Holding

The probate court alone has exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a will, and an arbitrator cannot decide probate issues even with the parties' consent.

Summary

The deceased Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka left a will appointing his younger daughter as executrix, which was contested by Radhey Shyam, who claimed to be an adopted son. The parties, along with another claimant, were brought before a Supreme Court order that appointed a retired Chief Justice as arbitrator to resolve the dispute over the legal heirs and the validity of two wills. The arbitrator framed issues concerning the execution and genuineness of the wills, but the probate suit was simultaneously pending in the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the arbitrator, under the Arbitration Act, could decide probate matters that are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the probate court under the Indian Succession Act. It held that probate courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a will and that consent cannot confer jurisdiction on an arbitrator. Consequently, the arbitrator was barred from deciding the probate issues, and the probate court was directed to continue the proceedings.

Issues considered

Whether an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act can adjudicate on the execution and genuineness of a will.
Whether the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction under the Indian Succession Act to grant probate and determine the validity of a will.
Whether consent of parties can confer jurisdiction on an arbitrator to decide probate matters.

Legislation cited

Arbitration Acts. 14, s. 17, s. 20, s. 30, s. 33, s. 8
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 2(11), s. Order 22 Rule 10, s. Order 22 Rule 11, s. Order 22 Rule 3, s. Order 22 Rule 4, s. Order 22 Rule 5
Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 3(f), s. 8
Indian Succession Act, 1925s. 211(1), s. 213, s. 217, s. 222, s. 223, s. 273, s. 274, s. 276, s. 299

Subjects

ArbitrationProbateWillJurisdictionIndian Succession ActArbitration ActLegal representativeCivil ProcedureExclusive jurisdictionEstate

Judgment

A CHIRANJILALSHRILALGOENKA(DECEASED) TIIROUGH L. RS.
v.
JASJITSINGHAND ORS.

MARCH 18, 1993

B (Y.. RAMASWAMY AND R.M. SAHA!, JJ.)

Arbitration Act :

Sections 8, 14, 17, 20, 30 and 33-Arbitratol'-Whether entitled to
C enquire into execution and genuineness of will.

Indian Succession Act, 1925: Sections 213, · 217, 222, 223 and
276-Will--Probate of jurisdiction of probate cowt to enquire into execution cl.,
and genuineness of wi/1--Whethel'-Arbitrator can enquire into such issues
under Arbitration Act.
D
The appellant Shri Chiranjilal Shri Lal Goenka was involved in
several suits, one of which was the present appeal. He died on November 25,
1985 leaving behind his last Will dated October 29, 1982 in which he ap·
pointed his younger daughter Mrs. Sushila N. Ruugta as the sole executrix.
Radhey Shyam, the natural son of Shri Mangal Chand Kedia and Mrs. Sita
E daughter of Shri C.S. Goenka; claimed to be the adopted son of Shri C.S.
Goenka.

F
The applicant, executrix; Radhey Sh yam and his wife filed substitution
applications under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC setting up rival claims. When the
dispute arose as to who should represent the estate of Shri C.S. Goenka by
order dated October 7, 1991 this Court brought all the three on record as
---
legal representatives; and by a further order dated November 1, 1991 by
consent of parties appointed a retired Chief Justice of the Bombay High
Court as an Arbitrator to settle the dispute as who would be the legal heirs to
the estate of late Chiranjilal Shri Lal Goenka. The arbitrator entered upon
G the reference and on the filing of pleadings by the parties framed diverse
issues.

Issues No. 1 and 2 related to the two Wills and were : (1) Does the
claimant No. 1 prove. execution of the Will dated 29th Oct. 1982 and prove
the same to be the last and genuine Will of Shri G.S. Goenka. (2) If not
H. does she prove the execution of the Will dated 4.7.78 and prove the same
454
C.S. GOENKA v. JASJIT SINGH 455

... to be the last and genuine Will ofthe late Shri G.S. Goenka. Simultaneous A
proceedings in the probate suit were being pursued in Bombay High
Court, and a Single Judge expressed doubt whether the arbitrator had
jurisdiction to decide the probate suit. Similarly, on an application made
before the arbitrator seeking clarification, he too stated that with his
appointment as arbitrator all the pending suits in the schedule should be
assumed to have been referred for arbitration and that includes the
B
--
•
~
probate suit as well, but that he cannot give any clarification in that
behalf.

An Interlocutory Application was, therefore, moved in this Court for
clarification, and it was contended on behalf of the applicant that the c
probate court had exclusive jurisdiction to grant probate of the Will to the
applicant for due implementation of the directions contained in the Will
as the executrix, and that this issue cannot be referred to arbitration and
It.
the arbitrator thereby is devoid of jurisdiction to decide Issue Nos. 1 and
2 that had been framed by him, and that the applicant had not consented
to refer the probate suit for arbitration. D

The application was contested on behalf of the respondents by
contending that proceeding the order of the Court dated November 1, 1991
the counsel for the respondents addressed a letter to the counsel for the
petitioner including the probate suit for reference to arbitration, and this E
~ was to obviate the litigation pJnding in all the courts as to who were the
legal heirs of Shri C.S.Goenka, and thereafter this court appointed the
arbitrator] that with a view to .rut an end to the litigation in all the suits
pending in different courts, this Court appointed the arbitrator to decide
all the disputes in pending suits. It is, therefore, desirable that the ar-
bitrator should decide Issue Nos. 1 and 2 that have been framed. F

Disposing of the Application, this Court,
>--
HELD : 1. Section 2(11) of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 defines
"legal representatives" to mean a person who in law represents the estate
of a deceased person; and includes any person who intermeddles "ith the G
estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative
character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party
-c;.
so suing or sued. Order 22 rule 3 says that if one or two or more plaintiffs
dies and the right to sue survives, the Court on an application made in
this behalf, shall cause the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff H
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 2 S.C.R.

A to be made a party and shall proceed with the snit Mutatis Mutandis by
operation or Order 22 Rule 11 this rule applies to the appellants at the
appeal stage. Similarly, Order 22 Rule 4 applies in the case or death or one
...
of several derendants or or sole defendant and in case of a dispute under
Rule 5 such a question shall be determined by the Court. [460H, 461A-B]

B 2. Inheritance is in some sort a legal and fictitious continuation or
the personality of the dead man; for the prepresentation is in some sort A ~.,---

identified by the law with him who he represents. The rights which the
dead man can no longer own or exercise in propria persona and the
'
obligations which he can no longer in propria persona rulfil, he owns
c exercises, and fulfils in the person or a living substitute. To this extent,
and in this fiction, it may be said that legal personality of a man survives
his natural personality, until his obligations being duly performed, and
his property duly disposed of, his representation among the living is no
longer called•for. [461D]
""'
D 3. The grant of Probate by a Court of competent jurisdiction is in
the nature. of a proceeding in rem. So long as the order remains in force
it is conclusive as to the due execution and validity of the will unless it is
duly revoked as per law. It binds not only upon all the parties made before
the Court but also upon all other persons in all proceedings arising out
E or the Will or claims under or connected therewith~ The decision of the
Probati: Court, therefore, is the judgment in rem. The probate granted by
~
the competent court is conclusive of the validity of the Will until if is
revoked and no e"ide.nce can be admitted to impeach it except in a
proceeding taken for revoking the probate. [465D]

F Slteoparsan Singh v. Ram11a11dan Prasad Singh, (1916) ILR 43 Cal.
694 PC and Narbharam Jivram v. Jayvallablt Haljiwan, AIR 1933 Born. 469,
approved. [465E-F]
-4,
4. It is settled law that a decree passed by a court without jurisdic-
tion on the subject matter or on the grounds on which the decree made
G which goes to the root of its jurisdiction or lacks inherent jurisdiction is
a corum non judice. A decree passed by such a court is a nullity and is
nonest. Its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or
is acted upon as a foundation for a right, even at the stage or execution or ~
in collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very
H authority of the coort to pass decree wb~ch cannot be cured_by consent or
C.S. GOENKA v. JASJIT SINGH 457

• waiver of the party. [467D]

A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Naik, [1988] 2 SCC 602; Bahadur Singh & Anr.
v. Muni Subrat Dass & Am; [1969] 2 SCR 432; Smt. Kaushalya Devi and
A

Ors, v. KL. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC ·838; Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal & Anr,
AIR 1979 SC 794 and Sushi/ Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (dead)
through his Lrs, JT 1989 (suppl.) SC 329. B

In the instant case, the applicant had consented to refer for arbitra-
lion the dispute in tlie pending probate proceedings, but consent cannot
confer jurisdiction nor an estoppel against statute. The other legatees in
the Will were not parties to it.
;
c
5. The Probate Court has been conferred with exclusive jurisdiction
to grant probate of the Will of the deceased annexed to the petition (suit);
on grant or refusal thereof, it has to preserve the original will produced
before it. The grant of probate is final subject to appeal, if any, or
revocation if made in terms of the provision of the Succession Act. It is a D
judgment in rem and conclusive and binds not only the parties but also
the entire world. The award deprives the parties or statutory right or
appeal provided under section 299. Thus the necessary conclusion is that
the Probate Court alone has exclusive jurisdiction and the Civil Court ou
original side or the Arbitrator does not get jurisdiction, even if consented
E
-I to by the parties, to adjudicate upon the proof or validity of the Will
propounded by the executrix, the appellant. [468D-F]

6. The execqtrix was nominated expressly in the Will as a legal

- representative entitled to represent the Estate of the deceased but the
heirs cannot get any probate before the Probate Court. They are entitled F
only to resist the claim or the executrix of the execution and genuiness of
the Will. The grant of probate gives the executrix the right to represent the
estate of the deceased, the subject-matter in other proceedings. This
exposition of the law is only for the purpose of finding the jurisdiction of
the arbitrator and not an expression of opinion on the merits in the
•.
G
probate suit. [468G'.I

7. The Arbitrator cannot therefore proceed with the probate suit to
~ decide the dispute in Issue Nos. 1 and 2 framed by him. The High Court
is lo proceed with the Probate suit, the Judge to fix the date and proceed
day-to-day till ii is concluded and decide the matter within six months. Till H
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] 2 S.C.R.

A then the Arbitrator is not to decide Issue Nos. 1 and 2, but at liberty to
proceed with the other issues, to await the decision of the Probate Court
and depending upon the result thereon, conclude the findings on issue
Nos.1 and 2 and then make the award and take the proceedings according
to law. [469H, 470A-B]

B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: I.A. No. 3 of 1992.

IN

Civil Appeal No. 732 of 1973.

C From the Judgment and Order da!ed 29.9.79 of the Delhi High Court
in Civil Writ 734 of 1971.

Satish Chandra, Pramod B. Agarwala and Mohinder Rupral for the ~
Appellants.
D V.R. Reddy Additional Solicitor General, P. Chidambaram, Syed
Akhtar, C.L. Sahu, R.C. Bhalla, P. Parmeshwaran, C.V.S. Rao, K Swamy
and E.C. Agarwala for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E K. RAMASWAMY. J. Shri Chiranjilal Shrilal Goenka was involved
in several suits and one of which is the pending appeal at his behest He
died on November 25, 1985 leaving behind last Will daied October 29, 1982
said to have been executed in which he appointed his younger daughter
Mrs. Sushila N. Rungta as sole executrix of his Will. Radhey Shyam claims
F to be the adopted son of Shri C.S. Goenka. Radhey Shyam is the natural
son of Shri Mangal Chand Kedia and Mrs. Sita another daughter of Sri
C.S. Goenka. The applicant executrix; Radhey Shyam and his wife filed ...,J
substitution applications under order 22 Rule 3 CPC setting up rival claims. '
When the dispute arose as to who would represent the estate of Shri C.S.
G Goenka, by order dated October 7, 1991 this Court brought all the three
on record as legal representatives. By further order dated November 1,
1991 this Court passed the following order :

·"By consent of parties Justice V.S. Deshpande, retired
Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court is appointed as
H arbitrator to settle the dispute as to who would be the

-·
C.S. GOENKA v. JASJIT SINGH [RAMASWAMY, J.] 459

legal heirs to the estate of the late Chiranjilal Shrilal A
Goenka."

The rest of the order is not necessary for the purpose of this case,
- hence omitted. Pursuant thereto Shri Justice V.S. Deshpande entered upon
the arbitration. Preceding the order counsel for Sri Radhey Shyam had
enclosed a letter giving details ohU the pending suits and item No. 19, Suit B
.
No. 65 of 1985, titled S.N. Rungta v. R.C. Goenka, was one such case.
schedule of the suits was annexed to t!\e order of appointment of the
.
The

arbitrator. On filing the respective plp~dings, tlfe arbitrator framed diverse
l
issues. Issues No. 1 and 2 relate to two Wills and are as under :
'1 ·'.
"l. Does Claimant No.l prove execution of the Will ·
c
dated 29th (28th) October, 1982 and prove the same to
be the last and genuine Will of late Shri G.S. Goenka.

2. If not does she prove the execution of the Will dated
4.7.1978 and prove the same to be the last and genuine D
Will of the late Shri G.S. Goenka".

Simultaneously proceedings in the probate suit is being pursued in
Bombay Hi~h Court where in the learned Judge, on application, expre.ssed.
doubt, whether arbitrator has jurisdiction to decide probate suit. Similarly,
on application made before the arbitrator seeking clarification, he t-00 had j
stated that when the appointment of him as arbitrator was made and all .,
the pending proceedings were referred to in the schedule, it would be .)}
assumed that this Court applied its mind and referred to him the probate
- suit as well but he cannot give any clarification in th.at behalf. It would be
expedient to the applicant to seek clarification from. this Court. Thus the F
prayers in the application are :

"A. That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to allow
the applicant to proceed with the Probate Suit No. 65 of
1987 pending before the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay
• in accordance \1/~th law; and G
B. to pass such order and other orders as this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances".

Shri Salish Chandra, learned Senior counsel for the applicant C-On·
tended, placing reliance on Gopi Rai v. B.N. Rai, AIR 1930 Allahabad 840. H
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 2 S.C.R.

A Che/Ian Bhai v. Nandu Bhai, !LR 21 Bombay, 337 and Manmohini Guha
v. Banga Chandra Das, !LR 31 Cal. 357 that probate court has exclusive
jurisdiction to grant probate of the Will to the applicant for due implemen-
tation of the directions contained in the Will as the executrix. That issue
cannot be referred to arbitration and the arbitrator thereby is devoid of
B jurisdiction to decide issuses Nos.1 and 2. He also further contended that
the applicant had not consented to refer the probate suit for arbitration.

Shri P, Chidambaram, learned Senior counsel for the respondents
contended that preceding the order of this Court dated November 1, 1991,
the counsel for the respondents" addressed a letter to the counsel for the
C petitioner including the probate suit for reference to arbitration. This was •
to obviate the litigation pending .in all the courts as to who are the legal
heirs of Shri C.S. Goenka. Thereafter this Court appeinted Shri Justice
S.V. Deshpande. The contention, therefore, of the applipnt that she did
not consent to refer the probate suit for arbitration is an after thought and
D ·cannot be accepted. He further contended that this Court, with'a"view to
put an end to the litigation in all the suits pending in different courts,
appointed the arbitrator to decide all the disputes in pending 'stiits so that
.
it would bind them. The arbitrator had accordingly framed Issues Nos. . 1
and 2, referred to herein before which pertinently relate to the Wills in the
probate suit alongwith other suits. Therefore, the arbitrator alone has got
E jurisdiction. The award of the arbitrator would be subject to appr<>val or
disapproval by this Hon'ble Court and on putting its seal it would bind all
the parties and the courts including the probate court. Therefore, it is
expedient that instead of parallel proceedings before the probate court and
the arbitrator to be permitted to continue, it is desirable that the arbitrator
should decide issues Nos.1 and 2 with other issues and determine as to who
F
would be the legal heirs and his decision would be binding •in the probate
suit. If any clarification is necessary it may be indicated accordingly.

Having given our anxious consideration we will proceed further in
deciding the scope and effect of the order passed by this Court. As seen
G the order of reference to the arbitrator relates "to settle dispute as to who
would be the legal heirs to the estate of Shri C.S. Goenka". Section 2(11)
of CPC Act 5 of 1908 defmes legal representatives means a person who in
law represents the estate of a deceased person, and includes any person
who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues
H or is sued in a representatives character the person on whom the estate
'•

C.S. GOENKA v. JASJIT SINGH [RAMASWAMY, J.] 461

• devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued. Order 22 rule 3 says A
that if one or two or more plaintiffs die and the right to sue does not survive
to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or a sole plaintiff or sole
surviving plaintiffs dies and the right to sue survives, the Court on an
application made in this behalf, shall cause the legal representatives of die
deceas"ed plaintiff to be made a party and shall proceed with the slit.
...._ Mutatis-Mutandis by operation of Order 22 il.ule 11 this rule applies to the
B
appellants at the appeal stage ..Similarly, Order 22 Rule 4 applies in tht
case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant and in case
of a dispute under Rule 5 such a question shall be determined by the
court.
c
Inheritance is ilt some sort a legal and fictitious continuation of the
personality of the dead man, for the presentation is in some sort identified
by the law with him who he represents. The rights which the dead man can
no longer own or exercise in ptopria persona and the obligations which he

said that
-
can no longer in propria persona fulfil, he owns, exercise and fulfils in the
persons of a living substitute. To this extent, and in this fiction, it may be
. legal personality of a man survives
. his natural personality until
D

his, obligation being duly performed, and his property duly disposed of, his
representation arnong the living is no longer called for.

In Black's Law DictiolUlTY the meaning of the world 'Legal Repre- E
~
sentative' is : The term is its broadest sefl.se means one who stands in place
of, and represents the interests of another. A person who overseas the legal
affairs of another. Examples include the executors or administrator of an

- estate and a ccrurt apPointed guardian of a minor or incompetent person.
F
Term "Legal representative" which is almost always held to be
synonymous \Vi.th term "personal representative", means in accident cases,
~ member of family eatitled to benefits under wrongful death statute. Un-
satisfied claim and judgment fund. In The Andhra Bank Ltd. v. R.
Srinivasan and Ors., 1963 (1) and. W.R.(S.C.) 14 this Court considered the
question whether the legatee under the Will is the legal representative G
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Code. It was held that it is well
known that. the expression "Legal Representative" had not been defined in
the Code of 1882 and that led to a difference of judicial opinion as to its
denotation. Considering the case law developed in that behalf it was held
that respondents 2 to 12, the l~atees under the Will of the estate are legal H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 2 S.C.R.

A representatives of the deceased Raja Bahadur and so it follows that the JA
estate of the deceased was sufficiently represented by them when the
judgment were pronounced.

In The Official Liquidator v. Parthasarathi Sinha and Ors., AIR 1983
SC 188 this f=ourt considered whether the legal representative would be
B bound by the liability for misfeasance proceeding against the deceased.
While considering that question under section 50 CPC this Court held that
the legal representative, of course, would not be liable for any sum beyond
the value of the estate of the deceased in his hands. Mulla on CPC 14th
Ed., Vol. 1 at P.27 stated that a person on whom .the estate of the deceased
C devolves would be his legal representative even if he is not in actual
possession of the estate. It includes heirs and also persons who without title
either as executors, administrators were in possession of the estate of the
deceased. It .is, therefore, clear that the term legal representative is wide
and inclusive of not only the heirs but also intermeddlers of the estate of
D the deceased as well as a person who in law represents the estate of the
deceased. It is not necessarily confined to heirs alone. The executor,
administrators, assigns or persons acquired interest by devolution under
Order 22 Rule 10 or legatee under a Will. are legal representatives .

.Section 3(fJ of the Hindu Succession Ac~ 1956 defines "heirs" means
E any person, male or female who is entitled to succeed to the property of
an intestate under this Act. Section 8 thereof provides that the property of
a male Hindu dying intestate shall· devolve according to the provisions of
this Chapter 'Chapter II' (Inestate succession) firstly upon the heirs, being
the relatives specified in Class 1 of the Schedule ......... Schedule provides
F Class I. heirs are Son, daughter, widow, mother. ........... Thus under the
personal law of Hindu Succession Act, if a Hindu dies intestate, the heirs
either male or female specified in Schedule I Class I, are heirs and succeed
to the estate as per law. 1n· their absence, the' next £lass or classes are
entitled to succeed to tl1e property of an intestate under the Act. In
Sudama Devi and Ors. v. Jogendra Choudhary and Ors., AIR 1987 Patna
G 239, (Full Bench) considered the question whether father of the minor in
possession of his property and who himself was a party to the suit alongwith
the minor is legal representative. The minor died. The father was held per
majority to be legal representatives under section 2(11) of the Code as an
intermeddler. It must therefore be held that not only that Class I heirs
H under Section 8 read with Schedule of the Hindu Succession Act but also
C.S. GOENKA v. JASJIT SINGH [RAMASWAMY, J.] 463

the executor of the Will of the deceased Goenka are legal representatives A
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Code.

Section 213 of the Indian Succession Act (Act 39) of 1925 for short
'the Succession Act' provides right to the executor to obtain probate of the
, Will thus :- B
"(1) No right as executor .... can be established in any Court
of Justice, unless court of competent jurisdiction in (India)
has granted probate of tlte will under which the right is
claimed ..... with a copy of the Will annexed. By operation
of sub-section 2(i) only in the case of wills made by any c
Hindu .... where such wills are of the classes specified in
Cls. (a) and (b) of Sec. 57 ... Section 57 provides that the
provisions of part which are set out in Schedule III, shall,
subject to the restrictions and modifications specified
therein apply - (a) to all wills ..... made by any Hlµdu, on
D
or after the first day of September, 1870, within the local
0

limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the High
Court of Judicature at M.adras and Bombay... (c) to all
wills and codicils made by any Hindu ..... on or after the
first day of January, 1927, to which'those provisions are
not applied by Cls. (a) and (b). In other places the Dist. E
Court or Court to whom tlte power is delegated alone are
entitled to grant probate.

- Section 276 provides the procedure to obtain probate, namely :- (1)
application for probate .... with the Will annexed, shall be made by a F
distinctly written in English .... the will as the case may be, the particulars
are the details mentioned in Cls.(a):tci (e) and further details provided in
sub-sections (2) and (3), the mention of the details whereof are not
material for the purpose of this case. The petition shall be verified in· the
manner prescribed under section 280 and also further to be verified by at
least one of the witnesses to the will in 'the manner and to the affect G
specified therein. The Caveator is entitled to object to its grant by opera-
tion of .Section 284........ When it is contested Section 295 directs that
probate proceedings shall take, as nearly as may be, the form of a regular
suit, according to the provisions of C.P.C. and the petitioner for probate
.... shall be the plaintiff and the person who had appeared to oppose the H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] 2 S.C.R.

A grant shall be the defen.dant. Section 217 expressly provides that save as
otherwise provided by this Act or by any other law for the time being in
force, all grants or probate .... with the will annexed .... shall be made or
carried out, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of Part
IX. Se.ction 222 declares that (1) frobate shall be grOf!ted 01tly to an executor
appointed by the will. (2) The appointment may be ewressed or by neces-
B sary implication Section 223 prohibits grant of probates to the persons
specified therein. Section 224 gives power to appoint several executors.
Section 227 ·declares the effect of probate thus:- Probate. of a will when
granted establishes the will from the .death of the testator, ·and renders valid

c
all intennediate acts of the executor as .such. Section 248 eiwisages grant of
probate for special purposes, nijlllely, if an executor is appointed for any
-
limited purpose specified in the. will, the probate shall be limited to that
purpose, and if he should appoint an attorney...•... with the will annexed,
shall be limited accordingly.

D Section 273 declares conclusiveness of probate thus :- Probate shall
have the effect over all the property and estate moveable or immovable, of
the deceased, throughout the State in which the same is or ar.e granted,
and shall be conclusive as to the representative title against the debtors of the
deceased ai1d all persons holding property which belongs to him, and shall
afford full indemnity to all debtors, paying their ·debts and all persons
E delivering up such property to the person to whom such probate have been
granted. The further details are not necessary for the purpose of this case.
Under section 294 it. shall be the duty of the court to preserve original Wills.
Section 299 gives right of appeals against an order or the decree of the court
of probate. By operation of Section .211(1) the executor ·of a deceased
F person is his legal representative for all pur11oses, and all the property of
the deceased person vests in him as such.

In Jnswardeo Narain Singh v. Smt. Kanta Devi & Ors., AIR 1954 SC
280 this court held that the court of probate is only concerned with the
question as to whether the document put forward as the last will and
G testament of a deceased person was duly executed and attested in accord-
ance with law and whether at the time of such execution the testator had
sound .disposing mind. The question whether a particular bequest is good
or bad is not within the purview of the Probate Court. Therefore the only
issue in a probate proceeding relates to the genuineness and due execution
H of the Will and the court itself is under duty to determine it and preserve
C.S. GOENKA v. JASJIT SINGH [RAMASWAMY, J.] 465

• the preserve the original Will in its custody. The Succession Act is a self A
contained code in so far as the question of making an application for
probate, grant or refusal. of probate or an appeal carried against the
, decision of the probate court. This is clearly manifested in the fasecule of
the provision of Act. The probate proceedings shall be conducted by the
probate court in the manner prescribed in the Act and in no other ways.
The grant of probate with a copy of the Will annexed establishes con-
B
clusively as to the appointment of the executor and the valid execution of
the will. Thus it does no more than establish the factum of the will and the
legal character of the executor. Probate court does not decide any question
of title or of the existance of the property itself.
c
The grant of a Probate by Court of competent jurisdiction is in the
n.ature of. a proceeding in rem. So long as the order remains in force it is
conclusive as to the due execution and validity of the will unless it is duly
revoked as per law. It binds not only upon all the parties made before the
court but also upon all other persons in all proceedings arising out of the D
Will or claims under or connected therewith. The decision of the Probate
Court, therefore, is the judgment in rem. The probate granted by the
competent court is conclusive of the validity of the Will until it is revoked
and no evidence can be admitted to impeach it except in a proceeding
taken for revoking the probate. In Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan Prasad
Singh, (1916) !LR 43 Cal., 694 PC the judicial committee was to consider E
whether the Will which had been affirmed by a Court of competent
jurisdiction, \Vould not be impugned in a Court exercising original jurisdic-
tion (Civil Court) in suit to declare the grant of probate illegal etc. The
privy council held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to impugne the
grant of probate by the court of competent jurisdiction. In that case the F
subordinate court of Muzafarbad was held to be had no jurisdiction to
question the validity of the probate granted by the Calcutta High Court. In
Narbheram Jivram v. Jevallabh Haljivan, AIR 1933 Bombay, 469 probate
was granted by the High Court exercising probate jurisdiction. A civil suit
on the Original Side was filed seeking apart from questioning the probate,
also other reliefs. The High Court held that when a probate was granted, G
it operates upon the whole estate and establishes the Will from the death
of the testator. Probate is conclusive evidence not only of the factum, but
also of the validity of the Will and after the probate has been granted, it
is incumbent on a person who wants to have the Will declared null and
void, to have the probate revoked before proceeding further. That could H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS· (1993} 2 S.C.R.

A be done only before the Probate Court and not on the original side of the
High Court. When a request was made to transfer the suit to the Probate
Court, the learned Judge declined to grant the relief and stayed the
proceeding on the original side. Thus it is conclusive that the court of
probate alone had jurisdiction and is competent to grant probate to the
will annexed to the petition in the manner prescribed under the Succession
B Act. That court alone is competent to deal with the probate proceedings
and to grant or refuse probate of the annexed will. It should keep the
original will in its custody. The probate thus granted is conclusive unless it
is revoked. It is a judgment in rem. ·

c We agree with Mr. Chidambaram that the applicant had consented
to refer the dispute for arbitration of dispute in the pending probate
proceedings, but consent cannot confer jurisdiction nor an estoppel against
statute. The other legatees in the will were not parties to it. In A.R. Antulay
v. R.s. Naik, [1988] 2 SCC 602 when a Constitution Bench directed the
D High Court Judge to try the offences under the Prevention of Corruption
Act with which the petitioner therein was charged and the trial was being
proceeded with, he questioned by way of writ petition the jurisdiction of
this Court to give such a direction. A Be~ch of seven judges per majority
construed meaning of the word 'jurisdiction', Mukerjee, J. as he 'then was,
speaking per himself. Oza and Natarajan, JJ. held that the power to create
E or enlarge jurisdiction is legislative in character_. So also the power to
confer a right of appeal or to take away a right of appeal. The Parliament
alone can do it by law and n.ot Court, whether interior or ,both combine,
can enlarge the jurisdiction of a Court and divest a person of his rights of
appeal or revision. Ranganath Misra, J. as he then was, held that jurisdic-
F tion comes solely from the law of the land and cannot be exercised
otherwise. In this country, jurisdiction can be exercised only when provided
for either in the Constitution or in the laws made by the Legislature.
Jurisdiction is thus the authority or power of the Court to deal with a
matter and make an order carrying binding force in the facts. Oza, J.
G supplementing the question held that the jurisdiction to try a case could
only be conferred by law enacted by the legislature. The Supreme Court
could not confer jurisdiction if it does not exist in law. Ray, J. held that the
Court cannot confer a jurisdiction on itself which is not provided in the
law. In the dissenting opinion Venkatachaliah, J., as .he then was to lay
down that the expression jurisdiction or prior determination is a "verbal
H coat of many colours". In the case of a Tribunal, an error of law might
C.S. GOENKA v. JASJIT SINGH [RAMASWAMY, J.] 467

• become not merely an error in jurisdiction but might partake of the A
character of an error of jurisdiction. But, otherwise, jurisdiction is a 'legal
shelter' and a power to bind despite a possible error in the decision. The
existence of jurisdiction does not depend on the correctness of its exercise.
The authority to decide embodies a privilege to bind despite error, a
privilege which is inherent in and indispensable to every judicial function.
The characteristic attribute of a judicial act is that it binds whether it be
B
right or it be wrong. Thus this Court laid down as an authoritative proposi-
tion oflaw that the jurisdiction could be conferred by statute and this Court
cannot confer jurisdiction or an authority on a tribunal. In that case this
Court held that Constitution Bench has no power to give direction contrary
to Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. The direction per majority was c
held to be void.

It is settled law that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction
on the subject matter or 9n the grounds on which the decree made which
goes to the root to its jurisdiction of lacks inherent jurisdiction is a comm D
non judice. A decree passed by such a· court in a nullity and is nones!. Its
invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced or is acted
upon as a foundation for a righ~ even at the stage of execution or in
collateral proceedings. The defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very
authority of the court to pass decree which cannot be cured by consent or
waiver of the party. In Bahadur Singh & Anr. v. Muni Subrat Dass & Anr., E
[1969] 2 SCR 432 an eviction petition was filed under the Rent Control Act
on the ground of nuisance. The dispute was referred to the arbitration. An
award was made directing the tenant to run the workshop upto a specified

- time and thereafter to remove the machinery and to deliver vacant posses-
sion to the landlord. The award was signed by the arbitrators, the tenant F
and the landlord. It was filed in the court. A judgment and decree were
passed in terms of the award. On expiry of the time and when the ·tenant
y' did not remove the machinery nor delivered vacant possession, execution
was levied under Delhi-and Ajmer Rent_Contr.ol Act.-It was held that a
decree passed in contravention of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act was
void and the landlord could not execute the decree. The same view was G
reiterated in Smt. Kaushalya Devi and Ors. v. KL. Bansal, AIR 1970 SC
838. In Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal & Anr., AIR 1979 SC 794 a compromise
dehore grounds for eviction was arrived at between the parties under
section 13 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act. A decree in terms
thereof was passed. T?e possession was not delivered and execution was H
SUPREME COJ]RT'~EPORTS (1993] 2 S.C.R.

A · laid. It was held that the decree was nullity and, therefore, the tenant could
not be evicted. In Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra (dead)
through his Lri., IT 1989 (suppl.) SC329 the Civil Court decreed eviction
but the building was governed by Haryana Urban (Control of Rent &
Eviction) Act 11 of 1973. It was held that the decree was without jurisdic-
B tion and its nullity can be raised in execution. In Union of India v. M/s. Ajit
Mehta and Associates. Pune and Ors., AIR 1990 Bombay 45 a Division
Bench to which Sawant, J. as he then was, a member was to consider
whether the validity of the award could be questioned on jurisdictional
issue under section 30 of the Arbitration Act. The Division Bench held that
Clause 70 of the- Contract provided that the Chief Engineer shall appoint
C aD. engineer officer to be sole arbitrator and unless both parties agree in
a
writing such reference shall not take place untii after completion of the
works or termination or determination of the. Co~tract. Pursuant to this
contract under section 8 of the Act, an Arbitrator was appointed and award
was made. Its validity was questioned under section 3o thereof. The
D Division Bench considering the scope of Sections 8 and 20(4) of"the Act
and on review of the case law held that Section 8 cannot be invoked for
appointment of an Arbitrator unilalerally but be available. only. under
section 20(4) of the Act. Therefore, the vo;ry appointment of the Arbitrator
without consent of both parties was held void being without jurisdiction.
The Arbitrator so appointed inherently iacked jurisdiction and hence the
E award made by such Arbitrator is nones!. In Che/Ian Bhai 's case Sir C.
Farran, Kt., CJ. of Bombay High Court held that the Probate Court alone
is to deten;nine whether probate of an alleged will shall issue to the
executor named in it and that the executor has no power to refer the
question _of execution of Will to arbitration. It was also held that the
F executor having propounded a Will, and applied for probate, a caveat was
filed denying the execution of the alleged Will, and the matter was duly
registered as a suit, the executor and the caveatrix subsequently cannot
refer the dispute ·ta arbitration, signing a submission paper, but such an
award made p~rsuant thereto was held to be without jurisdiction.

G In Gopi Rai's case, Sulaiman, J. as he then was, speaking for the
Division Bench held that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to allow the
dispute relating to the genuineness of a Will in a probate proceedings
pending before him to be referred to the arbitration of an arbitrator. He
has got to be specified that the Will is a genuine document before the order
H of granting probate is passed. He cannot delegate those functions to a
C.S. GOENKA v. JASJIT SINGH [RAMASWAMY, J.] 469

private individual and decide the point through him. Similar was the view A
laid in Manmohini Guha's case, Sarda Kanta Das v. Gobinda Das 6 Indian
Cases 912 and Khe/awati v. Chet. Ram Khub Ram, AIR 1952 Punjab 67.
When the plea of estoppel was raised, Sulaiman. J. in Gopi Rai's case held
that "We cannot hold that there is any estoppel against Gopi Rai on this
question of jurisdiction. That is a matter which we can take into account
B
only when ordering costs.'.' The decision in Na/la Ramudamma v. Na/la
Kasi Naidu, AIR 1945 Madras 269 relied on by Shri Chidambaram does
not help his clients. Therein the question was the matrimonial dispute. The
Arbitrator had decided at the reques[of the parties and a decree was
passed. It was held that the dispute would come under section 21 of the
Arbitration Act. The question of jurisdiction was not raised therein. Equal- C
ly the decision in Mt. Mahasunder Kuer and Anr. v. Ram Ratan Prasad Sahi,
AIR 1916 Patna 382 is also of little assistance. The question of adoption,
']> it was held, cannot be decided in the probate proceedings.

On a conspectus of the above legal scenario we conclude that the D
Probate Court has been conferred with .exclusive jurisdiction to grant
probate of the Will of the deceased annexed to the petition (suit); on grant
or refusal thereof, it has to preserve the original Will produced before it.
The grant of probate is final subject to appeal, if any, or revocation if made
in terms of the provisions of the Succession Act. It is a judgment in rem
and conclusive and binds not only the parties but also the entire world. E
The award deprives the parties of statutory right of appeal provided under
section 299. Thus the necessary conclusion is that the Probate Court alone

- has exclusive jurisdiction and the Civil Court on original side or the
Arbitrator does not get jurisdiction even if consented to by the parties, to
adjudicate upon the proof or validity of the Will propounded by the F
executrix, the applicant. It is already seen that the executrix was nominated
expressly in the will is a legal representative entitled to represent the Estate
of the deceased but the heirs cannot get any probate before the Probate
Court. They are entitled only to resist the claim of the executrix of the
execution and genuineness of the Will. The grant of probate gives the
executrix the right to represent the estate of the deceased, the subject-mat- G
ter in other proceedings. We make it clear that our exposition of law is
only for the purpose of finding the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and not an
expression of opinion on merits in the probate suit.

From this perspective we are constrained to conclude that the Ar- H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 2 S;C.R.

A bitrator cannot proceed with the probate suit to decide the dispute in issues
Nos.l and 2 framed by him. Under these circumstances the only course J.
open in the case is that the High Court is requested to proceed with the
probate suit No.65/85 pending on the probate jurisdiction of the High
Court of Bombay and decide the same as expeditiously as possible. The
B learned Judge is requested to fix the date and proceed day-to-day at his
convenience till it is concluded and decide the matter according to law
preferably within six months. Till then the Arbitrator is requested not to --I
decide issue Nos.I and 2. He may be at liberty to proceed with the other
issues. He is requested to await the decision of the Probate Court; depend-
ing upon the.result thereon, he would conclude his findings on Issues Nos.I
C and 2 and then make the award. and take the proceedings according to law.
The application is accordingly ordered but without cost.

N.V.K. Application disposed of.

--