CHINNAMMAversusGOPALAN AND ORS.

                            CHINNAMMA                                          A
                                v.
                         GOPALAN AND ORS.

                           OCTOBER 13, 1995

   [A.M. AHMADI, C.J., S.C. SEN AND K.S. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.)                     B

      Kera/a Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965:

      Sections 11(2)(a), 11(2)(b), 11(2)(c) and 12-Eviction on ground of
non-payment of rent-Arrears of rent-Notice mandatory-Eviction                  C
Orde~Setting aside of-Tenant obliged to deposit only amount intimated in
notice-Section 12-Applicable only during pendency of proceedings.

      The appellant was a tenant of a residential building nnder the first
respondent-landlord on lease at a rent of Rs. 20 per mensnm w.e.f. 1.8.1972.
She was in arrears of rent with effect from 1.6.1975. The respondent sent      D
a notice on 22.6.1977 terminating the tenancy and demanding surrender
of the building.

      Subsequently, the respondent filed a petition seeking eviction of the
appellant - tenant on the grounds of default in payment of rent and            E
bonafide requirement of the building for his own occupation under Sec-
tions 11(2) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act,
1965. The plea for bonafide requirement for respondent's own occupation
was found against.

       However, the Rent Controller ordered eviction under Section 11(2)       F
(b) of the Act on the ground of default in payment of rent. The appellant
filed an appeal before the appellant authority which directed the Rent
Controller to consider the maintainability of the petition. The Rent Con-
troller passed an order on 22.2.1980 directing the appellant to deposit Rs.
540 being arrears of rent due as on 1.2.1980, interest at 6% per annum, Rs.    G
25 towards cost and rent for subsequent four months. This amount was
specifically quantified as Rs. 750, on deposit of which the appellant would
be entitled to apply for getting the eviction order vacated under Section
11(2)(c) of the Act.
                                                                   f
      The appellant deposited the sum of Rs. 750 on 6.4.82 and prayed for H
                                   319
    320                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A setting aside the order of eviction. The Rent Controller dismissed the
    petition. The appeal was also dismissed. The appellant filed a revision
    petition before the District Judge which was allowed.

          The respondent filed original petition before the High Court which
    set aside the order passed in revision by the District Judge. The High
B   Court held that it was not the arrears specified in the order of eviction but
    the deposit of all arrears of rent that accrued even subsequent thereto till
    the date of filing of the application under Section 11(2) (c) of the Act, that
    should be made. Aggrieved by the High Court's Judgment the appellant
    preferred the present appeal.
c
          Allowing the appeal, this Court

           HELD : 1.1. A mere look at Sections 11 and 12 of the Kerala
    Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965 would show that they operate
    in different situations. Under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act the Court passes
D   a final order of eviction, directing the tenant to put the landlord in
    possession of the building, if there is default as provided therein. The
    execution of such final order is statutorily suspended for a period of one
    month. Within that time or such further time as the Court may allow, the
    tenant is given an opportunity to deposit the arrears of rent with interest
E   and cost of the proceedings and, if so done, the Court is bound to vacate
    the order passed under section 11(2) (b) of the Act. [328-D·El

           1.2. On the other hand, the provisions of set:!:in 12 are applicable
    during the pendency of the proceedings for eviction. Section 12 is a special
    provision which provides a summary procedure whereby during the penden·
F   cy of the proceedings the Court can direct the tenant to pay the current rent
    as admitted by the tenant and ifit is not so done, the main eviction proceed·
    ings itself will come to an end and the court is enabled to pass an order
    directing the tenant to up the landlord in possession of the building.
                                                                       [328-F-H]
G          1.3: It is nobody's case that either the Rent Control Court or the
    appellate Court or the Rivisional Court passed any order under section
    12 of the Act regarding the payment of subsequent arrears (or future rent
    till the termination of proceedings) admitted by the tenant, when the
    proceedings were pending for eviction and before the order was passed
H   under section 11(2) (b) of the Act. [329-C]
                        CHINNAMMA v. GOPALAN                                 321

      1.4. To invoke section 12 of the Act, an independent order passed             A
during the pendency of the proceedings under section 11 is rec1uired.
Section 12 of the Act has no application to a case wherein the proceedings
for eviction are not pending, but on the other hand an order of eviction
has been passed by the court under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. In a case
where an order of eviction has been passed under Section 11(2)(b) of the
                                                                                    B
Act, Section 11(2)(c) alone is attracted and Section 12 of the Act is
"Inapplicable." [329-D, Fl

        Chellamma Verghese v. Cicey, (1994) 2 KLT 106, overruled.

       2. The proviso to section 11(2)(b) of the Act is mandatory. The              C
language of section 11(2)(b) and the proviso thereto, read along with
Section 11(2)(c) clearly obliges the tenant only to deposit the arrears of
rent (along with interest and cost of proceedings) for which the landlord
is obliged to send the notice under the proviso to section 11(2)(b) of the
Act and the Court has passed an order on the basis of such cause of action,         D
under section 11(2)(b) of the Act. By no stretch of imagination, the arrears
of rent specified in Section 11 (2)(c) of the Act will take within its folil, the
entire arrears of rent due till the date of deposit, since the date of deposit
will always be after the date of the order passed by the Court under section
11(2)(b) of the Act. [329-H, 330-C-D]
                                                                                    E
        Smt. Prakash Mehra v. K.L. Malhotra, AIR (1989) SC 1652, relied on.

        P. Anil v. Devaki & Ors., (1991) KLJ 611, approved.

     Francis v. Jacob, (1983) KLT 669 and K.G.U. Tmst v. Slui Ram
Chandraji, AIR (1978) SC 287, held inapplicable.                                    F

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6227 of
1995.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 27.10.94 of the Kerala High                  G
Court in O.P. No. 10288 of 1988-Y.

        G. Vishwantha Iyer and T.G.N. Nair for the Appellant.

     S. Balakrishnan, S. Prasad and Ms. Rev'athy Raghavan for the
Respondents.                                                      H
    322                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A         The .I udgment of the Court was delivered by

           PARIPOORNAN, J. The first respondent in O.P. No. 10288/88,
    Kerala High Court - hereinafter referred to as the 'tenant' - appeals against
    lhe jud1,'IT1enl of the High Court dated 27.10.1994. The petitioner in the
    Original Petition - hereinafter referred lo as the 'landlord' - is the first
B
    respondent herein. The statutory authorities and other proforma respon-
    dents in the High Court are the respondents in this Civil Appeal. The
    learned Judge of the High Court, by the Judgment dated 27.10.1994, in
    exercise of the power under Article 227 of the Constitution, set aside the
    order passed by the District Judge, Palakkad in R.C.R.P. No. 6 of 1985
c   dated 31.7.1986 (Ext. P-3) and restored the order passed by the Rent
    Control Court and appellate authority rendered in I.A. No. 764/82 in
    R.C.P. (O.P.) No. 141/77 (Ext. P-1) and R.C.A. 68/83 (Ext. P- 2). The
    appellant-tenant was given three months' time to surrender the possession
    of the building in question to the respondent-landlord.
D
           2. This litigation has a chequered history. The appellant is a tenant
    of a residential building bearing Door No. 22/70 in Sriram Street, Moothan-
    thara, Koppom, Palakkad Taluk under the first respondent-landlord. The
    appellant took the building on lease at a rent of Rs. 20 per mensum from
    the landlord on l.8.1972. Alleging that the rent from 1.6.1975 is in arrears,
E   the landlord sent a notice on 22.6.1977 terminating the tenancy and
    demanding surrender of the building. Subsequently, the landlord filed
    R.C.P. (O.P.) No. 141/77 seeking eviction of the tenant under sections
    11(2) and 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1965
    (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The grounds urged for eviction of the
F   tenant are, default in payment of rent [S.11(2)] and bonajide requirement
    of the building for the landlord's own occupation [S. 11(3)]. The plea of
    bonafide requirement for landlord's own occupation was found against.
    However, the Rent Control Court ordered eviction under section 11{2)(b)
    of the Act on the ground of default in payment of rent. The Court ordered
    that in case the tenant deposits a sum of Rs. 820 as arrears as on 1.11.1978
G   within one month from the date of the order, i.e. 30.11.1978, the tenant
    could move an application for vacating the order of eviction. The tenant
    filed an appeal - R.C.A. No. 8/79 before the appellate authority. The
    appellate authority, by order dated 26.7.1979, set aside the order passed by
    the Rent Controller and ordered a remit, directing the Rent Controller to
H   consider the maintainability of the petition. After remit, the Rent Control-
            CHINNAMMA v. GOPALAN [PARIPOORNAN,J.]                         323

ler passed an order on 22.2.1980 under section 11(2)(b) of the Act in the        A
following terms :

            "In the result, l find that the petitioner's claim for recovery of
        possession under section 11(3) is unsustainable. But the petitioner
        is entitled to get recovery of possession since the respondent has
        defaulted payment of rent. So the respondent is ordered to sur-          B
        render vacant possession of the petition scheduled building under
        section 11(2) within 30 days from today. In case the respondent
        deposits the sum of Rs. 540 which is tire an-ears of re/ll due as on
        1.2.1980 she will be entilled lo apply for getting the order vacated
        under section JJ(2) (c) of Act 211965. The respondent is ordered         C
        to pay costs of the petitioner including advocate's fee which is fixed
        as Rs. 25. The respondent is further ordered to pay interest at 6
        % per annum on the arrears of Rs. 540 from today."

                                                         (emphasis supplied)
                                                                                 D
The appeal, R.C.A. No. 40/1980, filed by the tenant before the appellate
authority was dismissed on 21. 7.1981. Thereafter, the tenant moved the
Revisional Authority, District Court, Palghat in R.C.R.P. No. 53 of 1981
and the learned District Judge passed the following order on 24.3:1982 :

        "The tenant shall be free to get the order vacated by making the
                                                                                 E
        necessary deposit and application as contemplated in Sec. 11(2)(c)
        of Act 2 of 1965 before the Rent Control Court on or before
        24.5.1982."

It is nobody's case that either the Rent Control Court or the appellate          F
Court or the Revisional Court passed any order under Section 12 of the
Act regarding the payment of subsequent arrears (or future rent till the
termination of proceedings) admitted by the tenant, when the proceedings
were pending for eviction and before the order was passed under section
11(2)(b) of the Act. Before expiry of the time fixed in the aforesaid order
of the District Judge, the tenant filed I.A. No. 764/82 before the Rent          G
Controller on 6.4.1982, along with a remittance of a sum of Rs. 750 and
prayed for setting aside the order of eviction dated 22.2.1980. The Rent
Controller, by Ext. P-1, order dated 4.8.1983, held that the tenant has failed
to remit the amount, which is due, within the time specified and dismissed
the petition. The appeal filed by the tenant was dismissed by the appellate H
    324                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   authority by Ext. P-2, order dated 14.12.1984. The learned District .Judge,
    in R.C.R.P. No. 6 of 1985, by Ext. P-3, order dated 31.7.1986, set aside the
    order passed by the Rent Controller dated 4.8.1983 and or I he appellate
    authority dated 14.12.1984 and also set aside the order of eviction passed
    in R.C.P. (O.P.) No. 141/77. The learned District Judge took the view that
    it was not disputed by the landlord that the amount of Rs. 750 deposited
B   on 6.4.1982 will cover the entire amount specifically quantified by the Rent
    Control Court in its order dated 22.2.1980 as affirmed by the Revisional
    Court in R.C.R.P. No. 53/81 dated 24.3.1982. In other words, the amount
    remitted by the tenant included the arrears of rent Rs. 540 with interest at
    the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the order, Rs. 25 towards cost
C   and also the rent for subsequent four months. The District Judge in Ext.
    P-3, order dated 31.7.1986, held that the Rent Controller has only to see
    whether the order for deposit (order dated 22.2.1980) as affirmed by the
    Revisional Court (order dated 24.3.1982) has been complied with or not.
    In this case, it was admittedly complied with. No further question arose for
D   consideration to set aside the order of eviction, under section 11(2)(c) of
    the Act. It was further held that it was beyond the powers of the Rent
    Controller in an application under section 11(2) (c) of the Act to consider
    the claim of arrears of rent that has become due after the passing of the
    order under section 11(2)(b). In other words, the order of eviction passed
    in R.C.P. (O.P.) No. 141 of 1977 on 22.2.1980 clearly determined the
E   amount payable by the tenant and that was the only amount required to be
    paid by the tenant to get the order vacated under section 11(2)(c) of the
    Act. It was admittedly paid. Since the eviction has been allowed only on
    the ground of 11011- payme11t of rent till then, it is not for the Rent Controller
    or appellate authority to see whether any rent has been kept in arrears by
F   the tenant subsequent thereto. It was held that it is beyond the powers of
     the Rent Controller in ari application under section 11(2)(c) of the Act to '
    consider the claim for arrears of rent that has become due after the
     passing of an order under Section 11(2)(b) of the Act. It is, in this view,
     the learned District Judge in Ext. P-3 order dated 31.7.1986 set aside the
     order of the lower authorities (Ext. P-1 and P-2).
G
          3. The landlord filed Original Petition No. 10288/88 in the High
    Court of Kerala and assailed the aforesaid order passed by the District
    Judge in R.C.R.P. No. 6/85 dated 31.7.1986 (Ext. P-3). The learned single
    Judge of the Kerala High Court, after referring to the prior history of the
H   case and the earlier orders passed in the various proceedings, posed the
             CHINNAMMA v. GOPALAN [PARJPOORNAN,J.]                          325

question thus :                                                                    A
         "whether the Revisional Court was right in holding that the respon-
         dent was not required to ·pay or deposit more than the amount
         which was quantified by the Rent Controller, the same being
         confirmed by the Appellate Authority and the Revisional Authority
         or whether the respondent/tenant should have deposited the entire         B
         arrears of rent that fell due by 6.4. 1982 instead of Rs. 750 in terms
         of the directions of the revisional court in R.C.R.P. No. 53of1991."

(It was on 6.4.1982, the tenant filed the application under section 11(2)(c)
of the Act and mac.le the deposit.)
                                                                                   c
After referring to sections 11(2) (a), (b) and (c) and section 12(1) and (2)
of the Act the learned Single J uc.lge held thus :

         "The expression "arrears of rent" in Sec. 11(2)(c) of the Act (was
         held to mean) will be the "entire arrears, of rent due" as on the         D
         date of deposit under that sub-clause in the context of section 12 of
         the Act."

                                                          (emphasis supplied)

In taking the said view the learned Single Judge followed a Bench decision         E
in Chillamma Varghese v. Cicey, (1994) 2 KLT 106 and held that it is not
the arrears specified in the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller
dated 22.2.1980 but the deposit of all an-eaf.I· of rent that accrued even
subsequent thereto till the date of filing of the application under Section
 // (2)(c) of the Act. that should be made. The learned Single .I udge set aside
the order passed in revision by the District .Judge in R.C.R.P. No. 6 of 1985      F
dated 31.7.1986 (Ext. P-3).

      4. We heard counsel. The short question that arises for our con-
sideration is what is the amount that should be deposited by the tenant
under section 11(2)(c) of the Act lo set aside the order passed under G
section 11(2)(b) of the Act. Should the deposit be only of that amount
which was specified as payable in the order of eviction passed under
section 11(2)(b} of the Act or will it take within its fold even the arrears
of rent that accrued due subsequent to the said order of eviction and upto
the date of deposit? The Rent Controller passed the order of eviction on
22.2.1980. He held that in case the tenant deposits a sum of Rs. 540/- which H
    326                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A is the arrears of rent due as on 1.2.1980 along with the advocate's fee Rs.
    25 and interest at the rate of 6% per annum on arrears of Rs. 540, the
    tenant will be entitled to get the order of eviction vacated under section
    11(2)( c) of the Act. The learned District Judge has found that the amount
    of Rs. 750 will cover the amount quantified specifically by the Rent
    Controller in the order dated 22.2.1980. The deposit made along with the
B
    application filed under section 11(2)(c) of the Act - complied with the
    order _.dated 22.2.1980. Really, no other point arose for consideration on
    the facts of this case, at that stage. But the learned Single Judge of the
    High Court held that deposit to be made by the tenant should also include
    the arrears of rent that accrued due subsequent to the order of eviction
C   dated 22.2.1980 and should include the dues till the date of deposit. i.e.,
    6.4.1982. The question is whether the view so expressed by the learned
    single Judge is in accord with section 11(2)(c) and the Scheme of the Act?

          5. It will b~ useful to quote section 11(2)(a), (b) and the proviso
    thereto, l.1(2)( c) and section 12 of the Act, which are as under :
D
             "11. Eviction of tenants

             (2) (a) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the
             Rent Control Court for a direction in that behalf.

E            (b) If the Rent Control Court, after giving the tenant a reasonable
             opportunity of showing cause against the application, is satisfied
             that the tenant has not paid or tendered the relit due by him in
             respect of the building within fifteen days after the expiry of the
             time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the
F            absence of any such agreement by the last day of the month next
             following that for which the rent is payable, it shall make an order
             directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building,
             and if it is not satisfied it shall make an order rejecting the
             application thereof by him :

G                Provided that an application under this sub- section shall be
             made only if the landlord has sent a registered notice to the tenant
             intimating the default and the tenant has failed to pay or tender the
             rent together with interest at six per cent per annum and postal
             charges incurred in sending the notice within fifteen days of the
H            receipt of the notice or of the refusal thereof.
                                                                               --


    CHINNAMMA v. GOPALAN [PARIPOORNAN,J.]                           327

(c) The order of the Rent Control Cou:t directing the tenant to            A
put the landlord in possession of the bui\ding shall not be executed
before the expiry of one month from the date of such order or
such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion
allow; and if the tenant deposits the al7"e~rs of rent with interest and
cost of proceedings within the said period of one month or such
further period , as the case may be, it shall vacate that order."          B

"12. Payment or deposit of rent dwing the pendency of proceedings
for eviction: (1) No tenant agai11st whom a11 application for eviction
has been made by a landlord under section 11, Shall be entitled to
contest the applicatio11 before the Rent Control Court under that
section, or to prefer an appeal under section 18 against any order
                                                                           c
made by the Rent Control Court on the application urdess he has
paid or pays to the landlord, or deposits with the Rent Control
Court or the appellate authority, as the case may be, all a1TCars of
re11t admitted by the te11ant to be due in respect of the building up
to the date ofpayment or deposit, and continues to pay or to deposit       D
any rent which may subsequently become due in respect of the
building, until the temzination of the prqceedings before the Rent
Co11trol Court or the appellate authority, as the case may be.

(2) The deposit under sub-section (1) shall be made within such
time as the Court may fix and in such manner as may be prescribed          E
and shall be accompanied by the fee prescribed for the service of
notice referred to in sub-section ( 4) :

   Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the deposit of the
arrears of rent shall not be less than four weeks froni the date of
the order and the time fixed for the deposit of rent which .sub-           F
sequently accrues due shall not be less than two weeks from the
date on which the rent becomes due.

(3) If any tenant fails to pay or to deposit the rent as aforesaid, the
Rent Control Court or the appellant authority, as the case may be,         G
shall, unless the tenant shows sufficient cause to the contrary, stop
all fwther proceedings and make an order directing the tenant to put
the landlord in possession of the building.

(4) When any deposit is made under sub-section (1), the Rent
Control Court or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall H
    328                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A           cause notice of the deposit lo be served on the landlord in the
            prescribed manner and the a111ount dcposilcd may, subject to such
            conditions as may be prescribed, be withdrawn by the landlord on
            application made by him to the Rent Control Cowt or the appellate
            authority in that behalf."

B
                                                           (emphasis supplied)

          6. In coming to the conclusion as he did the learned Single Judge
    relied on the earlier Bench decision in Chellamma Varghese v. Cicey
    (supra); which held that sections 11 and 12 of the Act should be read
c   together and so the arrears of rent in section 11{2)(c) of the Act would
    mean "entire arrears of rent due" as on the date of deposit under that
    sub-clause in the context of section 12 of the Act.

          7. A mere look at sections 11 and 12 of the Act would show that they
D   operate in different situations. Under Section 11(2) (b) of the Act the court
    passes a final order of eviction, directing the tenant to but the landlord in
    possession of the building, if there is default as provided therein. The
    execution of such final order is statutorily suspended for a period of one
    month. Within that time or such further time as the court may allow, the
E   tenant is given an opportunity to deposit the arrears of rent with interest
    and cost of the proceedings and, if so done, the court is bound to vacate
    the order passed under section 11 {2)(b) of the Act. On the other hand,
    the provisions of section 12 are applicable during the pe11dency of the
    proceedings for eviction. It permits the tenant against whom an application
    has been made by the landlord under section 11 to contest the application
F   or to prefer an appeal only if the tenant has paid or pays to the landlord
    or deposits in the Court all mTears of rent admitted by the tenant to be due
    in respect of the building upto the date of payment of deposit and also
    continues to pay or to deposit any rent which may subsequently become
    due in respect of the building till the termination of the proceedings before
G   the Court. Section 12 is a special provision applicable during the pendency
    of the proceedings and the provisions thereof point out that an order has
    to be made by the Court fixing a time and the manner for payment or
    deposit of the amount. If the tenant fails to pay or deposit the rent so
    specified, unless sufficient cause is shown to the contrary, the Rent Control
H   Court shall stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the
            CHINNAMMA v. GOPALAN [PARIPOORNAN,J.]                      329

tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. In other word A
Section 12 provides a summary procedure whereby• during the pendency of
the proceedings the Court can direct the tenant to pay the current rent as
admitted by the tenant and if it is not so done, the main eviction proceed-
ings itself wiJ1 come to an end and the Court is enabled to pass an order
directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. For B
the applicability of section 12 it is evident that the proceedings for eviction
should be pending, and the Court should, by an order, direct the tenant to
pay or deposit all arrears of rent that have been admitted by the tenant to
be due and the tenant shall continue to pay the admitted rent that may
subsequently become due till the termination of the proceedings and if it C
is not so done, that itself is treated as an independent default which wiJ1
enable the Court to stop further proceedings and make an order directing
the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Section 12 will
not apply to a proceeding which is already over under section 11(2)(b) of
the Act. To invoke section 12 of the Act, an independent order, passed
dwing the pendency of the proceedings under section 11 is required. With D
regard to the proceedings which have ended in an order passed by the Rent
Control Court under section 11(2)(b), it is onlY. the provisions of section
11(2)(c) that are applicable. The view of the learned Single Judge that
provision of section 11(2)(b) should be read along with section 12 of the
Act relying on an earlier Bench decision in Chellamma Varghese v. Cicey E
(supra), is not justified in law. We hold that section 12 of the Act has no
application to a case where in the proceedings for eviction are not pending,
but on the other hand an order· of eviction has been passed by the Court
under section 11(2)(b) of the Act. In a case where an order of eviction has
been passed under section 11(2)(b) of the Act, section ll(2)(c) alone is F
attracted and section 12 of the Act is "inapplicable".

      8. In order to maintain an application for eviction of the tenant on
the ground of default in the payment of rent, the proviso to section 11(2)
(b), mandates the landlord to send a registered notice to the tenant
intimating the default and there should be failure by the tenant to pay the G
rent together with interest at 6% per annum and postal charges incurred
in sending the notice within 15 days of the receipt or the notice or of the
refusal thereof. The proviso to Section 11(2)(b) of the Act is mandatory.
Only after compliance of the proviso aforesaid, the landlord can apply to
the Rent Control Court for a direction to evict the tenant. The Rent H
    330                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Control Court, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity, should be
  satisfied that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in
  respect of the building as per the terms of agreement of tenancy or by the
  last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable, the
  court can make an order Jirecting the tenant to put .the landlord in
  possession of the building. An order passed under section 11(2)(b) remains
B in suspended animation for a period oi one month. If within the period of
  one month from the date of the order passed under section 11(2)(b) or
  such further period as Rent Controller Court may allow, the tenant
  deposits the arrears of rent with interest and cost of proceedings, the Court
  is bound to vacate the order passed under section 11(2)(b). The language
c of section 11(2)(c), and the proviso there to, read along with section
  11(2)(c) clearly obliges the tenant only to deposit the arrears of rent (along
  with interest and cost of proceedings) for which the landlord is obliged to
  send the notice under the proviso to section 11(2)(b) of the Act and the
  court has passed an order on the basis of such cause of action, under
D section 11 (2)(b) of the Act. By no stretch of imagination, the arrears of
  rent specified in Section 11(2)(c) of the Act will take within its fold, the
  entire arrears of rent due till the date of deposit, since the date of deposit
  will always be after the date of the order passed by the Court under Section
   11(2)(b) of the Act. In the decision of this Court in Smt. Prakash Mehra v.
  KL. Malhotra, AIR (1989) SC 1652, a somewhat similar provision in Delhi
E Rent Control Act, 1958 (59 of 1958), Section 14(1)(a) came up for con-
   sideration :

             "14. Protection of tenant against eviction - (1) Notwithstanding
             anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract,
             no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises
F
             shall be made by any Court or Controller in favour of the landlord
             against a tenant :

             Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him
             in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of
G            possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds
             only namely :

              (a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the whole of
                  the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within
H                 two months of the date on which a notice of demand for the
            CIIINNAMMA I'. GOPALAN [PARIPOORNAN,J.]                       331

              arrears of rent has been served on him by the landlord in the A
              manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property
              Act, 1882 (4 of 1882)."

The crucial words, occuring in section 14(J)(a) to the effect, "the whole of
the arrears of rent'', \Vas construed by this Court to mean only the arrears
of rent demanded by the notice j(Jr payment of al7"ears of rent. In para 7 of
                                                                                 B
the Judgment, this Court held as follows :

            "It is urged before us by learned counsel for the appellant that
        S. 14(l)(a) of the Act contemplates the payment or tender of the
        whole of the arrears of rent legally recoverable from the tenant on C
        the date when the demand notice is sent including the rent which
        has accnted after se1Vice of the demand notice. When the notice was
        sent on 7 May, 1976 rent for the months of April and May 1976
        had become due, and as two months was given for payment of the
        arrears, it would include also the rent which had accrued during D
        the said period of two months. We are not satisfied that there is
        substance in the contention. The arrears of rent envisaged by S.
        14(1) (a) of the Act are the arrears demanded by the notice for
        payment of arrears of rent. The arrears due cannot be extended
        to rent which has fallen due after service of the notice of demand."
                                                                                 E
The observations have great relevance herein.


      9. We are of the view that the reasoning and conclusion by the
learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court, contrary to our conclusion
hereinabove, is incorrect and unsustainable in law. The Bench decision
                                                                                 F
relied upon by the learned Judge Chellamma Varghese v. Cicey (supra),
construed the words "the arrears of rent" oecuring in section 11(2)(c) of
the Act, in the light of the provisions in section 12 of the Act. The approach
so made is clearly erroneous. The decisions referred to in Chel/anuna
Varghese case, Francis v.jacob, (1983) KLT 669), and K.G.U. Tntst v. S/11i       G
Ram Chandraji, AIR (1978) SC 287, have nothing to do with the controver-
sy raised herein those decisions only stated that '1rent duet! nor entire
amount of rent due 1\ will include the recovery of rent, which became time
barred. That aspect does not arise herein. We overrule the decision in
Chella1111na Varghese v. Cicey.                                                  H
    332                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A          10. We are of the view that the judgment of Radhakrishna Menon,
    J. in P. Anil v. Devaki and Otliets, (1991) KU 611, holding that the words,
    "the arrears of rent" occuring in section 11(2)(c) cannot be anything other
    than the arrears of rent made mention of in the notice (sent by the landlord
    under the proviso to section 11(2)(b) of the Act) and cannot be extended
B   to rent which has fallen due after the service of the notice, represents the
    correct enunciation of the law on the subject.

          11. The judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 27.10.1994 is set
    aside and this appeal is allowed. 'fhe ordet passed by the District Judge
    in R.C.R.P. No. 6 of 1985 dated 31.7.1986 ls testoted. B:owever, there shall
C   be no order as to costs.

    v.s.s.                                                     Appeal allowed.




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