COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISEversusM/S. HONGO INDIA (P) LTD. & ANR.

                            [2009] 4 S C.R. 1197


         COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE                      A
~
                                      v.
                   MIS. HONGO !NOIA (P) LTD. & ANR.
                      Civil Appeal No. 1939 of 2009
                             MARCH 27, 2009
                                                                       B
           [K.G.BALAKRISHNAN, CJI., P.SATHASIVAM AND
                        J.M.PANCHAL, JJ.]
             Limitation Act, 1963:
               s.5 - Condonation of delay- High Court's power under    c
        s.5 to condone delay in filing reference application under
        s.35H(1) of the unamended Central Excise Act, beyond the
        period of 180 days - Held: Time limit prescribed under
        s.35H(1) is absolute and unextendable under s.5- Delay after
        prescribed period of 180 days thus not condonable - It is the D
    •
        duty of the court to respect legislative intent and by giving
        liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended by invoking
        s. 5 of the Act - Central Excise Act, 1944 - s.35H(1)(before
        Act 4912005) - Interpretation of statutes.
             The question which arose for consideration in these E
        appeals was whether the High Court in the reference
        application under Section 35H(1) of the unamended
        Central Excise Act, 1944 has power under Section 5 of
        the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay beyond the
        period prescribed under the main statute i.e., Central F
        Excise Act.
             Dismissing the appeals, the Court
             HELD: 1. The High Court has no power to condone
        the delay in filing the "reference application" filed by the G
    "   Commissioner under unamended Section 35H(1) of the
        Central Excise Act, 1944 beyond the prescribed period of
        180 days and it rightly dismissed the reference on the
        ground of limitation. [Para 21] [1212-F-G]
                                     1197                              H
    1198     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2009] 4 s c R.


A         2. In the case of appeal to the Commissioner, Section
    35 provides 60 days time and in addition to the same,
    Commissioner has power to condone the delay up to 30
    days, if sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, Section 358
    provides 90 days time for filing appeal to the Appellate
B   Tribunal and sub-section (5) therein enables the Appellate
    Tribunal to condone the delay irrespective of the number
    of days, if sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, Section
    35EE which provides 90 days time for filing revision by
    the Central Government and, proviso to the same enables
                                                                    •
C   the revisional authority to condone the delay for a further
    period of 90 days, if sufficient cause is shown, whereas
    in the case of appeal to the High Court under Section 35G
    and reference to the High Court under unamended
    Section 35H of the Act, total period of 180 days has been
    provided for availing the remedy of appeal and the
D   reference. However, there is no further clause empowering
    the High Court to condone the delay after the period of
    180 days. In the absence of any clause condoning the
    delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed
    period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the
E   Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in
    holding that there was no power to condone the delay
    after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. Even
    otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and
    to the Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central
F   Government, the legislature has provided 60 days and 90
    days respectively, on the other hand, for filing an appeal
    and reference to the High Court larger period of 180 days
    has been provided with to enable the Commissioner and
    the other party to avail the same. The legislature provided
G   sufficient time, namely, 180 days for filing reference to the
    High Court which is more than the period prescribed for
    an appeal and revision. [Paras 12, 19] [1204-G-H; 1205-A-
    C; 1211-D-F]
         Commisst0ner of Customs, Central Excise, Naida v.
H   Punjab Fibres Ltd. Naida (2008) 3 SCC 73; Union of India v
             COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE               1199
                 V MIS. HONGO INDIA (P) LTD. & ANR

          Mis. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470 Sharda Devi A
          v. State of Bihar (2002) 3 SCC 705; Elisabeth and Others v.
          Harwan Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd., Hanoekar House,
          Swatontapeth, Vasco-De-Gama, Goa 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433;
          MM Thomas vs. State of Kera/a and Another (2000) 1 SCC
          666; Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, B
          Jamshedpur and Others (2008) 3 SCC 70 - referred to.
                3. The nature of the remedy provided in Central
          Excise Act are such that the legislature intended it to be a
          complete Code by itself which alone should govern the
          several matters provided by it. If, on examination of the         c
          relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the
          Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits
          conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement
          the provisions of the Act. Even in a case where the special
•         law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24           D
          of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would
          nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether and
          to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature
          of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law
          exclude their operation. The applicability of the provisions      E
          of the Limitation Act, therefore, has to be judged not from
          the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of
      •
          the Central Excise Act relating to filing of reference
          application to the High Court. The scheme of the Central
          Excise Act, 1944 support the conclusion that the time limit       F
          prescribed under Section 35H(1) to make a reference to
          High Court is absolute and unextendable by court under
          Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well settled law that it
          is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent
          and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be        G
...
          extended by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the
          Act. [Para 20] [1210-A-E]
                             Case Law Reference
               (2ooa) 3 sec 73          refe-rred to       Para 2
                                                                            H
    1200      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2009] 4 S.C.R


A          (2001) a sec 470        referred to        Para 12
           (2002) 3 sec 10s        referred to        Para 14
           1993 Supp (2)
           sec 433                 referred to        Para 14
B
           (2000) 1 sec 666        referred to        Para 17
           (2008) 3 sec 10         referred to        Para 18
         CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1939
    of 2009
c
         From the Judgement and Order dated 07.02.2007 of the
    Allahabad High Court in Central Excise Reference Application
    No. 14 of 2003.
                                 WITH
D
           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1940 2009
           CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1941 2009
         Parag P. Tripathi, ASG, K. Radhakrishnan, Ashok K.
E   Srivastava, Aruna Gupta, Amey Narglokar, Kul Bharat, Anil
    Katiyar, B. Krishna Prasad, for the Appellants.
          Monish Pandey, M.P. Devanath, Vinay Garg, Deepam
    Garg, Jyoti Sharma, V.K. Singh, Rupal Bhatia, Yash Pal Dinhgra,
    for the Respondent.
F
           The Judgement of the Court was delivered by
           P. SATHASIVAM, J.
           1) Leave granted.
G         2) In all these appeals, the question for consideration is
    whether the High Court has power to condone the delay in
    presentation of the reference application under unamended
    Section 35 H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (hereinafter
    referred to as "the Act") beyond the prescribed period by
H   applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. When S.L.P.(c)
                 COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE 1201
             V. M/S. HONGO INDIA (P) LTD. & ANR. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

             No. 14467 of 2007 came up for hearing on 4.12.2008, a two-           A
.-
             Judge Bench, after noticing the decision in Commissioner of
             Customs, Central Excise, Naida vs. Punjab Fibres Ltd., Naida
             (2008) 3 sec 73, expressed doubt about the said judgment
             with regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of
             condoning delay beyond the prescribed period under the Act.          B
             After finding that under Section 35H of the unamended Act
             (before enactment of Act 49/2005), with regard to application
             for reference, the High Court exercises its advisory jurisdiction
 ~           in a case where the substantial question of law of public
             importance arise, the said Bench directed the matter to be heard     C
             by larger Bench. In this way, all the above mentioned matters
             arising from the judgments of the Allahabad High Court on
             identical issue posted before this Bench for determining the
             question, namely, "whether the High Court in the reference
             application under Section 35H(1) of the unamended Act,
     ..-     has power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to             D
             condone the delay beyond the period prescribed under
             the main statute i.e., Central Excise Act."
                    3) In all these three matters, Commissioner of Customs &
             Central Excise approached the High Court of Allahabad by way E
             of reference application under Section 35 H(1) of the
             unamended Act beyond the prescribed period as provided in
           ~ the same. The High Court relied on earlier orders and finding
             that it has no power to condone the delay in filing the reference
             application under the said provision, dismissed the reference
             application as barred by limitation.                              F
             4) Chapter VI-A of the Act deals with Appeals. As per
       Section 35, any person aggrieved by any decision or order
       passed by a Central Excise Officer may file an appeal to the
       Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) within sixty days from G
     > the date of the communication to him of such decision or order.
       Proviso to sub-section (1) enables the Commissioner
       (Appeals), if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
       sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid
       period of sixty days, allow it to be presented within a further
       period of thirty days.                                            H
    1202       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2009] 4 S.C.R.


A         5) Section 358 speaks about appeals to the Appellate
    Tribunal. Any person aggrieved by certain decisions/orders
    passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise or
    Commissioner (Appeals), may prefer an appeal to the Appellate
    Tribunal within three months from the date on which the order
B   sought to be appealed against is communicated to the officer
    concerned or the other party. Sub-section (5) enables the
    Appellate Tribunal to condone delay even beyond the prescribed
    period if there was sufficient cause for not presenting it within
    that period.
c       6) Section 35EE provides revision by Central Government.
  As per sub-section (2), an application under sub-section (1) shall
  be made within three months from the date of the
  communication. However, proviso to sub-section (2) enables
  the revisional authority to condone the delay for a further period     •
D of ninety days, if sufficient cause is shown.
          7) Unamended Section 35G speaks about Appeal to the
    High Court. Sub-section 2(a) enables the aggrieved person to
    file an appeal to the High Court within 180 days from the date
E   on which the order appealed against is received by the
    Commissioner of Central Excise or the other party. There is no
    provision to condone the delay in filing appeal beyond the
    prescribed period of 180 days.
        8) Unamended Section 35H speaks about reference
F application to the High Court. As per sub-section (1 ), the
  Commissioner of Central Excise or other party within a period
  of 180 days of the date upon which he is served with notice of
  an order under Section 35C direct the Tribunal to refer to the
  High Court any question of law arising from such order of the
G Tribunal. Here again as per sub-section (1 ), application for
  reference is to be made to the High Court within 180 days and
  there is no provision to extend the period of limitation for filing
  the application to the High Court beyond the said period and to
  condone the delay.
H          9) In these three appeals, we are concerned with "reference
                 COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE 1203
              V M/S. HONGO IND/A (P) LTD. & ANR [P. SATHASIVAM, J]

             application" made to the High Court under Section 35H (1) of A
Ir
             the Act before amendment of Central Excise Act by Act 49/2005
             (w.e.f. 28.12.2005) by which several provisions of the Act were
             omitted including Section 35H. However, in view of the reference
             made it is but proper to consider the question referred before
             us. Admittedly in all these matters, the Commissioner of B
             Customs & Central Excise approached the High Court by way
             of reference application beyond the prescribed period of 180
             days. The High Court of Allahabad, with reference to the scheme
             of the Act and in the absence of specific provision for applying
             Section 5 of the Limitation Act, took note of other provisions     c
             i.e., Sections 35, 358 and 35EE, which enable the other
             authorities to condone the delay if sufficient cause was shown,
             accordingly, dismissed the reference application filed by the
             Commissioner of Central Excise on the ground of limitation.

                   10) Now let us consider whether Section 5 of the Limitation D
             Act is applicable in respect of reference application filed in the
             High Court under Section 35H of the unamended Act.
                     11) Mr. Pa rag P. Tripathi, learned Additional Solicitor
             General, appearing for the appellant contended that in view of
                                                                                 E
             the fact that the High Court has all inherent and plenary power,
             is competent to consider the delay even after the prescribed
       !-.   period under the Act. He further contended that in the absence
             of specific prohibition in the Act for condoning delay particularly
             in Section 35H in lieu of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
             Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable and the High Court F
             ought to have exercised its power by condoning the delay. He
             initially contended that since Section 35H speaks about the
             substantial question of public importance, even the delay, if any,
             has to be condoned. On the other hand, learned counsel
 ...         appearing for the respondents supporting the stand taken by G
             the High Court submitted that the Central Excise Act is a self-
             contained Act and a Code by itself and in the absence of specific
             provision enabling the High Court to exercise its power by
             condoning the delay, the High Court is justified in refusing to
             entertain the reference application of the Excise Department H
    1204       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (2009] 4 S.C.R.


A   filed beyond the prescribed period He also contended that in              '
    the light of the scheme of the Act and of the fact that sufficient
    period, i.e, 180 days, has been provided for the Commissioner
    as well as the other party for making reference to the High Court,
    the legislative intent has to be respected.
B
           12) Article 214 of the Constitution of India makes it clear
    that there shall be a High Court for each State and Art. 215 states
    that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have
    all the powers including the power to punish for contempt of
    itself. Though we have adverted to Section 35H in the earlier
c   part of our order, it is better to extract sub-section (1) which is
    relevant and we are concerned with in these appeals :

           "35H. Application to High Court- (1) The Commissioner
           of Central Excise or the other party may, within one hundred
D          and eighty days of the date upon which he is served with
           notice of an order under section 35C passed before the
           1st day of July, 2003 (not being an order relating, among
           other things, to the determination of any question having
           a relation to the rate of duty of exci~e or to the value of
           goods for purposes of assessment), by application in the
E
           prescribed form, accompanied, where the application is
           made by the other party, by a fee of two hundred rupees,
                                                                          A
           apply to the High Court to direct the Appellate Tribunal to
           refer to the High Court any question of law arising from
           such order of the Tribunal."
F
        Except providing a period of 180 days for filing reference
  application to the High Court, there is no other clause for
  condoning the delay if reference is made beyond the said
  prescribed period. We have already pointed out that in the case
G of appeal to the Commissioner, Section 35 provides 60 days
  time and in addition to the same, Commissioner has power to                 "
  condone the delay up to 30 days, 1f sufficient cause is shown.
  Likewise, Section 358 provides 90 days time for filing appeal
  to the Appellate Tribunal and sub-section (5) therein enables
  the Appellate Tribunal to condone the delay irrespective of the
H
     COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE 1205
 V. M/S. HONGO \NOIA (P) LTD. & ANR. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

number of days, if sufficient cause is shown. Likewise, Section A
35EE which provides 90 days time for filing revision by the
Central Government and, proviso to the same enables the
revisional authority to condone the delay for a further period of
90 days, if sufficient cause is shown, whereas in the case of
appeal to the High Court under Section 35G and reference to B
the High Court under Section 35H of the Act, total period of 180
days has been provided for availing the remedy of appeal and
the reference. However, there is no further clause empowering
the High Court to condone the delay after the period of 180
days.                                                             C
       13) Reliance was placed to Section 5 and Section 29(2)
of the Limitation Act which read as under:

     "5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.
     -Any appeal or any application, other than an application        o
     under any of the provisions of Order XX\ of the Code of
     Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the
     prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies
     the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
     appeal or making the application within such period."
                                                                      E
     "29. Savings.- (1) Nothing in this Act shall affect section
     25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872).
     (2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit,
     appeal or application a period of limitation different from F
     the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of
     section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period
     prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
     determining any period of limitation prescribed for any
     suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the
     provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall G
     apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are
     not expressly excluded by such special or local law."
     14) In this background, let us examine the contentions
raised by both sides. Learned Additional Solicitor General H
    1206      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2009] 4 S C.R.


A   relying on the Judgment of this Court in Union of India vs. M/s
    Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470 contended that
    in the absence of specific exclusion of the Limitation Act in the
    Central Excise Act, in lieu of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
    Section 5 of the same is applicable even in the case of reference
B   application to the High Court. The said decision arose under
    the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The question which
    arose for consideration in that case was whether provisions of
    Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to an
    application challenging an award under Section 34 of the
c   Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In that case, award was
    filed by the appellant-Union of India in. the Bombay High Court
    on 29.3.1999. The appellant filed an application challenging the
    award on 19.4.1999 under Section 30 read with Section 16 of
    the Arbitration Act, 1940. Subsequently, the application was
0   amended by inserting the words "Arbitration and Conciliation
    Act, 1996" in place of "Arbitration Act, 1940". The application
    was dismissed by the learned single Judge on 26.10.1999 on
    the ground that it was barred by limitation under Section 34 of
    the 1996 Act. The Division Bench rejected the appeal and upheld
E   the findings of the learned single Judge. The said order was
    challenged in this Court. Though learned counsel for the appellant
    relied on the said decision in support of his claim, on perusal of
    the same, we are unable to concur with him. In paragraph 12,
    this Court held that as far as the language of Section 34 of the
    1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words used in the proviso to
F   sub-section (3) are "but not thereafter" and this phrase would
    amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section
    29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would, therefore, bar the
    application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to
    go further. To hold that the Court could entertain an application
G   to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the
    proviso, would render the phrase "but not thereafter" wholly
    otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
    Ultimately, this Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Union of
    India and confirmed the order of the High Court holding that the
H   application filed to set aside the award is barred by limitation_
   COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE 1207
V MIS. HONGO !NOIA (P) LTD. & ANR [P. SATHASIVAM, J]

      14) The next decision relied on by the learned ASG was in A
the case of Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 3 SCC 705.
This relates to an appeal before the Letters Patent Bench· in the
High Court against judgment of Single Judge. While considering
Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, this Court held as
under:                                                            B

     "9. A Letters Patent is the charter under which the High
     Court is established. The powers given to a High Court
     under the Letters Patent are akin to the constitutional
     powers of a High Court. Thus when a Letters Patent grants
     to the High Court a power of appeal, against a judgment C
     of a Single Judge, the right to entertain the appeal would
     not get excluded unless the statutory enactment concerned
     excludes an appeal under the Letters Patent.

     10. The question which thus arises is whether Section 54 D
     of the said Act excludes an appeal under the Letters
     Patent. Section 54 of the said Act reads as under:
     "54. Appeals in proceedings before Courl.-Subject to
     the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
     applicable to appeals from original decrees, and E
     notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment
     for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any
     proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the
     award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and
     from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal F
     as aforesaid an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court
     subject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the
     Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order 45 thereof."
       It was argued that Section 54 of the said Act contains a
non-obstante clause containing the words "an appeal shall only G
lie". After finding that Letters Patent is not an enactment, it is the
charter of the High Court, this Court found that a non-obstante
clause of this nature cannot cover the charter of the High Court.
By pointing out Section 54 it was contended that the said Act
provides for only one statutory appeal to the High Court and H
    1208      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2009] 4 S.C.R.


A then a further appeal to this Court. In other words, it was
  submitted that on a plain reading of Section 54, it is clear that a
  Letters Patent Appeal would not lie against a judgment passed
  by a Single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section
  54. On the other hand, counsel appearing for the other side
B submitted that a Letters Patent Appeal would lie. Accepting the
  said contention, this Court concluded that Section 26 of the said
  Act provides that every award shall be a decree and the
  statement of grounds of every award shall be a judgment. By
  virtue of the Letters Patent "an appeal" against the judgment of
c a Single Judge of a High Court would lie to a Division Bench.
  Section 54 of the said Act does not exclude an appeal under
  the Letters Patent. It was clarified that the word "only" occurring
  immediately after the non-obstante clause in Section 54 refers
  to the forum of appeal. In other words, it provides that the appeal
D will be to the High Court and not to any other court and the term
  "an appeal" does not restrict it to only one appeal in the High
  Court. It was explained tflat the term "an appeal" would take
  within its sweep even a Letters Patent Appeal. Though learned
  ASG heavily relied on the above three-Judge Bench decision,
E we are of the view that the said decision deals with Letters
  Patent power of the High Court. There is no dispute that the
  powers given-to a High Court under the Letters Patent are akin
  to the constitutional powers of the High Court. In such
  circumstances, when a Letters Patent grants to the High Court
  a power of appeal, against a judgment of a Single Judge, the
F right to entertain the appeal would not get excluded unless the
  statutory enactment concerned excludes an appeal under the
  Letters Patent. Inasmuch as the Letters Patent enables the High
  Court that the judgment of a Single Judge would lie to a Division
  Bench and of the fact that ·Section 54 of the Land Acquisition
G Act does not exclude an appeal under the Letters Patent, the
  said decision is right in holding that under Section 54 there is
  no bar as to the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal. While
  there is no dispute about the power of the High Court under the
  Letters Patent jurisdiction, we are of the view that the said
H analogy is not applicable to the cases on hand.
           COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE 1209
        V MIS. HONGO INDIA (P) LTD. &ANR. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

             16) The other decision relied on by the counsel for the A
        appellant is M. V Elisabeth and Others vs. Harvvan Investment
        and Trading Pvt. Ltd., Hanoekar House, Swatontapeth, Vasco-
        De-Gama, Goa, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 433. The learned ASG
        heavily relied on the following observations:
                                                                          B
             "66. The High Courts in India are superior courts of record.
             They have original and appellate jurisdiction. They have
             inherent and plenary powers. Unless expressly or impliedly
             barred, and subject to the appellate or discretionary
             jurisdiction of this Court, the High Courts have unlimited
             jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to determine their C
             own powers ..... "

              Here again, there is no dispute about the above
        proposition. The High Courts in India are having inherent and
        plenary powers and as a Court of Record the High Courts have D
•       unlimited jurisdiction including the jurisdiction to determine their
        own powers. However, the said principle has to be decided with
        the specific provisions in the enactment and in the light of the
        scheme of the Act, particularly in this case, Sections 35, 358,
        35EE, 35G and 35H of the unamended Central Excise Act, it E
        would not be possible to hold that in spite of the above-
        mentioned statutory provisions, the High Court is free to entertain
    "   reference application even after expiry of the prescribed period
        of 180 days.                                                 ·

               17) The other decision relied on is M. M. Thomas vs. State F
        of Kera/a and Another, (2000) 1 sec 666. This case' arose out
        of the vesting of all private forests in the State of Kera la on the
        appointed day (10.05.1971) under the Kera la Private Forests
        (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971. It is true that in para 14 il _
~-      was held that the High Court as a court of record, as envisaged G
        in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to
        correct the records. A court of record envelops all such powers
        whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual
        memorial and testimony. A court of record is undoubtedly a
        superior court which is itself competent to determine the scope H
              .,
    1210           SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2009] 4 S.C.R.


A   of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a court of record, has. a
    duty to itself to keep all its record~ correctly and in accordance
    with law Hence, the High Court has not only power, but a duty to
    correct any apparent error in respect of any order passed by it.
    This is the plenary power of the High Court. In para 17 of the
B   abovementioned decision, it was held :

           "17. If such power of correcting its own record is denied
           to the High Court, when it notices the apparent errors its
           consequence is that the superior status of the High Court '
           will dwindle down. Therefore, it is only proper to think that
c          the plenary powers of the High Court would include the
           power of review relating to errors apparent on the face of
           the record."
          There is no doubt that the High Court possess all powers
D   in order to correct the errors apparent on the face of record. •
    While accepting the above proposition, in the light of the scheme
    of the Act, we are of the view that the said decision is also not
    helpful to the stand taken by the appellant.
          18) In the earlier part of our order, we have adverted to
E Chapter VIA of the Act which provides appeals and revisions to
  various authorities. Though the Parliament has specifically
  provided an additional period of 30 days in the case of appeal •
  to the Commissioner, it is silent about the number of days if
  there is sufficient cause in the case of an appeal to Appellate
F Tribunal. Also an additional period of 90 days in the case of
  revision by Central Government has been provided. However,
  in the case of an appeal to the High Court under Section 35G
  and reference application to the High Court under Section 35H,
  the·Parliament has provided only 180 days and no further period
G for filing an appeal and making reference to the High Court is ~
  mentioned in the Act. In this regard, it is useful to refer to a recent
  decision of this Court in Punjab Fibres Ltd., Noida (supra).
  Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise, Noida is the
  appellant in this case, While considering the very same question,
H namely, whether the High Court has power to condone the delay
           COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & CENTRAL EXCISE 1211
        V. M/S. HONGO !NOIA (P) LTD. & ANR. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

~       in presentation of the reference under Section 35H(1) of the - A
        Act, the two-Judge Bench taking note of the said provision and
        the other related provisions fqllqwing Singh Enterprises vs.
        Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Others,
        (2008) 3 SCC 70 concluded that "the High Court was justified
        in holding that there was no power for condonation of delay in B
        filing reference application."
               19) As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections
    ' 35, 358, 35EE, 35G and 35H makes the position clear that an
        appeal and reference to the High Court should be made within
        180 days only from the date of communication of the decision C
        or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions
        makes the position clear that the legislature intended the
        appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the
        delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the
     ' preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the 0
        absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient
        cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion
        of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore,
        justified in holding that there was no power to condone the delay
        after expiry of the prescribed period of 180 days. Even
        otherwise, for filing an appeal to the Commissioner, and to the E
        Appellate Tribunal as well as revision to the Central Government,
      ~ the legislature has provided 60 days and 90 days respectively,
        on the other hand, for filing an appeal and reference to the High
        Court larger period of 180 days has been provided with to
        enable the Commissioner and the other party to avail the same. F
        We are of the view that the legislature provided sufficient time,
        namely, 180 days for filing reference to the High Court which is
        more than the period prescribed for an appeal and revision.
    ~         20) Though, an argument was raised based on Section
        29 of the Limitation Act, even assuming that Section 29(2) would G
        be attracted what we have to determine is whether the provisions
        of this section are expressly excluded in the case of refetence
        to High Court. It was contended before us that the words
        "expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express
        reference made in the special or local law to the specific H
    1212       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2009] 4 S.C.R.


A   provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be
    excluded. In this regard, we have to see the scheme of the
    special law here in this case is Central Excise Act. The nature
    of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature
    intended it to be a complete Code by itself which alone should
B govern the several matters provided by it. If, on an examination
    of the relevant provisions, it is clear that the provisions of the
    Limitation Act are necessarily excluded, then the benefits
    conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the
    provisions of the Act. In our considered view, that even in a case
C _ where the special law does not exclude the provisions of
    Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference,
    it would nonetheless be open to the court to examine whether
    and to what extent, the nature of those provisions or the nature
    of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude
    their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions
D of the Limitation Act, therefore, to be judged not from the terms
    of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Central Excise
    Act relating to filing of reference application to the High Court.
    The scheme of the Central Excise Act, 1944 support the
    conclusion that the time limit prescribed under Section 35H(1)
E to make a reference to High Court is absolute and unextendable
    by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is well settled
    law that it is the duty of the court to respect the legislative intent   •
    and by giving liberal interpretation, limitation cannot be extended
    by invoking the provisions of Section 5 of the Act.
F         21) In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the
    High Court has no power to condone the delay in filing the
    "reference application" filed by the Commissioner under
    unamended Section 35H(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944
    beyond the prescribed period of 180 days and rightly dismissed
G   the reference on the ground of limitation.
         22) In view of the above conclusion, we confirm the decision
    of the High Court. Hence, all the appeals are accordingly
    dismissed. No costs.

H    D.G.                                          Appeals dismissed.