Supreme Court of India
DAHYABHAI RANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR.versusSTATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 421
- Decided
- 23 July 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- P SATHASIVAM
Holding
The Court held that the procedural requirements of the Land Acquisition Act were satisfied and the acquisition for a school was valid.
Summary
The appellants, owners of a parcel of land in Surat, challenged the State of Gujarat's acquisition of the land for a primary school, alleging procedural defects under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. They claimed no hearing under Section 5A, no locality publication under Section 6(2), the award under Section 11A was beyond the two‑year limit, and that the land, now classified as residential, could not be used for a school. The Court examined the counter‑affidavits and found that a proper notice under Section 4 was published, the hearing was held on multiple dates, locality notices were displayed, and the award was issued within two years of the last publication on 19‑04‑1990. It also held that the land was reserved for school under the Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976, and that the authorities were justified in establishing a school. Consequently, all the appellants' objections were rejected and the acquisition upheld.
Issues considered
- Was a hearing/enquiry under Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, conducted as required?
- Was the locality publication under Section 6(2) of the Act effected?
- Was the award under Section 11A passed within the two‑year period from the last publication of the Section 6 declaration?
- Does the re‑classification of the land as residential preclude its acquisition for a school under the development plan?
- Is the land suitable for establishing a primary school given its residential congestion?
Legislation cited
- Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976s. 17, s. 20
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11A, s. 4, s. 5, s. 5A, s. 6, s. 6(2)
Subjects
Land acquisitionSection 5A hearingSection 6 publicationSection 11A award limitationSchool establishmentGujarat Town Planning ActPublic purposeCompensation
Judgment
[2010] 8 S.C.R. 575
DAHYABHAI RANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR. A
v.
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5882 of 2010)
JULY 23, 2010
B
[P. SATHASIVAM AND ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
s.5A - Hearing/enquiry under - Plea of landowners that c
hearing uls. 5A not held - Held: The affidavit of land
acquisition officer specifically stated that hearing of objections
was fixed from time (o time and landowners were heard
through their lawyers - In view of specific information, it is
incorrect to say that enquiry/hearing in terms of s.5A was not D
held.
s. 6(2) - Locality publication - s. 6 notification published
in gazette and public notice displayed at the office of
Mamlatdar of the concerned ward - Therefore it is incorrect
to say that no publication of notice in the locality u/s. 6(2) was E
effected.
s. 11 A - Award - Limitation - s. 6 notification published
on 19.4.1990-Award uls. 11A published on 18.4.1992- Held:
Award published within 2 years from publication of s. 6 F
notification.
Acquired land - Plea that land was designated as
residential and hence authorities cannot establish a school
thereon - Held: Not tenable as land in question was reserved
for school in the sanctioned development plan u/s. 17 of G
Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 -
It is for the authorities to take a decision understanding the
need and necessity of establishing primary school in the area.
575 H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A The respondent-State initiated acquisition
proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the
purpose of construction of school on the suit land owned
by the appellants. The appellants challenged the
acquisition proceedings on the ground that there was no
B hearing/enquiry in terms of Section SA of the Act; that the
locality publication was not effected under Section 6(2);
that the award under Section 11 A was not passed within
two years from the date of last publication of notification
under Section 6 which vitiated the acquisition
c proceeding; that after change of classification of the suit
land namely, residential use, the respondents could not
establish a prima~y school; and that in view of the fact
that the area was designated as residential congested by
houses on either side, it was not a fit place for
establishing a school.
0
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. With regard to the first objection as to the
enquiry under Section SA of the Land Acquisition Act,
E 1894, though the appellants stated that they were npt
given an opportunity of being heard, however, in the
counter affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition
Officer, Surat before the High Court it was specifically
asserted that notification under Section 4 in the Official
F Gazette was published on 09.03.1989, public notice was
displayed at the office of Mamlatdar of the concerned
Ward on 20.04.1989 and hearing of objections under
Section SA was fixed on 20.0S.1989. In para 4 of the
counter affidavit, the Land Acquisition Officer specifically
stated that appellants were given several opportunities
G for hearing their objections from time to time. The hearing
was fixed on 29.05.1989, OS.06.1989, 12.06.1989,
20.09.1989, 28.09.1989 and 16.10.1989 and the appellants
were heard through their lawyer. In view of the above
H
DAHYABHAI RANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR. v. 577
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.
specific information, the contention contrary to the same A
is liable to be rejected. [Para 8] [582-F-H; 583-A-B]
2. With regard to the second objection that locality
publication was not effected under Section 6(2) of the Ac.t,
in the same counter affidavit filed by the Land Acquisition
8
Officer, it was asserted that publication of notification
under Section 6 was published in the Gazette dated
21.03.1990. Public Notice displayed at the office of
Mamlatdar of the concerned Ward on 19.04.1990. In the
light of the said information, the claim that no publication C
of notice in the locality under Section 6(2) cannot be
accepted. [Para 9] [583-B-C]
Avinash Mehrotra v. Union of India and Ors. (2009) 6
SCC 398; Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Anr. v. Makrand
Singh and Ors. (1995) 2 SCC 497; Eugenio Misquita and D
Ors. v. State of Goa and Ors.(1997) 8 SCC 47; S.H,
Rangappa v. State of Karnataka and Anr. (2002) 1 SCC 538;
. General Manager, Department of Telecommunications,
Thiruvananthapuram v. Jacob Slo Kochuvarkey Kalliath
(Dead) By Lrs. and Ors. (2003) .9 SCC 662; Bihar State E
Housing Board v. State of Bihar and Ors. (2003) 10 SCC 1;
Kunwar Pal Singh (dead) by Lrs. v. State of UP. and Ors.
(2007) 5 sec 85 - relied on.
3. With regard to the third objection that the award
under Section 11A was not made within two years from F
the date of last publication of Notification under Section
6, it is clearly indicated in the reply affidavit filed by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer that the notification
under Section 6 was last published on 19.04.1990, by
affixing a copy of the Notification on the notice board of G
the office of City Mamlatdar, Surat and also by affixing the
same in ward No.4 of Surat city. Hence the period of two
years stipulated in Section 11A would begin to run from
19.04.1990 and, therefore, the publication of the award
H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A under Section 11 of the Act on 18.04.1992 was within the
stipulated time limit of two years. In such circumstances,
this contention also is liable to be rejected. [Paras 10, 17)
[583-D; 594-E-G)
4. The counter affidavit filed by the Director of
8
Planning, Surat Municipal Corporation stated that the suit
land was reserved for school purpose in the development
plan sanctioned by the State Government under the
provisions of Gujarat Town Planning and Urban
Development Act, 1976. As per Section 20 of the said Act,
C the acquiring body, namely, Surat Municipal Corporation
is required to acquire the land under the Land
Acquisition Act as the impugned land was reserved for
school purpose. Further, inasmuch as the suit land was
kept under reservation for school in the sanctioned
D development plan for the State Government under
Section, 17 of the Gujarat Town Planning & Urban
Development Act, it is the duty of the Corporation to
acquire the land for implementing the provisions of the
same. In view of the same, this contention is also liable
E to be rejected. [Para 18) [595-A-D]
5. In respect of the claim of the appellants that in view
of existence of many schools in and around the vicinity,
there was no need to establish a school in the land of the
F appellants, the Director of Planning, Surat Municipal
Corporation, in the counter affidavit stated that there was
no municipal school near the site in question and that the
schools of the Corporation which were located in
Begampura, Moti Talkies, Mumbaivad, Shetranjivad,
Viramgami Mahalia were very far from the land under
G acquisition and due to increase in population in the city
of Surat, they were justified in establishing a school for
providing primary education to the children in the said
area. In respect of 'need' and 'necessity', it is for the
Government and their authorities to take a decision
H
DAHYABHAI RANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR. v. 579
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS.
considering various aspects. If such a decision was taken A
based on materials it was not for the Court to doubt their
claim. It was also stated that the Surat Municipal
Corporation was required to pay the amount of
compensation to the tune of Rs.10,54,901.95 and the said
amount was already deposited with the Government B
Treasury on 27.05.1992. In view of the said information,
the contention of the appellants is to be rejected. [Para
19] [595-D-H; 596-A]
Avinash Mehrotra v. Union of India and Ors. (2009) 6
sec 398 - referred to. c
Case Law Reference:
(2009) 6 sec 398 relied on Para 5
(1995) 2 sec 497 relied on Para 11 D
(1997) 8 sec 47 relied on Para 12
(2002) 1 sec 538 relied on Para 13
(2003) 9 sec 662 relied on Para 14
E
(2003) 1o sec 1 relied on Para 15
(2001) 5 sec 85 relied on Para 16
2009) 6 sec 398 referred to Paras 5, 20
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
5882 of 2010.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.01.2009 of High
Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No.
5663 of 1990. G
Ranjit Kumar, Prashant G. Desai, B.K. Biju, Dinesh Kumar
Garg, Kaushal D. Pandya, S.C. Patel, Hemantika Wahi and
Renuka Sahu for the appearing parties.
H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P. SATHASIVAM, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 12.01.2009 passed by the High Court of Gujarat at
B Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 5663 of 1990 with
Civil Application No. 3458 of 2006 whereby the High Court
dismissed the petition preferred by the appellants herein.
3. Brief facts:
c a) According to the appellants, they are owners of the
land in question measuring 848.66 sq.m., Nandh No. 2190/
P, Ward No.4 of Surat City. The State of Gujarat initiated
acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") for construction
D of a school in the land in question u.nder the Surat Municipal
Corporation. The appellants objected to the said
acquisition on the ground that:
(i) this is the only land for them for carrying on the business
E of washermen and they are using this land for the purpose
of their livelihood.
(ii) There are vacanUopen lands adjoining to the land in
question.
F (iii) Within a radius of 1 km., number of schools are
available particularly being run by the Surat Municipal
Corporation.
(iv) While acquiring the land, the respondents have not
G followed the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 6 and 11A of the
Act
b) On the other hand, it is the stand of the State
Government that:
H
DAHYABHAI RANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR. v. S81
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
(i) the land is required for establishing a primary school A
by the Surat Municipal Corporation.
(ii) They fully complied with the statutory notices and other
requirements.
(iii) The appellants did not avail the opportunity of B
participating in the SA enquiry by filing objections.
(iv) The declaration made under Section 6 of the Act is
within time.
(v) Award under Section 11A has been passed within the
c
statutory period. Since the establishment of school is for
a public purpose and in view of compliance of all the
statutory formalities, there is no merit in the appeal and
prayed for dismissal of the same.
D
4. Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
appellants and Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned senior counsel
for the Surat Municipal Corporation and Ms. Hemantika Wahi,
learned counsel for the State of Gujarat.
E
S. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
appellants has raised the following contentions:
a) there was no hearing/enquiry in terms of Section SA
of the Act which is mandatory;
F
b) the locality publication was not effected under
Section 6(2);
c) the Award passed under Section 11A was not made
within two years from the date of last publication of G
notification under Section 6, therefore the .acquisition is
vitiated;
d) after change of classification of the land in question,
namely, residential use, the resp_ondents are not permitted
to establish a primary school which is not permissible; H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 8 S.C.R.
A e) In view of the fact that the area being designated as
residential congested by houses on either side, it is not a
fit place for establishing a school as observed by this Court
in Avinash Mehrotra vs. Union of India and Others, (2009)
6 sec 398.
B
6. On the other hand, ·Mr. Prashant G. Desai, learned
senior counsel for the Surat Municipal Corporation has
submitted that in view of Section 12 (2) (b) and Section 20 (1)
of the Gujarat Town Planning & Urban Development Act, 1976,
C the State Government is well within their powers in establishing
a primary school in Surat. He further submitted that all the
statutory provisions have been strictly complied with and the
declaration under Section 6 and Award under Section 11A
were duly made within the prescribed time. Ms. Hemantika
Wahi, learned counsel appearing for the State, by drawing our
D attention to specific averments in the counter affidavit submitted
that the appellants having not filed objections in the enquiry
under Section 5A, all the three modes of publication as
contemplated under Section 6 were duly published and made
and Award passed within the prescribed period, there is no
E infirmity in the acquisition proceedings and prayed for dismissal
of the appeal.
7. We have considered the r.ival contentions and perused
the relevant materials.
F 8. With regard to the first objection as to enquiry under
Section 5A of the Act though the appellants have stated that
they were not given an opportunity of being heard, in the counter
affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Surat
before the High Court it has been specifically asserted that
G notification under Section 4 in the Official Gazette was
published on 09.03.1989, public notice displayed at the office
of Mamlatdar of the concerned Ward on 20.04.1989 and
hearing of objections under Section 5A was fixed on
20.05.1989. In para 4 of the counter affidavit, the Land
H Acquisition Officer has specifically stated that appellants were
DAHYABHAI RANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR. v. 583
STATE OF, GUJARAT AND ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
given several opportunities for hearing their objections from A
time to time. The hearing was fixed on 29.05.1989, 05.06.1989,
12.06.1989, 20.09.1989, 28.09.1989 and 16.10.1989 and the
appellants were heard through their lawyer Mr. Kashyap H.
Shukla. In view of the above specific information the contention
contrary to the same is liable to be rejected. B
9. The second objection is that locality publication was not
effected under Section 6(2) of the Act. In the same counter
affidavit, the Land Acquisition Officer has asserted that
publication of notification under Section 6 was published in the C
Gazette dated 21.03.1990. Public Notice displayed at the
office of Mamlatdar of the concerned Ward on 19.04.1990. In
the light of the said information, the claim that no publication of
notice in the locality under Section 6(2) cannot be accepted.
10. The third and the important objection relates to passing D
of Award under Section 11A. It is the stand of the appellants
that Award was not made within two years from the date of last
publication of Notification under Section 6 hence the acquisition
is vitiated. Since heavy reliance was placed on the said
objection, it is useful to refer Section 6 and Section 11A of the E
Act which reads thus:
"6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose. -
(1) Subject to the provision of Part VII of this Act, when the
appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the
report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-section (2), that F
any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for
a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect
under the signature of a Secretary to such Gdvernment or
of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders and
different declarations may be made from time to time in G
respect of different parcels of any land covered by the
same notification under section 4, sub-section (1)
irrespective of whether one report or different reports has
or have been made (wherever required) under section 5A,
' sub-section (2); H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular
land covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section
(1 )-
(i) published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967
B
(1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after
the expiry of three years from the date of the publication
of the notification; or
c (ii) published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after
the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of
the notification:
D Provided further that no such declaration shall be made
unless the compensation to be awarded for such property
is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public
revenues or 'some fund controlled or managed by a local
authority.
E Explanation 1. - In computing any of the periods referred
to in the first proviso, the period during which any action
or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification
issued under section 4, sub-section (1 ), is stayed by an
order of a Court shall be excluded.
F
Explanation 2. - Where the compensation to be awarded
for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a
corporation owned or controlled by the State, such
compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid
G out of public revenues.
(2) Every declaration shall be published in the Official
Gazette, and in two daily newspapers circulating in the
locality in which the land is situated of which at least one
shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall
H
DAHYABHAI HANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR · v. 58~.
'STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
cause public notice of the substance of such declaration A·
·to.be given at convenient places in the said locality (the
last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such
·public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date. of;
, ·the publication of the declaration), and such declaration
shall state the district or other territorial division in which B
the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, it~
approximate area, and, where a plan shall have be.e.n
made of the land, the place where such plan may be
inspected.
(3)The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that C
·the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company,
as the case may be; and, after making such declaration,
the ·appropriate Government may acquire the land in
·ma.nner ·hereinafter appearing.
D
11A. Period within which an award shall be made.- (1) The
Collector shall make an award under section 11 within a
period of two years from the date of the publication bf the
declaration and if no award is made within that period, the
.entire proceeding for the acquisition of the land shall lapse: E
'
Provided that in a case where the said declaration has
.been published before the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be
made within a period of two years from such
commencement. F
Explanation - tn computing the period of two.. years
-referred to in this section, the period during which any
action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said
declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be G
excluded."
·11. 'These .provisions were considered by this Court in
.vario.us decisions. In Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and
Another vs. Makrand Singh and Others, (1995) 2 SCC 497, H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [201 O] 8 $.C.R.
A the question that was posed for consideration was whether the
High Court was right in its conclusion that the declaration under
Section 6 was published after three years and the last of the
publications shall be the last date for the purpose of computing
three years' period envisaged in clause (i) of the proviso to sub-
B section ( 1) of Section 6 of the Act as amended by Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. The discussion and
conclusion in paras 4 and 5 are relevant:
"4. T~~ question, therefore, is that which date of the
publicatiqns in three steps i.e. publication in the Gazette,
c two newspapers and local publication to be the last date
for the purpose of computing three years' limitation
prescribed in clause (1) of the proviso to Section 6( 1) of
the Act. Prima facie, it gives an impression that the last of
any of the three steps puts in motion, the running of
D limitation of three years. But on deeper probe, it does not
appear to be so and such a construction would easily
defeat the public purrose and deflects the course of
justice. So it is necessary to understand the scheme and
policy of the Act to get the crux of the question. It is seen
E that sub-section (1) of Section 4 gives power of eminent
domain to the State to acquire the land, whenever it
appears to it that the land is needed or likely to be needed
for any public purpose or for any company, by a notification
published in the Official Gazette and two daily newspapers
F circulating in that area and at least one of them should be
in the regional language and also the Collector is enjoined
to cause public notice of the substance of notification to
be given at convenient places in the said locality in which
the land is situated. It is also mentioned thereunder that
G the last date of such publication and the giving of such
public notice "being hereinafter referred to" as the date of
publication of the notification. It would be seen that the
purpose of notification under Section 4(1) is an intimation
to the owner or person having an interest in the land that
Government exercised the power of1 eminent domain in
H
DAHYABHAI RANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR. v. 587
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
relation to his land and for public purpose his land is A
needed or likely to be needed; puts an embargo on his
freedom to deal with the land as an unencumbered land
and also pegs the price of the land prevailing as on that
date. It also is a caveat to the Collector to make the award
under Section 11 as well as to determine the market value B
prevailing as on the last of the dates to be the date and
the award should be made within a period prescribed by
Section 11-A, lest the entire acquisition shall stand lapsed.
The word 'hereinafter' is for such purposes as well as for
the ·purpose of determination of the compensation under c
Chapter Ill of the Act as well. Therefore, the word
'hereinafter' referred to as the last date of the publication
of the notification is the date from which the prevailing
prices of the land is to be computed etc.
5. Clause (1) of the proviso to Section 6(1) mandates the D
. publication of the declaration in the Official Gazette and it
should be within three years from the date of the
publication of the notification under Section 4(1) i.e. the last
of the dates referred to in Section 4(1 ). The word 'publish'
emphasises the act accomplished i.e. declaration under E
Section 6(1) being published in the Official-Gazette. The
last date under Section 6(2) shall be the date for the
purposes "hereinafter referred to" would be not for
computing the period of three years prescribed in clause
. (1) of proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act as it was already F
done, but purposes to be followed hereinafter. Otherwise
language would have been "hereinbefore done". Sub-
section (2) as such did not prescribe any limitation within
which the declaration under Section 6( 1) or other steps
hereinafter to be taken, in other words, the steps to be G
taken thereafter in making the award under Section 11 or
in computation of the period prescribed in Section 11-A.
The publication of the declaration in two daily newspapers
having circulation in the locality one of which is in the
regional language and the publication of the substance of H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A the declaration in the locality are ministerial acts and is a
procedural part. It appears that these publications are
required to be done to make the declaration published in
the manner, to be conclusive evidence of the public
purpose under Section 6(1) and also to provide limitation
B to make the award under Section 11 by the Collector. In
other words, the limitation prescribed under Section 11-A
is for the purpose of making the award and if the Collector
fails to do so, the entire proceeds under Sections 4(1) and
6(1) shall stand lapsed. If this consistent poHcy of the Act
c is understood giving teeth to the operational efficacy to the
I scheme of the Act and public purpose the Act seeks to
serve, we are of the considered view that publication in the
Official Gazette already made under clause (1) of proviso
to sub-section (1) of Section 6 is complete, as soon as
the declaration under Section 6(1) was published in the
D
Official Gazette. That will be the date for the purpose of
computation of three years' period from the last of the
dates of the publication of the notification under Section
4(1). The procedural ministerial acts prescribed under sub-
section (2) are only for the purpose of the procedure to be
E followed 'hereinafter, in other words, the steps to be taken
subsequent to the publication of the declaration under
Section 6(1) of the Act. We cannot agree with Shri Rana,
the learned Senior Counsel, that the date of making the
declaration by the Secretary to the Government or the
F authorised officer is the date for computing period of three
years. Equally, we cannot agree with the learned counsel
for the respondents, Shri Upadhyay, that publication of the
substance being the last date from which the period of
three year$ needs to be computed. Acceptance of either
G contention would easily defeat the public policy under the
Act by skilful manner of management with the lower level
officials.
12. In Eugenio Misquita and Others vs. State of Goa and
H Others, (1997) 8 sec 47, similar issue was considered by this
DAHYABHAI RANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR. v. 589
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
Court. K. Venkataswami, J. speaking for the Bench has A
concluded as follows:
"9. Let us examine whether the learned counsel is right in
his submission. As seen from the above extracts of relevant
provisions, while. Section 4(1) commands publication of
8
notification under that section, Section 6 speaks of the
declaration being made to the effect that any particular
land is needed for public.purpose or for a company. There
are judicial decisions that have interpreted the word
"made" to mean "published" for the:reasons stated in those
decisions. Therefore, strictly speaking, but for those judicial C
decisions the date of making of the declaration under
Section 6(1) will be the relevant date for reckoning the
period of limitation. However, in the interest of the general
public; the courts have taken the view that the declaration
made will stand accomplished only when it is published. D
This· publication has, therefore, nothing to do with the
.. · publication referred to in Section 6(2) of the-Act which is
for a different purpose, inter alia; for reckoning the limitation ·
prescribed under Section 11-A of the Act. This
construction is supported by the. language. employed in E
Section 6(2) of the Act. In particular, the word "hereinafter''
used in Section 6(2) will amply prove that the last of the
series of the publication referred to under Section 6(2) is
relevant for the purposes comi~g thereafter, namely, for
making award under Section 11-A. The language F
employed in second proviso to Section 6(1) also supports
this construction. Therefore, the contention of learned
counsel cannot be accepted.
10. This· is also the view taken by this Gourt in Krishi G
Utpadan Mandi Samiti case, The learned Judges framed
the question thus: (SCC p. 499, para 4)
"4. The question, therefore; is· that which date of the
publications in three steps i.e. publication in the Gazette,
H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A two newspapers and local publication to be the last date
for the purpose of computing three years' limitation
prescribed in clause (1) of the proviso to Section 6(1) of
the Act."
11. It may be noted that this Court in that case was
B
considering a case which arose before the coming into
force of Amending Act 68 of 1984. The case on hand has
arisen after Amending Act 68 of 1984. The only difference
is the period of limitation; for the cases arising before the
Amending Act it was three years and one year for the
c cases arising after the Amending Act. Otherwise, the
principle is the same.
16. The above view of this Court lends support to the view
that for the purpose of calculating the limitation prescribed
D under clause (i1) of the first proviso to Section 6(1 ), it is
not the last of the publication in the series that should be
taken into account, but the publication that was made in
the first instance under Section 6.
17. In the light of the law laid down by this Court, we have
E
no hesitation to hold that the declaration published under
Section 6 of the Act was well within one year and the
challenge to the same has been rightly rejected by the High
Court. However, the view taken in the judgment of the High
Court under appeal that the relevant date for reckoning the
F period of limitation will be the date of making of the
declaration under Section 6, may not be correct. As held
in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti case mere making of
declaration is not enough. The making of declaration under
Section 6 is complete for the purpose of clauses (1) and
G (i1) of the first proviso to Section 6(1) when it is published
in the Official Gazette."
After holding so, since the Notification under Section 4 was
lastly published on 06.08.1992 in the Official Gazette and
H declaration under Section 6 was published in the Gazette on
DAHYABHAI RANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR. v. 591
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
05.08.1993, this Court found that the same is well within one A
year and accordingly dismissed the appeal of the landowners.
,. 13. In S.H. Rangappa vs. State of Karnataka and Another,
(2002) 1 SCC 538, a three-Judge Bench of th.is Court speaking
through Kirpal, J. has observed thus:
B
• 1. Declaration under Section 6 is preceded by issuance
of a notification under Section 4 which indicates the
intention of the Government to inter alia acquire land for a
public purpose. Pursuant to the issuance of the same,
objections can be filed and after hearing the same, Section C
6( 1) enables the appropriate authority if it is satisfied, after
considering the report made under Section 5-A of the Act,
that if any particular land is needed for a public purpose,
then a declaration is to be made under the signature of
an appropriate officer. Where notification under Section 4 D
is published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition Amendment Act, 1984, as in the present case,
proviso (ii) requires that such a declaration shall not be
made after the expiry of one year from the date of the
publication of Section 4 notification. E
8. We wish to clarify that the words "publish" and "from the
date of publication of the notification" occurring in proviso
(i1) to Section 6(1) refer to the publication of Section 4
notification and have no reference to the publication of any
notification under Section 6. Under Section 6(1 ), it is O'nly F
a declaration which is required to be made, the time-limit
being within one year of the publication of Section 4
notification. The main purpose for the issuance of a
declaration under Section 6 is provided by sub-section (3),
namely, that the declaration is conclusive evidence that the G
land is needed inter alia for a public purpose and after the
making of the declaration the appropriate Government may
acquire the land in the manner provided by the Act. Sub-
section (2) requires the declaration to be published in the
H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in
the locality in which the land is situate and in addition
thereto the Collector is also required to cause public notice
of the substance of the declaration to be given in the
convenient places in the said locality.
B -
9. It is pertinent to note that sub-section (2) of Section 6
does not prescribe any time-limit within which the
declaration made under Section 6(1) is to be published. It
is well known that after an order or declaration is made
there can be a time gap between the making of the order
c or a declaration and its publication in the Official Gazette.
Whereas the time-limit for the making of an order is
provided under Section 6(1 ), the legislature advisedly did
not provide for any time-limit in respect of the steps
required to be taken under sub-section (2) of Section 6. If
D the contention of Mr G.L. Sanghi, the learned Senior
Counsel for the appellant is correct, the effect would be that
not only the declaration would have to be published within
the time prescribed under the proviso to Section 6(1) but
all other steps, like publication in the daily newspaper and
E the Collector causing public notice of the declaration to be
given at convenient places in the locality, must also be
completed within a period of one year of Section 4
notification. This could certainly not be a consequence
contemplated by the legislature. As already observed, the
F purpose of Section 6 notification being to give a final
declaration with regard to the need of the land for public
purpose, the interest of the landow_ners was sufficiently
safeguarded with the requirement of the making of the
declaration under Section 6(1) within a prescribed period.
G It is difficult for us to read into sub-section (2) the
provisions of the proviso to Section 6(1) which relate to
the time-limit for Issuance of the notification under Section
6(1 ).
10. This view which we have expressed hereinabove finds
H
DAHYABHAI RANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR. v. 593
STATE OE GUJARAT AND ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
support from a decision of a Bench of four Judges of this A.
Court in the case of Khadim Hussain v. State of U.P."
14. In General Manager, Department of
Telecommunications,· Thiruvananthapuram vs. Jacob S/o
Kochuvarkey Ka/liath (Dead) By LRs. and others, (2003) 9 B
SCC 662, this Court again reiterated that period of two years
from the date of publication of the declaration prescribed under
Section 11A for passing the Award, must be calculated from
the last of the series of the publications referred to under
Section 6(2). After holding so, Doraiswamy Raju, J. speaking C
for the Bench has held that last of the series of publications
being publication in daily newspapers: the period of two years
must be calculated from the date of such publication.
·15. In Bihar State Housing Board vs. State of Bihar and
Others, (2003) 10 SCC 1, Arijit Pasayat, J. while considering D
the rival contentions with reference to Sections 4 (1), 6( 1), 6(2)
and 11A of the Act has held thus:
"9. If one takes note of the parenthesis appearing in sub-
section (2) of Section 6, it is clear that reference t<>; the E
subsequent provisions of the Act to the date of publication •
of declaration has to be determined as the last of the dates
of the publication and the giving o.f public notice. As the
date of publication by local publication was the last at that
point of time i.e. 15-3-1991, the award on 25-3-1992 was
not beyond the prescribed period of limitation." F
16. In Kunwar Pal Singh (dead) by LRs vs. State of U.P.
and Others, (2007) 5 SCC 85, Panta, J. speaking for the Bench
held:
G
"17. The provisions of Section 11-A are intended to benefit
the landowner and ensure'fhat the award is made within a
period of two years from the date of the declaration under
Section 6. In ordinary course, therefore, when the
Government fails to make an award within two years of the H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A declaration under Section 6, the land has still not vested
in the Government and its title remains with the owner, the
acquisition proceedings are still pending and, by virtue of
the provisions of Section 11-A, the proceedings will lapse.
The period of two years referred to in Section 11-A shall
B be computed by counting from the last of the publication
dates, as per the prescribed modes of publication.
25. Again, in Bihar State Housing Board v. State of Bihar
this Court reiterating the proposition of law has held that
modes of publication of declaration prescribed under
c Section 6(2) are conjoint and cumulative and all of them
must be resorted to and completed. Sub-section (2) of
Section 6 of the Act necessarily makes it abundantly clear
that the last of the dates of the publication and giving of
such public notice shall "hereinafter" be referred to as the
D date of publication of the declaration and limitation period
of two years for making award under Section 11-A has to
be counted as the last of the dates out of the three modes
of publication specified in Section 6 of the Act."
E 17. In the case on hand, it is clearly indicated in the reply
affidavit filed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer that the
notification under Section 6 was last published on 19.04.1990,
by affixing a copy of the Notification on the notice board of the
office of City Mamlatdar, Surat and also by affixing the same
F in ward No.4 of Surat city. Hence the period of two years
stipulated in Section 11 A would begin to run from 19.04.1990
and, therefore, the publication of the Award under Section 11
of the Act on 18.04.1992 was within the stipulated time limit of
two years. In such circumstances, this contention also is liable
G to be rejected as devoid of any merit.
18. Learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted
that inasmuch as the respondents, by a notification, has
changed the classification of the land in question and
designated as "residential use" at this moment, they are not
H
DAHYABHAI RANCHHODDAS DHOBI AND ANR. v. 595
STATE OF GUJARAT AND ORS. [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
permitted to set up a school in the land in question. In the A
counter affidavit filed by the Director of Planning, Surat
Municipal Corporation has highlighted that the land in question
has been reserved for school purpose in the development plan
sanctioned by the State Government under the provisions of
·Gujarat Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976. As B
per Section 20 of the said Act, the. acquiring body, namely,
Surat Municipal Corporation is required to acquire the land
under the Land Acquisition Act as the impugned .land is
reserved for school purpose. Further, ina_smuch as the land in
question is kept under reservation for school in the sanctioned c
development ·plan for the State Government under Section 17
of the Gujarat Town Planning & Urban Development Act, it is
the duty of the Corporation to acquire the land for implementing
tbe provisions of the same. In view of the same,'this contention
is also liable to be rejected.
D
19. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
appellants has also submitted that in view of existence of many
schools ih and around the vicinity, there is no need to establish
a school in the land of the appellants. In respect of the said
claim, the Director of Planning, Surat Municipal Corporation, E
in the counter affidavit has stated that there is no municipal
school near the site in question and that the schools of the
Corporation which ar; located in Begampura, Moti Talkies,
Mumbaivad, Shetranjivad, Viramgami Maholla are very far from
the land under acquisition and due to increase in population in F
the city of Surat, they are justified in establishing a school for
providing primary education to the children in the said area. In
respect of 'need' and 'necessity', it is for the Government and
their authorities to take a decision considering various aspects.
If such a decision is taken based on materials it is not for the G
Court to doubt their claim. It is also stated that the Surat
Municipal Corporation is required to pay the amount of
compensation to the tune of Rs.10,54,901.95 and the said
amount has already been deposited With the Government
Treasury on 27.05.1992. In view of ttie:above information, the
H
596 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 8 S.C.R.
A contention of learned senior counsel for the appellants is to be
rejected.
20. Finally, learned senior counsel for the appellants, by
drawing our attention to the recent decision of this Court in
Avinash Mehrotra vs. Union of India and Others, (2009) 6 SCC
.B
398 submitted that in view of the strict conditions issued by this
Court.for establishing a school particularly in a crowded city,
the respondents cannot fulfill those conditions and on this
ground also the acquisition proceeding is liable to be dropped.
C It is true that in view of what had happened in Lord Krishna
Middle School in Kumbakonam in the State of Tamil Nadu, this
Court issued several directions and conditions, safety
measures and standards for establishing a school. In our view,
it is t~e duty of the. St~te·and their educational authorities:. to
adhere to all tho~onditibns before commencing a school in
D the land in question. ' ·
_:.--- -. ., - ' '
21. In t~e liglit of the above discussion, we are unable to
·sustain any of the objections raised by the appellants. On the
other hand, weare in entire agreement with the stand taken by
E the State as well as the 'conclusion arrived at by the High ·court.
Consequently, "the appeal fails and the same is dismissed,
howeve~. with rio order as to costs.
.. ...
D.G. A!JJ?ea.1 dismissed.
- ..
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