Holding

Clause (g) applies only to minor or technical misconduct and is inapplicable, but the dismissal was shockingly disproportionate, constituting unfair labour practice under Clause (a), warranting reinstatement with reduced back‑wage awards.

Summary

The case concerned two plant operators (respondents 3 and 4) who were dismissed for sleeping on duty while the machine was left running. The Labour Court held that the dismissal was shockingly disproportionate and ordered reinstatement with back wages. The appellant appealed, arguing that Clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 applied only to minor or technical misconduct and therefore the dismissal could not be an unfair labour practice. The Supreme Court held that Clause (g) indeed covers only minor or technical misconduct and does not apply to the respondents' major misconduct. However, because the punishment was grossly disproportionate, the dismissal amounted to legal victimisation under Clause (a) of the same Schedule, constituting an unfair labour practice. The Court affirmed reinstatement with continuity of service but reduced the back‑wage award to 40% for respondent 3 and 50% for respondent 4, and directed written warnings upon reinstatement. The appeal was dismissed with these modifications.

Issues considered

Whether Clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 applies to the respondents' misconduct of sleeping on duty.
If Clause (g) does not apply, whether the employer is guilty of an unfair labour practice under Clause (a) (victimisation) due to the shockingly disproportionate dismissal.
Whether the order of reinstatement with back wages is justified and what quantum of back wages should be awarded.

Legislation cited

Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971s. Schedule IV Item 1 (a), s. Schedule IV Item 1 (g), s. Section 26, s. Section 3(16)

Subjects

labour lawunfair labour practicevictimisationdisproportionate punishmentreinstatementback wagesstatutory interpretationSchedule IVMaharashtra Act

Judgment

COLOUR-CHEM LTD. A
v.
A.L. ALASPURKAR AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 5, 1998

[S.B. MAJMUDAR, M. JAGANNADHA RAO AND A.P. MISRA, JJ.] B

Labour Law:

Maharashtra Recognition of TradeUnions and Prevention of Unfair
Labour Practices Act, 1971: Schedule IV Item I (g)-Unfair labour practice- C
Scope of-Workman found guilty of major misconduct of sleeping while on
duty keeping the machine in a working condition-Held: Sch IV Item I (g)
deals with misconduct of a minor or technical character and does not cover
major misconduct, even after taking into account the nature of misconduct
or past record of service of the employee if it is found by the court that the
punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the charge held proved D
'A against the employee-The .comma after the words "misconduct of a minor
or technical character" cannot be read as "or"-In the circumstances of the
case, Sch. IV Item I (g) not attracted.

Schedule JV Item I (g)-Victimisation:_Meaning of-Victimisation in
fact and Victimisation in law explained. E
Schedule IV Item I (g)-Victimisation-Plant Operators along with JO
mazdoors found sleeping at 3.30 a.m. keeping the machine in a working
condition without pouring raw material therein-Delinquent Plant Operators
dismissed from service for a major misconduct-Held: Having regard to the
nature of misconduct, even if it is a major misconduct, and the past record F
"'· of the employees, the punishment of dismissal is shockingly disproportionate
or is such which no reasonable employer would ever impose it in like
circumstances-Hence, such a punishment amounts to unfair labour practice
of legal victimisation-Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946--Jndustrial
Disputes Act, 1947.

Misconduct-Workman sleeping while on duty keeping the machine in
G
a working condition-Punishment of dismissal from service-Management
raised plea of losing confidence in such workman-Labour Court reinstated
workman 3 and 4 with 40% and 50% back wages respectively till the date
of award and 100% till actual reinstatement-Held: The work which the
workman were doing was not of any confidential nature-Hence, the question H
663
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R.

A of the management losing confidence in the workman does not arise-
Punishment of dismissal from service shockingly disproportionate-labour
Court quite justified in ordering reinstatement with continuity of service-
But in view of the gravity of misconduct the workman deserve to be further
punished-Hence, even after the award of the labour Court instead of 100%
B hack wages only 40% and 50% wages directed to be paid to workman 3 and
4 respectively till actual reinstatement pursuant to present order of the
Supreme Court.

Interpretation of Statues:

Welfare Legislation-Provisions-Two constructions-Possibility of-
C Held: If two constructions are reasonably possible, that which furthers the
policy and object of the Act and which is more beneficial to the employees
has to he preferred-But if the provision is capable of only one construction
plain meaning has to he given effect to.

D Words and Phrases :
"Victimisation "-Meaning of-In the context of Sch. IV Item 1(g) of the
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union and Prevention of Unfair labour
Practices Act, 1971.

E Respondent nos. 3 and 4 were working in the plant of the appellant-
eompany as Plant Operators. At about 03.30. a.m. when they were on duty
in the night shift, the Plant-i'1-Charge, on a suf!lrise visit, found res1>ondent
nos. 3. and 4 and 10 mazdoors as well as the Shift Supervisor sleeping
though the machine was kept working. For the said misconduct a domestic
F enquiry was held after which both these respondents were dismissed from
service. Respondent nos. 3. and 4 filed complaints before respondent no. 2-
authority under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade
Unions and Prevention of Unfair labour Practices Act, 1971. The contention
of these complainants was that they were victimised and the appellant-
management had committed diverse unfair practices as contemplated under
G Clauses (a), {b), {d), (f) and (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act.

The Labour Court held that respondent nos. 3 and 4 had committed
misconduct alleged against them. However, the Labour Comi found that
looking to the nature of the misconduct alleged and proved against the
complainants the punishment of dismissal from service was grossly
H disproportionate and therefore, it amounted to unfair labour practice on the
COLOUR-CHEM LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR 665
part of the aJJJJeliant as covered hy Clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the A
Act. As a result the Labour Court JJassetl an order of reinstatement of
res)londent nos. 3 and 4 with 40% anti 50% hack wages respectively till
the date of the award of the Lahour Court anti thereafter with 100% back
wages till reinstatement. The revisional court, namely, the Industrial Court
tlismissetl both the revision applications filetl hy the appellant anti respondent B
nos. 3 and 4. The High Court dismissed the writ JJetition filetl by the apJJCllant.
Hence this aJJJICal.

On behalf of the apJJellant-management it was contended that the
provisions of Item l(g) of Schedule IV of the Act would aJ11>ly only if the
, .. misconduct committed hy the res11ontlent nos. 3 and 4 was a minor misconduct C
or is of a technical nature; that since the Lahour court had found that the
mi~contluct of respondent nos. 3 anti 4 was a major misconduct anti, therefore,
the Labour Court was not .iustified in taking the view that the apJJellant was
!,'Uilty of unfair labour Jlractice covered hy the said clause; that even assuming
that the said clause was attracted looking to the nature of the misconduct
.
._._
anti the JJast record of sen·ice of the resJJontlent' nos. 3 anti 4 it could not be D
said that the punishment of dismissal was shockingly disJJroportionate; that
the misconduct of resJJontlent nos. 3 anti 4 hatl created a situation where the
machine was kept working without JJOuring raw material therein which
would have created a hazard with the possibility of an exJJlosion; anti that
since the aJJJJellant had lost confidence in re'sJJontlent nos. 3 and 4
comJlensation coultl he awartlctl instead of reinstatement.
E
On behalf of the respondent nos. 3 anti 4 it was contentletl that clause
(g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act would also cover even major misconduct
iffor such misconduct the orders of discharge or dismissal were passed by
the employer without having regard to the nature of the particular misconduct
or the past record of service of the employees; and that this was not a fit case F
'I in which compensation coultl be awarded in lieu of reinstatement as that
woultl spell economic disai.1er to these workmen who were already out of job
since 1983, that is, for more than 14 years.
The following JlOints arose for determination hy this Court:-
1. Whether Clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act is aJlJllicable G
to the facts of the present case.

2. If not whether the ap11ellant can be said to have been guilty of
having committed unfair labour Jlractice as Jler Clause (a) of Item
1 of Schedule IV of the Act on the basis of which the ortler of the H
A
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R.

Labour Court as confirmed by the higher courts can be supported.
-
3. Whether the order of reinstatement with back wages as passed by
the Lahour Court and as confirmed hy the higher courts is Ju~iificd
on the facts and circumstances of the case.

B Dismissing the appeal, this Court
HELD : 1.1. Clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra
Recognition of Trade Unions and Pre,'ention of Unfair Labour Practices Act,
1971 deals with unfair labour practice said to have been committed by an
employer who discharges or dismisses an employee for misconduct of a
minor nature or technical character and while doing so no regard is kept
C to the nature of the misconduct alleged and proved against the delinquent or
without having regard to the past record of sen'ice of the employee so that
under these circumstances the ultimate punishment imposed on the delinquent
would he found hy the Court to he a shockingly disproportionate punishment.
It is not possible to agree with the contention of the respondent-workmen
D that the said clause would also cover even ma.ior misco!J.duct if for such
misconduct the orders of discharge or dismissal arc passed by the employer
without having regard to the nature of the particular misconduct or the l>a~1
record of the employees and if under these circumstances it is found by the
court that the punishment imposed is a shockingly disproportionate one. It
is true that after the words 'for misconduct of a minor or technical character'
E there is found a comma in Clause (g), hut if the contention of the respondent-
workman is to be accepted the comma will have to he replaced by 'or'. That
cannot be done in the context and settings of the said clause as the said
exercise a1>art from being impermissible would not make a harmonious
reading of the provision. The comma as found in the clause after providing
F for the nature of the misconduct only indicates how the same nature of the
misconduct referred to in the first part of the clause results in a shockingly
dis1>ro1>ortionate punishment if certain relevant factors as mentioned in the
subsequent part of the clause, are not considered by the employer.
[675-B-H; 676-A]
Hindustan Lever Ltd v. Ashok Vishnu Kate, [1995] 6 SCC 326, relied
G on.
Pm1durang Kashinath Want v. Divisional Controller, MSRTC, Dhule,
(1995) 1 CLR 1052 (Born) and Maharashtra State Road Transport
Corporation v. Niranjan Sridhar Grade, (1985) 50 FLR (Born), approved.
H 1.2. It is true that this being a labour welfare legislation liberal
- COLOUR-CHEM LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR 667

construction should be placed on the relevant provisions of the Act. It is also A
•
true that if two constructions are reasonably possible to be placed on the
Section, it follows that the construction, which furthers the policy and object
of the Act and is more beneficial to the employee, has to be preferred. But
there is another canon of interpretation that a Statute or for that matter even
a particular Section has to be interpreted according to its plain words and B
without doing violence to the language used by the Legislature. Clause (g)
of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act is not reasonably capable of two
constructions. The one and only subject matter of Clause (g) is the misconduct
of a minor or technical character. The remaining 11arts of the clause do not
indicate any separate subject matter like the major misconduct. But they are
•· all adjuncts and corollaries or appendages of the principal subject, namely, C
minor or technical misconduct which in given set of cases may amount to
resulting in shoCkingly disproportionate punishment if they are followed by
discharge or dismissal of the delinquent. [677-B-G)

The Workmen ofMis Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. ofIndia (Pvt.) Ltd.
v. The management & Ors., [197JJ 1 sec 81J, referred to. D
2.1. The term 'victimisation' is neither defined in the present Act nor
in the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 nor in the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. Therefore, it has to be given a general dictionary meaning. Thus .
if a person is made to suffer by some exceptional treatment it would amount
to victimisation. The term 'victimisation' is of comprehensive import. It may E
be victimisation in fact or in law. Factual victimisation may consist of diverse
acts of employers who ar!! out to drive out and punish an employee for no
real reason and for extraneous reasons. Looking to the nature of the charges
levelled against respondent nos. J and 4, therefore, even in the light of their
-4' •

.. past record of service it could not be said that for such misconduct they were
liable to be dismissed form service. It must, therefore, held that if the F
punishment of dismissal or discharge is found shockingly dispropo11ionate
by the Court regard being had to the particular major misconduct and the
<
past record of service of the delinquent or is such as no reasonable employer
could ever impose in like circumstances, it would be unfair labour practice
by itself being an instance of victimisation in law or legal victimisation G
independent of factual victimisation, if any. Such an unfair labour practice
is covered by the present Act by Clause (a) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the
Act. [679-G; 680-A-E)

2.2. In the present case no reasonable management could have punished
l a delinquent workman who in the late hours of the night shift by about OJ.JO H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R. ·-..:=

A a.m .. had gone to sleep keeping the machine in a working condition especially
in the absence of any gross misconduct reflected by the past record of
•
service, with the extreme penalty of dismissal. This was a 11eculiar case in
which the Plant-in-Charge found in the earl~' hours of the dawn entire work
force of to mazdoors and 2 operators like the respondents and the supen'isor
B all asleep. So far as 10 mazdoors were concerned they were let off for the
very misconduct by mere warning while the respondents were dismissed
fro.n service. It is, of course, true that the respondents were assigned more
responsible duty as compared to mazdoors, hut in the background of
surrounding circumstances and especially in the light of their past record
of service there is no escape form the conclusion that the punishment of
C dismissal imposed on them for such misconduct was grossly and shockingly
dispropo1iionatc. By imposing such grossly disproportionate punishment on
the respondents the appellant management had tried to kill a fly with a
sledgehammer. Consequently it must be held that the appellant was guilty of
unfair labour practice Such an act was squarely covered by Clause (a) of Item
1 of Schedule IV of the Act being legal victimisation, if not factual
D victimisation. (661-E-H; 662-A-B]

Hind Construction & Engineering Co. Ltd v. Their Workmen, [1965)
2 SCR 85 and Bharat Iron Works v. Bhaguhhai Balubhai Patel & Ors.,
[1976) 2SCR 280, followed.

E Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th Edn., P. 1197, referred to.

3.1. When the 1mnishment of dismissal was shockingly
di1>proportionate to the charges held 11roved agaiiist respondent nos. 3 and
4 reinstatement with continuity of scn'icc was the least that could have been
ordered in their favour. There is no question of the appellant losing confidence ...
F in respondent nos. 3 and 4. It was not the case of the management while
framing the charge sheets against the workmen. The contention that apart
from going to sleep in the early hours of the morning when the night shift
-·
was coming to a close the machine was ke11t working and that would have
created hazard for the working of the 11lant and 11ossibility of an explosion
G was likely to arise even though mentioned in the written objections before
the Labour Court, was never pressed in service for consideration before the
Labour Court at the stage of arguments, nor any decision was invited on this
aspect. Nor such contention was also canvassed by the appellant in revision
before the Industrial Court or before the High Court. This contention,
therefore, must .be treated to be clearly an afterthought. All that was alleged •
H by its witness before the Court was that because of the respondents going r
~
:""":I

COLOUR-CHEM LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR 669
to slee11 and allowing the machine to work without 11ouring raw material. A
'•-\- therein the 11roduction went down to some extent. That has nothing to do with
the working of the unattended machine becoming a hazard or inviting the
possibility of any ex11losion. Under these circumstances and especially looking
to the past record of se11•ice of the respondents it could not he said that the
management would lose confidence in these workmen. The work which they
were doing was not of any confidential nature which an operator has _to carry B
out in the plant. It was a manual work which could be entrusted to anyone.
Consequently the submission that in lieu of rein~1atement compensation may
he awarded to the res11ondents, cannot he countenanced. It must, therefore,
he held that the Labour Com1 was quite justified in ordering reinstatement
--... of respondent-workmen with continuity of service. [682-C-H; 683-A-B] c
3.2. However, because of the misconduct committed by them of slee11ing
while on duty in the night shift the Labour Court has imposed the penalty
of depriving the workmen, respondent nos. 3 and 4 respectively, of 60% and
50% of the hack wages. After the award they have been granted 100% back
.A wages till rein~1atement. But, as respondent nos. 3 and 4 went to slee11 while D
on duty and that too not alone hut in the company of the entire staff of 10.
mazdoors, they deserve to he further punished by being deprived of at lea~1
some part of back wages even after the award of the Labour Court till actual
reinstatement. Interest of justice would be served if respondent no. 3 is
directed to be paid only 40% of the back wages even after the award of the
~ E
- '1
Labour Court till actual reinstatement punuant to the 1>resent order. Similarly
respondent no. 4 will be entitled to only 50% back wages even after the date
of the Labom' court's award till actual reinstatement as per the 11resent
order. In addition thereto the appellant management will he entitled to give
written warnings to both these res1>ondent when they are reinstated in
• semce not to re11eat such misconduct in future. The imposition of this type F
~ of penalty would be sufficient in the facts and circumstances of the case and
will 011erate as suitable corrective for the respondent-employees. They have
suffered enough since more than 14 years. They are out of service for all
these 14 years. At the time when they went to sleep in the night shift they
were pretty young. Now they have naturally grown up in age and with passage
of years more maturity must have dawned on them. Under these circumstances
G
r the cut in the back wages as imposed by this Court would be quite sufficient
"(
.,~, to act as deterrent for them so that such misconduct may not be committed
..• by them is future. [683-B-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 510of1992. H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 13. 9. 91 of the Bombay High Court
in W.P. No. 3863of1989.
. ~·
Narayan B. Shetty, H.S. Parihar, Kuldeep S. Parihar and P.N. Anaokar for
the Appellant

B Mrs. Indra Jaisingh, B.N. Singhvi and Brij Bhushan for the Respondent
Nos. 3-4.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :

S.B. MAJMUDAR, J. The appellant-management by obtaining special
C leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India has brought in
challenge the order of the High Court of Bombay dated 13th September 1991
dismissing the writ petition of the appellant and confirming the order of the
Labour Court as further confirmed in revision by the industrial Court, Bombay.
By the impugned order respondent nos.3 and 4 herein who were workmen in
D the concern of the appellant were ordered to be reinstated in service with 40%
,i...:_·
and 50% back wages respectively till the date of the award of the Labour
Court and thereafter with cent per cent back wages till reinstatement.

A few relevant facts leading to these proceedings are required, to be
noted to highlight the grievance of the appellant-management against the
E impugned order.

Background Facrs

Respondent nos.3 and 4 were working the plant of the appellant as
Plant Operators. On the night between 5th and 6th May 1982 when they were
F on duty in the night shift, at about 03.30 a.rn. when the Plant-in-Charge one
Shri Chandrahasan made a surprise visit, he found respondent nos.3 and 4
and 10 mazdoors as weli as the Shift Supervisor sleeping though the machine
was kept working. The Shift Supervisor was found sleeping in the cabin while
respondent nos.3 and 4 operators and 10 rnazdoors were found sleeping on
the terrace of the factory. For the said misconduct a domestic enqliiry was
G held, after chargesheeting respondent nos.3 and 4 charge-sheets of even date
were issued on 18th May 1982. After the domestic enquiry both these
respondentS by order dated 04th June 1983 were dismissed from service.
Respondent nos. 3 and 4 filed complaints before respondent no 2-authority
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Union &
H Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act. 1971 [hereinafter referred to as 'the
COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 671
Act']. The contention of these complainants was t11at t11ey were victimised A
..-\ and tlie appellant-management had committed diverse unfair practices as
y- contemplated under Clauses (a), (b), (d), (f) and (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV
of t11e Act. The appellant contested these complaints. The Labour Court in
the light of tl1e evidence recorded came to the conclusion tliat the appellant-
company had proved that the complainants had committed misconducts alleged
against them as per t11e charge-sheets dated 18th May 1982. It also held that
B
:.(
the complainants failed to prove that tl1ey were dismissed by way of unfair
labour practices covered by Clauses (a), (b), (d) and (f) of Item 1 of Schedule
IV of the Act. However, it held that tl1e appellant had committed unfair labour
practice as per Clause (g) of Item 1 of the said Schedule. Contention of the
complainants t11at they were discriminated against was rejected. It was also c
found t11at the appellant failed to prove that the complainants were gainfully
employed since their dismissals on 04th June 1983. The Labour Court in short
found that looking to the nature of the misconduct alleged and proved
against the complainants the punishment of dismissal was grossly
disproportionate and, therefore, it amounted to unfair labour practice on the
-.,L part of the appellant as covered by Clause (g) of Item I of Schedule IV of D
the Act. As a result, tl1e Labour Court passed an order of reinstatement with
appropriate back wages as seen earlier. The said order of t11e Labour Court
resulted in two revisions, one on behalf of the workmen and another on behalf
of the management. The revisional court namely the Industrial Court dismissed
both the revision applications and confirmed the order of tl1e Labour Court. E
The appellant carried the matter in writ petition before the High Court which
as noted earlier came to be dismissed. That is how tile appellant is before us.

We have heard learned senior counsel for the appellant as well as
learned senior· counsel for respondent nos.3 and 4 who are tile only contesting
., parties, respondent nos. 1 and 2 being the a~tllorities under the Act who have F
adjudicated the dispute are only formal parties.
""
Rival Contentions

Learned senior counsel Shri Narayan B. Shetty for the appellant
submitted that the Labour Court as well as the Industrial Court and also the
G
r High Court have patently erred in applying t11e'provisions of Item I Clause
(g) of Schedule IV of tile Act in the present case. It was submitted that on
a proper construction of the said provision the said clause would apply only
if the misconduct committed by the respondents was a minor misconduct or
is of technical nature. That tl1e Labour Court had found that t11e misconduct H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] l S.C.R.

A of respondent nos.3 and 4 was a major misconduct and the said finding v. as
not disturbed or dissented from by the revisional authority or by the High ·('--
Court. Under these circumstances tl1e Labour Court was not justified in taking
the view that the appellant was guilty of unfair labour practice covered by
the said clause and when the Labour Court held that on oilier alleged unfair
labour practices the complainants had made out no case, the complaints filed
B by the respondents were liable to be dismissed. He alternatively submitted
tliat even assuming that tlle said clause was attracted looking to tlle nature
of the misconduct and tl1e past service record of the respondents it could not
be said that tl1e punishment of dismissal was shockingly disproportionate.
Even on tllat ground tlle complaints were liable to be dismissed. It was lastly
c contended tl1at in any view of tlle matter this was not a fit case where
reinstatement could have been ordered and instead compensation could have
been awarded to the respondents in lieu of reinstatement as tlleir misconduct
had created a situation in which the machine was kept working and the
respondents had gone to sleep while on duty. The result was tllat apart from
lesser production the unattended machine in working state had created a
D hazardous situation wherein the plant would have been blown off and an ,....:
explosion would have resulted, as tl1e chemical industry of tlle appellant
where tlle respondents were working is a.hazardous industry.
;-:
' .
Refuting these contentions learned senior counsel. Smt, Indira Jaisingh
for respondent nos, 3 and 4 contended tllat on a proper construction of
E
Clause (g) of Item I of Schedule IV of tlle Act it is rightly held by tlle High
Court tllat tlle said clause is squarely attracted to tlte facts of tlle present case
as it covered apart from misconduct of minor or technical character all oilier
misconducts where looking to tlle nature of tlte misconduct or tlle past record
of service it appeared to the Court that the punishment iniposed was shockingly
F disproportionate to tlte charges held proved against tlte delinquent workmen. ,.
She further contended tltat in any case shockingly disproportionate y
punishment in the light of tlle nature of tlte misconduct alleged and proved
would itself amount to unfair labour practice or victimisation as held by this
Court in tlle case of Hind Construction & Engineering Co Ltd. v. Their
Workmen, (1965] 2 SCR 85. She also submitted that while considering Clause
G (g) of ltern 1 of Schedule IV of the Act tlle Court should adopt beneficial rule
of construction as tltls is a labour welfare legislation. In tltis connection she
pressed in service two decisions of this Court to which we will make a
reference hereinafter. She also submitted tltat proportionality of tlle punishment
could always be considered by courts dealing with labour legislations and tlle
H court had• ample jurisdiction in appropriate cases to set aside such
COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 673
disproportionate punishment in the light of the charges held proved against A
~· the delinquents concerned. She next submitted that as t11e Labour Court had
found that the respondent-complainants were not shown to have been gainfully
employed in t11e meantime there was no reason for not awarding full back
wages at least from the date of the award of the Labour Court as the award
of 40% and 50% back wages to respondent nos. 3 and 4 respectively till t11e
date of the award had remained final as the complainants had not challenged
B
the said award of back wages before the High Court. She also submitted that
once the punishment is found to be grossly disproportionate to t11e charges
levelled and proved against the delinquents, the order of rei~statemcnt was
perfectly justified and there was no question of appellant losing confidence
in the respondent-complainants and .consequently t11is is not a fit case in c
which compensation can be awarded in lieu of reinstatement as t1.1at would
spell economic disaster to these workmen who are already out of job since
1983, tllat is, for more than 14 years.

In rejoinder it was contended by learned senior counsel for the appellant
·J... that the same learned Judge of the High Court who decided t11e present case D
had subsequently taken t11e· view of the construction of Clause (g) of Item
I of Schedule IV of the Act that the same would cover only minor misconducts.
He also relied upon another judgment of the High Court on the same lines.
He also contended tllat the Labour Court had repelled the contention on
behalf of the respondent-complainants that the management had committed
E
unfair labour practice of victimisation covered by Clause (a) of Item 1 of
Schedule IV of the Act and if Clause (g) thereof did not apply to such major
misconducts complaints were required to be dismissed·.

Points for Determination
~ F
y In view of t11e riforesaid rival contentions the following points arise for
our determination.

I. Whether Clause (g) of Item I of Schedule IV of the Act is applicable
to t11e facts of tile present case.
G
2. If not, whethf;r the appellant can be said to have been guilty of
.. r having committed unfair labour practice as per Clause (a) of Item
I of Schedule IV of the Act on the basis of which the order of the
labour Court as confirmed by the higher courts can be supported.

3. Whether the order of reinstatement with back wages as passed by H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R.

A the Labour Court and as confirn1ed by the higher courts is justified
on the facts and circumstances of the case.

We shall deal with these points seriatim,

Point No.I
B
For resolving the controversy centering round this point it is necessary "'-
to have a look at the rcJeyant statutory provisions of the Act. The Act was
passed by the Maharashtra Legislature in 1971 as Act No. 1of1972. Amongst
its diverse objects and reasons one of the reasons for enacting the said Act
was for defining and providing for prevention of certain unfair labour practices
C to constitute courts (as independent machinery) for carrying out the pmposes
mentioned therein one of which being enforcing provisions relating to unfair
labour practices. Unfair labour practices is defined by Section 3 sub-section
(16) of the Act to mean, 'unfair labour practices' as defined in section 26'.
Section 26 of the Act Jays down that, "unless the context requires otherwise,
D 'unfair labour practices, mean any of the practices listed in Schedules II, III
and IV". We are not concerned with Schedules II and III which deal with
unfair Jabour practices on the part of the employer and trade unions. We are
directly concerned with Schedule IV which deals with general unfair Jabour
practices on the part of the employers. The relevant provisions of Item 1 of
Schedule IV of the Act read as under :
E
"l. To discharge or dismiss employees
(a) by way of victimisation:
(b) ..................... ..

F (c) ,..
(d)

(e)

(f)

G (g) for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having
any regard to the nature of the particular misconduct or the past
record of service of the employee, so as to amount to a shockingly
disproportionate punishment."
So far as the aforesaid Clause (g) is concerned the Labour Court has held that
H tl1e misconduct alleged against the respondents and held proved before it
_-f·

COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR (S.B. MAJMUDAR,J.] 675
was not a misconduct of minor or technical character as they were found A
sleeping on duty and were also guilty of negligence in keeping the machine
in working state without putting necessary raw m.aterial therein. As the
aforesaid finding of the Labour Court about the nature of misconduct of
respondent nos. 3 and 4 was confirmed by the revisional court and as that
finding was not challenged by the respondents before the High Court we B
shall proceed for the present discussion on the basis that respondent nos.
3 and 4 were guilty of major misconduct. The moot questiOQ, therefore, which
falls for consideration is whether on the express language of Clause (g) the
said provision gets attracted or not. A conjoint reading of different sub-parts
of the aforesaid provision, in our view, leaves no room for doubt that it deals
with an unfair labour practice said to have been committed by an employer C
who discharges or dismisses an employee for misconduct of a minor or
technical character and while doing so no regard is kept to the nature of the
misconduct alleged and proved against the delinquent or without having
regard to the past service record of the employee so that under these
circumstances the ultimate punishment imposed on the delinquent would be D
found by the Court to be a shockingly disproportionate punishment. It is not
possible to agree with the contention of learned senior counsel for the
respondent-workmen that· the said clause would also cover even major
misconducts if for such misconducts the orders of discharge or dismissal are
passed by the employer without having regard to the nature of the misconduct
or the past record of the employees and if under these circumstances. it is E
found by the court that the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate
one. It is true that after the words ·for misconduct of a minor or technical
character' there is found a comma in Clause (g), but if the contention of
learned senior counsel is to be accepted the comma will have to be replaced
by ·or'. That cannot be done in the context and settings of the said clause F
as the said exercise apart from being impermissible would not make a harmonious
reading of the provision. Even that apart, in the said Clause (g) the Legislature
has used the word 'or' while dealing with the topic of non-consideration by
the employer while imposing the punishment the relevant factors to be
considered, namely, either the non-consideration of the nature of the particular
misconduct or the past record of service of the employee, which would make G
the punishment appear to be shockingly disproportionate to the charge of
misconduct held proved against the delinquent. Thus the term 'or' as employed
by the Legislature in the said clause refers to the same topic, namely non-
consideration of relevant aspects by the employer while imposing the
·(
punishment. Consequently it cannot be said to have any reference to the
nature of the misconduct, whether minor or major. It must, 'therefore, be held H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) J S.C.R.

A that the comma as found in the clause after providing for the nature of the
misconduct only indicates how the same nature of the misconduct referred
to in the first part ~f the clause results in a shockingly disproportionate
punishment if certain relevant factors, as mentioned in the subsequent part
of the clause, are not considered by the employer. If the contention of learned
senior counsel for the respondents was right all the sub-parts of clause (g)
B have to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. That would result in a
very anomalous situation. In such an eventuality the discharge or dismissal
of an employee in case of a major misconduct without regard to the nature
of the particular misconduct or past record of service may by itself amount
to shockingly disproportionate punishment. Consequently for a proved major
C misconduct; if past service record is not seen, the punishment of discharge
or dismissal by itself may amount to a shockingly disproportionate punishment.
Such an incongruous result is not contemplated by Clause (g) of Item I of
Schedule IV of the Act. Such type of truncated operation of the said provision
is contra-indicated by the very texture and settings of the said clause. Once
the said clause deals with the topic of misconduct of a minor or technical
D character it is difficult to appreciated how the said clause can be construed
as covering also major misconducts for which there is not even a whisper in
the said clause. On a harmonious construction of the said clause with all it
sub-parts, therefore, it must be held that the Legislature had contemplated
while enacting the said clause punishment of discharge or dismissal· for
E misconduct of minor or technical character which, when seen in the light of
the nature of the particular minor or technical misconduct or the past record
of the employee would amount to inflicting of shockingly disproportionate
punishment. Jn this connection we may mention that the same learned Judge
B.N. Srikrishna. J., in a latter decision in the case of Pandurang Kashinath
Wani v. Divisional Controller, MS.R.T.C. Dhule & Ors., (1995) I CLR 1052
F has taken the view that Clause (g) of Item I of Schedule IV of the Act refers
to minor or technical misconducts only. The same view was also taken by
another learned Judge Jahagirdar. J., in the case of Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corporation v. Niranjan Sridhar Gade and another, (I 985) 50 FLR
(Born) I. So far as this Court is concerned the same Act came for consideration
G in the case of Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kale and others, (1995)
6 SCC 326. It is, of course, true that the question with which this Court was
concerned was a different one, namely, whether before any final discharge or
dismissal order is passed, a complaint could be filed under the Act on the
ground that the employer was contemplating to commit such unfair labour
practice, if ultimately the departmental proceedings were likely to result into
H final orders of dismissal or discharge attracting any of the clauses of Item I
COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.) 677

of Schedule IV of the Act. However while considering the scheme of the Act A
-~ especially the very same Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act a Bench of this
Court consisting of G.N. Ray. J. and one of us S.B. Majmudar. J. in paragraph

'°' 26 Qf the Report assumed that the said clause would cover minor misconducts.

Learned senior counsel for the respondents was right when she
contended that this being a labour welfare legislation liberal construction B
4 ~ should be placed on the relevant provisions of the Act. She rightly invited
our attention to paragraph 41 of the Report of the aforesaid case in this
connection. She also invited our attention to a decision of this Court in the
case of The Workmen ofMis. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt)
Ltd. etc v. The Management and others etc., [1973] l SCC 813 especially the
observations made in paragraph 35 of the Report. It has been observed
c
therein that if two constructions are reasonably possible to be placed on the
section, it followed that the construction which furthers the policy and object
of the Act and is more beneficial to t11e employee, has to be preferred. But
it is furtl1er observed in the very said paragraph that there is another canon

..(
of interpretation that a Statute or for that matter even a particular section, has D
to be interpreted according to its plain words and without doing violence to
the language used by the legislature. In our view, Clause (g) of Item 1 of
Schedule IV of the Act is not reasonably capable of two constructions. Only
one reasonable construction is possible on the express language of Clause
(g), namely, that it seeks to cover only those types of unfair labour practices
where minor misconducts or technical misconducts have resulted in dismissal E
or discharge of delinquent workmen and such punishment in the light of the
nature of misconduct or past record of the delinquent is found to be shockingly
disproportionate to the charges of minor misconduct or charges of technical
misconduct held proved against the delinquent. One and only subject-matter
of Clause (g) is the misconduct of minor or technical character. The remaining F
.... parts of tl1e clause do not indicate any separate subject-matter like the major
"' misconduct. But they are all adjuncts and corollaries or appendages of the
principal subject, namely, minor or technical misconduct which in given set
ofcases may amount to resulting in shockingly disproportionate punishment
if they are followed by discharge or dismissal of the delinquent. The first
point, therefore, will have to be answered in the negative in favour of t11e G
appellant and against the respondent-delinquents.

Point No. 2

However this is not the end of the matter. Looking to the nature of the
charges levelled against the delinquent-respondents it has to be appreciated H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS '
[1998] l S.C.R.

A that all that was alleged against them was that they were found sleeping in
the wee hours of the night shift almost near dawn at 03.30 a.m. having kept
the machine in a rul111ing condition without seeing to it that proper rnw
material was inserted therein. Even on the basis that it was a major misconduct
which was alleged and proved, looking to the past record of the service of
B the delinquents no reasonable employer could have imposed puriishment of
dismissal. The past record was to the effect that respondent no. 3 was once
found allegedly gambling in the factory premises but was in fact found to be
playing cards on a Diwah day which was a public holiday, while the only past
misconduct alleged against respondent no. 4 was that on one occasion he
was warned for negligent discharge of duty. Looking to the nature of the
C charges levelled against them, therefore, and even in the light of their past
service record it could not be said that for such misconducts they were liable
to be dismissed from service. Such punishments patently appear to be grossly
disproportionate to tl1e nature of the charges held proved against tl1em. That
finding reached by the Labour Court on facts remains unassailable. Once that
conclusion is reached even apart from non-application of Clause (g) of Item
D I of Schedule IV of the Act. Clause (a) of Item I of the said Schedule of the
Act gets squarely attrncted as it would amount to victimisation on the part
of the management which can be said to have imposed a most unreasonable
punishment on tl1ese ·employees. In this coI111ection learned senior counsel
for the respondent-workmen has rightly pressed in service a decision of a
E Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in tl1e case of Hind Construction
(suprn). In that case this Court was considering the jurisdiction and power
of tl1e Industrial Court during the time when Section 11-A of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 was not on the Statute Book. Considering the nature of
the punishment imposed on the workmen, who had gone on strike, because
they had not reported for duty on a day which otherwise was a holiday but
F which was declared by tl1e management to be a working day, this Court
speaking through Hidayatullah, J. made the following pertinent observations
at page 88 of the Report :
" ... But where tl1e punishment is shockingly disproportionate, regard
being had to the particular conduct and the past record or is such,
G as no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances,
t11e Tribunal may treat tl1e imposition of such punishment as itself
showing victimization or unfair labour practice ...... "

It has to be kept in view that tllese observations were made by tllis Court
H at a time when unfair labour practices were not codified either by tl1e Industrial
COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAIMUDAR. J.] 679
Disputes Act or even by the present Act. The present Act tried to codify A
unfair practices on t11e part of t11e employer by enacting the Act in 1972 and
even the Industrial Disputes Act being the Central Act also followed t11e
Maharashtra Act and taking a leaf from the book of Maharashtra Legislature,
Parliament introduced the concept of unfair labour practices by inserting
Chapter V-C by Act No. 46of1982 w.e.f. 21st August 1984. Sections 25-T and
25-U of the Industrial Disputed Act deal with 'Prohibition of unfair labour B
practice' and 'Penalty for co111111itting unfair labour practices' respectively.
The term 'unfair labour practice' was defined by the Industrial Disputes Act
by inserting Section 2(ra) with effect from the very same date, i.e. 21st August
1984 by t11e very same Act, i.e., Act No. 46 of 1982 to mean, 'any of the
practices specified in the Fifth Schedule'. The Fifth Schedule of the Industrial C
Disputes Act, which saw the light of the day pursuant to the very same
Amending Act, deals with 'unfair labour practices' which are a mirror image
and replica of the unfair labour practices contemplated and codified by the
present Maharashtra Act. But apart from these subsequent statutory provisions
which tried to codify unfair labour practices on the part of the employers, the
basic concept of victimisation as laid down by t11is Court in Hind Construction's D
case (supra) holds the field and is not whittled down by any subsequent
statutory enactments. Not only it is not given a go-by but it is reiterated by
t11e present Act by enacting Clause (a) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act
meaning thereby any discharge or dismissal of an employee by way of
victimisation would be unfair labour practice. E
The tem1 'victimisation' is not defined by the present Act. Sub-section (18)
of Section 3 of the Act which is the Definition Section lays down tliat, 'words
and expressions used in this Act and not defined therein, but defined in the
Bombay Act, shall, in relation to an industry to which t11e provisions of the
-~ Bombay Act apply, have the meanings assigned to t11em by the Bombay Act; F
and in any other case, shall have t11e meanings assigned to t11em by the
Central Act'. Bombay Act is the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and
t11e Central Act is the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as laid down by Definition
Section 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act. The term 'victimisation' is defined neither
by the Central Act nor by t11e Bombay Act. Therefore, the tenn 'victimisation' G
has to be given general dictionary mear1ing. In ·concise 0:-..ford Dictionary, 7th
Edn., ilie tem1 'victimisation' is defined at Page 1197 as follows :

'"make a victim; cheat; make suffer by dismissal or other exceptional
treatment"
H
680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) l S.C.R.

A Thus if a person is made to suffer by some exceptional treatment it would
amount to victimisation. The term 'victimisation' is of comprehensive import. r"-·
It may be victimisation in fact or in law. Factual victimisation may consist of
diverse acts of employers who are out to drive out and punish an employee
for no real reason and for extraneous reasons. As for example a militant trade
union leader who is a thorn in the side of the management may be discharged
B or dismissed for that very reason camouflaged by another ostensibly different
reason. Such instances among to uufair labour practices on account.of factual
victimisation. Once that happens Clause (a) of Item I of Schedule IV of the
Act would get attracted, even apart from the very same act being covered by
uufair labour practices envisaged by Clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the very
c same Item l of Schedule IV. But it cannot be said that Clause (a) of Item l
which deals with victimisation covers only factual victimisation. There can be
in addition legal victimisation and it is this type of victimisation which is
contemplated by the decision of this Court in Hind Construction (supra). It
must, therefore, be held that if the punishment of dismissal or discharge is
found shockingly disproportionate by the Court regard being had to the
D particular major misconduct and the past service record of the delinquent or )-0
is such as no reasonable employer could ever impose in like circumstances,
it would be uufair labour practice by itself being an instance of victimisation
in Jaw or legal victimisation independent of factual victimisation, if any. Such
an uufair labour practice is covered by the present Act by enactment of
E Clause (a) of Item l of Schedule IV of the Act as it would be an act of
victimisation in law as clearly ruled by this Court in the aforesaid decision.
On the same lines is a latter decision of this Court in the case of Bharat Iron
Works v. Bhagubhai Baiubhai Patel & Ors., [1976) 2 SCR 280 wherein a
Bench of three learned Judges speaking through Goswami, J. laid down the
parameters of the term 'victimisation' as understood in Jabour laws and as
F contemplated by industrial jurisprudence. It has been observed that ordinarily ~

a person is victimised if he is made a victim or a scapegoat and is subjected 'f
to persecution, prosecution or punisi1ment for no real fault or guilt of his own.
If actual fault or guilt meriting punishment is established, such action will be
rid of the taint of victimisation. The aforesaid observations obviously refer
G to factual victimisation. But then follows further clucidfition of the term
'victimisation' to the following effect :

"Victimisation may partake of various types, as for example, pressurising
an employee to leave the union or union activities, treating an employee
in a discriminatory manner or inflicting a grossly monstrous punishment
H which no national person would impose upon an employee and the
COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 681

like.... " A
""I"
· The aforesaid observations in this decision fall in line with the observations
in the earlier decision of this Court in Hind Construction (supra). Consequently
it must be held that when looking to the nature of the charge of even major
misconduct which is found proved if the punishment of dismissed or discharge
as imposed is found to be grossly disproportionate in the light of the nature B
of the miscondtlct or the past record of the employee concerned involved in
the misconduct or is such which no reasonable employer would ever impose
in like circumstances, inflicting of such punishment itself could be treated as
legal victimisation. On the facts of the present case there is a clear finding
reached by the Labour Court and as confirmed by the Industrial Court that
. the charges levelled against the respondent-delinquents which were held
c
proved even though reflecting major misconducts, were not such in the light
of their past service record as would merit imposition of punishment of
dismissal. This factual finding would obviously attract the conclusion that by
imposing such punishment the appellant-management had victimised the
respondent-delinquents. Imposition of such shockingly disproportionate D
~
punishment by itself, therefore, has to be treated as legal victimisation apart
from not being factual victimisation as on the latter aspect the Labour Court
has held against the respondent-workmen and that finding has also remained
well sustained on record. Thus it must be held that the management even
though not guilty of factual victimisation was guilty of legal victimisation in
the light of the proved facts which squarely attracted the ratio of the decisions
E
of this Court in Hind Construction (supra) and Bharat Iron Works (supra).
It is easy to visualise that no reasonable management could have punished
a delinquent workman who in the late hours of the night shift by about 03.30
__,
a.m. had gone to sleep keeping the machine in a working condition especially
~
in the absence of any gross misconduct reflected by the past service record, F
'( with the extreme penalty of dismissal. It is also interesting to note that this
was a peculiar case in which the Plant In-charge found during his surprise
visit at 03.30 a.m. in the early hours of the dawn entire work force of 10
mazdoors and 2 operators like the respondents and the supervisor all asleep.
It is also pertinent to note that so far as 10 mazdoors were concerned they
were let off for this very misconduct by mere warning while the respondents G
.were dismissed from service. It is, of course, true that the respondents were
assigned more responsible duty as compared to mazdoors, but in the
background of surrounding circumstances and especially in the light of their
past service record there is no escape from the conclusion that the punishment
of dismissal imposed on them for such misconduct was grossly and shockingly H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A disproportionate, as rightly held by the Labour Court and as confinned by the
revisional court and the High Cowt. By imposing such grossly disproportionate
punishment on the respondents the appellant-management had tried to kill a
fly with a sledge hammer. Consequently it must be held that tl1e appellant was
guilty of unfair labour practice. Such an act was squarely covered by Clause
(a) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act being legal victimisation, if not factual
B victimisation. The ultimate finding of the Labour Court about maintainability
of the complaint can be supported on this ground. The second point is
answered in the affinnative ag~inst tlie appellant and in favour of the
respondent·-workmen.

C Point No. 3
So far as t11is point is concerned it has to be held that when t11e
punishment of dismissal was shockingly disproportionate to the charges held
proved against'them reinstatement with continuity of service was the least
that could have been ordered in their favour. There is no question of appellant
D losing confidence in them. In tliis connection learned senior counsel for tlie
appellant tried to submit tliat apart from going to sleep in the early hours of
tlie morning when tlie night shift was coming to a close tlie machine was kept
working and that would have created a hazard for tlie working of the plant
and possibility of eiq>losion was likely to arise. So far as tliis contention is
E concerned it must be stated that this was not tlie case of tlie management
while framing tlie charge-sheets against the workmen. Not only tliat, there is
not a whisper about t.'1.e said eventuality and possibility in tlie evidence led
by the management before the Labour Court. But that apart no such contention,
even tliough mentioned in tlie written objections before tlie Labour Court,
was ever pressed in service for consideration before tlie Labour Court at tlie
F stage of arguments, nor any decision was invited on tliis aspect. No such
contention was also canvassed by tlie appellant in revision before tlie
industrial Court or before the High Court. This contention, tlierefore, must be
treated to be clearly an afterthought and appears to have been rightly given
up in subsequent stages of the trial by tlie management itself. All that was
G alleged by its witness before the Court was that because of the respondents
going to sleep and allowing the machine to work without pouring raw material
, tlierein tlie production went down to some extent. That has notliing to do
witll tlie working of tlie unattended machine becoming a hazard or inviting
possibility of any explosion. Under tliese circumstances and especially looking
to the past service record of the respondents it could not be said that tlie
H management would lose confidence in tliese workmen. The work which tliey
COLOUR-CHEM. LTD. v. A.L. ALASPURKAR [S.B. MAJMUDAR, J.] 683

were doing was not of any confidential nature which an operator has to carry A
~ out in the plant. It was a manual work which could be entrusted to anyone.
Consequently the submission of learned senior counsel for the appellant, that
in lieu of reinstatement compensation may be awarded to the respondents,
cannot be countenanced. It must, therefore, be held that the Labour Court
was quite justified in ordering reinstatement of respondent-workmen with
continuity of service. However because of the misconduct committed by B
them, of sleeping while on duty in the night shift the Labour Court has
imposed the penalty of depriving the workmen, respondent nos. 3 and 4
respectively, of 60% and 50% of the back wages. After the award they have
been granted 100% back wages till reinstatement. But, in our view, as
respondent nos. 3 and 4 went to sleep while on duty and that too not alone
but in company of the entire staff of 10 mazdoors, they deserve to be further
c
punished by being deprived of at least some part of back wages even after
'/ the award of the Labour Court till actual reinstatement. Interest of justice
would be served, in our view, if respondent no. 3 is directed to be paid only
40% of the back wages even after the award of the Labour Court till actual
;-{ reinstatement pursuant to our present order. Similarly respondent no. 4 will D
be entitled to only 50% back wages even after the date of the Labour Court's
award till actual reinstatement as per the present order. In addition thereto the
appellant-management will be entitled to give written warnings to both these
respondents when they are reinstated in service not to repeat such
misconducts in future. The imposition of this type of additional penalty, in
E
our view, would be sufficient in the facts and circumstances of the case and
will operate as suitable corrective for the respondent-employees. They have
suffered enough since more than 14 years. They are out of service for all
these 14 years. At the time when they went to sleep in the night shift they
were pretty young. Now they have naturally grown up in age and with
~ passage of years more maturity must have dawned on them. Under these F
'\" circumstances the cut in the back wages as imposed by the Labour Court and
as further imposed by us would be quite sufficient to act as deterrent for them
so that such misconducts may not be committed by them in future. The.third
point is answered as aforesaid •by holding that the order of reinstatement is
justified but the order of back wages as ordered by the Labour Court requires
to be modified to the aforesaid extent.
G
r-
In the result, this appeal is dismissed subject to the slight modification
that respondent nos. 3 and 4 will be entitled to reinstatement and continuity
of service but so far as back wages are concerned, even after the order of
the Labour Court instead of 100% of back wages, respondent no. 3 will be
H
684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A entitled to 40% back wages till reinstatement and respondent no.4 will be
entitled to 50% back wages till actual reinstatement pursuant to the present r--
order. They will also be suitably warned in writing by the appellant as
aforesaid. We direct the appellant to. reinstate the respondents concerned ·
within four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order at its end.
The office shall send a copy of this order to the appellant for information and
B necessary action. Pursuant to the interim order of this Court pending this
apneal the appellant was directed to deposit Rs. 78,000 for being paid to the
respondent-workmen towards their claim of back wages as awarded by the
Labour Court and as confirmed by higher courts. Deducting the said amount
the balance of back wages as payable to the respondents concerned pursuant
C to the present order shall be worked out and this amount of back wages with
all other consequential monetary benefits flowing from the order of
reinstatement shall be made available by the appellant to the respondents
concerned within a period of eight weeks from the receipt of a copy of this
order at its end. It is also made clear that because of the grant of continuity
of service to the respondents all other future benefits like promotion, retiral
D benefits etc. according to rules and regulations of appellant-management will
also be made available to the respondent-workmen. Orders accordingly. In the
facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.

V.S.S. Appeal dismissed.

r -
.'