CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BANGALOREversusKESORAM INDUSTRIES AND COTTON MILLS LTD. DUNLOP INDIA LTD. AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
- Citation
- 1989 INSC 380
- Decided
- 8 December 1989
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- G L OZA
Holding
The statutory condition of considering objections was deemed satisfied; the High Court erred in invalidating the octroi resolution, which is therefore upheld.
Summary
The Corporation of the City of Bangalore published a notice under Section 98(1) of the City of Bangalore Corporation Act, 1949 inviting objections to a proposed octroi levy on certain items. After receiving objections, the Corporation placed them on the table, circulated a Commissioner’s note analysing them, and on 30 December 1974 passed a unanimous resolution levying the octroi. The respondents challenged the resolution, arguing that the statutory condition of ‘consideration of objections’ was not fulfilled; the Karnataka High Court held the resolution invalid, citing insufficient time for real consideration. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that where a statute imposes a condition precedent, the court presumes its compliance and the burden lies on the challenger to prove non‑compliance. The term ‘consideration’ was interpreted to include merely taking note of objections, and the Court ruled that the time factor alone could not demonstrate non‑consideration. Consequently, the High Court’s decision was set aside and the octroi resolution upheld.
Issues considered
- Did the Corporation satisfy the statutory condition precedent of ‘consideration of objections’ under Section 98(1) of the City of Bangalore Corporation Act, 1949 before passing the octroi resolution?
- Can the court examine the manner or adequacy of the consideration given to the objections?
- Who bears the burden of proof when a statutory condition precedent is alleged to have been breached?
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BANGALORE A
v.
KESORAM INDUSTRIES AND COTTON MILLS LTD.
DUNLOP INDIA LTD. AND ORS. ETC. ETC.
DECEMBER 8, 1989
B
[G.L. OZA AND M. FATHIMA BEEVI, JJ.]
City of Ban!(alore Corporation Act, 1949: Section 98. Octroi-
Levy of-Consideration of objections by the Corporation against the
levy-Court-Whether can examine the manner of consideration.
Taxation-Essentials of valid taxation-What are-Procedure for
c
imposition of tax-Court-Whether to presume compliance with-Non-
compliance with condition-Precedent of levy of tax-Burden ofproof-
On whom.
Words and phrases: 'Consideraiion'-Meaning of. D
The City Corporation of Bangalore invited objections from the
public to the proposed levy of octroi on certain items. In a meeting of
the Corporation after placing the objections on the Table and circulat-
ing the Notes of the Commissioner analysing the objections, a unani-
mous resolution was passed levying the octroi. E
The respondents challenged the validity of the Resolution con-
tending that it was passed in violation of Section 98(1) of the City of
Bangalore Corporation Act, 1949.
The High Court declared the Resolution invalid holding that F
because of shortage of time, the condition precedent for passing the
resolution i.e. real consideration of the objections was not satisfied.
Hence these appeals by the Corporation.
Setting aside the judgment of the High Court and allowing the
appeals, this Court, G
HELD: I.' Taxation in order to be valid must not only be
authorised by a statute, but also be levied or collected in strict con-
a
formity with the statute which authorises it .. Where condition-precedent
is laid down for statutory power being exercised it _must _be futnlled
before a sub-ordinate authority can·exercise·deiegated power,· When the H
443
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A statute requires that delegated power may be exercised on fulfilment of
certain conditions precedent, the Court would presume the regularity
of the order including the fulfilment of the condition precedent. It is for
the party who challenged the legality to show that the condition prece-
dent was not in fact complied with by the authority. {446H; 447B]
B
2. The Municipal Administration 1s coordinated to secure the
vital interest of the general public. It is the function of the representa-
tive body to ascertain the local opinion and decide thereon before
imposition of the tax. It has, therefore, to be assumed that local rep-
resentatives who had taken note of the objections received in pursuance
of the notice published have consciously reached the decision. Once it is
c clear that there had been consideration of the objection, it is not for the
Court to examine the manner in which the legislative will had been
indicated. [447C-D]
3. The Court has no jurisdiction to examine the validity of the
reasons that goes into the decision or the motive that induced· the
D delegated authority to exercise its powers. No judicial duty is laid on the
authority in discharge of the statutory obligations, and, therefore, the
only question to be examined is whether the statutory provisions have
been complied with. [447H; 448A]
4. The High Court was not justified in assuming from the time
E factor alone that there could not have been a consideration of the objec-
tions. It is not the function of the Court to probe into the details of the
discussions and the deliberations before legislative will is seen expressed
by passing the resolution. The connotation of the word 'consideration'
occuring in sub-section (1) of Section 98 comprehends 'taking note of'
or 'paying heed to' depending upon the nature of the subject. It may he
F open to the councillors to express their views even within the limited time
available. No standard can he prescribed in such matters. When it is
shown that the council had the opportunity to consider the objections
received, it has to be deemed, that they had taken note of the same
before reaching a decision. [448H; 449A-B]
G Municipal Board, Hapur v. Raghuvendra Kripal and Others,
[1966] 1 S.C.R. 956; Sundarjas Kanya/al Bhatija & Ors. etc. v. The
Collector, Thane, Maharashtra & Ors., [1989] 3 Judgment Today 57;
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Limited v. The State of U.P. and Others,
[1962] 1 S.C.R. 422; Copa! Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh &
H Another, A.I.R, 1964 S.C. 370, followed.
CITY OF BANGALORE v. KESORAM INDUSTRIES [F ATHIMA BEE VI, J.] 445
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. A
1216(N) of 1975.
WITH
Civil Appeal Nos. 509·641(N) of 1977.
B
From the Judgment and Order dated 26.2.1975 of the Kamataka
High Court in W.P. No. 371of1975.
A.S. Nambiar and M. Veerappa for the Appellant.
K.N. Bhat, Vineet Kumar and K.M.K. Khan, for the Res- C
pondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M. FATHIMA BEEVI, J. I. These connected appeals by special
D
leave arise from the common judgment of the High Court ot
Kamataka. The Writ Petitions filed by the respondents against the
appellant, the Corporation of the City of Bangalore were allowed and
the resolution dated the December 30, 1974 passed by the Corporation
levying octroi on certain additional items under Section 98 of the City
of Bangalore Corporation Act, 1949 (shortly stated as 'the act') was
E
declared as invalid.
2. Section 98 of the Act requires the Corporation before passing
any resolution imposing a tax or duty for the first time to publish a
notice in the Official Gazette and in the local newspapers of its inten-
tion and inviting objections. The Corporation may, after considering
F
the objections, if any, received within the period specified determine
by resolution to levy the tax or duty.
3. On the recommendation of the Standing Committee to levy
octroi on certain new items of goods the appellant published a notice
as contemplated under Section 98(1) of the Act inviting objections
G
from the public and the said notice was published in the Gazette dated
17-9-1974. Several objections were received in pursuance of the. said
notification. The subject was included in the supplementary agenda at
the meeting held on 30-12-1974. It was taken up as Item No. 146 and
the resolution was passed unanimously. The Commissioner thereafter
issued notification.
H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11989) Supp. 2 S.C.R.
4. Tne respondents challenged the validity of the resolution on
A
the ground inter alia that there had not been consideration of the
objections before passing the resolution and, therefore, the mandatory
provision under Section 98( 1) was violated. The High Court in allow-
ing the Writ Petitions has taken the view that what is contemplated
under the sta~ute is a real consideration of the objections and not a
B mere pretence and since the time was too short there was no oppor-
tunity for such consideration and on account of non-consideration of
the objections to the purposed levy the condition precedent for the
passing of the resolution was not satisfied and therefore, the resolution
is invalid.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
c objections have been placed on the table after the Commissioner had
prepared a note of the several objections analysing the nature of the
objection, setting out the legal conditions regarding the levy and con-
taining the answers to the objection, distributed cyclostyled copies of
the note before the meeting, and the subject was taken up and passed
D unanimously. The text of the resolution it is submitted indicated that
there was proper application of mind by the council. Relying on the
decision of this Court in Municipal Board, Hapur v. Raghuvendra
Kripal and Others, [1966) 1 S.C.R. 956 the learned counsel maintained
that the High Court should not have ventured into the question of the
manner In which consideration was given to the item in the agenda and
E the presumption that the statutory authority has followed the pres-
cribed procedure sho.uld prevail. It was also pointed out that the
Mayor of the Corporation and one of the councillors have filed
affidavits affirming that the objections along with the note were placed
on the table and the objections were taken note of before reaching the
decision. The respondents' learned counsel submitted that considera-
F tion of the objections is a condition precent for imposition of the levy
and the High Court having been satisfied of the non-compliance with
this mandatory requirement, has rightly invalidated the tax.
6. The admitted facts are that the resolution had been passed on
30-12-74 after placing the objections on the table and, distributing
G notes of the Commissioner, analysing the objections and containing
answers to the same. The subject was in the urgent agenda and the
record of proceedings revealed that the resolution had been passed
unanimously.
7. Taxation in order to be valid must not only be authorised by a
H statute, but also be levied or collected in strict conformity with the
CITY OFBANGALOREv. KESORAMINDUSTRIES [FATHIMABEEVl,J.] 447
statute which authorises it. Where a condition precedent is laid down
A
for statutory power being exercised it must be fulfilled before a
sub-ordinate authority can exercise delegated power. When the statute
requires that delegated power may be exercised on fulfilment of cer-
tain conditions precedent, the Court would presume the regularity of
the order including the fulfilment of the condition precedent. It is for
-i) the party who challenged the legality to show that the condition prece- B
dent was not in fact complied with by the authority.
8. The Municipal Administration is coordinated to secure the
vital interest of the general public. It is the function of the representa-
tive body to ascertain the local opinion and decide thereon before
imposition of the tax. It has, therefore, to be assumed that local
representatives who had taken note of the objections received in c
pursuance of the notice publised have consciously reached the deci-
sion. Once it is clear that there had been consideration of the objec-
tion, it is not for the Court to examine the manner in which the legisla-
tive will had been indicated. We shall only refer to the recent decision
of this Court in Sundarjas Kanya/al Bhatiia & Ors. etc. v. The D
Collector, ]hane, Maharashtra & Ors., Judgments Today I1989] 3 S.C.
57:
'r
"It must be noted that the functions of the Government in
establishing a Corporation under the Act is neither execu-
tive nor administrative. Counsel for the appellants was E
right in his submission that it is legislative process indeed .
. No judicial duty is laid on the Government in discharge of
the statutory duties. The only question to be examined is
whether the statutory provisions have been complied with.
If they are complied with, then, the Court could say no
more. In the present case the Government did publish th.e F
proposal by a draft notification and also considered the
representations received. It was only thereafter, a decision
was taken to exclude Ulhasnagar for ihe time being. That
decision became final when it was notified under Section
3(2). The Court cannot sit in judgment over such decision.
It cannot lay dqwn norms for the exercise of that power. It G
cannot substitute even "its juster will for theirs."
The Court has no jurisdiction to examine the validity of the
reasons that goes into the decision or the motive that induced the
delegated authority to exercise its powers. No judicial duty is laid on
the authority in ·discharge of the statutory obligations and, therefore, H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1989] Supp. 2 S.C.R.
A the only question to be examined is whether the statutory provisions
have been complied with.
9. In The Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Limitedv. The State of U.P.
and Others, [1962] 1 S.C.R. 422 this Court held that:
B "Where a condition precedent has to be satisfied before a
subordinate authority can pass an order, (executive or in
the nature of subordinate legislation), it is not necessary
that the satisfaction of the condition should be recited in
the order itself, unless the statute requires it, But it is desir-
able that it should be so mentioned for then the presump-
tion that the condition was satisfied would immediately
c arise and the burden would be on the persons challenging
the order to show that the recital is not correct. Even when
the recital is not made in the o.rder, it will not become void
ab initio and only a further burden is ca"st on the authority
passing the order to satisfy the court by other means, e.g.
D by filing an affidavit, that the condition precedent was
satisfied."
10. In Gopal Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, A.LR.
1964 S.C. 370, this Court held that:
E "There is a presumption, when a statutory authority makes
an order for imposition of tax, that it has followed the
prescribed procedure. The said presumption is not in any
way weakened by the long acquiescence in the imposition
by the residents of the locality. Nonetheless no tax shall be
levied or collected except in accordance with law. If it is not
F imposed in accordance with law, it would infringe the
fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19( l)(f) of the
Constitution. While the long period of time that lapses
between the imposition of the tax and the attack on it may
permit raising of certain presumptions where the evidence
is lost by efflux of time, it cannot exonerate the statutory
G authority if it imposes a tax in derogation of the statutory
provision.''
11. The High Court was not justified in assuming from the time
factor alone that there could not have been a consideration of the
objections. It is not the function of the Court to probe into the details
H of the discussions and the deliberations before legislative will is seen
CITY OF BANGALORE v. KESORAMINDUSTRIES (FATHIMABEEVl,J.J 449
expressed by passing the resolution. The connotation of the word A
'consideration' occuring in sub-section (1) of Section 98 comprehends
'taking note of or 'paying heed to' depending upon the nature of the
subject. It may be open to the councillors to exp~ess their views even
within the limited time available. No standard can be prescribed in
such matters. When it is shown that the council had the opportunity to
consider the objections received, it has to be deemed, that they had B
taken note of the same before reaching a decision.
We are, therefore, of the view that the High Court has commit-
ted an error in assuming on account of the shortage of time alone and
that there had been non-compliance \\'itll the requirements under the
statute. We set aside the judgment of the High Court and allow the c
appeals. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
T.N.A. Appeals allowed.
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