Holding

The suit is barred by limitation and fails to disclose a cause of action, so the plaint must be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d).

Summary

The plaintiffs sold agricultural land to respondent No.1 in 2009 and alleged that only a small part of the sale consideration was paid, seeking cancellation of the sale deed. They filed the suit in December 2014, more than five years after the deed, claiming the cause of action arose only when they discovered alleged fraud in 2014. The trial court and the Gujarat High Court held that the plaintiffs had acknowledged full payment in the deed, that the cause of action arose in 2009, and that the suit was therefore barred by the three‑year limitation period under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Supreme Court affirmed that the plaint neither disclosed a genuine cause of action nor complied with the limitation period, and that non‑payment of consideration cannot invalidate a registered sale deed. Consequently, the plaint was rightly rejected under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The plaint discloses a cause of action for cancellation of the sale deed.
The suit is barred by limitation under Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether non‑payment of the full sale consideration can be a ground to set aside a registered sale deed.
The applicability of Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC to reject the plaint.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VII Rule 11(a), s. Order VII Rule 11(d)
Land Revenue Codes. Section 73AA
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 58, s. Article 59, s. Section 2(j), s. Section 3
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 54

Subjects

Order VII Rule 11Limitation ActSale deed cancellationCause of actionVexatious litigationTransfer of Property Act

Judgment

694 [2020]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 5 S.C.R. 694 [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A DAHIBEN
v.
ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS & ORS.
B (Civil Appeal No. 9519 of 2019)
JULY 09, 2020
[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.VII, r. 11 (a) & (d) –
C Rejection of plaint, if suit is barred by Limitation and does not
disclose cause of action – The plaintiffs sold the suit property to
respondent no.1-purchaser vide registered sale deed dated
02.07.2009 – The respondent had issued 36 cheques for
Rs.1,74,02,000/- towards payment of the sale consideration in favour
of the plaintiffs, the details of which were set out in the sale deed
D
dated 02.07.2009 – The respondent no.1 subsequently sold the suit
property to respondent nos.2 and 3 vide registered sale deed dated
01.04.2013 – In 2014, the plaintiffs filed a suit against the
respondent no.1 and also impleaded respondent nos.2 & 3 as
defendants and sought cancellation of the sale deed dated
E 02.07.2009 as the sale consideration fixed was not paid in entirety
by respondent no.1 – It was alleged that respondent no.1 had paid
only Rs. 40,000/- through 6 cheques and remaining 30 cheques for
Rs. 1,73,62,000 were ‘bogus’ cheques – Respondent Nos. 2 & 3
filed an application for rejection of plaint u/or.VII,r.11(a) & (d) of
the CPC contending that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred
F
by limitation and no cause of action was disclosed in the plaint –
The Trial Court on perusal of the registered sale deed dated
02.07.2009 noted that the plaintiffs had in fact accepted and
acknowledged the payment of the full sale consideration from
respondent no.1, through cheques which were issued prior to the
G execution of the sale deed – The Trial Court held that period of
limitation for filing the suit was 3 years from the date of execution
of the sale deed dated 02.07.2009, however, the suit was filed on
15.12.2014, which was barred by limitation – The High Court
affirmed the findings of the Trial Court and held that the suit was
barred by Limitation – On appeal, held: In the Sale Deed dated
H
694
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 695
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS. & ORS.

02.07.2009, the plaintiffs had expressly and unequivocally A
acknowledged that the entire sale consideration was ‘paid’ by
defendant no. 1/respondent no. 1 herein to the plaintiffs – The
conduct of the plaintiffs in not taking recourse to legal action for
over a period of 5 and ½ years from the execution of the Sale Deed
in 2009, for payment of the balance sale consideration, also reflects B
that the institution of the present suit was an after-thought – The
plaintiffs by clever drafting of the plaint, attempted to make out an
illusory cause of action and bring the suit within the period of
limitation – The plaintiffs deliberately did not mention the date of
the registered sale deed dated 02.07.2009 in the prayer, since it
would have become evident that suit was barred by limitation – The C
omission was made to mislead the Court – Thus, plaintiffs failed to
discharge the onus of proof that the suit was filed within the period
of limitation – Besides, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme
Court, even if averments of the plaintiffs are taken to be true that
the entire sale consideration was not paid, it could not be a ground D
for cancellation of the sale deed – The Plaintiffs may have other
remedies in law for recovery of the balance consideration, but could
not be granted the relief of cancellation of the registered Sale Deed
– Thus, the plaint was rightly rejected by the Trial Court u/Or. VII,
r.11 CPC.
E
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. If the case made out in the Plaint is to be believed,
it would mean that almost 99% of the sale consideration i.e.
Rs.1,73,62,000 allegedly remained unpaid throughout. It is,
however inconceivable that if the payments had remained unpaid,
the Plaintiffs would have remained completely silent for a period F
of over 5 and ½ years, without even issuing a legal notice for
payment of the unpaid sale consideration, or instituting any
proceeding for recovery of the amount, till the filing of the present
suit in December 2014. [Para 15.2][712-D-E]
2.1 In Vidyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr. this Court held that G
the words “price paid or promised or part paid and part promised”
indicates that actual payment of the whole of the price at the time
of the execution of the Sale Deed is not a sine qua non for
completion of the sale. Even if the whole of the price is not paid,
H
696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A but the document is executed, and thereafter registered, the sale
would be complete, and the title would pass on to the transferee
under the transaction. The non-payment of a part of the sale price
would not affect the validity of the sale. Once the title in the
property has already passed, even if the balance sale consideration
is not paid, the sale could not be invalidated on this ground. In
B
order to constitute a “sale”, the parties must intend to transfer
the ownership of the property, on the agreement to pay the price
either in praesenti, or in future. The intention is to be gathered
from the recitals of the sale deed, the conduct of the parties, and
the evidence on record. [Para 15.3][713-B-E]
C 2.2 In view of the law laid down by this Court, even if the
averments of the Plaintiffs are taken to be true, that the entire
sale consideration had not in fact been paid, it could not be a
ground for cancellation of the Sale Deed. The Plaintiffs may have
other remedies in law for recovery of the balance consideration,
D but could not be granted the relief of cancellation of the registered
Sale Deed. [Para 15.3][713-F-G]
3. This Court finds that the suit filed by the Plaintiffs is
vexatious, meritless, and does not disclose a right to sue. The
plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (a). [Para
E 15.3][713-G-H]
4. The conduct of the Plaintiffs in not taking recourse to
legal action for over a period of 5 and ½ years from the execution
of the Sale Deed in 2009, for payment of the balance sale
consideration, also reflects that the institution of the present suit
F is an after-thought. The Plaintiffs apparently filed the suit after
the property was further sold by Respondent No.1 to Respondent
Nos. 2 and 3, to cast a doubt on the title of Respondent No.1 to
the suit property. [Para 15.5][715-C-D]
5. The present case is a classic case, where the plaintiffs
G by clever drafting of the plaint, attempted to make out an illusory
cause of action, and bring the suit within the period of limitation.
The Plaintiffs deliberately did not mention the date of the
registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 executed by them in
favour of Respondent No.1, since it would be evident that the
suit was barred by limitation. The prayer however mentions the
H
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 697
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS & ORS.

date of the subsequent Sale Deed i.e. 01.04.2013 when the suit A
property was further sold by Respondent No.1 to Respondent
Nos. 2 & 3. The omission of the date of execution of the Sale
Deed on 02.07.2009 in the prayer clause, was done deliberately
and knowingly, so as to mislead the Court on the issue of limitation.
[Para 15.7][716-B; F-H]
B
6. The delay of over 5 and ½ years after the alleged cause
of action arose in 2009, shows that the suit was clearly barred by
limitation as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The suit
was instituted on 15.12.2014, even though the alleged cause of
action arose in 2009, when the last cheque was delivered to the
Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus of proof C
that the suit was filed within the period of limitation. The plaint is
therefore, liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of
CPC. [Para 15.8][717-A-B]
Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv (1986) Suppl. SCC 315 : [1986]
2 SCR 782; Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. D
M.V. Sea Success I & Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 512 : [2003] 5
Suppl. SCR 851; Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna
Tapovanam (2005) 10 SCC 51 : [2005] 3 SCR 556; T.
Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal & Anr. (1977) 4 SCC
467 : [1978] 1 SCR 742 – relied on. E
Maharaj Shri Manvendrasinhji Jadeja v. Rajmata
Vijaykunverba w/o Late Maharaja Mahedrasinhji
(1998) 2 GLH 823; Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant
Charity Commissioner (2004) 3 SCC 137 : [2004] 1
SCR 1004; Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co. (2007) F
5 SCC 614 : [2007] 6 SCR 608; D. Ramachandran v.
R.V. Janakiraman (1999) 3 SCC 267 : [1999] 1 SCR
983; Vijay Pratap Singh v. DukhHaran Nath Singh AIR
1962 SC 941 : [1962] Suppl. SCR 675; Saleem Bhai v.
State of Maharashtra (2003) 1 SCC 557 : [2002] 5
Suppl. SCR 491; I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate G
Tribunal (1998) 2 SCC 170; Madanuri Sri
Ramachandra Murthy v. Syed Jalal (2017) 13 SCC 174
: [2017] 5 SCR 294; Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v.
Union of India & Anr. (2011) 9 SCC 126 : [2011] 15
H
698 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A SCR 299; State of Punjab v. Gurdev Singh (1991) 4
SCC 1 : [1991] 3 SCR 663; Vidyadhar v. Manikrao &
Anr. (1999) 3 SCC 573 : [1999] 1 SCR 1168;
Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna Singh
(Dead) by LRs. [2019] 4 SCR 1069 – referred to.
B Case Law Reference
[1986] 2 SCR 782 relied on Para 12.1
[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 851 relied on Para 12.3
[2004] 1 SCR 1004 referred to Para 12.6
C [2007] 6 SCR 608 referred to Para 12.7
[1999] 1 SCR 983 referred to Para 12.7
[1962] Suppl. SCR 675 referred to Para 12.9
[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 491 referred to Para 12.9
D [2005] 3 SCR 556 relied on Para 12.10
[1978] 1 SCR 742 relied on Para 12.10
(1998) 2 SCC 170 referred to Para 13
[2017] 5 SCR 294 referred to Para 13
E [2011] 15 SCR 299 referred to Para 14
[1991] 3 SCR 663 referred to Para 13
[1999] 1 SCR 1168 referred to Para 15.3
[2019] 4 SCR 1069 referred to Para 15.8

F CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 9519
of 2019.
From the Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2016 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in First Appeal No. 2324 of 2016.
Harin P. Raval, Sr. Adv., Gaurav Agrawal, Nipun Saxena, Kartikey
G Kanojiya, Ms. Sukanya Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
Nakul Dewan, Sr. Adv., Pradhuman Gohil, Ms. Taruna Singh Gohil,
Ms. Ranu Purohit, Shiva P., Sambit Nanda, Praveen Kumar Rai, Hemal
Kiritkumar Sheth, P.S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari, Ms. Mayuri Nayyar
Chawla, Ms. Anne Mathew, Bharat Sood, Ms. Shruti Jose, Advs. for
H the Respondents.
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 699
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS. & ORS.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
INDU MALHOTRA, J.
1. The present Civil Appealhas been filed to challenge the impugned
Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2016 passedby a Division Bench of
the Gujarat High Court, which affirmed the Order of the Trial Court,
allowing the application filed by Defendant Nos. 2 and 3/Respondent B
Nos. 2 and 3 herein under Order VII Rule 11(d), CPC holding that the
suit filed by the Appellant and Respondent Nos. 9 to 13 herein(hereinafter
referred to as the “Plaintiffs”) was barred by limitation.
2. The subject-matter of the present proceedings pertains to a
plot of agricultural land of old tenure, admeasuring approximately 8701 C
sq.mtrs. in Revenue Survey No.610, Block No.573 situated in village
MotaVarachha, Sub-District Surat (hereinafter referred to as the “suit
property”) which was in the ownership of the Plaintiffs.
3. The land was under restrictive tenure as per Section 73AA of
the Land Revenue Code. The Plaintiffs filed an application dated D
13.05.2008 before the Collector, Surat to obtain permission for selling
the suit property to Respondent No.1/Defendant No.1, which was non-
irrigated, and stated that they had no objection to the sale of the suit
property.
4. The Collector vide Order dated 19.06.2009, after carrying out E
verification of the title of the Plaintiffs, permitted sale of the suit property,
and fixed the sale price of the suit property as per the jantri issued by
the State Government @ Rs.2000/- per sq.mtr., which would work out
to Rs.1,74,02,000/-. The Collector granted permission for the sale subject
to the terms and conditions contained in Section 73AA of the Land F
Revenue Code. It was stipulated that the purchaser shall make the
payment by cheque, and reference of the payment shall be made in the
Sale Deed.
5. After obtaining permission from the Collector, the Plaintiffs
sold the suit property to Respondent No.1 herein vide registered Sale
G
Deed dated 02.07.2009.
Respondent No.1 - purchaser issued 36 cheques for
Rs.1,74,02,000 towards payment of the sale consideration in favour of
the Plaintiffs, the details of which were set out in the registered Sale
Deed dated 02.07.2009.
H
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A 6. The Respondent No.1 subsequently sold the suit property to
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 herein vide registered Sale Deed dated
01.04.2013, for a sale consideration of Rs.2,01,00,000/-.
7. On 15.12.2014, the Plaintiffs filed Special Civil Suit No.718/
2014 before the Principal Civil Judge, Surat against the original purchaser
B i.e. Respondent No. 1, and also impleaded the subsequent purchasers
i.e. Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as defendants. It was inter alia prayed
that the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 be cancelled and declared as being
illegal, void, ineffective and not binding on them, on the ground that the
sale consideration fixed by the Collector,had not been paid in entirety by
Respondent No. 1.
C
The Plaintiffs contended that they were totally illiterate, and were
not able to read and write, and were only able to put their thumb impression
on the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009. The Sale Deed was obtained without
payment of full consideration. The Respondent No.1 had paid only
Rs. 40,000 through 6 cheques, and remaining 30 cheques for Rs.1,73,62,000
D were “bogus” cheques. The Plaintiffs prayed for cancellation of the
Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, and also prayed that the subsequent Sale
Deed dated 01.04.2013 be declared as illegal, void and ineffective; and,the
physical possession of the suit property be restored to the Plaintiffs.
8. Respondent Nos.2 and 3 filed an Application for Rejection of
E the Plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the CPC, contending
that the suit filed by the Plaintiffs was barred by limitation, and that no
cause of action had been disclosed in the plaint.
It was inter alia submitted that the Plaintiffs had admitted the
execution of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 in favour of Respondent
F No.1 before the Sub-Registrar, Surat. The only dispute now sought to be
raised was that they had not received a part of the sale consideration.
This plea was denied as being incorrect.
It was further submitted that if the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009
was being challenged, then the suit ought to have been filed within three
G years i.e. on or before 02.07.2012.
It was further submitted that pursuant to the execution of the
registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, the Plaintiffs had participated in
the proceedings before the Revenue Officer for transfer of the suit
property in the revenue records in favour of Respondent No.1. On that
H
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 701
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS. & ORS. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

basis, the suit property had been transferred to Respondent No.1 vide A
Hakk Patrak Entry No. 6517 dated 24.07.2009. Before certifying the
said entry, notice under Section 135D of the Land Revenue Code had
been duly served on the Plaintiffs, and ever since, Respondent No. 1
had been paying the land revenue on the suit property, and taking the
produce therefrom.
B
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 further submitted that they had purchased
the suit property from Respondent No.1 after verifying the title, and
inspecting the revenue records. The Respondent No.1 had sold the suit
property vide a registered Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013, on payment of
valuable consideration of Rs. 2,01,00,000/-. Pursuant thereto, the suit
property was transferred in the name of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 in the C
revenue records.
It was further submitted that the Plaintiffs, with a view to mislead
the Court, had deliberately filed copies of the 7/12 extracts dated
20.07.2009, which was prior to the mutation being effected in the name
of Respondent No.1. It was submitted that the suit was devoid of any D
merit, and clearly time-barred, and liable to be rejected.
9. The Trial Court carried out a detailed analysis of the averments
in the plaint alongwith the documents filed with the plaint, including the
registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, executed by the Plaintiffs. The
undisputed facts which emerged from the averments in the plaint was E
that the suit property was of restrictive tenure under Section 73AA of
the Land Revenue Code. Since the Plaintiffs were in dire need of money,
and wanted to sell the suit property to Respondent No. 1, they had filed
an application before the Collector, Surat on 13.05.2008 to obtain
permission for sale of the suit property. The Collector vide Order dated F
19.06.2009 granted permission to the Plaintiffs and fixed the sale price
at Rs. 1,74,02,000/- which was to be paid through cheques. It was
contended in the plaint that the Respondent No. 1 had in fact paid only
Rs. 40,000/-, and false cheques of Rs. 1,73,62,000/- were issued, which
remained unpaid.
G
On a perusal of the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009,
[marked as Exhibit 3/9] it was noted that the Plaintiffs had in fact accepted
and acknowledged the payment of the full sale consideration from
Respondent No.1, through cheques which were issued prior to the
execution of the Sale Deed, during the period 07.07.2008 to 02.07.2009.
H
702 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A As per the Plaintiffs, the Sale Deed was executed on 02.07.2009
in favour of Respondent No.1, which was registered before the Office
of the Sub-Registrar, for which the Plaintiffs would have remained
personally present.The transaction having been executed through a
registered document, was in the public domain, and in the knowledge of
the Plaintiffs right from the beginning.
B
The Trial Court noted that there was no averment in the plaint
that the cheques had not been received by them. Once the cheques
were received by them, in the normal course, they would have presented
the cheques for encashment within 6 months.The Court held that had
the Plaintiffs not been able to encash 30 cheques, a complaint ought to
C have been filed, or proceedings initiated for recovery of the unpaid sale
consideration. There was however, nothing on record to show that the
Plaintiffs had made any complaint in this regard for a period of over 5
years.
The Plaintiffs also failed to produce the returned cheques, their
D passbooks, bank statements, or any other document to support their
averments in the plaint.
A notice for transfer of the suit property in the revenue records
under Section 135D was served on the Plaintiffs, to which no objection
was raised. The name of Respondent No. 1 was entered into the revenue
E records, which was certified by the Revenue Officer.
The Trial Court held that the period of limitation for filing the suit
was 3 years from the date of execution of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009.
The suit was filed on 15.12.2014. The cause of action as per the averments
in the plaint had arisen when the Defendant No.1/Respondent No.1 had
issued ‘false’ or ‘bogus’ cheques to the Plaintiffs in 2009. The suit for
F
cancellation of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 could have been filed by
2012, as per Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963.The suit was
however filed on 15.12.2014, which was barred by limitation.
The suit property was subsequently sold by Respondent No.1 to
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 by a registered Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013.
G Before purchasing the suit property, the Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 had
issued a public notice on 14.08.2012. The Plaintiffs did not raise any
objection to the same.
The Trial Court, on the basis of the settled position in law, held
that the suit of the Plaintiffs was barred by limitation, and allowed the
H application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 703
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS. & ORS. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

10. Aggrieved by the Judgment dated 12.08.2016 passed by the A
Sr. Civil Judge, Surat, the Plaintiffs filed First Appeal No.2324/2016 before
the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad.
The Division Bench of the High Court took note of the fact that
the Plaintiffs did not deny having executed the registered Sale Deed
dated 02.07.2009 in favour of Respondent No.1. In the said Sale Deed, B
it was specifically admitted and acknowledged by the Plaintiffs that they
had received the full sale consideration. The Sale Deed contained the
complete particulars with respect to the payment of sale consideration
by Respondent No. 1 through 36 cheques, the particulars of which were
recorded therein. Since the execution of the Sale Deed was not disputed,
and the conveyance was duly registered in the presence of the Plaintiffs C
before the Sub-Registrar, the Sale Deed could not be declared to be
void, illegal, or ineffective.
The suit property was subsequently sold by Respondent No. 1 in
favour of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 vide registered Sale Deed dated
01.04.2013 for a sale consideration of Rs. 2,01,00,000/-. Respondent D
Nos. 2 and 3 were bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration.
The present suit for cancellation of the Sale Deed was filed by
the Plaintiffs after a period of over 5 years after the execution of the
Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, and 1 year after the execution of the Sale
Deed dated 01.04.2013 by Respondent No.1. It was noted that prior to E
the institution of the suit on 15.12.2014, at no point of time did the Plaintiffs
raise any grievance whatsoever,of not having received the full sale
consideration mentioned in the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009. It was for
the first time that such an allegation was made after over 5 years from
the date of execution of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009. F
Since the suit in respect of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 was
held to be barred by law of limitation, the High Court was of the view
that the suit could not be permitted to be continued even with respect to
the subsequent Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013. The Plaintiffs had not raised
any allegation against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, and there was no privity G
of contract between the Plaintiffs and Respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
The High Court rightly affirmed the findings of the Trial Court,
and held that the suit was barred by limitation, since it was filed beyond
the period of limitation of three years.
H
704 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A 11. Aggrieved by the impugned Judgment and Order dated
12.08.2016 passed by the High Court, the original Plaintiff No.1 has
filed the present Civil Appeal.
12. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, perused
the plaint and documents filed therewith, as also the written submissions
B filed on behalf of the parties.
12.1 We will first briefly touch upon the law applicable for
deciding an application under Order VII Rule 11CPC, which
reads as under:
“11. Rejection of plaint.– The plaint shall be rejected
C in the following cases:–
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed in undervalued, and the
plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the
valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to
D do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the
plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and
the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply
the requisite stamp-paper within a time to be fixed by
E the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the
plaint to be barred by any law;
(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions
F of rule 9
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the
correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite
stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court,
for reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff
G was prevent by any cause of exceptional nature for
correction the valuation or supplying the requisite
stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the time fixed
by the Court and that refusal to extend such time would
cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.”

H (emphasis supplied)
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 705
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS. & ORS. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

The remedy under Order VII Rule 11 is an independent and special A
remedy, wherein the Court is empowered to summarily dismiss a suit at
the threshold, without proceeding to record evidence, and conducting a
trial, on the basis of the evidence adduced, if it is satisfied that the action
should be terminated on any of the grounds contained in this provision.
The underlying object of Order VII Rule 11 (a) is that if in a suit, B
no cause of action is disclosed, or the suit is barred by limitation under
Rule 11 (d), the Court would not permit the plaintiff to unnecessarily
protract the proceedings in the suit. In such a case, it would be necessary
to put an end to the sham litigation, so that further judicial time is not
wasted.
C
In Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi1 this Court held that the whole
purpose of conferment of powers under this provision is to ensure that a
litigation which is meaningless, and bound to prove abortive, should not
be permitted to waste judicial time of the court, in the following words :
“12. …The whole purpose of conferment of such power is to D
ensure that a litigation which is meaningless, and bound to
prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the time of
the Court, and exercise the mind of the respondent. The sword
of Damocles need not be kept hanging over his head
unnecessarily without point or purpose. Even if an ordinary
civil litigation, the Court readily exercises the power to reject E
a plaint, if it does not disclose any cause of action.”
12.2 The power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action
is, however,a drastic one, and the conditions enumerated in
Order VII Rule 11 are required to be strictly adhered to.
F
12.3 Under Order VII Rule 11, a duty is cast on the Court to
determine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action by
scrutinizing the averments in the plaint2, read in conjunction
with the documents relied upon, or whether the suit is barred
by any law.
G

1
1986 Supp. SCC 315
Followed in Maharaj Shri Manvendrasinhji Jadeja v. Rajmata Vijaykunverba w/o Late
Maharaja Mahedrasinhji, (1998) 2 GLH 823
2
Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V. Sea Success I & Anr., (2004) 9 SCC
512. H
706 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A 12.4 Order VII Rule 14(1) provides for production of documents,
on which the plaintiff places reliance in his suit, which reads
as under :
“Order 7 Rule 14: Production of document on which
plaintiff sues or relies.–
B (1)Where a plaintiff sues upon a document or relies upon
document in his possession or power in support of his
claim, he shall enter such documents in a list, and shall
produce it in Court when the plaint is presented by him
and shall, at the same time deliver the document and a
C copy thereof, to be filed with the plaint.
(2)Where any such document is not in the possession or
power of the plaintiff, he shall, wherever possible, state
in whose possession or power it is.
(3)A document which ought to be produced in Court by
D the plaintiff when the plaint is presented, or to be entered
in the list to be added or annexed to the plaint but is
not produced or entered accordingly, shall not, without
the leave of the Court, be received in evidence on his
behalf at the hearing of the suit.
E (4)Nothing in this rule shall apply to document produced
for the cross examination of the plaintiff ’s witnesses,
or, handed over to a witness merely to refresh his
memory.”
(emphasis supplied)
F
Having regard to Order VII Rule 14 CPC, the
documents filed alongwith the plaint, are required to be taken
into consideration for deciding the application under Order
VII Rule 11 (a). When a document referred to in the plaint,
forms the basis of the plaint, it should be treated as a part
G of the plaint.
12.5 In exercise of power under this provision, the Court would
determine if the assertions made in the plaint are contrary
to statutory law, or judicial dicta, for deciding whether a
case for rejecting the plaint at the threshold is made out.
H
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 707
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS. & ORS. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

12.6 At this stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written A
statement and application for rejection of the plaint on the
merits,would be irrelevant, and cannot be adverted to, or
taken into consideration.3
12.7 The test for exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11
is that if the averments made in the plaint are taken in B
entirety, in conjunction with the documents relied upon, would
the same result in a decree being passed. This test was laid
down in Liverpool & London S.P. & I Assn. Ltd. v. M.V.
Sea Success I&Anr.,4 which reads as :
“139. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or C
not is essentially a question of fact. But whether it does
or does not must be found out from reading the plaint
itself. For the said purpose, the averments made in the
plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The
test is as to whether if the averments made in the plaint
are taken to be correct in their entirety, a decree would D
be passed.”
In Hardesh Ores (P.) Ltd. v. Hede & Co.5 the Court
further held that it is not permissible to cull out a sentence
or a passage, and to read it in isolation. It is the substance,
and not merely the form, which has to be looked into. The E
plaint has to be construed as it stands, without addition or
subtraction of words. If the allegations in the plaint prima
facie show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon
an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact.6
12.8 If on a meaningful reading of the plaint, it is found that the F
suit is manifestly vexatious and without any merit, and does
not disclose a right to sue, the court would be justified in
exercising the power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
12.9 The power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC may be exercised
by the Court at any stage of the suit, either before registering G

3
Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137
4
(2004) 9 SCC 512.
5
(2007) 5 SCC 614.
6
D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, (1999) 3 SCC 267; See also Vijay Pratap
Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC 941. H
708 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A the plaint, or after issuing summons to the defendant, or
before conclusion of the trial, as held by this Court in the
judgment of Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra.7 The
plea that once issues are framed, the matter must necessarily
go to trial was repelled by this Court in Azhar Hussain
(supra).
B
12.10 The provision of Order VII Rule 11 is mandatory in nature.
It states that the plaint “shall” be rejected if any of the
grounds specified in clause (a) to (e) are made out. If the
Court finds that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action,
or that the suit is barred by any law, the Court has no option,
C but to reject the plaint.
13. “Cause of action” means every fact which would be necessary
for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to
judgment. It consists of a bundle of material facts, which are necessary
for the plaintiff to prove in order to entitle him to the reliefs claimed in
D the suit.
In Swamy Atmanand v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam8 this Court
held :
“24. A cause of action, thus, means every fact, which if
E traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove an
order to support his right to a judgment of the court. In other
words, it is a bundle of facts, which taken with the law
applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against
the defendant. It must include some act done by the defendant
since in the absence of such an act, no cause of action can
F possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of
the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which
it is founded”
(emphasis supplied)
In T. Arivandandamv. T.V. Satyapal & Anr.9 this Court held that
G
while considering an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC what is

7
(2003) 1 SCC 557.
8
(2005) 10 SCC 51.
9
(1977) 4 SCC 467.
H
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 709
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS. & ORS. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

required to be decided is whether the plaint discloses a real cause of A
action, or something purely illusory, in the following words : -
‘‘5. …The learned Munsiff must remember that if on a
meaningful – not formal – reading of the plaint it is manifestly
vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear
right to sue, he should exercise his power under O. VII, R. 11, B
C.P.C. taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is
fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a
cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing …”
(emphasis supplied)
Subsequently, in I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debt Recovery Appellate C
Tribunal,10 this Court held that law cannot permit clever drafting which
creates illusions of a cause of action. What is required is that a clear
right must be made out in the plaint.
If, however, by clever drafting of the plaint, it has created the
illusion of a cause of action, this Court in Madanuri Sri Ramachandra D
Murthy v. Syed Jalal11 held that it should be nipped in the bud, so that
bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage.
The Court must be vigilant against any camouflage or
suppression, and determine whether the litigation is utterly vexatious,
and an abuse of the process of the court. E
14. The Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes a time-limit for the
institution of all suits, appeals, and applications. Section 2(j) defines the
expression “period of limitation” to mean the period of limitation prescribed
in the Schedule for suits, appeals or applications. Section 3 lays down
that every suit instituted after the prescribed period, shall be dismissed F
even though limitation may not have been set up as a defence. If a suit
is not covered by any specific article, then it would fall within the residuary
article.
Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, prescribe the
period of limitation for filing a suit where a declaration is sought, or G
cancellation of an instrument, or rescission of a contract, which reads as
under :

10
(1998) 2 SCC 170.
11
(2017) 13 SCC 174.
H
710 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A Descrip tion of suit Period of limitation Time from which period
begins to run
58. To obtain any other Three years When the right to sue first
declaration. accrues.
59. To cancel or set aside Three years When the facts entitling the
an instrument or decree or plaintiff to have the
for the rescission of a instrument or decree
B contract. cancelled or set aside or
the contract rescinded first
become known to him.

The period of limitation prescribed under Articles 58 and 59 of the
1963 Act is three years, which commences from the date when the right
to sue first accrues.
C
In Khatri Hotels Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.,12
this Court held that the use of the word ‘first’ between the words ‘sue’
and ‘accrued’, would mean that if a suit is based on multiple causes of
action, the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when the
right to sue first accrues. That is, if there are successive violations of the
D right, it would not give rise to a fresh cause of action, and the suit will be
liable to be dismissed, if it is beyond the period of limitation counted from
the date when the right to sue first accrued.
A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdev
13
Singh, held that the Court must examine the plaint and determine when
E the right to sue first accrued to the plaintiff, and whether on the assumed
facts, the plaint is within time. The words “right to sue” means the right
to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. The right to sue accrues
only when the cause of action arises. The suit must be instituted when
the right asserted in the suit is infringed, or when there is a clear and
F unequivocal threat to infringe such right by the defendant against whom
the suit is instituted.
Order VII Rule 11(d) provides that where a suit appears from the
averments in the plaint to be barred by any law, the plaint shall be rejected.
15. Analysis and Findings
G
We have carefully perused the averments in the plaint read with
the documents relied upon.
15.1 On a reading of the plaint and the documents relied upon, it
is clear that the Plaintiffs have admitted the execution of
12
(2011) 9 SCC 126.
H 13
(1991) 4 SCC 1.
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 711
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS. & ORS. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 in favour of A
Defendant No.1/Respondent No.1 herein.
Para 5 of the plaint reads as :
“(5) …Thus, subject of the aforesaid terms the plaintiffs
had executed sale deed selling the suit property to the
opponent no.1 vide sale deed dated 02/07/2009 bearing B
Sr.No. 5158…”
The case made out in the Plaint is that even though
they had executed the registeredSale Deed dated
02.07.2009 for a sale consideration of Rs.1,74,02,000,an
amount of only Rs.40,000 was paid to them. The remaining C
31 cheques mentioned in the Sale Deed, which covered the
balance amount of Rs.1,73,62,000 were alleged to be
“bogus” or “false”, and allegedly remained unpaid.
We find the averments in the Plaint completely
contrary to the recitals in the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, D
which was admittedly executed by the Plaintiffs in favour
of Respondent No.1. In the Sale Deed, the Plaintiffs have
expressly and unequivocally acknowledged that the entire
sale consideration was “paid” by Defendant No.1/
Respondent No.1 herein to the Plaintiffs. E
Clauses 3 and 4 of the Sale Deed are extracted
hereinbelow for ready reference : -
“Since the full amount of consideration of the sale as
decided above, has since been paid by you the Vendees
to we the Vendors of this sale deed, for which we the F
Vendors of this sale deed acknowledge the same so, we
or our descendants, guardian or legal heirs is to take
any dispute or objection in future that such amount is
not received, or is received less, and if we do so then,
the same shall be void by this deed and, if any loss or
G
damage occurs due to the same then, we the Vendors of
this sale deed and descendants, guardians, legal heirs
of we the vendors are liable to the pay the same to you
the vendees or your descendants, guardian, legal heirs
and you can recover the same by court proceedings.
H
712 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A (4) We the party of Second part i.e. Vendors of the sale
deed since received full consideration on the above
facts, the physical possession, occupancy of the land
or the property mentioned in this sale deed has been
handed over to you the Vendee of this sale deed, and
that has been occupied and taken in possession of the
B
land or property mentioned in this sale deed by you the
Vendee of this sale deed by coming at the site and
therefore, we the Vendors of this sale deed have not to
raise any dispute in the future that the possession of
the land or the property has not been handed over to
C you. …”
(emphasis supplied)
The Sale Deed records that the 36 cheques covering
the entire sale consideration of Rs.1,74,02,000 were “paid”
to the Plaintiffs, during the period between 07.07.2008 to
D 02.07.2009.
15.2 If the case made out in the Plaint is to be believed, it would
mean that almost 99% of the sale consideration i.e.
Rs.1,73,62,000 allegedly remained unpaid throughout. It is,
however inconceivable that if the payments had remained
E unpaid, the Plaintiffs would have remained completely silent
for a period of over 5 and ½ years, without even issuing a
legal notice for payment of the unpaid sale consideration,
or instituting any proceeding for recovery of the amount, till
the filing of the present suit in December 2014.
F 15.3 The Plaintiffs have made out a case of alleged non-payment
of a part of the sale consideration in the Plaint, and prayed
for the relief of cancellation of the Sale Deed on this ground.
Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides
as under :
G
“54. ‘Sale’ defined.—‘Sale’ is a transfer of ownership
in exchange for a price paid or promised or part-paid
and part-promised.”
The definition of “sale” indicates that there must be
a transfer of ownership from one person to another i.e.
H
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 713
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS. & ORS. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

transfer of all rights and interest in the property, which was A
possessed by the transferor to the transferee. The transferor
cannot retain any part of the interest or right in the property,
or else it would not be a sale. The definition further indicates
that the transfer of ownership has to be made for a “price
paid or promised or part paid and part promised”. Price
B
thus constitutes an essential ingredient of the transaction of
sale.
In Vidyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr.14 this Court held
that the words “price paid or promised or part paid and part
promised” indicates that actual payment of the whole of
the price at the time of the execution of the Sale Deed is C
not a sine qua non for completion of the sale. Even if the
whole of the price is not paid, but the document is executed,
and thereafter registered, the sale would be complete, and
the title would pass on to the transferee under the
transaction. The non-payment of a part of the sale price D
would not affect the validity of the sale. Once the title in
the property has already passed, even if the balance sale
consideration is not paid, the sale could not be invalidated
on this ground. In order to constitute a “sale”, the parties
must intend to transfer the ownership of the property, on
the agreement to pay the price either in praesenti, or in E
future. The intention is to be gathered from the recitals of
the sale deed, the conduct of the parties, and the evidence
on record.
In view of the law laid down by this Court, even if
the averments of the Plaintiffs are taken to be true, that the F
entire sale consideration had not in fact been paid, it could
not be a ground for cancellation of the Sale Deed. The
Plaintiffs may have other remedies in law for recovery of
the balance consideration, but could not be granted the relief
of cancellation of the registered Sale Deed. G
We find that the suit filed by the Plaintiffs is vexatious,
meritless, and does not disclose a right to sue. The plaint is
liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (a).

14
(1999) 3 SCC 573.
H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A 15.4 The Plaintiffs have averred in the plaint that the period of
limitation commenced on 21.11.2014, when they obtained a
copy of the index of the Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009, and
discovered the alleged fraud committed by Defendant No.1.
The relevant extract from the plaint in this regard is set
B out hereinbelow :–
“(7) … Not only that but also, on obtaining the copy of
the index of the sale deed of the acts committed by the
Opponent No.1, 4, 5 and on obtaining the certified copy
of the sale deed, we the plaintiffs could come to know
C on 21-11-2014 that, the Opponent No.1 had in collusion
with Opponent No.4, 5 mentioned the false cheques
stated below in the so called sale deed with intention to
commit fraud and no any consents of we the plaintiffs
have also been obtained in that regard. The said cheques
have not been received to we the plaintiffs or no any
D amounts of the said cheques have been credited in
accounts of we the plaintiffs. Thus, the cheques which
have been mentioned in the agreement caused to have
been executed by the Opponent No.1, the false cheques
have been mentioned of the said amounts. Not only that
E but also, the agricultural land under the suit had been
sold by the Opponent No.1 to the Opponent No.2
Dillipbhai Gordhanbhai Sonani and the Opponent
No.3, Laljibhai Gordhanbhai Sonani on 1-4-2013 for
Rs.2,01,00,000/- as if the said sale deed was having
clear title deeds. On taking out the copy of the said
F sale deed with seal and signature on 21-11-2014, it could
come to the knowledge of we the plaintiffs. We the
plaintiffs have not done any signature or witness on
the said agreement. The said agreement is not binding
to we the plaintiffs. Since the said agreement is since
G null, void and invalid as well as illegal, therefore, no
any Court fee stamp duty is required to be paid by we
the plaintiff on the said agreement and for that we the
plaintiffs rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court
in A.I.R.2010, Supreme Court, Page No. 2807. …”

H (emphasis supplied)
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 715
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS. & ORS. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

The plea taken in the plaint that they learnt of the A
alleged fraud in 2014, on receipt of the index of the Sale
Deed, is wholly misconceived, since the receipt of the index
would not constitute the cause of action for filing the suit.
On a reading of the plaint, it is clear that the cause of
action arose on the non-payment of the bulk of the sale B
consideration, which event occurred in the year 2009. The
plea taken by the Plaintiffs is to create an illusory cause of
action, so as to overcome the period of limitation. The plea
raised is rejected as being meritless and devoid of any truth.
15.5 The conduct of the Plaintiffs in not taking recourse to legal C
action for over a period of 5 and ½ years from the execution
of the Sale Deed in 2009, for payment of the balance sale
consideration, also reflects that the institution of the present
suit is an after-thought. The Plaintiffs apparently filed the
suit after the property was further sold by Respondent No.1
to Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, to cast a doubt on the title of D
Respondent No.1 to the suit property.
15.6 The Plaintiffs have placed reliance on the Order of the
Collector dated 19.06.2009 with the plaint. The Order
reveals that the permission was granted subject to the
fulfilment of certain conditions. Clause 4 of the permission E
states that :
“(4) The purchaser of the land/property, shall have to
make the payment of the price of the land by cheque
and its reference shall require to be made in the Sale
Deed.” F
If the Plaintiffs had a genuine grievance of non-
payment of the balance sale consideration, the Plaintiffs
could have moved for revocation of the permission granted
by the Collector on 19.06.2009.
G
Clause 6 of the Order provided that :
“(6) On making violation of any of the aforesaid terms,
the permission shall automatically be treated as
cancelled and, separate proceeding shall be taken up
for the violation of the terms and conditions.”
H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 5 S.C.R.

A The Plaintiffs did not make any complaint whatsoever
to the Collector at any point of time. The conduct of the
Plaintiffs is reflective of lack of bona fide.
15.7 The present case is a classic case, where the plaintiffs by
clever drafting of the plaint, attempted to make out an illusory
B cause of action, and bring the suit within the period of
limitation.
Prayer 1 of the plaint reads as :
“1) The suit property being agricultural land of old
tenure of Revenue Survey No.610 whose block Number
C is 573 situated at village Mota Varachha, Sub-district :
Surat city, Dis : Surat has been registered by the
opponent No.1 of this case in office of the Sub-Registrar
(Katar Gam) at Surat vide Serial No.5158 in book No.1.
Since, the same is illegal, void, in-effective and since
the amount of consideration is received by the plaintiffs,
D and by holding that it is not binding to the plaintiffs
and to cancel the same, and since the sale deed as
aforesaid suit property has been executed by the
opponent No.1 to the opponent No.2,3, it is registered
in the office of Sub-registrar, Surat (Rander) on 01/04/
E 2013 vide serial No.443 which is not binding to we the
plaintiffs. Since, it is illegal, void, in-effective and
therefore, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to cancel
the same and this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to send
the Yadi in that regard to the Sub-registrar, Surat (Karat
Gam) and the Sub-Registrar (Rander) in regard to the
F cancellation of both the aforesaid documents.”
The Plaintiffs deliberately did not mention the
date of the registered Sale Deed dated 02.07.2009 executed
by them in favour of Respondent No.1, since it would be
evident that the suit was barred by limitation. The prayer
G however mentions the date of the subsequent Sale Deed
i.e. 01.04.2013 when the suit property was further sold by
Respondent No.1 to Respondent Nos. 2 & 3.
The omission of the date of execution of the Sale
Deed on 02.07.2009 in the prayer clause, was done
H deliberately and knowingly, so as to mislead the Court on
the issue of limitation.
DAHIBEN v. ARVINDBHAI KALYANJI BHANUSALI 717
(GAJRA) (D) THR LRS. & ORS. [INDU MALHOTRA, J.]

15.8 The delay of over 5 and½ years after the alleged cause of A
action arose in 2009,shows that the suit was clearly barred
by limitation as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The suit was instituted on 15.12.2014, even though the alleged
cause of action arose in 2009, when the last cheque was
delivered to the Plaintiffs.
B
The Plaintiffs have failed to discharge the onus of proof
that the suit was filed within the period of limitation. The
plaint is therefore, liable to be rejected under Order VII
Rule 11 (d) of CPC.
Reliance is placed on the recent judgment of this Court C
rendered in Raghwendra Sharan Singh v. Ram Prasanna
Singh (Dead) by LRs.15 whereinthis Court held the suit
would be barred by limitation under Article 59 of the
Limitation Act, if it was filed beyond three years of the
execution of the registered deed.
15.9 The Plaintiffs have also prayed for cancellation of the D
subsequent Sale Deed dated 01.04.2013 executed by
Respondent No.1 in favour of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3;
since the suit in respect of the 1 st Sale Deed dated
02.07.2009 is rejected both under clauses (a) and (d) of
Order VII Rule 11, the prayer with respect to the 2nd Sale E
Deed dated 01.04.2003 cannot be entertained.
16. The present suit filed by the Plaintiffs is clearly an abuse of
the process of the court, and bereft of any merit.
The Trial Court has rightly exercised the power under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC, by allowing the application filed by Respondent Nos.2 & F
3, which was affirmed by the High Court.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present Civil Appeal is
dismissed with costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- payable by the Appellant to
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3, within a period of twelve weeks from the date
of this Judgment. G
Pending applications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.

Ankit Gyan Appeal dismissed.

15
Civil Appeal No.2960/2019 decided on 13.03.2019. H