Holding

Sufficient cause existed for the four‑day delay, so the appeal was condoned and the High Court's dismissal was set aside.

Summary

The State of Jammu & Kashmir appealed a High Court order that enhanced compensation for land acquired for public purpose, increasing the award from Rs 1,000 to Rs 8,000 per kanal. The High Court dismissed the appeal as time‑barred, being four days late, and rejected the State's application for condonation of delay. On special leave, the Supreme Court examined Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, which permits condonation of delay where the appellant shows "sufficient cause." The Court held that the expression "sufficient cause" is flexible and must be applied to achieve substantial justice, without discriminating against the State as a litigant. Finding that the State had sufficient cause for the delay, the Court condoned the delay, set aside the High Court's dismissal, and remitted the matter for disposal on its merits. The appeal was allowed and no costs were awarded.

Issues considered

Whether the delay of four days in filing the appeal can be condoned under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether the State, as a litigant, is entitled to the same "sufficient cause" test as private parties.
Interpretation of the term "sufficient cause" in the context of condoning delay.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXI
Limitation Act, 1963s. 5

Subjects

limitationcondonation of delaysufficient causeland acquisitioncompensation valuationState as litigantequality before lawIndian Limitation ActSection 5

Judgment

COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG & ANR,
A
V,
MST. KATJJI & ORS.

FEBRUARY 19, 1987

[M.P, THAKKAR AND B.C. RAY, JJ,] B

Indian Limitation Act, 1963; s,5-Condoning delay in filing
appeal-Existence of 'sufficient cause'-Determination of-State seek-
ing condonation of delay-To be treated equitably,

An appeal by the State, against a decision enhancing compensa-
tion in respect of acquisition of lands for a public purpose, raising c
important questions as regards principles of valuation, was dismissed
by the High Court as time barred, being four days beyond time, by
rejecting an application for condonation of dalay.

The State appealed to this Court by special leave. D

Allowing the appeal,

HLED: 1.1 The expression 'sufficient cause' employed by the
legislature in s.5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 is adequately elastic
to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of E
matters on merits. [388E-F]

1.2 The State which represents the collective cause of the community,
does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The doctrine of equality
before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant,
are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an F
equitable manner. The Courts, therefore, have to be informed with the
spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation
of the expression 'sufficient cause'. So also the same approach has to be
evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the end in view to do
even handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which
scuttles a decision on merits. [390B·C] G

2. In the instant case, sufficient cause exists for delay in institut-
ing the appeal in the High Court. Delay is, therefore, condoned. The
matter is remitted to the High Conrt for disposal on merits. [390C-D I
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No, 460 H
- of 1987.
387
:~

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.4. 1986 of the Jammu &
A and Kashmir High Court in Civil 1st Appeal No. 54 of 1985.

Altaf Anjad, Adv. General and S.K. Bhattacharya for the
Appellants.

B S.M. Aquil and Shakeel Ahmed for the Respondents.

The Order of the Court was delivered by

THAKKAR, J. To condone, or not to condone, is not the only
question. Whether or not to apply the same standard in applying the
"sufficient cause" test to all the litigants regardless of their personality
-"'-
c in the said context is another.

An appeal preferred by the State of Jammu & Kashmir arising
out of a decision enhancing compensation in respect of acquisition of
lands for a public purpose to the extent of nearly 14 lakhs rupees by
D making an upward revision of the order of 800% (from Rs.1000 per
kanal to Rs.8000 per kanal) which also raised important questions as
regards principles of valuation was dismissed as time barred being 4
days beyond time by rejecting an application for condonation of delay. ·+ ·-_
Hence this appeal by special leave.
E
The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by
enacting Section 5 1 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to
enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of
matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the
legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in
F a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being
the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is
common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably
liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message
does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the
hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is
G realized that:-

I. "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provi-
sions of o;der XX.I of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the
prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had
sufficiet1t cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such
H period." '
ANANTNAG v. MST. KATJI [THAKKAR, J.] 389

I. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging
an appeal late. A

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious
matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause
of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is
condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause B
would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean
that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not
every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine

must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic c
manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations
are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim D
to have vested right in injustice being done because of a
nun-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deli-
berately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala
fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact E

- he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on
account of its power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of removing in justice
and is expected to do so. F

Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was
sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the
appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation
and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of
equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a G
litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law )s administered
in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-
motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for con-
donation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an
impersonal machinary (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or
hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the in- H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A herited bureaucratic m"ethcidology imbued with the note-making, file
pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less dif-
ficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event,
the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does
not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to
be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the
B course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So
also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to mat-
ters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on mertis in
preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turn-
ing to the facts of the matter giving rise .to the present appeal, we are
satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the
C High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is there-
fore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the
High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits
after affording reasonable opportunity. of hearing to both the sides.

Appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs.
D
P.S.S. Appeal allowed.

+-.