Holding

The High Court was correct; the eviction order under clause (rr) of section 43(2) is final and the landlord’s bona‑fide need remains unaffected by subsequent events.

Summary

The appellant, D.K. Soni, a tenant, challenged an order allowing the landlord, P.K. Mukerjee, to evict him on the ground of personal need under the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The landlord obtained a final permission for eviction before the 1972 Urban Buildings Act came into force, and later executed agreements to sell the premises to the tenant's wife and to third parties. After the tenant's death, the Prescribed Authority ordered eviction under section 21 read with clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the new Act. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was right to uphold that order despite the tenant’s death and subsequent agreements, and whether those later events destroyed the landlord’s bona‑fide need. It held that the clause (rr) makes the eviction order final and not open to reconsideration, that the landlord’s need for his own residence persisted, and that the subsequent events did not materially alter that need. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, with a deadline for the appellant to vacate the premises.

Issues considered

The applicability of clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings Act, 1972 to the eviction order obtained under the earlier Act.
Whether the death of the original tenant and subsequent sale agreements defeat the landlord’s claim of bona‑fide personal need.
Whether the High Court was correct in not interfering with the Prescribed Authority’s eviction order.

Legislation cited

Limitation Acts. 5
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 53A
U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 (Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act)s. 3, s. 7
U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972s. 21, s. 43(2)(rr)
Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976

Subjects

landlord‑tenantevictionbona fide needpersonal needfinality of ordersubsequent eventsU.P. Rent Control ActU.P. Urban Buildings Actsection 43(2) clause rrsection 21limitationtransfer of propertyland ceiling

Judgment

D.K. SONI
A v.
P.K. MUKERJEE AND ORS.

OCTOBER 27, 1987

B [SABYASACHI MUKHARJI AND G.L. OZA, JJ.]

Landlord-Tenant matter-Order of eviction of the tenant on
grounds of personal need of the landlord challenged-Provisions of
0.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 (Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act)
and the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Evic·
lion) Act, 1972-Proceedings thereunder.
c
Respondent No. 1, Shri P.K. Mukerjee, filed an application
under the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 (Temporary Control of Rent and
Eviction Act) (Old Act), seeking permission to file a suit for eviction of
his tenant, Harbans Lal Soni, the father of the appellant, D.K. Soni, on
D the grounds of his bona fide requirement for his personal need. The
Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the application, holding that
the respondent's requirement was not bona fide. A revision was filed by
the respondent No. 1 before the Commissioner who allowed the same.

The U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Evic-
E lion) Act, 1972 (new Act) came into effect on July 15, 1972. On August
2, 1972, the State Government rejected the representation of the tenant
(father of the appellant) filed under section 7 of the Old Act against the

F
order of the Commissioner aforementioned. The tenant then moved a
writ petition in the High Court. A Single Judge of the High Court
allowed the petition and set aside the abovesaid orders of the Commis·
sioner and the State Government. Upon an appeal being filed by the c
-
respondent (No. 1) against the order of the Single Judge, a Division
Bench of the High Court allowed the same, setting aside the order of the
Single Judge and upholding the above-said orders of the commissioner
and the State Government, allowing the evictio.n of the tenant.

G In September, 1978, the respondent No. 1 moved an application
under section 21, read with section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act. Thereafter,
the respondent executed an agreement as vendor to sell the permises in
dispute in favour of the vendee, the wife of the appellant, Smt. Madho
Soni-daughter-in-law of the tenant, Harbans Lal. The agreement was
dated November 7, 1978, and it mentioned therein that the landlord,
ff respondent No. 1 had filed an application against the tenant above·
616
D.K. SONI v. P.K. MUKERJEE 617

named. The father-in-law of the vendee-for permission to file a suit for
..,.. eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute on account of the A
respondent's personal need, and that the permission had been granted.
The agreement recited that a vacant portion of the land of the disputed
premises, would be in the exclusive possession of the vendor and the rest
of the property-the disputed premises would be sold to the vendee,
Smt. Madhu Soni. The agreement stipulated that the vendee or the l3
other members of the family had no right over the portion of the land to
be kept with the vendor, and that the appellant had given up his tenancy
4: rights in respect of the same, and also that premises would be built on
the said vacant land with the money to be obtained by selling the dis-
... puted house to Smt. Madhu Soni. The price of the house was settled at
Rs.1,00,000 out of which a sum of Rs.5000 was paid as earnest money,
f
and it was stipulated that the rest of the amount would be paid at the c
_,i._ time of registration. It was agreed that the parties would move the
authorities for permission to transfer as early as possible and the sale-
deed would be executed within one month of the grant of permission
and notice to the vendee. It was stated that if the vendee failed to get the
sale-deed executed within the time stipulated, the earnest money of D
Rs.5000 would be forfeited and the property would stand released in
favour of the vendor. It was also stipulated that the need of the vendor
for the premises subsisted and the agreement had been entered into to
enable the vendor to get money out of the sale to construct a house for
himself on the vacant piece of land. On December 12, 1978, the father of
the appellant, who was the tenant, died, leaving behind a widow, two E
~
sons, including the appellant, and a daughter. On December 22, 1978,
the appellant informed the Prescribed Authority before whom the
application under section 21(1)(a) of the New Act, read with section
43(2)(rr), was pending, about the death of the tenant, Shri Harbans Lal
Soni.
F
On March 23, 1979, the respondent No. 1 filed an application (in
~ Case No. 53 of 1978) for substitution of the legal heirs of the deceased
tenant, along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act.
The Prescribed Authority rejected the application for substitution on
grounds of delay. On December 11, 1979, therespondentNo. lmoveda
second application under section 21(1)(a), read with section 43(2)(rr) of G
the new Act (on the ground as in his earlier application), which was
registered as Case No. 68of1979.

~. On March 12, 1981, the respondent No. 1 executed two separate
agreements for sale of the property in dispute, in favour of R.P.
Kanodia and P. K. Kanodia, respectively. H
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19881 1 S.C.R.

A The Prescribed Authority decided the Case No. 68 of 1979 above·
mentioned on July 7, 1981, directing the tenant to be evicted from the .,..._
premises in dispute. The Additional District Jildge dismissed the appeal
against the order of eviction passed by the Prescribed Authority.

On March 11, 1983, the appellant's wife, Smt. Madhu Soni r.Jed a
8 suit for injunction, restraining the respondent No. 1 from dispossessing
her from the premises in dispute on the strength of the registered agree-
ment, asserting that she resided in the premises in part performance of ':}-
the agreement under section S3A of the Transfer of Property Act. The ·
trial Court dismissed the suit. The High Court was then moved for
relief by a writ petition against the orders of the Prescribed Authority :-
for eviction and the order of the Additional District Judge. The writ
C petition was dismissed, followed by the dismissal of a Review Petition \
too. Aggrieved thereby the appellant has appealed to this Court by . ..>...._
special leave.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court,
D
HELD: The questions involved in the appeal are: Firstly, in view
of the provisions of section 43(2)(rr), was the High Court right in its
decision, in the facts and circumstances o'f the case, specially the factum
of the death of the (Original) tenant being alleged, and in view of the
fact that the execution of the Order for eviction had become rmal before
E the new Act came into operation? Secondly, how far do the subsequent ·~
events, namely, the agreements by the respondent No. 1 with the wife of
one of the sons of the tenant and with the Kanodias to sell the property
in dispute, demolish or destroy the case of a bona fide need of the
landlord? [622G·H; 623A] ...-

F In substance, the need was there of the landlord for his occupation
of his premises as he wanted to reside in his house after his retirement
from Government service, and for this purpose he had sought eviction
and obtained the order of eviction prior to the coming into operation of
the new Act. The object of the landlord was not defeated by the provi-
sions of the New Act. [626G-H]
G
Considering the subsequent events, namely, the refusal of permis·
sion by the Urban Ceiling Authorities, the escalation of building cost
(upto 1987), failure on the part of the vendee to register and execute the
document, it is not possible to hold that the subsequent events have so
materially altered the position as to defeat the Original Order for posses-
H sion passed in favour of the landlord. The subsequent events do not in
D.K. SONI v. P.K. MUKERJEE 619

any way affect the existence of the need of the landlord for possession of
A
the premises in question. [627C-E]
-"T'
There was no failure on the part of the landlord to take steps for
the substitution. Nothing was proved before the Court that the agree-
ments with R.P. Kanodia and P.K. Kanodia were valid today or given
effect to in view of the provision of the Land-Celling Act. It was not B
proved to the satisfaction of the authorities below that any agreement to
sell the premises to Kanodias had been given effect to and acted upon
-{:,
and in that view of the matter, the need of the landlord indubitably
succeeds, and any allegations made do not merit any revision of the
order which had become final. Finality of the judicial decisions is one of
the essential ingredients upon which the administration of justice must
I
rest. In that view of the matter, even if the contentions advanced on c
_).,, ; behalf of the respondents are taken into consideration and a new look is
taken because of the subsequent events, which cannot be done in view of
the specific provisions In clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the new Act, the
appellant bas no case. The High Court was right in not interfering with
the order of the Prescribed Authority. Finality of the decisions of the D
authorities under the Act has to be given due reverence and place In the
judicial administration. [629A-C]

The appeal fails. As the appellant had been staying in the pre·
mises for quite some time, time till April 30, 1988 granted to him to
deliver vacant possession of the house to the landlord, subject to his E
---"(
filing usual undertaking within four weeks. [629E-F]

-
Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The motor and general Traders,
[1975] 3 SCR 958; Pattersion v. State of Alabama, 294 U.S. 600 at 607;
Ramji Dayawala and Sons(P) Ltd. v. Invest Import, [1981] l SCR 899;
Hasmat Rai and Anr. v. Raghunath Prasad, [1981] 3 SCR 605; Syed F
, Asadullah Kazmi v. The Addi. District Judge, Allahabad and Ors.,
·~ [1982] 1 SCR 77; Sher Singh and Ors. v. The State of Punjab, [1983] 2
SCR 582; Bansilal Sahu v. The Prescribed Authority and Anr, [1980]
All L.J. 331; Smt. Sarju Devi v. Prescribed Authority, Kanpur, [1977]
All L.J. 251 and Tara Chand Khandelwal v. Prescribed Authority,,
Agra, [1976] All L.J. 708, referred to. G
\ I

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6626
of 1983.
" )-\.
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.5.1983 of the Allahabad
High Court in C.M.W.P. No. 13741of 1982. H
620 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

S.N. Kacker and R.B. Mehrotra for the Appellant.
A
B .D. Agarwala and Miss Asha Rani for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B SABY ASA CHI MUKHARJI, J. This is an appeal by the tenant
against an order upholding the order of eviction. The ground of evic-
tion was on the landlord's bona fide need and requirement. The appeal :)-
arises out of the judgment and order of the High Court of Allahabad
dated 18th of May, 1983 and also against the order dated 23rd of May,
1983 dismissing a review application by the said High Court. Shri P.K. c.
Mukerjee, respondent No. 1 herein had filed an application under
C section 3 of the U.P. Act No. 3 of 1947 (Temporary Control of Rent
and Eviction Act), hereinafter referred to as the old Act, seeking _j.__
permission to file the suit for eviction of the tenant, the father of the
appellant herein, on the ground that accommodation in dispute was·
bona fide required by the landlord for his personal need. In Sep-
D tember, 1971 the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rejected the appli-
cation of the landlord and held that his requirement was not bona fide.
On 12th of November, 1971 the Commissioner allowed the revision
filed by respondent No. 1 against the order of the Rent Control and
Eviction Officer dated 5th of September, 1971. It may be mentioned
that on 15th of July, 1972 the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of
E Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as the )--
new Act came into effect. On 2nd of August, 1972 the State Govern-
ment rejected the representation of the tenant namely, the father of
the appellant filed under section 7 of the old Act against the order of
the Commissioner dated 2nd of November, 197 I. On or about 7th of .-
February, 1975 the learned Single Judge of the High Court of
F Allahabad allowed the writ petition of the tenant and set aside the
orders of the Commissioner and the State Government hereinbefore
mentioned. On 3rd of August, 1978 a Division Bench of the High . )......
Court of Allahabad allowed the appeal of respondent No. 1 and set
aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court
dated 7th of February, 1975 and upheld the orders of the Commis-
G sioner and the State Government allowing the eviction of the tenant.
In September, 1978 respondent No. 1 moved an application under
section 21 read with section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act. Thereafter it is
alleged that respondent No. 1 had executed an agreement to sell the
disputed premises in favour of the appellant's wife namely, Smt. '.-'"'''
Madhu Soni. It is material to refer to the said agreement in brief. The
H agreement is dated as mentioned hereinbefore 7th of November, 1978
D.K. SONI v. P.K. MUKERJEE [MUKHARJJ, J.] 621

and was entered into between Shri P.K. Mukerjee, the landlord and A
Smt. Madhu Soni wife of Shri D.K. Soni (son of Shri Harbans Lal
Soni) the then tenant. It was stated that the landlord had filed an
application against Shri H.L. Soni the father-in-law of vendee for
permission to file a suit for eviction against him on account of his
personal need for the aforesaid premises and permission had been
granted. It also recited that a portion of the said land which was B
demarcated in the site plan measuring about 121' x 101.5' of the
vendor which would be for the construction of a house would be in
exclusive possession of the vendor and the rest of the property at 8,
Panna Lal Road, Allahabad being the disputed premises would be sold
to Smt. Soni. It also recited that the vendee or his family members
would have no right of whatsoever nature and the vendee, that is to
say, the appellant had given up his tenancy right in respect of the C
same, that is to say, the portion to be kept with the vendor and the
premises will be built on the vacant land with the money that would be
obtained by selling the property to Smt. Madhu Soni. The property
was sold for Rs.1,00,000 out of which Rs.5,000 was paid as earnest
money and it was stipulated that the rest of the money would be paid at D
the time of the registration. It was further agreed that the parties
would move the proper authorities as early as possible for permission
to transfer and the sale deed 'VOuld be executed within one month of
the grant of the permission and notice to the vendee. It was further
stated that if the vendee failed to get the sale deed executed after one
month from the date of permission and notice to the vendee by the E
vendor, the earnest money of Rs.5,000 would be forfeited and the
right of the vendor would be as it subsisted prior to the agreement. It
was further provided that in the event of non-execution of the sale
deed on account of any act or failure on the part of the vendee in
pursuance of the agreement to sell, the property would stand released
in favour of the vendor and the earnest money of Rs.5,000 would be F
forfeited. It was clearly stipulated that the need of the vendor fof the
premises still subsisted and this agreement was being entered into
since it would be possible for the vendor to construct a house for
himself on the land not agreed to be transferred measuring 121' x
JO 1.5'. On that basis the parties had signed agreement on 7th
November, 1978. G

On 12th of December, 1978 the father of the present appellant
Shri H.L. Soni who was the original tenant died leaving behind his
widow and two sons including the appellant and one daughter. It was
alleged that on 18th of December, 1978 respondent No. 1 sent a letter
of condolence to the appellant on the death of appellant's father. On H
622 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 1 S.C.R.

A 22nd of December, 1978 appellant informed the Prescribed Authority .·'?'-
before whom the application under section 21( 1)(a) of the new Act red
with section 43(2)(rr) was pending about the death of Shri H.L Soni.
On 23rd of March, 1979 respondent No. 1 moved an application for
substitution in Case No. 53 of 1978 for bringing on record the heirs of
deceased Shri H.L. Soni along with application under section 5 of the
B Limitation Act. On 10th of November, 1979, the Prescribed Authority
rejected the petitioners application for substitution and held that
respondent No. 1 had full knowledge of the death of Shri H.L. Soni
and he did not move the application within time. On I I th of
December, 1979 respondent No. 1 moved a second application under
section 21(1)(a) read with section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act on the same
ground on which the first application was moved. The second applica-
C tion was registered as Case No. 68 of 1979. It is alleged further that on
12th of March, 1981 respondent No. 1 executed two separate agree- -
ments to sell the property in dispute in favour of R.P. Kanodia and
P.K. Kanodia respectively. The Prescribed Authority on 7th of July,
1981 held that the second application under section 2l(l)(a) read with
D section 43(2)(rr) of the new Act being Case No. 68 of 1979 was within
time and directed the tenant to be evicted from the premises in dis-
pute. The Additional District Judge, Allahabad on 25th of October,
1982 dismissed the appeal of the tenant filed against the order of the
Prescribed Authority dated 7th of July, 1981. On 11th of March, 1983
the appellant's wife Stnt. Madhu Soni filed a suit for injunction rest-
E raining Respondent No. 1 from dispossessing her from the premises in
dispute on the strength of registered agreement and she asserted that
she resided in the accommodation as a result of part performa<1ce
under section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Initially
in junction was granted ex parte by the Trial Court and thereafter it was
vacated after hearing respondent No. !. Aggrieved thereby an appeal
-
F was filed by Smt. Madhu Soni in which the High Court had stayed
dispossession. The High Court thereafter dismissed the writ petition of
the tenant against the orders of the Prescribed Authority for eviction
and the order of the Additional District Judge. A review petition was
filed by the appellant and the same was dismissed. This appeal by
special leave is against that decision of the High Court dated 18th of
G May, 1983.

Behind this long tale of dates the questions involved in this ap-
peal are short, namely, firstly in view of the provisions of section 'r'
I
43(2)(rr) was the High Court right, in the facts and circumstances of
the case specially the death of original tenant being alleged, and in
H view of the fact that the execution of the order passed for eviction had
D.K. SONI v. P.K. MUKERJEE [MUKHARJI, J.] 623

become final before coming into operation of the new Act the order
was proper and secondly, how far the subsequent events, namely, the A
agreement with the wife of one of the sons of the original tenant to
purchase property as well as the agreement with the Kanodias
mentioned hereinbefore demolish or destroy the case of a bona fide
need of the landlord. In other words are these not sufficient subse-
quent events which destroy the landlord's bona fide need and as such B
should be taken note of by the appropriate courts in ordering eviction.
In this appeal, therefore, we have to keep in mind two aspects of law
namely, the finality of the decisions and secondly, how far and to what
extent subsequent events should be taken note of in order to do justice
between the parties.

Before we refer to the judgment of the High Court and the C
submissions made before us, it is necessary for us to bear in mind
certain decisions of this Court on these aspects on which reliance was
placed. This Court in Pasupu/eti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor &
General Traders, [1975) 3 S.C.R. 958 dealing with the Andhra Pradesh
Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, dealt with D
the question as to how far the subsequent events can be taken note of.
This Court held that for making the right or remedy, claimed by a
party justly and meaningfully as also legally and factually in accord-
ance with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must,
take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the
institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both E
sides are scrupulously obeyed. In'the facts of that case, this Court said
that the High Court was right in taking into consideration the facts
which came into being subsequent to the commencement of the pro-
ceedings. Therefore the fact that in determining what justice required
the Court was boun.d to consider any change, either in fact or in law,
which had supervened since the judgment was given. F

This general principle and proposition of law was of ancient vin-
tage. See the observations of the U.S. Supreme Court in Pattersion v.
State of Alabama, (294 U.S. 600 at page 607). The actual facts, how-
ever, of this case were entirely different, and so it was not necessary to
refer to those facts. In Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest G
Import, [ 1981) 1 S.C.R. 899, this principle was again reiterated en-
tirely under different context. This Court also reiterated the same
principle in Hasmat Rai and another v. Raghunath Prasad, [1981) 3
S.C.R. 605 where referring to Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor
and General Traders (supra), this Court held that when an action was
brought by the landlord under Rent Restriction Act for eviction on the H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A ground of personal requirement, his need must not only be shown to -'-r
exist at the date of the suit, but must exist on the date of appellate
decree, or the date when a higher court dealt with the matter. It was
emphasised by this Court that if during the progress and passage of
proceeding from court to court subsequent events had occurred which
if noticed would non-suit the plaintiff, the court had to examine and
B evaluate the-same and mould the decree accordingly. The tenant was
entitl~d to showh thabt the need or requihrement no mdo~e exhisted by j..
1
pomtmg out sue su sequent events, tot e court me u mg t e appe1-
late court. Otherwise the landlord would derive an unfair advantage,
and it would be against the spirit or intendment of Rent Restriction •
Act which was enacted to fetter the unfettered right of re-entry. Iu
C such a situation, it was reiterated that, it would be incorrect to say that \
as the decree or order for eviction was passed against the tenant he _ .>__
could not invite the court to take into consideration subsequent
events. But the tenant could be precluded from so contending when
decree or order for eviction had become final. (Emphasis supplied-see
the observations of Desai, J. at page 617(G.H) of the report). In Syed
D Asadu/lah Kazmi v. The Addi. District Judge, Allahabad and others,
[ 1982] 1 S.C.R. 77, this Court was concerned with a residence at
Allahabad. It was held by this Court that the order dated 25th March,
1977 of the appellate authority releasing a portion of the premises in
favour of the third respondent therein and leaving the remaining por-
tion in the tenancy of the appellant therein acquired finality when the )'-
E proceedings taken against it by the appellant had failed. The Pres-
cribed Authority was bound to give effect to that final order and was
ndt acting outside its jurisdiction or contrary to law where he ordered
eviction. This Court reiterated that it was true that subsequent events
had to be taken into account by a statutory authority or court when
considering proceeding arising out of a landlord's petition for eject-
F ment of a tenant on the ground of the landlord's personal need. But in ,
that case the order for release of a portion of the accommodation had )......
acquired finality before the death of the landlord and the controversy
concluded by it could not be reopened thereafter. This Court further
reiterated that inasmuch as the question which arose before the
Prescribed Authority on the application of the appellant after the pro-
G ceedings for release had acquired finality, it was not open even for this
Court to reopen the proceeding for release. Not quite relevant to the
present controversy, there is, however, just an observation in Sher
Singh & Ors. v. The State of Punjab, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 582. It was a ,)..r
decision dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution. There is an obser-
vation that traditionally, subsequent events had to be taken into
H account in the area of civil law. It is necessary, however, to refer to a
D.K. SONI v. P.K. MUKERJEE (MUKHARJI, J.] 625

decision of the special bench of the Allahabad High Court in Bansilal A
Sahu v. The Prescribed Authority and another, [1980] ALL. L.J. 331
which arose under the new Act. It was held therein that the question
whether the eviction of the tenant had to be ord~red from any speci-
fied part of the building under tenancy was not within the jurisdiction
of the Prescribed Authority, while acting under clause (rr) of section
43(2), irrespective of the occurrence of subsequent events which might B
make it improper to order the eviction from the entire building or
which might tend to establish that the need set up by the landlord
could be satisfied by ordering eviction of the tenant from a specified
part of the building under tenancy. It was held that subsequent events
or facts could not be considered so as to defeat the final order and the
I Prescribed Authority was bound to order eviction. The Special Bench C
.,l of the Allahabad High Court overruled another Bench decision of the
Allahabad High Court in the case of Smt. Sarju Devi v. Prescribed
Authority, Kanpur, [ 1977] All. L.J. 251 and accepted the proposition
laid down in Tara Chand Khandelwal v. Prescribed Arithority, Agra,
[1976] All L.J. 708. Satish Chandra, C.J. speaking for the Allahabad
High Court observed that the opening clause of this provision entitled D
the Prescribed Authority to find out whether permission under section
3 of the old Act had been obtained on any ground specified in sub-
section ( 1) or sub-section (2) of section 21 of the present Act and that
the same had become final. It was, therefore, according to the Chief
Justice, the beginning as well as the end of his jurisdiction to record
findings. If the conclusion was in the affirmative the Prescribed E
Authority had no discretion but to order the eviction of the tenant

- from the building under tenancy. It was further held that the jurisdic-
tion of the Prescribed Authority was to order the eviction of the tenant
from the building under tenancy. It had not expressly been conferred
any power to order eviction from a portion or part of the building
under tenancy. It was further held that the jurisdiction of the F
Prescribed Authority while deciding an application under section 21 of
the present Act could not be equated with the jurisdicton which had
been conferred for giving effect to the permission granted under sec-
tion 3 of the old Act. The two situations were different. Clause (rr) of
section 43(2) of the present Act specifically prohibited the Prescribed
Authority from satisfying itself afresh that the grounds existed. We are G
of the opinion that this is the correct state of law and if that is the
position the so-called subsequent events are not germane to the ques-
tion to be decided by the High Court.

In the aforesaid light, in our opinion, in the facts of this case the
High Court was right. H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] I S.C.R.

A It may be mentioned that clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the new ~
Act provides as follows:

"where any permission referred to in Section 3 of the old
Act has been obtained on any ground specified in sub-
section ( 1) or sub-section (2) of section 21 and has become
B final, either before the commencement of this Act or in
accordance with the provisions of this sub-section after the
commencement of this Act {whether or not a suit for the
eviction of the tenant has been instituted), the landlord
may apply to the prescribed authority for his eviction under
section 21, and thereupon the prescribed authority shall
order the eviction of the tenant from the building under
c tenancy, and it shall not be necessary for prescribed
authority to .satisfy itself afresh as to the existence of any
ground as aforesaid, and such order shall be final and shall
not be open to appeal under section 22:

D Provided that no application under this clause shall be
maintainable on the basis of a permission granted under
section 3 of the old Act, where such permission became
final more than three years before the commencement of
this Act:

E Prqvided further that in computing the period of three
years, the time during which the applicant has been pro-
secuting with due diligence any civil proceeding whether in
a court of first instance or appeal or revision shall be
.,.._
excluded"

F All these aspects were considered by the High Court. We recog- .
nise that unless the statute expressly prohibits as it did in the instant fa-
•
case, by the aforesaid clause, cautious recognition of subsequent
events to mould the relief should be taken note of. In the instant case
in substance the need was there of the landlord for his occupation of
his own premises. The landlord was a Government servant and wanted
G to reside in Allahabad and for this purpose he sought eviction and had
obtained an order of eviction prior to coming into operation of the new
Act. The hope of the landlord to come back to his origin was not
)-/
defeated by the provisions of the new Act. In vain he moved from I

court to court and in the meantime there has been escalation of prices
and restrictions on alienation of land and in order to save himself from
H this situation the landlord tried to sell part of the premises in question
D.K. SONI v. P.K. MUKERJEE (MUKHARJI, J.] 627

.,.~
subsequent to the decree to the wife of one of the sons of the tenant .
A
This is not material. The agreement in question further stipulated that
the present need of the landlord subsisted, and out of this agreement .
only Rs.5,000 was advanced in 1978 and nothing was paid thereafter.
The agreement for sale to Smt. Madhu Soni reads as follows:

"That it is made clear that the need of the vendor for the B
{ premises still subsists and this agreement is being entered
into since it will be possible for the vendor to construct a
house for himself on the land not agreed to be transferred
measuring 121' X 101.5'. The parties, therefore, have
signed this Deed on the 7th day of November, 1978
( ....... "
,.l __ c
In view of the subsequent events, namely, non-permission of the
Urban Ceiling Authorities, failure to register and execute the docu-
ment, delay for permission on the part of the vendee and the escalation
of prices, that is to say, if in 1979 perhaps it was possible to build some
kind of accommodation with the amount of sale price to be obtained D
from the execution of the document which it is not possible in 1987 and
further there is no readiness or willingness on the part of the vendee to
execute the document, after the existence of the basic need of the
landlord, for whicb originally the proceedings were taken and fina-
-( lised, we do not find it possible to hold that subsequent events have so
materially altered as to defeat the original order for possession passed E
in favour of the respondents.

We do not find perusing the records that there was any failure for
substitution on the part of the landlord to take steps. The other son of
the deceased was not residing with the deceased in the premises in
question, therefore, there was no need to substitute him. F
J..
The other agreements to which reference had been made was the
alleged agreement with R.P. Kanodia and P.K. Kanodia respectively.
Nothing was proved befqre us that agreement is valid today or given
effect to in view of the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act.
G
It may be mentioned that the Competent Autliority under the
Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 by the order dated 20th
~ of April, 1979 refused permission to sell in favour of Smt. Madhu Soni.
On 7th November, 1978 the wife of the appellant and the landlord had
entered into an agreement to Jiell a portion of the land as well as the
house in dispute to the itppellant's wife, and for that )>urpose a sUJh of H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

Rs.5,000 had been paid as earnest money as mentioned hereinbefore, ~-.,.
A and in the agreement, it was clearly stated that the parties would move
the proper authorities as early as possible for permission to transfer
the property and the sale deed would be executed within one month of
the grant of such permission and notice to the vendee. Clause 6 of the
agreement further stipulated that if the vendee failed to get the agree-
B ment executed after one month from the date of permission and notice
to the vendee the earnest money of Rs.5,000 would be forfeited and )-
the right of the vendor will be as it subsisted prior to the agreement.
The requisite permission in terms of the agreement was obtained by
the landlord in the year 1979 and a registered notice consequently was
also sent to the appellant's wife requiring her to get the sale deed
executed in accordance with the agreement. Thereafter a reply dated \
C 21st September, 1979 was also received by the landlord. However, the _.>-,_
appellant's wife failed to get the sale deed executed and consequently
the agreement itseH became infructuous and the earnest money stood
forefeited.

D
The need as it has been reiterated in the agreement of the land-
lord for his own purpose still subsisted. There was n<;> delay iri bringing
th~ heirs of the deceased tenant on record. In the aforesaid:view of the
matter there was no substance in the objection fjl~ aj!ainsithe execti-
tion of the order of eviction in terms of clause (rr) of section 43(2) of
E the new Act. In any event such events were frivolous after the order
had become final. The subsequent events which we have examined do
not in any way effect the decision of need for possession of the pre-
mises in question of the respondent-landlord. It may be mentioned
that there was an application by the respondent for the review. This
was heard and no order was made on that application. It was reiterated
F in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent that since 1st of
December, 1978 till Iodate the appellant had not paid any money to
the landlord nor deposited the da111ages in the court. At the time of his
death late H.l'.. Soni was residing in the house in dispute with his
eldest son Shri D.K. Soni, the appellant, his wife, Smt. Madhu Soni
and Mrs. Kailash Soni, the widow. Other son Shri A.K. Soni and
G daughter Mrs. Kangan Khanna were not residing with Late Shri H.L.
Soni at the time of his death and as such they were not heirs as contem-
plated by section 3(g) of the new Act. The landlord was a Government
servant and was posted at Lucknow and as such during his tenure he
had to reside at Lucknow but after his retirement he wanted to settle
down at his ancestral house at Allahabad and it was for this reason that
1-1 the proceedings for eviction were taken.
D.K. SONI v. P.K. MUKERJEE [MUKHARJI, J.) 629

It was not proved to the satisfaction of the authorities below that A
any agreement to sell the premises to Kanodias has been given effect
to and had been acted upon or can be acted upon. It that view of the
matter the need indubitably succeeds and even if the allegations made
are taken into consideration do not merit any revision of the order
which had become final. Finality of the judicial decisions is one of the B
essential ingredients upon which the administration of justice must
rest. In that view of the matter we are of the opinion, even if the
contentions advanced on behalf of the respondents are taken into
consideration and a new look is taken because of the subsequent
events, which in our opinion cannot be done in view of the specific
prohibition in clause (rr) of section 43(2) of the new Act, the appellant
has no case. C
1 In the aforesaid view of the matter we are of the opinion that the
High Court was right in not interfering with the order of the Prescribed
Authority. After all finality of the decisions of the authctrities under
the Act has to be given due reverence and place in the judicial
administration. Taking cautious note of the relevant subsequent D
events, we find no merit in the appellant's contentions inasmuch as
there is nothing on record to show that the landlord's bona fide need
for his residence in Allahabad has been met or can be met in the state
of affairs except by the order ~hi ch is ~pugned in this appeal.

In the premises, the appeal must fail and is accordingly dismissed E
without any order as to costs. Since, however, the appellant has been
staying in the disputed premises for quite some time, we grant time till
30th of April, 1988 to deliver vacant possession of the premises subject
to filing usual undertaking within four weeks from today. In default in
filing undertaking the order would become executable forthwith.
F
S.L. Appeal dismissed.

r