balaji Baliram Mupade and Another v. State of
Maharashtra and Others9.
5.1 It was further argued that the order passed on 05.04.2022 is not
an order in the eyes of law. The matter being listed on 12.04.2022,
the arguments were heard by two Members of the Board including
the Member who had earlier not signed the order. An order
was passed directing that the enquiry into the offence shall be
conducted by the Board, treating the CCL as juvenile. He further
referred to the documents placed on record with Crl. M.P. No.
28749 of 2024 that even the Principal Magistrate was present
in Court on that date. He had also heard the arguments but did
not sign the order. There was a well-considered order passed
on 12.04.2022, against which the only remedy available to the
victim was to file an appeal. However, the same was not availed
of within the period provided for under Section 101 of the Act.
5.2 It was further submitted that after the commencement of trial
before the Board, nearly six months thereafter an application
was filed for terminating the proceedings before the Board
and transferring the matter to the Children’s Court, to which
objections were filed by the CCL. The Board appreciated the
position of law correctly and dismissed the application filed by
the mother of the victim.
5.3 It was submitted that even if for arguments’ sake it is assumed
that the order passed on 12.04.2022 cannot be legally sustained.
It may, at the most, revive the order dated 05.04.2022 against
which the CCL has a remedy of filing an appeal. However, in
view of the developments which had taken place since the
passing of the order on 12.04.2022, the CCL has been deprived

9 (2021) 12 SCC 603
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 769

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

of his remedy of appeal. If this Court is of the view that the
order passed on 05.04.2022 was an order, the CCL be given
liberty to avail remedy of appeal against the same, as with the
passing of the impugned order by the High Court, the CCL has
been left remediless against the order.
5.4 Section 15(1) of the Act provides for preliminary assessment
regarding mental status and physical capacity of the CCL, who
had allegedly committed heinous offence. In case the Board is
satisfied, that enquiry into the matter has to be conducted by
the Board, it shall follow the procedure as prescribed. However,
an order can also be passed in terms of Section 18(3) of the
Act for trial of the CCL by the Children’s Court. It is only the
assessment, as to whether the Board or the Children’s Court
has to hold inquiry or conduct trial.
5.5 Section 18(3) of the Act provides that after preliminary
assessment under Section 15 of the Act, the Board shall pass
an order that there is a need for trial of the CCL as an adult.
The records of the case have to be transferred for trial to the
Children’s Court having jurisdiction.
5.6 Section 17 of the Act provides for procedure in relation to the
Board. It was submitted that the Board as such is not a court and
any proceeding conducted by the Board are not to be treated
as an order. It is merely an opinion. The Board, as defined in
section 2(10) of the Act, means the Board as constituted under
section 4 thereof. It shall consist of a Metropolitan Magistrate
or a Judicial Magistrate of First Class, not being the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate with at
least three years’ experience and two social workers selected
in the manner prescribed, one of them has to be a woman.
5.7 Section 7(3) of the Act provides that there shall be at least
two members including the Principal Magistrate present at the
time of final disposal of a case or make an order under Section
18(3) of the Act.
5.8 It was further submitted that the appeal against an order passed
under Section 18(3) of the Act by the Board, directing trial of the
CCL by the Children’s Court would lie to the Court of Sessions.
770 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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5.9 The term Children’s Court has been defined in Section 2(20) of the
Act. It means a Court established as such under the Commissions
for Protection of Child Rights Act, 200510 or a Special Court under
the 2012 Act, and where such Courts have not been designated,
the Court of Sessions having jurisdiction. The argument is, that
two separate authorities have been mentioned in sub-sections (1)
and (2) of Section 101 of the Act, otherwise separate provisions
were not required. This is the spirit of the law.
5.10 Section 19 of the Act deals with the powers of Children’s
Court. After receipt of the preliminary assessment from the
Board under Section 15, the Children’s Court may decide that
the child is to be tried as an adult or that there is no need for
trial of the CCL as an adult. An order passed by the Children’s
Court is appealable before the High Court in terms of Section
101(5) of the Act.
5.11 Reference was made to Rule 10A of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Model Rules, 2016 11
which prescribes the procedure for preliminary assessment
regarding the age of the CCL under Section 14, and inquiry
by the Board or trial by the Children’s Court under Section
15 of the Act.
5.12 Referring to the aforesaid scheme of the Act, it was submitted
that an assessment under Section 15 of the Act does not
envisage passing of an order. It is merely a satisfaction
recorded, and there is no final satisfaction recorded by the
Board on 05.04.2022 as next date of hearing had been given.
The matter had to be considered by the Board subsequently.
In fact, no order had been passed under Section 18(3) of the
Act. Subsequent orders passed by the Board showed that the
inquiry had already commenced. It was at a later stage that the
Complainant filed an application for termination of proceedings
before the Board, which was dismissed on 10.04.2023. The
order was appealable under Section 101(1) of the Act. However,
no appeal was filed. A revision was filed before the High Court

10 Hereinafter referred to as “2005 Act”.
11 Hereinafter to be referred as “the 2016 Rules”.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 771

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

under Section 397 read with Section 399 of the Cr.P.C., which
was not maintainable.
5.13 It was further argued that in terms of Section 14(3) of the
Act preliminary assessment under Section 15 thereof, has
to be made within a period of three months from the date
of first production of CCL before the Board. In the case in
hand, the child was produced before the Board for the first
time on 03.11.2021. The period of three months expired on
02.02.2022. No order could possibly be passed by the Board
on 05.04.2022. The result thereof is that the CCL is to be tried
by the Board and no order for his trial by the Children’s Court
could be passed thereafter.
5.14 Reliance was placed upon the judgment of this Court in Barun
Chandra Thakur vs. Master Bholu & Anr.12 to submit that this
Court opined that the timelines provided for under the Act have
to be adhered to. If the time provided for in Section 14(3) for
preliminary assessment under Section 15 cannot be extended,
no order for trial of the CCL by the Children’s Court can be
passed. Reliance was also placed upon judgment of this Court
in Shilpa Mittal vs. State (NCT of Delhi)13.
ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENTS
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State submitted that even
after the order is passed by the Board transferring the matter to the
Children’s Court for trial of the CCL, it can be reconsidered by the
Children’s Court under Section 19(1) of the Act. Any order passed by
the Children’s Court is appealable under Section 101(5) of the Act.
The scope of Section 101(1) and 101(2) is different. Sub-section (1)
deals with final orders, whereas sub-section (2) deals with preliminary
assessment. The trial of the offence is only by the Children’s Court.
6.1 It was further submitted that, in terms of proviso to Section
15(1) of the Act, the Board may take assistance of experienced
psychologists, psycho-social workers or other experts to enable
the Board to reach a proper conclusion.

12 [2022] 10 SCR 595 : 2022 INSC 716
13 (2020) 2 SCR 478 : (2020) 2 SCC 787 : 2020 INSC 25
772 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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6.2 In this case, a report dated 01.02.2022 has been submitted by
the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, NIMHANS-
DWCO. It was in response to a letter dated 12.01.2022 from the
Police Inspector, Marathahalli Police Station to the Psychiatrist,
NIMHANS Hospital, Bengaluru. Going backward, learned
counsel for the State referred to the interim order of the Board
dated 09.11.2021 in terms of which the Board had called for
the social investigation report of the child to enable the Board
to pass further order in terms of Section 18(3) of the Act.
However, no report was produced on 06.12.2021. The matter
was adjourned from 06.12.2021 to 11.01.2022, and thereafter
to 21.02.2022. The Social Investigation Report was received
by the Board on 19.02.2022.
6.3 The arguments on the issue of trial of the CCL by the Children’s
Court or inquiry by the Board, were completed on 29.03.2022
and the matter was adjourned to 05.04.2022 for orders, when
the Principal Magistrate passed an order directing for trial
of the CCL by the Children’s Court. Another member of the
Board did not append his signature and recorded that he had a
dissenting view and would pass the detailed order on the next
date i.e. 12.04.2022. In fact, in terms of Section 7(4) of the Act,
the proceeding for determination of the forum, which was to
conduct the inquiry or trial, concluded on that day itself, as the
opinion of the Principal Magistrate is final. The manner in which
the case was dealt with subsequently, is strange. Subsequent
order dated 12.04.2022 was passed by different members of
the Board. The entire proceedings were non-est. There was no
error in the application moved by the victim for termination of
proceedings before the Board and referring the matter to the
Children’s Court, for which an order had already been passed
by the Principal Magistrate on 05.04.2022.
6.4 It was further argued that merely because proceedings under
Section 15 of the Act could not be concluded within three
months, by default the CCL will not be tried by the Board. The
provision cannot be held to be mandatory, as no consequence
of such a default has been provided in the Act. Even proviso to
Section 14(4) provides for extension of time in case the inquiry
as envisaged under Section 14(1) cannot be concluded within
the time prescribed.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 773

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

6.5 It was further submitted that though there is no direct judgment
of this Court in this matter dealing with Section 14(3) of the
Act. However, the learned counsel for the State referred to
the following judgments of the Madhya Pradesh, Punjab &
Haryana and Delhi High Courts Bhola vs State of Madhya
Pradesh14, Neeraj and Others vs State of Haryana15 and
X vs. State16.
6.6 It was further argued that the inquiry envisaged under Section
15 of the Act provides for taking opinion from experienced
psychologists or psycho-social workers or other experts. The
role of investigating officer is also relevant as he is investigating
the same. There can be intentional delays caused in the process
also to take benefit, in case by default CCL in a heinous
offence is to be tried by the Board. As in the case in hand the
investigating officer himself took about two months in getting
the report from NIMHANS. In such a situation the Board should
not be treated as powerless to extend the time for reasons to
be recorded. No doubt, in such a matter all the proceedings
have to be completed as expeditiously as possible.
6.7 It was further submitted that there is no merit in the arguments
raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, to give him
liberty to challenge the order dated 05.04.2022 in case he has
grievance against the same. Much water has flown thereafter.
All possible arguments were raised in the revision decided by
the High Court, and considered. To give liberty to the appellant
to raise the same before a lower authority would be an exercise
in futility. The same would rather result in delaying the process
further. The prayer is for the dismissal of the appeal.
DISCUSSION
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant
referred record. We have divided our judgment in different parts,
as mentioned below:

14 2019 SCC OnLine MP 521
15 2005 SCC OnLine P&H 611
16 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11164
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Sl. HEADING PARA PAGE
No. No(s). No(s).
I. Relevant provisions. 8 16-37

II. Whether the period provided 9-9.28 37-57
for completion of preliminary
assessment under section 14(3) of
the Act is mandatory or directory.

III. Exercise of revisional power by the 10-10.5 58-61
High Court.
IV. Anomaly in Section 101 of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection
of Children) Act, 2015.
11-12.2 62-66
(A) Regarding the terms used as
‘Children’s Court’ and ‘Court of
Sessions’.
(B) Time for filing appeal against 13-13.2 66-67
order of the Board under
Section 15 of the Act.
(C) Regarding second appeal. 14-14.1 67-68
V. Validity of order passed by the Board 15-15.5 68-71
on 05.04.2022.
VI. Remedy of appeal to appellant. 16-16.2 71-72
VII. Additional issues. 17-17.3 72-74
VIII. Reliefs and Directions. 18-19 74-77

I. RELEVANT PROVISIONS
8. The relevant provisions of various statutes and the Rules applicable
in the matter are extracted below:
EXTRACTS OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF
CHILDREN) ACT, 2015
“Section 2(10). “Board” means a Juvenile Justice Board
constituted under section 4.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 775

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

Section 2(13). “child in conflict with law” means a child
who is alleged or found to have committed an offence and
who has not completed eighteen years of age on the date
of commission of such offence.
Section 2(20). “Children’s Court” means a court established
under the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act,
2005 (4 of 2006) or a Special Court under the Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (32 of 2012),
wherever existing and where such courts have not been
designated, the Court of Sessions having jurisdiction to
try offences under the Act.
Section 2(22). “Committee” means Child Welfare
Committee constituted under section 27.
Section 2(23). “court” means a civil court, which has
jurisdiction in matters of adoption and guardianship and
may include the District Court, Family Court and City Civil
Courts.
Section 2(33). “heinous offences” includes the offences
for which the minimum punishment under the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in
force is imprisonment for seven years or more.
x x x
Section 4. Juvenile Justice Board.—
(1) xx xx
(2) A Board shall consist of a Metropolitan Magistrate
or a Judicial Magistrate of First Class not being Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or Chief Judicial Magistrate
(hereinafter referred to as Principal Magistrate) with at least
three years experience and two social workers selected
in such manner as may be prescribed, of whom at least
one shall be a woman, forming a Bench and every such
Bench shall have the powers conferred by the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) on a Metropolitan
Magistrate or, as the case may be, a Judicial Magistrate
of First Class.
(3) to (7) xx xx
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Section 7. Procedure in relation to Board.—
(1) & (2) xx xx
(3) A Board may act notwithstanding the absence of any
member of the Board, and no order passed by the Board
shall be invalid by the reason only of the absence of any
member during any stage of proceedings:
Provided that there shall be atleast two members including
the Principal Magistrate present at the time of final disposal
of the case or in making an order under sub-section (3)
of section 18.
(4) In the event of any difference of opinion among the
members of the Board in the interim or final disposal, the
opinion of the majority shall prevail, but where there is
no such majority, the opinion of the Principal Magistrate,
shall prevail.
x x x
Section 14. Inquiry by Board regarding child in conflict
with law.—(1) Where a child alleged to be in conflict with
law is produced before Board, the Board shall hold an
inquiry in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
may pass such orders in relation to such child as it deems
fit under sections 17 and 18 of this Act.
(2) The inquiry under this section shall be completed within
a period of four months from the date of first production of
the child before the Board, unless the period is extended,
for a maximum period of 2 more months by the Board,
having regard to the circumstances of the case and after
recording the reasons in writing for such extension.
(3) A preliminary assessment in case of heinous offences
under section 15 shall be disposed of by the Board within
a period of three months from the date of first production
of the child before the Board.
(4) If inquiry by the Board under sub-section (2) for petty
offences remains inconclusive even after the extended
period, the proceedings shall stand terminated:
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 777

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

Provided that for serious or heinous offences, in case the
Board requires further extension of time for completion of
inquiry, the same shall be granted by the Chief Judicial
Magistrate or, as the case may be, the Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, for reasons to be recorded in writing.
(5) xx xx
x x x
Section 15. Preliminary assessment into heinous
offences by Board.—(1) In case of a heinous offence
alleged to have been committed by a child, who has
completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board
shall conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to
his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence,
ability to understand the consequences of the offence and
the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the
offence, and may pass an order in accordance with the
provisions of sub-section (3) of section 18:
Provided that for such an assessment, the Board may take
the assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho-
social workers or other experts.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, it is
clarified that preliminary assessment is not a trial, but is to
assess the capacity of such child to commit and understand
the consequences of the alleged offence.
(2) Where the Board is satisfied on preliminary assessment
that the matter should be disposed of by the Board, then
the Board shall follow the procedure, as far as may be,
for trial in summons case under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):
Provided that the order of the Board to dispose of the
matter shall be appealable under sub-section (2) of
section 101.
Provided further that the assessment under this section
shall be completed within the period specified in section 14.
x x x
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Section 17. Orders regarding child not found to be
in conflict with law.—(1) Where a Board is satisfied on
inquiry that the child brought before it has not committed
any offence, then notwithstanding anything contrary
contained in any other law for the time being in force, the
Board shall pass order to that effect.
(2) In case it appears to the Board that the child referred to
in sub-section (1) is in need of care and protection, it may
refer the child to the Committee with appropriate directions.
Section 18. Orders regarding child found to be in
conflict with law.—
(1) & (2) xx xx
(3) Where the Board after preliminary assessment under
section 15 pass an order that there is a need for trial
of the said child as an adult, then the Board may order
transfer of the trial of the case to the Children’s Court
having jurisdiction to try such offences.
Section 19. Powers of Children’s Court.—(1) After the
receipt of preliminary assessment from the Board under
section 15, the Children’s Court may decide that—
(i) there is a need for trial of the child as an adult as
per the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) and pass appropriate orders after
trial subject to the provisions of this section and
section 21, considering the special needs of the
child, the tenets of fair trial and maintaining a child
friendly atmosphere;
(ii) there is no need for trial of the child as an adult
and may conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass
appropriate orders in accordance with the provisions
of section 18.
(2) The Children’s Court shall ensure that the final order,
with regard to a child in conflict with law, shall include an
individual care plan for the rehabilitation of child, including
follow up by the probation officer or the District Child
Protection Unit or a social worker.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 779

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

(3) The Children’s Court shall ensure that the child who is
found to be in conflict with law is sent to a place of safety
till he attains the age of twenty-one years and thereafter,
the person shall be transferred to a jail:
Provided that the reformative services including educational
services, skill development, alternative therapy such as
counselling, behaviour modification therapy, and psychiatric
support shall be provided to the child during the period of
his stay in the place of safety.
(4) The Children’s Court shall ensure that there is a periodic
follow up report every year by the probation officer or
the District Child Protection Unit or a social worker, as
required, to evaluate the progress of the child in the place
of safety and to ensure that there is no ill-treatment to the
child in any form.
(5) The reports under sub-section (4) shall be forwarded
to the Children’s Court for record and follow up, as may
be required.
x x x
Section 101. Appeals. —(1) Subject to the provisions of
this Act, any person aggrieved by an order made by the
Committee or the Board under this Act may, within thirty
days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal to the
Children’s Court, except for decisions by the Committee
related to Foster Care and Sponsorship After Care for
which the appeal shall lie with the District Magistrate:
Provided that the Court of Sessions, or the District
Magistrate, as the case may be, may entertain the appeal
after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from filing the appeal in time and such appeal shall
be decided within a period of thirty days.
(2) An appeal shall lie against an order of the Board passed
after making the preliminary assessment into a heinous
offence under section 15 of the Act, before the Court of
Sessions and the Court may, while deciding the appeal,
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take the assistance of experienced psychologists and
medical specialists other than those whose assistance has
been obtained by the Board in passing the order under
the said section.
(3) No appeal shall lie from any order of acquittal made by
the Board in respect of a child alleged to have committed
an offence other than the heinous offence by a child who
has completed or is above the age of sixteen years.
(4) No second appeal shall lie from any order of the Court
of Session, passed in appeal under this section.
(5) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Children’s Court
may file an appeal before the High Court in accordance
with the procedure specified in the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).
(6) & (7) xx xx
102. Revision.—The High Court may, at any time, either
on its own motion or on an application received in this
behalf, call for the record of any proceeding in which any
Committee or Board or Children’s Court, or Court has
passed an order, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to
the legality or propriety of any such order and may pass
such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit: Provided that
the High Court shall not pass an order under this section
prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable
opportunity of being heard.”
EXTRACTS OF RELEVANT RULES 10, 10A, 11 & 13
OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION
OF CHILDREN) MODEL RULES, 2016
“Rule 10. Post-production processes by the Board.-
(1) On production of the child before the Board, the
report containing the social background of the child,
circumstances of apprehending the child and offence
alleged to have been committed by the child as provided
by the officers, individuals, agencies producing the child
shall be reviewed by the Board and the Board may pass
such orders in relation to the child as it deems fit, including
orders under sections 17 and 18 of the Act, namely:
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 781

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

(i) disposing of the case, if on the consideration of the
documents and record submitted at the time of his
first appearance, his being in conflict with law appears
to be unfounded or where the child is alleged to be
involved in petty offences;
(ii) referring the child to the Committee where it appears
to the Board that the child is in need of care and
protection;
(iii) releasing the child in the supervision or custody of
fit persons or fit institutions or Probation Officers as
the case may be, through an order in Form 3, with a
direction to appear or present a child for an inquiry
on the next date; and
(iv) directing the child to be kept in the Child Care
Institution, as appropriate, if necessary, pending
inquiry as per order in Form 4.
(2) In all cases of release pending inquiry, the Board shall
notify the next date of hearing, not later than fifteen days of
the first summary inquiry and also seek social investigation
report from the Probation Officer, or in case a Probation
Officer is not available the Child Welfare Officer or social
worker concerned through an order in Form 5.
(3) When the child alleged to be in conflict with law,
after being admitted to bail, fails to appear before the
Board, on the date fixed for hearing, and no application
is moved for exemption on his behalf or there is not
sufficient reason for granting him exemption, the Board
shall, issue to the Child Welfare Police Officer and the
Person-in-charge of the Police Station directions for the
production of the child.
(4) If the Child Welfare Police Officer fails to produce
the child before the Board even after the issuance of
the directions for production of the child, the Board shall
instead of issuing process under section 82 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 pass orders as appropriate
under section 26 of the Act.
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(5) In cases of heinous offences alleged to have been
committed by a child, who has completed the age of
sixteen years, the Child Welfare Police Officer shall
produce the statement of witnesses recorded by him
and other documents prepared during the course of
investigation within a period of one month from the date
of first production of the child before the Board, a copy
of which shall also be given to the child or parent or
guardian of the child.
(6) In cases of petty or serious offences, the final report
shall be filed before the Board at the earliest and in any
case not beyond the period of two months from the date
of information to the police, except in those cases where
it was not reasonably known that the person involved in
the offence was a child, in which case extension of time
may be granted by the Board for filing the final report.
(7) When witnesses are produced for examination in an
inquiry relating to a child alleged to be in conflict with law,
the Board shall ensure that the inquiry is not conducted in
the spirit of strict adversarial proceedings and it shall use
the powers conferred by section 165 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) so as to interrogate the child and
proceed with the presumptions in favour of the child.
(8) While examining a child alleged to be in conflict with
law and recording his statement during the inquiry under
section 14 of the Act, the Board shall address the child
in a child-friendly manner in order to put the child at ease
and to encourage him to state the facts and circumstances
without any fear, not only in respect of the offence which
has been alleged against the child, but also in respect of
the home and social surroundings, and the influence or the
offences to which the child might have been subjected to.
(9) The Board shall take into account the report containing
circumstances of apprehending the child and the offence
alleged to have been committed by him and the social
investigation report in Form 6 prepared by the Probation
Officer or the voluntary or non- governmental organisation,
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 783

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

along with the evidence produced by the parties for arriving
at a conclusion.
Rule 10A. Preliminary assessment into heinous
offences by Board.- (1) The Board shall in the first
instance determine whether the child is of sixteen years
of age or above; if not, it shall proceed as per provisions
of section 14 of the Act.
(2) For the purpose of conducting a preliminary assessment
in case of heinous offences, the Board may take the
assistance of psychologists or psycho-social workers or
other experts who have experience of working with children
in difficult circumstances. A panel of such experts may
be made available by the District Child Protection Unit,
whose assistance can be taken by the Board or could be
accessed independently.
(3) While making the preliminary assessment, the child
shall be presumed to be innocent unless proved otherwise.
(4) Where the Board, after preliminary assessment under
section 15 of the Act, passes an order that there is a need
for trial of the said child as an adult, it shall assign reasons
for the same and the copy of the order shall be provided
to the child forthwith.
Rule 11. Completion of Inquiry.- (1) Where after
preliminary assessment under section 15 of the Act, in
cases of heinous offences allegedly committed by a child,
the Board decides to dispose of the matter, the Board
may pass any of the dispositional orders as specified in
section 18 of the Act.
(2) Before passing an order, the Board shall obtain a social
investigation report in Form 6 prepared by the Probation
Officer or Child Welfare Officer or social worker as ordered,
and take the findings of the report into account.
(3) All dispositional orders passed by the Board shall
necessarily include an individual care plan in Form 7 for
the child in conflict with law concerned, prepared by a
Probation Officer or Child Welfare Officer or a recognised
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voluntary organisation on the basis of interaction with the
child and his family, where possible.
(4) Where the Board is satisfied that it is neither in the
interest of the child himself nor in the interest of other
children to keep a child in the special home, the Board
may order the child to be kept in a place of safety and in
a manner considered appropriate by it.
(5) Where the Board decides to release the child after
advice or admonition or after participation in group
counselling or orders him to perform community service,
necessary direction may also be issued by the Board to the
District Child Protection Unit for arranging such counselling
and community service.
(6) Where the Board decides to release the child in
conflict with law on probation and place him under the
care of the parent or the guardian or fit person, the
person in whose custody the child is released may be
required to submit a written undertaking in Form 8 for
good behaviour and well-being of the child for a maximum
period of three years.
(7) The Board may order the release of a child in conflict
with law on execution of a personal bond without surety
in Form 9.
(8) In the event of placement of the child in a fit facility or
special home, the Board shall consider that the fit facility or
special home is located nearest to the place of residence
of the child’s parent or guardian, except where it is not in
the best interest of the child to do so.
(9) The Board, where it releases a child on probation
and places him under the care of parent or guardian or
fit person or where the child is released on probation and
placed under the care of fit facility, it may also order that
the child be placed under the supervision of a Probation
Officer who shall submit periodic reports in Form 10 and
the period of such supervision shall be maximum of three
years.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 785

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

(10) Where it appears to the Board that the child has not
complied with the probation conditions, it may order the
child to be produced before it and may send the child to
a special home or place of safety for the remaining period
of supervision.
(11) In no case, the period of stay in the special home
or the place of safety shall exceed the maximum period
provided in clause (g) of sub-section (1) of section 18 of
the Act.
x x x
Rule 13. Procedure in relation to Children’s Court and
Monitoring Authorities.-
(1) Upon receipt of preliminary assessment from the
Board the Children’s Court may decide whether there
is need for trial of the child as an adult or as a child
and pass appropriate orders.
(2) Where an appeal has been filed under sub-section
(1) of section 101 of the Act against the order of the
Board declaring the age of the child, the Children’s
Court shall first decide the said appeal.
(3) Where an appeal has been filed under sub-section
(2) of section 101 of the Act against the finding of
the preliminary assessment done by the Board, the
Children’s Court shall first decide the appeal.
(4) Where the appeal under sub-section (2) of section 101
of the Act is disposed of by the Children’s Court on
a finding that there is no need for trial of the child as
an adult, it shall dispose of the same as per section
19 of the Act and these rules.
(5) Where the appeal under sub-section (2) of section
101 of the Act is disposed of by the Children’s Court
on a finding that the child should be tried as an adult
the Children’s Court shall call for the file of the case
from the Board and dispose of the matter as per the
provisions of the Act and these rules.
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(6) The Children’s Court shall record its reasons while
arriving at a conclusion whether the child is to be
treated as an adult or as a child.
(7) Where the Children’s Court decides that there is no
need for trial of the child as an adult, and that it shall
decide the matter itself:
(i) It may conduct the inquiry as if it were functioning
as a Board and dispose of the matter in
accordance with the provisions of the Act and
these rules.
(ii) The Children’s Court, while conducting the
inquiry shall follow the procedure for trial in
summons case under the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973.
(iii) The proceedings shall be conducted in camera
and in a child friendly atmosphere, and there
shall be no joint trial of a child alleged to be in
conflict with law, with a person who is not a child.
(iv) When witnesses are produced for examination
the Children’s Court shall ensure that the
inquiry is not conducted in the spirit of strict
adversarial proceedings and it shall use the
powers conferred by section 165 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).
(v) While examining a child in conflict with law and
recording his statement, the Children’s Court
shall address the child in a child-friendly manner
in order to put the child at ease and to encourage
him to state the facts and circumstances without
any fear, not only in respect of the offence which
is alleged against the child, but also in respect
of the home and social surroundings and the
influence to which the child might have been
subjected.
(vi) The dispositional order passed by the Children’s
Court shall necessarily include an individual care
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 787

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The State of Karnataka and Another

plan in Form 7 for the child in conflict with law
concerned, prepared by a Probation Officer or
Child Welfare Officer or recognized voluntary
organisation on the basis of interaction with the
child and his family, where possible.
(vii) The Children’s Court, in such cases, may pass
any orders as provided in sub-sections (1) and
(2) of section 18 of the Act.
(8) Where the Children’s Court decides that there is a
need for trial of the child as an adult:
(i) It shall follow the procedure prescribed by
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 of trial
by sessions and maintaining a child friendly
atmosphere.
(ii) The final order passed by the Children’s Court
shall necessarily include an individual care
plan for the child as per Form 7 prepared by
a Probation Officer or Child Welfare Officer or
recognized voluntary organisation on the basis
of interaction with the child and his family, where
possible.
(iii) Where the child has been found to be involved
in the offence, the child may be sent to a place
of safety till the age of twenty-one years.
(iv) While the child remains at the place of safety,
there shall be yearly review by the Probation
Officer or the District Child Protection Unit or a
social worker in Form 13 to evaluate the progress
of the child and the reports shall be forwarded
to the Children’s Court.
(v) The Children’s Court may also direct the child
to be produced before it periodically and at
least once every three months for the purpose
of assessing the progress made by the child
and the facilities provided by the institution for
the implementation of the individual care plan.
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(vi) When the child attains the age of twenty-one
years and is yet to complete the term of stay,
the Children’s Court shall:
(a) interact with the child in order to evaluate
whether the child has undergone
reformative changes and if the child can
be a contributing member of the society.
(b) take into account the periodic reports
of the progress of the child, prepared
by the Probation Officer or the District
Child Protection Unit or a social worker, if
needed and further direct that institutional
mechanism if inadequate be strengthened.
(c) to (cd) xx xx
(vii) xx xx”
EXTRACT OF RELEVANT PROVISION OF PROTECTION
OF CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT, 2012
“Section 28. Designation of Special Courts.—
(1) For the purposes of providing a speedy trial, the
State Government shall in consultation with the
Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the
Official Gazette, designate for each district, a Court
of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences
under the Act:
Provided that if a Court of Session is notified as a
children’s court under the Commissions for Protection
of Child Rights Act, 2005 (4 of 2006) or a Special
Court designated for similar purposes under any other
law for the time being in force, then, such court shall
be deemed to be a Special Court under this section.
(2) While trying an offence under this Act, a Special
Court shall also try an offence [other than the offence
referred to in subsection (1)], with which the accused
may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2
of 1974) be charged at the same trial.
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 789

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(3) The Special Court constituted under this Act,
notwithstanding anything in the Information Technology
Act, 2000 (21 of 2000) shall have jurisdiction to try
offences under section 67B of that Act in so far as
it relates to publication or transmission of sexually
explicit material depicting children in any act, or
conduct or manner or facilitates abuse of children
online.”
II. WHETHER THE PERIOD PROVIDED FOR COMPLETION OF
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT UNDER SECTION 14(3) OF
THE ACT IS MANDATORY OR DIRECTORY.
9. Section 15 of the Act enables the Board to make preliminary
assessment into heinous offences where such an offence alleged to
have been committed by a child between 16 and 18 years of age. The
preliminary assessment is to be conducted with regard to his mental
and physical capacity to commit such an offence, ability to understand
the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which the
offence was allegedly committed. Proviso to the aforesaid section
provides that for making such an assessment the Board may take
assistance of an experienced psychologist or psycho-social worker
or other experts. Explanation thereto provides that the process of
preliminary assessment is not a trial but merely to assess the capacity
of such a child to commit and understand the consequences of the
alleged offence. The importance of the assistance from the expert
is even evident from Section 101(2) of the Act. While considering
the appeal against an order passed under Section 15, the appellate
authority can also take assistance of experts other than those who
assisted the Board.
9.1 The importance of the aforesaid provision was considered by
this Court in Barun Chandra Thakur’s case (supra) where
requirement of such assistance was held to be mandatory, even
though the words used in proviso to Section 15(1) and Section
101(2) of the Act are ‘may’.
9.2 Section 14(3) of the Act provides that the preliminary assessment
in terms of Section 15 is to be completed by the Board within
a period of three months from the date of first production of
the child before the Board.
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9.3 In case the Board after preliminary assessment under Section
15 of the Act comes to a conclusion that the trial of the CCL is
to be conducted as an adult, then the Board shall transfer the
records to the Children’s Court having jurisdiction.
9.4 The argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant was
that the CCL was produced before the Board on 03.11.2021.
The period of three months having expired on 02.02.2022, any
order passed by the Board thereafter is non-est, and the trial of
CCL cannot now be transferred to the Children’s Court.
9.5 What we need to consider is as to whether the timeline for
the conclusion of inquiry as envisaged under Section 14 is
mandatory or directory?
9.6 As per the scheme of Section 14 of the Act, sub-section (1)
thereof provides that, when a CCL is produced before the Board,
after holding inquiry, it may pass order in relation to such CCL
as it deems fit under Section 17 and 18 of the Act.
9.7 Section 17 of the Act envisages the order regarding a child
not found to be in conflict with the law. Whereas Section 18
(1) envisages an order passed in case a child is found to be
in conflict with law. It includes child of the age of 16 years and
above, who is involved in a heinous offence, but inquiry to be
conducted by the Board.
9.8 Section 14(2) of the Act provides that the inquiry as envisaged
under Section 14(1) thereof shall be completed within a period
of four months from the date of first production of the child
before the Board. The time is extendable by the Board for a
maximum period of two months, for the reasons to be recorded.
The consequences of non-conclusion of any such inquiry have
been provided in Section 14(4) of the Act, only with reference to
petty offences. The aforesaid sub-section provides that if inquiry
by the Board under sub-section (2) for petty offences remains
inconclusive even after the extended period, the proceedings
shall stand terminated. Proviso to the aforesaid sub-section
provides that in case the Board requires further extension of
time for completion of inquiry into serious and heinous offences,
the same shall be granted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or,
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 791

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

as the case may be, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, for
reasons to be recorded in writing.
9.9 Meaning thereby that as far as inquiry of CCL, as envisaged
under Section 14(1) of the Act, by the Board for heinous offences
is concerned, there is no deadline after which either the inquiry
cannot be proceeded further or has to be terminated.
9.10 Now coming to the issue in hand. It is not in dispute that the
CCL has allegedly committed a heinous offences. The argument
is with reference to the period provided for the conclusion of
preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Act and passing
of an order under Section 15(2) or 18(3) of the Act, namely as
to whether the matter is to be enquired into by the Board or
is to be transferred to the Children’s Court for trial of the CCL
as an adult.
9.11 We may add here that apparently the placement of Section
18(3) does not seem to be appropriate. Sub-sections (1) and
(2) of Section 18 deal with final orders to be passed by the
Board on inquiry against the CCL, whereas sub-section (3)
envisages passing of an order by the Board as to whether the
trial of CCL is to be conducted by the Children’s Court in terms
of preliminary assessment, as envisaged in Section 15 thereof.
Passing of such an order could very well be placed in Section
15 itself after sub-section (2) thereof.
9.12 The inquiry as envisaged in Section 15(1) of the Act enables
the Board to take assistance from experienced psychologists or
psycho-social workers or other experts. The proviso has nexus
with the object sought to be achieved. The Act deals with the
CCL. The preliminary assessment as envisaged in Section 15
has large ramifications, namely, as to whether inquiry against
the CCL is to be conducted by the Board, where the final
punishment, which could be inflicted is lighter or the trial is to
be conducted by the Children’s Court treating the CCL as an
adult, where the punishment could be stringent.
9.13 As noticed earlier, the preliminary assessment into the heinous
offence by the Board in terms of Section 15(1) of the Act has to
be concluded within a period of three months in terms of Section
14(3) of the Act. The Act as such does not provide for any
792 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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extension of time and also does not lay down the consequence
of non-compilation of inquiry within the time permissible. In the
absence thereof the provision prescribing time limit of completion
of inquiry cannot be held to be mandatory. The intention of the
legislature with reference to serious or heinous offences is also
available from the language of Section 14 of the Act which itself
provides for further extension of time for completion of inquiry
by the Board to be granted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or
Chief Metropolitan Magistrate for the reasons to be recorded
in writing. It is in addition to two months’ extension which the
Board itself can grant.
9.14 As in the process of preliminary inquiry there is involvement
of many persons, namely, the investigating officer, the experts
whose opinion is to be obtained, and thereafter the proceedings
before the Board, where for different reasons any of the party
may be able to delay the proceedings, in our opinion the time
so provided in Section 14(3) cannot be held to be mandatory,
as no consequences of failure have been provided as is there in
case of enquiry into petty offences in terms of Section 14(4) of
the Act. If we see the facts of the case in hand, the investigating
officer had taken about two months’ time in getting the report
from the NIMHANS.
9.15 Where consequences for default for a prescribed period in
a Statute are not mentioned, the same cannot be held to be
mandatory. For this purpose, reference can be made to the
following decisions of this Court.
9.16 This Court in Topline Shoes Ltd vs Corporation Bank17
while interpretating Section 13(2)(a) of the repealed Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 prescribing time limit for filing reply to the
complaint, held the same to be directory in nature. Relevant
para 11 thereof is extracted below:
“11. We have already noticed that the provision as
contained under clause (a) of sub-section (2) of
Section 13 is procedural in nature. It is also clear that
with a view to achieve the object of the enactment, that

17 [2002] 3 SCR 1167 : (2002) 6 SCC 33 : 2002 INSC 287
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 793

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

there may be speedy disposal of such cases, that it has
been provided that reply is to be filed within 30 days
and the extension of time may not exceed 15 days.
This provision envisages that proceedings may not
be prolonged for a very long time without the opposite
party having filed his reply. No penal consequences
have however been provided in case extension of time
exceeds 15 days. Therefore, it could not be said that
any substantive right accrued in favour of the appellant
or there was any kind of bar of limitation in filing of
the reply within extended time though beyond 45 days
in all. The reply is not necessarily to be rejected. All
facts and circumstances of the case must be taken
into account. The Statement of Objects and Reasons
of the Act also provides that the principles of natural
justice have also to be kept in mind.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.17 This Court in Kailash vs Nanhku and Others 18 while
interpretating Order VIII Rule 1 CPC prescribing time limit for
filing written statement, held the same to be directory in nature.
Relevant paras 30 and 46 thereof are extracted below:
“30. It is also to be noted that though the power of
the court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 Order
8 is circumscribed by the words “shall not be later
than ninety days” but the consequences flowing from
non-extension of time are not specifically provided for
though they may be read in by necessary implication.
Merely because a provision of law is couched in a
negative language implying mandatory character, the
same is not without exceptions. The courts, when
called upon to interpret the nature of the provision,
may, keeping in view the entire context in which the
provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be
directory though worded in the negative form.
x x x

18 [2005] 3 SCR 289 : (2005) 4 SCC 480 : 2005 INSC 186
794 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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46. We sum up and briefly state our conclusions as
under:
(i) - (iii) xxxx
(iv) The purpose of providing the time schedule
for filing the written statement under Order 8
Rule 1 CPC is to expedite and not to scuttle the
hearing. The provision spells out a disability on
the defendant. It does not impose an embargo
on the power of the court to extend the time.
Though the language of the proviso to Rule 1
Order 8 CPC is couched in negative form, it does
not specify any penal consequences flowing
from the non-compliance. The provision being
in the domain of the procedural law, it has to
be held directory and not mandatory. The power
of the court to extend time for filing the written
statement beyond the time schedule provided
by Order 8 Rule 1 CPC is not completely taken
away.
(v) Though Order 8 Rule 1 CPC is a part of
procedural law and hence directory, keeping
in view the need for expeditious trial of civil
causes which persuaded Parliament to enact
the provision in its present form, it is held that
ordinarily the time schedule contained in the
provision is to be followed as a rule and departure
therefrom would be by way of exception. A prayer
for extension of time made by the defendant shall
not be granted just as a matter of routine and
merely for the asking, more so when the period
of 90 days has expired. Extension of time may
be allowed by way of an exception, for reasons
to be assigned by the defendant and also be
placed on record in writing, howsoever briefly,
by the court on its being satisfied. Extension
of time may be allowed if it is needed to be
given for circumstances which are exceptional,
occasioned by reasons beyond the control of
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 795

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

the defendant and grave injustice would be
occasioned if the time was not extended. Costs
may be imposed and affidavit or documents in
support of the grounds pleaded by the defendant
for extension of time may be demanded,
depending on the facts and circumstances of
a given case.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.18 This Court in State of Bihar and Others vs Bihar Rajya
Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti19 while section 34 (5) and (6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 held the period prescribed
in sub-section (6) to be directory. The relevant paras 23, 25
and 26 are extracted below:
“23. It will be seen from this provision that, unlike
Sections 34(5) and (6), if an award is made beyond
the stipulated or extended period contained in the
section, the consequence of the mandate of the
arbitrator being terminated is expressly provided.
This provision is in stark contrast to Sections 34(5)
and (6) where, as has been stated hereinabove, if
the period for deciding the application under Section
34 has elapsed, no consequence is provided. This is
one more indicator that the same Amendment Act,
when it provided time periods in different situations,
did so intending different consequences.
x x x
25.We come now to some of the High Court judgments.
The High Courts of Patna [Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas
Bank Samiti v. State of Bihar, 2016 SCC OnLine Pat
10104], Kerala [Shamsudeen v. Shreeram Transport
Finance Co. Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 23728],
Himachal Pradesh [Madhava Hytech Engineers (P)
Ltd. v. Executive Engineers, 2017 SCC OnLine HP
2212], Delhi [Machine Tool India Ltd. v. Splendor
Buildwell (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9551],

19 [2018] 7 SCR 1147 : (2018) 9 SCC 472 : 2018 INSC 648
796 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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and Gauhati [Union of India v. Durga Krishna Store
(P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Gau 907] have all taken
the view that Section 34(5) is mandatory in nature.
What is strongly relied upon is the object sought
to be achieved by the provision together with the
mandatory nature of the language used in Section
34(5). Equally, analogies with Section 80 CPC have
been drawn to reach the same result. On the other
hand, in Global Aviation Services (P) Ltd. v. Airport
Authority of India [Global Aviation Services (P) Ltd.
v. Airport Authority of India, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom
233] , the Bombay High Court, in answering Question
4 posed by it, held, following some of our judgments,
that the provision is directory, largely because no
consequence has been provided for breach of the
time-limit specified. When faced with the argument
that the object of the provision would be rendered
otiose if it were to be construed as directory, the
learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court held
as under: (SCC OnLine Bom para 133)
“133. Insofar as the submission of the learned
counsel for the respondent that if Section 34(5)
is considered as directory, the entire purpose
of the amendments would be rendered otiose
is concerned, in my view, there is no merit in
this submission made by the learned counsel for
the respondent. Since there is no consequence
provided in the said provision in case of non-
compliance thereof, the said provision cannot
be considered as mandatory. The purpose of
avoiding any delay in proceeding with the matter
expeditiously is already served by insertion
of appropriate rule in the Bombay High Court
(Original Side) Rules. The Court can always
direct the petitioner to issue notice along with
papers and proceedings upon other party before
the matter is heard by the Court for admission
as well as for final hearing. The vested rights
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 797

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

of a party to challenge an award under Section
34 cannot be taken away for non-compliance
of issuance of prior notice before filing of the
arbitration petition.”
The aforesaid judgment has been followed by recent
judgments of the High Courts of Bombay [Maharashtra
State Road Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Simplex
Gayatri Consortium, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 805] and
Calcutta [Srei Infrastructure Finance Ltd. v. Candor
Gurgaon Two Developers and Projects (P) Ltd., 2018
SCC OnLine Cal 5606].
26. We are of the opinion that the view propounded by
the High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta represents
the correct state of the law. However, we may add
that it shall be the endeavour of every court in which
a Section 34 application is filed, to stick to the time-
limit of one year from the date of service of notice
to the opposite party by the applicant, or by the
Court, as the case may be. In case the Court issues
notice after the period mentioned in Section 34(3)
has elapsed, every court shall endeavour to dispose
of the Section 34 application within a period of one
year from the date of filing of the said application,
similar to what has been provided in Section 14 of
the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and
Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act,
2015. This will give effect to the object sought to
be achieved by adding Section 13(6) by the 2015
Amendment Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.19 This Court in C. Bright vs District and Others 20 while
interpretating the nature of section 14 of the Securitisation
and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002 held the period prescribed therein
mandating the District Magistrate to deliver possession of a

20 [2020] 7 SCR 997 : (2021) 2 SCC 392 : 2020 INSC 633
798 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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secured asset within 30 days, extendable to an aggregate of
60 days, to be directory in nature. The relevant paras 8 and
11 are extracted below:
“8. A well-settled rule of interpretation of the statutes
is that the use of the word “shall” in a statute,
does not necessarily mean that in every case it is
mandatory that unless the words of the statute are
literally followed, the proceeding or the outcome of
the proceeding, would be invalid. It is not always
correct to say that if the word “may” has been used,
the statute is only permissive or directory in the
sense that non-compliance with those provisions
will not render the proceeding invalid [State of U.P.
v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912] and
that when a statute uses the word “shall”, prima facie,
it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real
intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the
whole scope of the statute [State of U.P. v. Babu Ram
Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751]. The principle of literal
construction of the statute alone in all circumstances
without examining the context and scheme of the
statute may not serve the purpose of the statute [RBI
v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd.,
(1987) 1 SCC 424].
x x x
11. In a judgment reported as Remington Rand of
India Ltd. v. Workmen [Remington Rand of India
Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 224], Section 17
of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 came up for
consideration. The argument raised was that the
time-limit of 30 days of publication of award by the
Labour Court is mandatory. This Court held that
though Section 17 is mandatory, the time-limit to
publish the award within 30 days is directory inter
alia for the reason that the non-publication of the
award within the period of thirty days does not entail
any penalty.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 799

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

9.20 As against above, where consequences of non-compliance
within the period prescribed for anything to be done in the statute
have been mentioned, the same was held to be mandatory by
this Court in SCG Contracts (India) (P) Ltd. v. K.S. Chamankar
Infrastructure (P) Ltd.21 It was with reference to Order VIII Rule
1 CPC as amended for suits relating to commercial disputes in
terms of Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division
of High Courts Act, 2015. Relevant paras of the judgment are
extracted hereinbelow:
“10. Several High Court Judgments on the amended
Order 8 Rule 1 have now held that given the
consequence of non-filing of written statement, the
amended provisions of the CPC will have to be held
to be mandatory. See Oku Tech (P) Ltd. v. Sangeet
Agarwal, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6601 by a learned
Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dated 11-8-2016
in CS (OS) No.3390 of 2015 as followed by several
other judgments including a judgment of the Delhi
High Court in Maja Cosmetics v. Oasis Commercial
(P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6698.
11. We are of the view that the view taken by the
Delhi High Court in these judgments is correct in
view of the fact that the consequence of forfeiting
a right to file the written statement; non-extension
of any further time; and the fact that the Court shall
not allow the written statement to be taken on record
all points to the fact that the earlier law on Order 8
Rule 1 on the filing of written statement under Order
8 Rule 1 has now been set at naught.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.21 The judgment of this Court in Barun Chandra Thakur’s case
(supra) does not come to the rescue of the appellant. This Court
in the aforesaid judgment had only noticed the scheme of the
Act in paras 59 and 60 and concluded that the conclusion of
the inquiry and trials under Act should be expeditious, is the
scheme of the Act.

21 [2019] 3 SCR 1050 : (2019) 12 SCC 210 : 2019 INSC 187
800 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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9.22 Hence, we are of the opinion that the time provided in Section
14(2) of the Act to conduct inquiry is not mandatory but directory.
The time so provided in Section 14(3) can be extended by the
Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,
as the case may be, for the reasons to be recorded in writing.
9.23 After holding that the period as provided for under Section 14(3)
for completion of preliminary assessment is not mandatory, what
further? We deem it our duty to clarify the position further. For
this purpose, the tools of interpretation as were used in Afcons
Infrastructure Limited and Another vs Cherian Varkey
Construction Company Private Limited and Others22 could
be aptly used to clarify the position further. In the aforesaid
case, the consideration before this Court was the interpretation
of Section 89 CPC. (See: paragraphs 20 and 21)
9.24 The rule of causus omissus i.e. ‘what has not been provided in
the Statute cannot be supplied by the courts’ in the strict rule
of interpretation. However, there are certain exceptions thereto.
Para ‘19’ of the judgment of this Court in Surjit Singh Kalra
vs. Union of India and Another23 throws light thereon. The
same is extracted below:
“19. True it is not permissible to read words in a statute
which are not there, but “where the alternative lies
between either supplying by implication words which
appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting
a construction which deprives certain existing words
of all meaning, it is permissible to supply the words”
(Craies Statute Law, 7th edn., p.109). Similar are
the observations in Hameedia Hardware Stores v.
B. Mohan Lal Sowcar, (1988) 2 SCC 513, 524-25
where it was observed that the court construing a
provision should not easily read into it words which
have not been expressly enacted but having regard
to the context in which a provision appears and the
object of the statute in which the said provision is
enacted the court should construe it in a harmonious

22 [2010] 8 SCR 1053 : (2010) 8 SCC 24 : 2010 INSC 431
23 [1991] 1 SCR 364 : (1991) 2 SCC 87 : 1991 INSC 36
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 801

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

way to make it meaningful. An attempt must always
be made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to
advance the remedy intended by the statute. (See:
Sirajul Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of Waqf,
1959 SCR 1287, 1299:AIR 1959 SC 198)”
(emphasis supplied)
9.25 The issue was thereafter considered by this Court in Rajbir
Singh Dalal (Dr.) vs. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa
and Another24. In the aforesaid case this Court observed as:
‘where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication
words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or
adopting a strict construction which leads to absurdity or deprives
certain existing words of all meaning, and in this situation it is
permissible to supply the words (vide Principles of Statutory
Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, 9th Edn., pp.71-76)’. This
Court also considered the traditional principles of interpretation
known as the ‘Mimansa rules of interpretation’. The issue under
consideration in the aforesaid case was regarding requisite
academic qualification for appointment to the post of Reader
in the University in Public Administration. Applying the tools of
interpretation, this Court opined that ‘relevant subject’ should
be inserted in the qualification required for the post of Reader
after the words ‘at the Masters degree level’ to give the rules
a purposive interpretation by filling in the gap.
9.26 The same principles were followed by this Court in Central
Bureau of Investigation, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell
vs. Ramesh Gelli and Others25.
9.27 In our opinion, the guidance as is evident from sub-section (4)
of section 14 of the Act enabling the Chief Judicial Magistrate
or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to extend the period of inquiry
as envisaged under Section 14(1), shall apply for extension of
period as envisaged in sub-section (3) also. Such an extension
can be granted for a limited period for the reasons to be recorded
in writing. While considering the prayer for extension of time,

24 [2008] 11 SCR 992 : (2008) 9 SCC 284 : 2008 INSC 913
25 [2016] 1 SCR 762 : (2016) 3 SCC 788 : 2016 INSC 134
802 [2024] 5 S.C.R.

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the delay in receipt of opinion of the experts shall be a relevant
factor. This shall be in the spirit of the Act and giving the same
a purposive meaning.
9.28 We approve the views expressed by the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh in Bhola vs State of Madhya Pradesh26 and the High
Court in Delhi in CCL vs State (NCT) of Delhi27 who while
dealing with the provisions of section 14 of the Act have held
that the time period prescribed for completion of the preliminary
assessment is not mandatory but merely directory in nature.
We also approve the views expressed by the High Court of
the Punjab and Haryana in Neeraj and Others vs State of
Haryana28 and by the High Court of Delhi in X (Through his
Elder Brother) vs State29 who also expressed similar views
while dealing with the pari materia provisions of the repealed
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
III. EXERCISE OF REVISIONAL POWER BY THE HIGH COURT
10. The order under challenge in the present appeal was passed by the
High Court in revision filed by the complainant, impugning the order
dated 10.04.2023 passed by the Board vide which the application
filed by her under section 19 of the Act for termination of proceedings
before the Board and transferring the case to the Children’s Court
for trial, was rejected. It was for the reason that the order passed by
the Principal Magistrate on 05.04.2022 was final in terms of Section
7(4) of the Act, as no majority opinion could have been given.
10.1 In terms of the provision of law, the CCL could have grievance
against that order and availed of his remedy against the same
but, the proceedings were allowed to be continued further. Lesser
said the better as to how two members of the Board without the
Principal Magistrate being there had conducted the proceedings
taking a different view in the matter. It is relevant to note that
when subsequent order was passed by two members of the
Board on 12.04.2022, the Principal Magistrate had already been

26 2019 SCC OnLine MP 521
27 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5063
28 2005 SCC OnLine P&H 611
29 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11164
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Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
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transferred, as is evident from impugned order of the High Court
(para 19). In fact, the order passed by the two members of the
Board on 12.04.2022 directing inquiry in the case by the Board
was non-est in the eyes of law, if considered strictly in terms
of Section 7(4) of the Act. From various orders passed by the
Board, it is evident that the inquiry could not proceed further
either on account of the absence of the Presiding Officer or APP
(Public Prosecutor) or the witnesses summoned. At that stage,
an application was moved by the complainant for termination of
proceedings before the Board and transferring the matter to the
Children’s Court, to which objections were filed by the appellant.
The Board vide order dated 10.04.2023 dismissed the application
holding that the complainant had a right of appeal against the
order dated 12.04.2022, which could have been availed and
the Board does not have any power to review its order. The
aforesaid order was challenged by the complainant before the
High Court by filing the Revision Petition invoking power under
Section 397 read with Section 399 Cr.P.C. It is the order passed
in the aforesaid petition which is impugned before this Court.
10.2 Firstly, the issue is mentioning of Section 397 read with Section
399 Cr. P.C for filing revision petition before the High Court
and about its maintainability on that account. Nothing hinges
on that, as it was mere mentioning of a wrong section in the
petition. The High Court otherwise has the power to deal with
the subject-matter. Section 102 of the Act enables the High
Court to exercise its revisional powers with reference to any
order or proceeding by the Board or the Children’s Court.
Hence, on that account we do not find that the revision should
have been dismissed.
10.3 Another argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant was
that there being remedy of appeal available with the complainant
against the order dated 12.04.2024 vide which two members of
the Board had directed inquiry into the offence allegedly committed
by CCL by the Board. In our opinion, even though such a remedy
may be available to the complainant which should normally be
availed, but what is evident from the facts of the case is that
there was an earlier order passed by the Principal Magistrate
on 05.04.2022, which was final regarding conduct of trial of the
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CCL by the Children’s Court, still subsequently two members of
the Board without the Principal Magistrate being there passed
an order on 12.04.2022 directing inquiry into the offence by the
Board. In fact, the subsequent order was totally non-est. Even
if in such a situation the aforesaid order was not challenged by
availing the remedy of appeal, in our opinion the revision under
Section 102 of the Act cannot be said to be not maintainable.
10.4 Firstly, there is no time limit provided for filing a revision therein,
and secondly it could be on an application filed by any of the
parties. The High Court can exercise its revisional powers for
satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any such order
and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit.
Besides the legality of the order dated 12.04.2022, the case in
hand is such where even the propriety of the proceeding was
also in question. The proceedings before the Board could not
continue after the passing of the order dated 05.04.2022, in
terms of Section 7(4) of the Act.
10.5 Hence, non-availment of the remedy of appeal by the complainant
in such a situation cannot be held to be fatal. We may also add
here that even the appellant could have availed the remedy of
appeal against the order dated 05.04.2022, but he thought of
continuing before the Board in a non-est proceeding.
IV. ANOMALY IN SECTION 101 OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
(CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT, 2015
(A) REGARDING THE TERMS USED AS ‘CHILDREN’S
COURT’ AND ‘COURT OF SESSIONS’
11. Section 101 of the Act provides for appeal against various orders as
provided therein. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that any person
aggrieved by an order made by the Committee or the Board under
the Act may within 30 days from the date of such order prefer an
appeal to the Children’s Court, with an exception that against decision
of the Committee relating to foster care and sponsorship care the
appeal shall lie to the District Magistrate. The term ‘Committee’ has
been defined in Section 2(22) of the Act to mean ‘Child Welfare
Committee’ constituted under Section 27 thereof.
The proviso to sub-section (1) of section 101 provides that the Court
of Sessions or District Magistrate, as the case may be, may entertain
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 805

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

the appeal after expiry of the period of 30 days in case sufficient
cause is shown for the delay in filing.
11.1 Sub-section (2) of Section 101 provides that an appeal against the
order passed by the Board after making preliminary assessment
under Section 15 of the Act shall lie before the Court of
Sessions. While deciding the appeal, the Court can take
assistance of experienced psychologists and medical specialists,
other than those whose assistance was taken by the Board while
passing the order impugned. It shows independent examination
of the issue. Sub-section (4) provides that, no second appeal will
be maintainable from the order passed by the Court of Sessions.
In Barun Chandra Thakur’s case (supra) the provisions have
been held to be mandatory.
11.2 Some anomalies are evident in the aforesaid proviso, as
pointed out by the learned counsel for the parties at the time
of hearing. Their contention was that the anomalies should also
be addressed, so as to streamline the procedure in future. We
also think in the same direction, keeping in view the spirit of law.
11.3 The term Court of Sessions as such has not been defined in the
Act. The trial of CCL, who is of the age of 16 years or above
and is involved in a heinous offence is to be conducted by the
Children’s Court, treating him as an adult.
11.4 ‘Children’s Court’ has been defined in the Act in Section 2(20)
to mean the Court established under the 2005 Act or a Special
Court established under the 2012 Act. Where such Courts are
not existing, the Court of Sessions shall have jurisdiction to try
the offence under the Act. Meaning thereby the Presiding Officer
of the Children’s Court and the Court of Sessions have been
put in same bracket. There is no doubt with the proposition
that a Sessions Judge would include an Additional Sessions
Judge as well.
11.5 Section 25 of the 2005 Act provides that for providing speedy
trial of offences against children or violation of child rights, the
State Government in concurrence with the Chief Justice of the
High Court by notification specify at least a Court in the State
or for each district a Court of Sessions to be a Children’s Court.
Meaning thereby the Special Court under the 2005 Act is at the
level of the Sessions Court.
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11.6 Section 101(1) of the Act deals with filing of appeals against
certain orders passed by the Board or the Committee before
the Children’s Court, as the case may be. The proviso to the
aforesaid sub-section provides that in case there is any delay
in filing the appeal, the power of condonation has been vested
with the Court of Sessions. The word ‘Children’s Court’ is not
mentioned, though appeal is maintainable before Children’s
Court.
11.7 Sub-section (2) of Section 101 of the Act provides for an appeal
against an order passed by the Board under Section 15 of the
Act. The appellate authority is stated to be Court of Sessions.
11.8 Rule 13 of the 2016 Rules deals with the procedure in relation
to Children’s Court and Monitoring Authorities. Sub-rules (3)
and (4) thereof which deal with appeal filed under Section
101(2) of the Act refer the appellate authority as the ‘Children’s
Court’ though in Section 101(2) of the Act appeal is stated to
be maintainable before the Court of Sessions. From the above
provision also, it is evident that the words ‘Court of Sessions’
and the ‘Children’s Court’ have been used interchangeably.
12. Section 102 of the Act provides for revisional power of the High
Court. This again talks of calling for records of any proceedings
in which a Committee or a Board or Children’s Court or Court has
passed an order. It does not talk of exercise of revisional power
against the order passed by the Sessions Court. To put the record
straight, it is added that the term ‘court’ has been defined in the
Act in Section 2(23) to mean a civil court, which has jurisdiction in
matters of adoption and guardianship and may include the District
Court, Family Court and City Civil Courts.
12.1 Similarly, sub-section (2) provides that against an order passed
by the Board after preliminary assessment under Section 15 of
the Act, the appeal is maintainable before the Court of Sessions.
The Board is headed by the Principal Magistrate. Here, the
word Children’s Court is not mentioned.
12.2 From a conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act
and the 2016 Rules, in our opinion, wherever words ‘Children’s
Court’ or the ‘Sessions Court’ are mentioned both should be
read in alternative. In the sense where Children’s Court is
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Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

available, even if the appeal is said to be maintainable before
the Sessions Court, it has to be considered by the Children’s
Court. Whereas where no Children’s Court is available, the
power is to be exercised by the Sessions Court.
(B) TIME FOR FILING APPEAL AGAINST ORDER OF THE
BOARD UNDER SECTION 15 OF THE ACT
13. Though, the right of appeal has been provided in Section 15(2) and
Section 101(2) of the Act against an order passed under Section
18(3) after preliminary assessment under Section 15 of the Act,
however, neither any time has been fixed for filing the appeal nor
any provision is provided for condonation of delay in case need be.
13.1 In our opinion, the same being an omission. In order to make
the Act workable and putting timelines for exercise of statutory
right of appeal which always is there, we deem it appropriate
to fill up this gap, which otherwise does not go against the
scheme of the Act. Hence, for the period for filing of appeal
in Section 101(2), we take guidance from Section 101(1) of
the Act. The period provided for filing the appeal therein is
30 days and in case sufficient cause is shown the power to
condone the delay has also been conferred on the appellate
authority. Timeline has also been provided for decision of
appeal.
13.2 Ordered accordingly.
(C) REGARDING SECOND APPEAL
14. In sub-section (4), it is provided that no second appeal shall lie from
the order of Sessions Court. Sub-section (5) provides for appeal to
the High Court against an order of Children’s Court, for this procedure
of CrPC is applicable, as if the second appeal may lie against the
order passed by the Children’s Court. High Court has also been
conferred revisional powers under Section 102 of the Act.
14.1 The aforesaid provisions will also need examination in detail
for seamless working of the provisions of the Act removing
anomalies. However, as this is not the issue involved in the
present appeal and no arguments have been addressed
thereon, hence, we leave this issue open to be considered in
some appropriate case.
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V. VALIDITY OF ORDER PASSED BY THE BOARD ON
05.04.2022
15. In the case in hand, after receipt of the report dated 01.02.2022
submitted by the Department of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry,
NIMHANS-DWCO, the arguments of learned counsel for the parties
were heard by the Board and vide order dated 29.03.2022 the
matter was kept for orders on 05.04.2022. On that day, the Principal
Magistrate passed the order, after considering the preliminary
assessment report and the social investigation report, that the CCL
is to be tried by the Children’s Court as an adult. The records of
the case were directed to be transferred to the Children’s Court,
Bengaluru. When the file was put up before the member of the Board
for signature, he recorded as under:
“I am having a dissenting view to above said order. I will
pass detailed order on next date of hearing.”
15.1 The matter was directed to be put up on 12.04.2022. On the
next date, the Principal Magistrate being not there and another
person having been appointed as a member of the Board, the
arguments apparently were reheard by the two members of the
Board in the absence of the Principal Magistrate, and it was
directed that enquiry into the offence allegedly committed by
the CCL is to be conducted by the Board.
15.2 Section 7 of the Act deals with the procedure in relation to
the Board. Sub-Section 3 thereof provides that the Board may
act notwithstanding absence of any member of the Board. No
order passed by the Board shall be invalid by reason only of
absence of any member during any stage of proceedings. The
proviso thereto provides that at the time of final disposal of
the case or making an order under Section 18(3) of the Act,
there shall be at least two members including the Principal
Magistrate.
15.3 When the arguments in the matter were heard with reference
to the order under Section 18(3) of the Act, and the order was
reserved on 29.03.2022 the Board consisted of a Principal
Magistrate and a Member.
15.4 Section 7(4) of the Act provides that in case there is any
difference of opinion in the interim or the final disposal, the
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 809

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

opinion of the majority shall prevail. Where there is no such
majority, the opinion of the Principal Magistrate shall prevail.
15.5 A perusal of the record shows that after the order was reserved
on 29.03.2022, the matter was listed on 05.04.2022 for orders.
The Principal Magistrate recorded his opinion that the CCL is to
be tried by the Children’s Court. The other member of the Board
recorded his dissent though, no detailed reasons were given as
such. In terms of Section 7(4) of the Act, the opinion of the majority
is to prevail. The case in hand does not fall in that category, as
the Board on that date consisted of the Principal Magistrate and
a Member, and the Member had recorded his dissent. In such a
situation the opinion of the Principal Magistrate will prevail. In the
case in hand the order was signed by the Principal Magistrate.
Even if the other member of the Board had not signed the order
and had merely mentioned that he had a dissenting view, without
any reasons being recorded, the order of the Principal Magistrate
will prevail. Needless to add that reasons in any order are ‘heart
and soul’ and are helpful for the next higher Court to examine
the matter. The proceedings with reference to the opinion of the
Board regarding inquiry or trial of the CCL, either by the Board
or Children’s Court, stood culminated. Any further proceedings
in that matter were non-est and without jurisdiction. Much less
to say anything more about the same. The opinion of the High
Court in that regard does not call for any interference.
VI. REMEDY OF APPEAL TO APPELLANT
16. In our opinion, considering the facts of the case in hand, the appellant
deserves to be granted that right.
16.1 Initially the application filed by the complainant was rejected
by the Board. Aggrieved against the same, the complainant
preferred revision before the High Court. The High Court decided
the same merely on the issue of finality of the opinion of the
Board. It was in terms of Section 7(4) of the Act, which provides
that where majority opinion is not possible, the opinion of the
Principal Magistrate shall prevail. An appeal is a valuable right.
The arguments, if any, which the CCL may have against the
order dated 05.04.2022 passed by the Board directing for his
trial by the Children’s Court, have not been considered. The
impugned order only noticed as fact that the Board had formed
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opinion after considering the opinion received from NIMHANS.
If scheme of the Act is considered, an appeal against order of
the Board passed under Section 15 of the Act lies to the Court
of Sessions. The appellate authority, to examine the issues,
is entitled to get the assistance of experienced psychologists
and medical specialists other than those whose assistance has
been obtained by the Board. Hence, independent examination
is envisaged. The said process has not been followed in the
case in hand. We do not want to prejudice the rights of the
parties in that regard.
16.2 Hence, we are of the opinion that the CCL can exercise his
right of appeal against order dated 05.04.2022 passed by the
Board within 10 days and appeal, if any filed, shall be decided
by the appellate authority within two months thereafter.
VII. ADDITIONAL ISSUES
17. Before parting with the judgment, we quote with approval para
25 of the impugned order passed by the High Court. The same is
extracted below:
“25. One more point observed by this Court is that while
signing the order sheet and also orders, the names of the
Judicial Member as well as Non-judicial Members are not
noted below their signatures. This is coming in the way
of anyone knowing the names of the members who were
present and who were absent. Therefore, only on the
basis of signatures, this Court was able to distinguish as to
who was the Non-Judicial Member present on 05.04.2022
and who was the third member who joined in expressing
dissenting opinion on 12.04.2022. This Court is of the
considered opinion that it would be appropriate to mention
the names of the members below their signatures, which
would also help the transparency in conduct of the said
proceedings and put the members on guard about their
roles played in the said proceedings.”
17.1 The High Court has noticed an important issue which arises in
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings throughout the country.
The Presiding Officers or Members of the Board, as the case in
hand, or Tribunals do not mention their names when the order
is passed. As a result of which it becomes difficult to find out
[2024] 5 S.C.R. 811

Child in Conflict with Law Through his Mother v.
The State of Karnataka and Another

later on, as to who was presiding the Court or Board or Tribunal
or was the member at the relevant point of time. There may be
many officers with the same name. Insofar as the judicial officers
are concerned, unique I.D. numbers have been issued to them.
17.2 We expect that wherever lacking, in all orders passed by the
Courts, Tribunals, Boards and the quasi-judicial authorities, the
names of the Presiding Officers or the Members be specifically
mentioned in the orders when signed, including the interim
orders. If there is any identification number given to the officers,
the same can also be added.
17.3 The matter does not rest here. In many of the orders the presence
of the parties and/or their counsels is not properly recorded.
Further, it is not evident as to on whose behalf adjournment
has been sought and granted. It is very relevant fact to be
considered at different stages of the case and also to find out
as to who was the party delaying the matter. At the time of
grant of adjournment, it should specifically be mentioned as to
the purpose therefor. This may be helpful in imposition of costs
also, finally once we shift to the real terms costs.
VIII. RELIEFS AND DIRECTIONS
18. In view of our aforesaid discussions, the present appeal is disposed
of with the following directions:
(i) The provision of Section 14(3) of the Act, providing for the period
of three months for completion of a preliminary assessment
under Section 15 of the Act, is not mandatory. The same is held
to be directory. The period can be extended, for the reasons
to be recorded in writing, by the Chief Judicial Magistrate or,
as the case may be, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.
(ii) The words ‘Children’s Court’ and ‘Court of Sessions’ in
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
and the 2016 Rules shall be read interchangeably. Primarily
jurisdiction vests in the Children’s Court. However, in the
absence of constitution of such Children’s Court in the district,
the power to be exercised under the Act is vested with the
Court of Sessions.
(iii) Appeal, under Section 101(2) of the Act against an order of
the Board passed under Section 15 of the Act, can be filed
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within a period of 30 days. The appellate court can entertain
the appeal after the expiry of the aforesaid period, provided
sufficient cause is shown. Endeavour has to be made to decide
any such appeal filed within a period of 30 days.
(iv) There is no error in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the
High Court in the present matter.
(v) There is no error in the order dated 15.11.2023 passed by the
High Court dealing with the procedure as provided for under
the Act in terms of Section 7(4) thereof.
(vi) Order passed by the Board as signed by the Principal Magistrate
on 05.04.2022 was final. However, the same is subject to right
of appeal of the aggrieved party. The appellant shall have the
right of appeal against the aforesaid order within a period of
10 days from today. The appellate authority shall make an
endeavour to decide the same within a period of two months
from the date of filing.
(vii) In all the orders passed by the Courts, Tribunals, Boards and
the Quasi-Judicial Authorities the names of the Presiding Officer
and/or the Members who sign the orders shall be mentioned.
In case any identification number has been given, the same
can also be added.
(viii) The Presiding Officers and/or Members while passing the
order shall properly record presence of the parties and/or their
counsels, the purpose for which the matter is being adjourned
and the party on whose behalf the adjournment has been
sought and granted.
19. A copy of the judgment be sent to all the Registrar Generals of High
Courts for further circulation amongst the Judicial Officers and the
Members of the Juvenile Justice Boards, the Directors of the National
Judicial Academy and the State Judicial Academies.

Result of the case: Appeal disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan