Holding

Sections 25 of the Evidence Act and 162 of the CrPC do not apply to departmental inquiries, making the police confession admissible and proved, and Rule 12 of the 1987 Rules is inapplicable, so the dismissal stands.

Summary

The case involved Constable Narender Singh, who confessed to theft of firearms while in police custody and was later discharged in the criminal trial due to lack of other evidence. He was dismissed from service in a departmental proceeding based on that confession. The Central Administrative Tribunal and the Delhi High Court held the confession inadmissible under Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Section 162 of the CrPC and set aside the dismissal. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the evidentiary embargo of Sections 25 and 162 does not apply to departmental inquiries, that the confession was duly proved, and that Rule 12 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 is inapplicable because the officer was not tried and acquitted. Accordingly, the dismissal was upheld and the Tribunal and High Court judgments were set aside. The Court also reiterated that the standard of proof in departmental proceedings is pre‑ponderance of probability, not beyond reasonable doubt.

Issues considered

Whether a confession made to a police officer is admissible as evidence in a departmental proceeding despite the embargo of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Whether Rule 12 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 applies when the employee has not been tried and acquitted by a criminal court.
Whether the standard of proof in departmental inquiries is pre‑ponderance of probability rather than beyond reasonable doubt.
Whether dismissal of a police constable without a departmental enquiry violates the proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 162
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 25, s. 26

Subjects

confessiondepartmental inquiryevidence actcriminal procedure codepolice dismissalstandard of proofArticle 311Rule 12pre‑ponderance of probability

Judgment

A COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, NEW DELHI
v.
NARENDER SINGH

APRIL 5, 2006

B [S.B. SINHA AND P.P. NAOLEKAR, JJ.]

-
Evidence Act, 1872--Section 25-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-
Section 162-Dismissa/ from service-Police constable arrested in connection
C with offence confessing his involvement-Criminal case resulting in his
discharge as apart from confession there was no other material on record-
ln disciplinary proceedings, dismissal from service-Challenge to this allowed
by High Court holding that confession was neither admissible in view of
Section 25 of Act of 1872 and Section 162 of Code of 1973 nor was it
proved-On appeal held: As embargoes of Section 25 of Act of 1872 and
D Section 162 of Code of 1973 are not app/icuhle to department proceedings,
evidence of confession was admissible therein-In facts of case, us the
confession was found to be in an identification memo signed by officer who
prepared it; it was neither retracted from nor any complaint made to higher
authorities that it was extracted by force or undue influence, and correctness
E of statement contained in it was not disputed; it was held to be proved in
accordance with law-Rule 12 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal)
Rules, I 987 found inapplicable as the constable was not tried and acquitted
by a criminal court.

Respondent was enrolled as constable in Delhi Police. He was arrested
p in connection with an offence and confessed his involvement therein. In
criminal case arising therefrom he was discharged as apart from confession
of accused, there was no other materials on record. However, in disciplinary
proceedings, he was dismissed from service. Central Administrative Tribunal
allowed his original petition against this holding that his confession was not
proved and it was inadmissible in view of Section 25 of Evidence Act, 1872
G and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. High Court upheld
this view. Hence the present appeal.

Respondent contended that (i) in a disciplinary proceeding even if the
provisions of Section 26 of the Evidence Act are not per se applicable, the

H 872
COMMR. OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. NA RENDER SINGH 873
principles analogous thereto would be applicable as such confession in police A
custody are ordinarily extracted by force (ii) in view of the fact that the
respondent was discharged from the criminal case, having regard to Rule 12
of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987, the order of
punishment was not sustainable.

Allowing the appeal, the Court B
HELD: I.I. The confession admittedly was made by the respondent while
in police custody. It appears that a date was put below the signature of the
officer who prepared the identification memo containing the confession of the
respondent. It is not in dispute that a Inspector was one of the witnesses to
the said document. [879-B, El · C
1.2. The fact that the respondent as an accused in the aforementioned
case made a confession has not been disputed. He had not retracted from it.
He did not make any complaint to the higher .authorities that the same was
extracted from him by force or undue influence. [880-GJ
D
1.3. The correctness or otherwise of the statement contained in
confession has also not been disputed.

1.4. The Tribunal was, therefore, not correct its view that the confession
made by the respondent had not been proved in accordance with law.
[880-G,H] E
2. So far the evidentiary value of the said confession is concerned,
Section 25 of the Evidence Act and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure provide for an embargo as regard admissibility of a confession in
a criminal trial. The said provisions have per se no application in a
departmental proceeding. The Tribunal as also the High Court were, therefore, F
not correct in arriving at tbe finding that the said confession was not
admissible even in a departmental proceeding. [880-H; 881-A, F]

Ku/dip Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., [1996] 10 SCC 659; Depot
Manager. A.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd Yousuf Miya and G
Ors.. 11997) 2 SCC 699; La/it Popli v. Canara Bank and Ors., (2003] 3 SCC
583; N. Rajarathinam v. State ofT.N. and Anr., [1996] 10 SCC 371; State of
Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975] 2 SCC 557 and State
of Haryana and Anr. v. Rattan Singh, [1977] 2 SCC 491, relied on.

3. Reliance placed by respondent on Rule 12 of the Delhi Police H
874 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) 3 S.C.R.

A (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 is misplaced. The said Rule applies in
a case where a person was tried and discharged. The respondent herein was
not tried and acquitted by a criminal court, and thus the said provision would
not apply. (884-8)

4.1. If an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same
B by itself would not be a ground to initiate a departmental proceeding against
him or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed. (878-F(

Kama/adevi Agarwal v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2002) l SCC
SSS, referred to.

c 4.2. The standard of proof required in recording a finding of conviction
in a criminal case and in a departmental proceeding are distinct and different.
Whereas in a criminal case, it is essential to prove a charge beyond all
reasonable doubt in a departmental proceeding preponderance of probability
would serve the purpose. (878-E(
D
Manager Reserve Bank of India, Banglore v. S. Mani and Ors., (200S(
S SCC 100; Bank of India and Anr. v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) S SCC
762 and Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJJ, Indian Oil Corporation
Ltd Haldia and Ors., (200S( 7 SCC 764, relied on

E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7488 of2004.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.7.2004 of the High Court of Delhi
in W.P. ©No. 10839 of2004.

Vikas Singh, ASG, Mrs. Anil Katiyar and Ashiesh Kumar for the
F Appellant.
M.N. Krishnamani, Arun Bhardwaj, S.S. Shamshery and Dr. Kailash
Chand for the Respondent.

The Judgment of Court was delivered by
G
S.B. SINHA, J. The respondent was enrolled as a Constable in the
Delhi Police on or about 01.08.1994. A First Information Report was lodged
against him on 30.10.1995 for commission of an offence under Section 3081 .
34 of the Indian Penal Code. He was arrested in connection therewith on
H 30.10.1995. He remained in judicial custody for a period of 15 days. A
COMMR. OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. NARENDER SINGH [S.B. SINHA, J.J 875

departmental proceeding was initiated against him in relation to the same A
incident.

He filed an original application before the Central Administrative Tribunal
(for short, 'the Tribunal') for stay of the said proceeding till disposal of the
criminal case. By an order dated 23 .07 .1996, the said original application was
disposed of by the Tribunal upon issuing some directions. B
In the meantime, two revolvers and one pistol were found from the Vijay
Ghat Armoury. Two persons who were accused therein, inter alia, made
confessions stating that the respondent had committed theft of the said two
revolvers and pistol. The respondent on the basis of said confessional C
statements was arrested on 05.09.1997. While in police custody he also made
a confession as regards his involvement in the said offence. He also led the
investigating team to the room of the Vijay Ghat Armoury and pointed out
the place wherefrom, he while working as a Sentry on the night of 22/
23.06.1997, committed theft of two revolvers and one pistol with some of his
colleagues. An identification memo. was prepared therefor wherein one D
Inspector Bhalle Ram was a witness. In view of the fact that apart from
confession of the accused, there was no other material on records, the
respondent was discharged from the criminal case by an order dated 01.08.200 I.
He was in the meantime dismissed from service without holding any enquiry
in terms of the proviso appended to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution E
of India, by an order dated 09.09. I997. A departmental appeal preferred
thereagainst by him was dismissed by an order dated 09.02. I998. The validity
of the said order was questioned by the respondent by filing an application
before the Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the said application by an order
dated 08.08.2001 holding that the Appellant failed to establish sufficient
grounds for dismissing the respondent from service without holding any F
disciplinary proceeding. A review petition filed thereagainst was also dismissed
by the Tribunal on 31.12.2001. A writ petition filed by the Appellant was also
dismissed by the High Court on 03.04.2002.

The Tribunal as also the High Court in their respective judgments G
opined that the appellant could not have taken recourse to clause (b) of the
proviso appended to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India.
Pursuant to or in furtherance of the said judgments and orders, a regular
disciplinary proceeding was instituted. On 01.05.2002, a charge-sheet was
drawn up against the Respondent which reads as under :
H
876 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R.

A "I, lnsp. Ajit Singh charge you Const. Narender Singh No.730/DA
that on 04.9.97, Harvinder Singh S/o Shri Surat Singh Rio Praladpur
Gharoli, P.S. Kharkhoda, Sonepat and Deepak S/o Shri Reghbir Singh
Rio Ghoge, P.S. Narcla, Delhi were arrested in case FIR No.371/97
u/s 186, 307, 353 IPC Sec. 27 Arms Act. P.S. Narela, Delhi. Both the
accused made confessions regarding the supply of arms by Const.
B Narender Singh No.612/DAP, 730/l)AP posted at CP Vijay Ghat on this
you Const. Narender Singh were arrested by special staff North Distt.
On 5.9.97 u/s 41. l Cr. P.C. and were produced before Court on 6.9.97.
Two days PC remand was also obtained by Crime Branch in case FIR
No.717/97 u/s 409, 380, 457 IPC P.S. Kotwali in which two revolvers
c and one pistol were stolen from Kot of CPR Vijayghat/lst Bn.

On interrogation you Const. Narender Singh 730/DAP confessed
that while you •vere at CPR Vijay Ghat you had committed theft of two
revolvers and pistol from the kot on intervening night 22/23.6.97 along
with Raju, Jasvinder Jassu and Dhannu after stealing keys of Kot from
D the pillow of Const. Narender Singh (Kot munshi).

The above act on your part amounts to grave misconduct and
unbecoming of a police officer which renders you liable to be dealt
under the provisions of Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules,
1987."
E
On or about 16.05.2002, in the said departmental proceeding, the
respondent was found guilty and by an order dated 22.07.2002, he was
dismissed from service by the Disciplinary Authority, stating :

"I have gone through the record and facts of the file, enquiry
F
report submitted by the E.O., defence taken by the delinquent Const.
Minutely and meticulously. The charges in a disciplinary action are
based on preponderance of evidence that does not exclude confession
made to the police and such confessions need not be necessarily
supported by recovery of material fact as enumerated in the Indian
G Evidence Act. In agreement of conclusion by the E.O. I find that
charges are proved against the delinquent officer, if is allowed to
continue in the department like Police, he not only will damage the
department by his criminal activities he will also tarnish image of the
police department. Therefore, I Manoj Kumar Lal, Deputy
Commissioner of Police 1st Bn. OAP on being satisfied that charges
H
COMMR. OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. NA RENDER SINGH [S.B. SINHA, J.] 877

on the basis of proof available on the record are proved against the A
def. Const. and are of such nature that calls for major departmental
punishment, I award Const. Narender Singh, NO. 730/DAP punishment
of dismissal from the service with immediate effect. His suspension
period from 30.10.200 I to date of issue of this order shall be treated
as not spent on duty for all intents and purposes."
B
An appeal filed thereagainst by the respondent was dismissed by the
appellate authority by an order dated 29.05.2003.

An original application was filed by the respondent before the Tribunal. ·
The Tribunal in terms of an order dated 24.02.2004 set aside the said order
of dismissal, holding : c
"14. Inspector Bhalle Ram had stated that he was posted as
Inspector CPRNijay Ghat. The applicant had made a Nisandehi in Kot
and disclosed that on the intervening night of 22/23.6.1997 had stolen
the fire arms. D
15. Inspector Tej Pal Singh, PW-12 had further appeared and
testified that he had investigated the matter. During the investigation,
"-
the applicant had taken him to Vijay Ghat where Nisandehi was prepared
on his instance which is exhibit PW-8/A. It is on the strength of the
Nisandehi that the respondents have concluded that this is an E
admission made by the applicant about the said theft.

16. We deem it necessary to mention that even if such a confession
is made during the course of investigation. It may not be relevant
before a Court of law but there is no such embargo to read the same
to departmental enquiry. Since the said statement made did not relate F
to any recovery, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has discharged
the applicant."

The Tribunal allowed the original application. The writ petition filed
thereagainst was dismissed by the High Court in limine.
G
Mr. Vikas Singh, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on
behalf of the appellant, would submit that the Tribunal and consequently the
High Court committed a manifest error in arriving at the aforementioned
findings inasmuch the embargo contained in Section 25 of the Evidence Act
and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are not applicable in the H
878 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R.

A departmental proceedings. It was submitted that the Tribunal further committed
an error in opining that the confession of the respondent herein being
Ex.8/ A had not been proved.

Our attention was furthermore drawn to the order of the disciplinary
authority as also the appellate authority with a view to show that the confession
B of the respondent had received due application of mind.

Mr. M.N. Krishnamani, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that even in a disciplinary
proceeding the provisions contained in Section 26 of the Evidence Act would

-
C be attracted as such confessions in police custody are ordinarily extracted by
force. Even if the provisions of Section 26 of the Evidence Act, the learned
counsel would submit, per se are not applicable, the principles analogous
thereto would be applicable even in departmental proceedings. It was
furthermore submitted that in view of the fact that the respondent was
discharged from the criminal case, having regard to the provisions contained
D in Rule 12 of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1987 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the 1987 Rules'), the order of punishment was not sustainable.

It is not in dispute that the standard of proof required in recording a
finding of conviction in a criminal case and in a departmental proceeding are
distinct and different. Whereas in a criminal case. it is essential to prove a
E charge beyond all reasonable doubt, in a departmental proceeding
preponderance of probability would serve the purpose. [See Kamaladevi
Agarwal v. State of W.B. and Ors., (2002] I SCC 555]

It is now well-settled by reason of a catena of decisions of this Court
F that if an employee has been acquitted of a criminal charge, the same by itself
would not be a ground not to initiate a departmental proceeding against him
or to drop the same in the event an order of acquittal is passed.

In Manager, Reserve Bank of India, Bang..ilore v. S. Mani and Ors ..
[2005] 5 SCC I 00, this Court held :
G
"It is trite that a judgment of acquittal passed in favour of the
employees by giving benefit of doubt per se would not be binding
upon the employer. ..... "

[See Bank of India and Anr. v. Degala Suryanarayana, [ 1999] 5 SCC 762 and
H Ajit Kumar Nag v. General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.,
COMMR. OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. NARENDER SINGH [S.B. SINHA, J.]879

Haldia and Ors.. (2005] 7 SCC 764] A
The Tribunal had proceeded to record its findings only on two counts,
namely, (i) confession made by the respondent was not admissible in evidence;
and (ii) the said confession has not been proved.

The confession admittedly was made by the respondent while in police B
custody. In the identification memo, it was recorded :

"Farad identification Memo place of occurrence in the presence
of witnesses accused Narender Singh alias Nanda S/o Joginder Singh
Rio D-8, Type-!Ind New Police Line, Kingsway Camp, New Delhi
under police custody by himself voluntarily by walking ahead in the C
vicinity of CDRNijay Ghat Armoury I st by DAP entered in the place
covered by boundary walls surrounding through Iron gate entered in
the place of Armoury Room shown the place and told that on 22/
23.6.97 (identified) at about 2 am to 05 am he was on sentry duty and
during his duty alongwith other colleagues named Jaswinder, Jaswant D
alias Jassu, Dhanraj @ Dhannu and Raja Singh @ Raju committed
theft of two revolvers and one pistol. This identification memo was
prepared then and there."

A copy of the original confession was placed before us wherefrom it
appears that a date was put below the signature of the officer who prepared E
the identification memo containing the confession of the Respondent. It is
not in dispute that Inspector Bhalle Ram was one of the witnesses to the said
document. He examined himself before the Enquiry Officer, wherein he
categorically stated :

"He stated that in Dec. 1997, he was posted as Inspr. CPRNijay F
Ghat. He cannot recollect the date at this time because the date on
the Nisandehi is not visible but lnspr. Tej Pal Singh along with his
staff of AA TS. Crime Branch along with accused Narender who is
present today here came at Vijay Ghat. Accused had made a Nisandehi
in Kot and disclosed that on the night between 22123 .6.97 at about 2 G
to 5 am he along with other accused had stolen 2 revolvers and I
pistol. The memo was prepared and signed by him as well as others
including Const. Narender. The Memo is exhibit PW-8/A."

In the cross-examination, he was asked only four questions which
H
880 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) 3 S.C.R.

A together with answers rendered thereto, as recorded by the Enquiry Officer
are reproduced hereinbelow :

"Q. No. I : Has the exhibit PW-8A any date written by lnspr. Tej Pal
Singh?

B Ans. The signature of lnspr. Tej Pal Singh is there.

Q. No.2 Is there any date on his exhibit below the signature of
Narender Singh ?

Ans. No.
c Q.No.3 Has Inspr. Tej Pal Singh recovered any weapon from Const.
Narender on that day ?

Ans. The weapon was not recovered in his presence but IO
told that the weapons have already been recovered.

D Q. No.4 Do you know that court decided the case on merits ?

Ans. Yes."

The fact that the respondent as an accused in the aforementioned case
made a confession and had pointed out the place wherefrom he allegedly had
E stolen two revolvers and one pistol, has, thus, not been disputed.

It may be noticed that no question was, furthermore, put to the said
witness to show that the question put to the said witness was as regard the
purported missing of the date below the signature of the Inspector Tej Pal
F Singh but it was not suggested that the said document is a forged or fabricated
one. The order of discharge was passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate after
four years from the date of institution of the case. The respondent had not
retracted from the said confession. He did not make any complaint to the
higher authorities that the same was extracted from him by force or undue
influence.
G
The correctness or otherwise of the statement contained in
Ex. PW-8/A has also not been disputed. The Tribunal, therefore, was not
correct in its view that the confession made by the respondent herein had not
been proved in accordance with law. So far as the evidentiary value of the
said confession is concerned, we may notice that Section 25 of the Evidence
H
COMMR. OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. NA RENDER SINGH [S.B. SINHA, J.) 881

Act and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for an A
embargo as regard admissibility of a confession in a criminal trial. The said
provisions have per se no application in a departmental proceeding. Section
25 of the Indian Evidence Act and Section 162 (c) of the Code of Criminal read
thus:

"25. f:onfession to police officer not to be proved-No confession B
made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused
of any offence."

162. Statements to police not to be signed : Use of statements in
evidence.--{!) No statement made by any person to a police officer
in the course of an investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced C
to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such
statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise,
or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, save
as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any
offence under investigation at the time when such statement was D
made ........"

"Offence" has been defined in Section 2(n) of the Code to mean :

"(n). "offence" means any act or omission made punishable by any
law for the time being in force and includes any act in respect of E
which a complaint may be made under Section 20 of the Cattle-
trespass Act, 1871 (I of 1871 )."

The said definition would apply, thus, both to Section 25 of the Evidence
Act and Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
F
The Tribunal as also the High Court were, therefore, not correct in
arriving at the finding that the said confession was not admissible even in
a departmental proceeding.

In Ku/dip Singh v. State of Punjab and Ors., [ 1996] I0 SCC 659, this G
Court held :

"I 0. Now coming to the main contention of the learned counsel
for the appellant, it is true that a confession or admission of guilt
made by a person accused of an offence before, or while in the
custody of, a police officer is not admissible in a court of law according H
882 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] 3 S.C.R.

A to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, 1872 but it is equally well
settled that these rules of evidence do not apply to departmental
enquiries ...... "

It is now well-settled that the provisions of the Evidence Act are not
applicable in a departmental proceeding. [See Depot Manager, A.P. State
B Road Transport Corporation v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya and Ors.. [ 1997] 2 SCC
699; la/it Pop/i v. Canara Bank and Ors.. (2003] 3 SCC 583; and N.
Rajarathinam v. State of TN. and Anr., [ 1996] 10 SCC 371 ].

In State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975] 2
C SCC 557, this Court held :

'The High Court was not correct in holding that the domestic
enquiry before the Tribunal was the same as prosecution in a criminal
case."

It was further held :
D
;The scope of Article 226 in dealing with departmental inquiries has
come up before this Court. Two propositions were laid down by this
Court in State of A. P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao. First, there is no warrant
for the view that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of
E misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials
that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court must be applied. If
that rule be not applied by a domestic tribunal of inquiry the High
Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not competent
to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry
F invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over
the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against
a public servant. The Court is concerned to determine whether the
enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf and according
to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
G natural justice are not violated. Second, where there is some evidence
which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has
accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion
that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function
of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent
finding on the evidence. The High Court may interfere where the
H
•
I._
COMMR. OF POLICE, NEW DELHI v. NARENDER SINGH [S.B. SINHA, J.] 883

departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the A
delinquent in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice
or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry
or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the
merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by
irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of B
it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person
could ever have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental authorities
are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts
and if there is some legal evidence on which their findings can be
based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter C
which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226."

[See also State ofHaryana and Anr. v. Ra/Ian Singh. (1977] 2 SCC 491]

The submission of Mr. Krishnamani that there lies a distinction between D
the provisions of Section 25 and Section 26 of the Evidence Act, in this
behalf; may although be correct but the same is not of much significance for
the purpose of this case.

Section 26 also speaks about confession by an accused while in custody E
of police. Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act although seek to achieve
the same purpose but they operate in somewhat two different fields. Section
25 raises an embargo as regard proof of confession before a police officer.
The same need not be in police custody; whereas Section 26 raises a bar as
regard admissibility of such confession, if made by an accused in the custody
of a police officer although such a confession might have been made before F
a person who is not a police officer.

The policy underlying behind Sections 25 and 26 is to make it a
substantive rule of law that confessions whenever and wherever made to the
police, or while in the custody of the police to any person whomsoever unless G
made in the immediate presence of a magistrate,. shall be presumed to have
been obtained under the circumstances mentioned in Section 24 and, therefore,
inadmissible, except so far as is provided by Section 27 of the Act.

A confession would mean incriminating statement made to the police
~ . suggesting inference of the commission of the crime and it, therefore, is
confined to the evidences to be adduced in a court of law. If the provisions
884 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) 3 S.C.R.

A of the Evidence Act are not attracted in a departmental proceeding, a fortiori
Sections 25 and 26 shall not apply.

Reliance placed by Mr. Krishnamani to Rule 12 of the 1987 Rules is
misplaced. The said Rule applies in a case where a person was tried and
discharged. The respondent herein was not tried and acquitted by a criminal
B court and, thus the said provision would not apply.

For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments of the Tribunal
and the High Court cannot be sustained, which are set aside accordingly. The
appeal is, thus, allowed. No costs.

c vs. Appeal allowed.