Holding

The landlord’s requirement does not qualify as bonafide under Section 12(1)(f), and the High Court was justified in overturning the lower courts’ findings.

Summary

The appellant-landlord filed an eviction suit against the tenant under Sections 12(1)(a) and 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, claiming default in rent and a bonafide requirement to use the shop for his son’s business. The trial court dismissed the rent default claim but upheld the eviction on the basis of a bonafide requirement, a decision affirmed by the appellate court. On second appeal, the High Court held that the landlord already occupied one vacant shop and later acquired another, providing reasonable alternative accommodation, and therefore the claimed requirement was not bonafide; it set aside the lower courts' findings and dismissed the suit while retaining the rent recovery decree. The landlord appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC. The Supreme Court examined the statutory criteria of Section 12(1)(f) and concluded that the landlord’s need was not genuine, as alternative suitable premises were available, and that the High Court was correctly justified in interfering with the lower courts' findings. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the High Court’s order upheld.

Issues considered

Whether the landlord’s claim of a bonafide requirement under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 is substantiated in view of the availability of alternative suitable accommodation.
Whether the High Court was justified in setting aside the lower courts' findings under its appellate jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedures. 100
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961s. 12(1)(a), s. 12(1)(f)

Subjects

evictionbonafide requirementrent controlMadhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Actalternative accommodationCivil AppealCPC Section 100landlord-tenant dispute

Judgment

••• DEENA NATH
v.
A
+- POORAN LAL
.....,._
JULY 11, 2001

[D.P. MOHAPATRA AND U.C. BANERJEE, JJ.] B

Rent Control & Eviction
;;;>.

... ~
Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961-Section 12(1)(/)-
Eviction-Bona fide requirement of landlord-Suit premises is one of the five c
shops owned by landlord-One vacant shop room in occupation of landlord
-\ at the time of filing of suit-Pending proceedings one more shop room was
vacated-Trial Court-Decreed the eviction suit-Affirmed by Appellate
Court-Second appeal-High Court holding that sufficient alternative
accommodation was available with the landlord.
D
Setting aside concurrent findings of Courts below-Justification of-
Held, Court is duty bound to examine not merely the requirement of landlord,
but also availability of other alternative accommodation in the occupation
~
of landlord-On facts and circumstances of the case, bona fide requirement of
~
landlord, not established-Thus, High Court was justified in interfering with
the concurrent findings of the Courts below-Constitution of India, 1950 E
Articles-226 and 136.
Civil Procedure Code, /908-S.100-Inte1ference by High Court-
Scope of-Eviction suit-Bonafide requirement-Concurrent findings by courts
belOl~et aside by High Court-Validity of-Held, if courts below have not
)- applied the statutory provisions in proper perspective, then finding ofbonafide F
requirement would not be a mere finding offact as such finding would vitiate
the judgment-High Court would be justified in upsetting such findings.
Appellant-landlord filed an eviction suit against respondent-tenant on
the ground of default in payment of rent and bonajide requirement under
sections 12(1)(a) & (t) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, G
1961. Trial Court while rejecting eviction on the ground of arrears of rent,
decreed the suit for eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement of landlord.
Respondent-tenant unsucessfully filed an appeal before the Appellate Court.
However, on second appeal, High Court rejected the plea of bonafide
requirement of landlord on the ground that reasonable alternative H
925
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A accommodation was available and set aside the concurrent findings of Courts
below. Hence the present appeal.

On behalf of the appellant-landlord, it was contended that High Court
committed an error in interfering with the concurrent findings of Courts ~- ...
below holding that the plaintiff had not successfully established his bonajide
B requirement for the non-residential accommodation; that the judgment of the
High Court is clearly unsustainable in view of the limited jurisdiction vested
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court ~

C HELD: 1.1. The requirement of appellant-landlord cannot be termed to
be a bonajide requirement under Section 12(l)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh
Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Thus, High Court was justified in
,.
interfering with the concurrent findings of the Courts below and the same l
does not warrant any interference. 1933-D)

D 1.2. S.12(l)(f) of the Act provides that there must be first a requirement
by the landlord and such requirement must be bonajide which means that it
is not mere whim or desire. The 'bonajide requirement' must be in presenti
and must be manifested in actual need which would evidence the Court that
a
it is not mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative intent is made I
further clear by making the provision that the landlord has no other reasonably
E suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city
or town concerned. This requirement lays stress that the need is pres.sing
and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the
tenant evicted from the accommodation. Thus, the legislative mandate being
clear and unambiguous, the Court is duty-bound to examine not merely the
F requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition but also whether
any other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation in his occupation
in the city/town is available. 1931-G-H; 932-A-BJ

1.3. Bonafide requirement, on a first look, appears to be a question of
fact. But in recording a finding on the question the court has_ to bear in mind
G the statutory mandate incorporated in Section 12(l)(f). If it is found that the
court has not applied the statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its
proper perspective then the finding regarding bonajide requirement would
cease to be a mere finding of fact, for such erroneous finding illegally arrived
at would vitiate the entire judgment. In such case the High Court cannot be
faulted for interfering with the finding in exercise of its second appellate
H jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (932-C-DJ
DEENA NATH v. POORAN LAL (MOHAPATRA, J.] 927
Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999] 6 SCC 222, A
relied on.

1.4. In the instant case, the judgment of the High Court clearly shows
that the lower courts have failed to consider the requirement of the section
regarding availability of reasonable accommodation in occupation of the
landlord-appellant. At the time of filling the suit, one vacant shop-room was B
in occupation of the landlord and in course of the proceedings one more shop-
room, on being vacated by the tenant, came in his occupation. The High Court
has found that the landlord could easily make arrangements for starting the
shop which his son intends to open in the vacant shop-rooms. If any adjustment
was necessary, then the tenant-respondent could also have been offered an C
alternate shop-room for his occupation. No such step was taken by the landlord ·
during all these years. The landlord even declined to accept the suggestion
made by this Court to permit respondent-tenant to occupy the shop room
presently in his occupation so that he may have the block of four shop rooms
for the business of himself and his son. [932-H; 933-A-C)
D
CIVIL AP PELLA,..E JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4041 2001.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.8.98 of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in S.A. No. 81 of 1998.

K.N. Shukla and Shiv Sagar Tiwari for the Appellant. E
H.S. Parihar and Kuldeep S. Parihar for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

D.P. MOHAPATRA, J. Leave granted.
F
This appeal filed by special leave is directed against the judgment and
decree passed by the High Court at Jabalpur in Second Appeal No. 81/98 in
which the Court set aside the concurrent judgments of the courts below and
dismissed the suit. The appellant, who is the landlord of the suit pr~mises
filed Civil Suit No. 4-A/92 in the Court of the 1st Civil Judge, Class I, G
Hoshangabad seeking eviction of the respondent, the tenant on the grounds
of default and bonafide requirements under Sections 12(1)(a) and (f) of the
Madhya fpdesh Acconunodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act')
respectively.

The suit premises is one of the five shop rooms on the ground floor H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2001] 3 S.C.R.

A of the building owned by the plaintiff. It was the case of the plaintiff that he
needs the shop room in occupation of the defendant for the purpose of
opening a new shop for his son Pradeep Kumar Gupta.

The defendant refuted both the grounds taken in support of the plea
for his eviction. He denied that he was in arrear of rent and also that the
B landlord had any bonajide need for the premises. The defendant further
pleaded that one other shop room which was previously let put to Krishnabai
and Krishna Gopal was lying vacant long prior to the filing of the suit on
4.1.1988 and.that during pen~ency ofj~e suit another shop roo_!11,:·which was
\
in occupation of one Kailash Jatav ,ha'.d been vacated. It was also the case
C of the defendant that Pradeep Kumar Gupta for whose benefit his (defendant)
eviction was sought had been allotted shop room No. 31 in Ravi Shankar
Market in Hoshangabad. In these circumstances, the defendant contended,
there was no bonafide need of the landlord for the suit premises. It was the
further case of the defendant that indeed the landlord wanted to enhance the
rent from Rs. 225 p.m. to Rs. 400 p.m. which he (defendant) did not agree to
D pay. Hence the suit for eviction.

Both the parties led evidence in support of their respective cases. The
appellant, while admitting the fact that the shop room which was vacated by
the tenants Krishnabai and Krishnagopal was at his disposal but that shoproom
•
I
was not suitable for starting the business of sale of clothes and tailoring
E materials which his son intends to start. He was also constrained to admit that
shop No. 31 of Ravi Shankar Market had been allotted in the name of his son-
Pradeep Kumar Gupta. Regarding the shop room vacated by Kailash Jatav the
explanation of the landlord was that it is a small triangular shaped room which
is not suitable for the purpose for which eviction is sought. The thrust of his
p contention was that on getting vacant possession of the suit premises from
the defendant, he will amalgamate that room with the room vacated by
Krishnabai and Krishnagopal and make it into ·one room.

From the side of the defendant on the other hand, an attempt was made
to show that the need pleaded by the landlord on the materials on record, can
G never be said to be bonafide need. The action of the plaintiff for getting him
evicted from t~e suit premises, according to the defendant, was purely arbitrary ·
and whimsical.
0

The trial Court on appreciation of the evidence on record, did not
accept_ the case of the plaintiff for eviction of the tenant .on the ground of
H arrear of rent. Though the fact of arrear was proved the tenant had deposited
DEENA NATH v. POORAN LAL [MOHAPATRA, J.] 929
-.
...... the amount on receiving notice under Section 13 of the Act and therefore, the A

.. ~~
trial court held that that would not be the basis of a decree of eviction. The
case of the plaintiff for eviction on the ground of bonaji.de requirement was
accepted by the trial Court and the suit for eviction of the defendant was
decreed.

The appeal filed by the defendant-tenant proved unsucessful. B

In Second Appeal the High Court initially formulated the following
question of law· for decision:

"Whether in view of the admitted position that the shop belonging
to Krishnabai and Krishna Gopal as well as that of Vishal Tailors was c
already vacated, the Court below was entitled to decree the suit on
the ground that the respondent had no reasonable and suitable
accommodation for starting the business of tailoring material of his
son?"

In course of hearing of the appeal, the High Court formulated a further D
question of law for its decision in the following terms:

"Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the
requirement of the respondent, could be said to be bona fide?"
(Emphasis supplied) E
On a detailed discussion of the evidence on record, the High Court
recorded the findings inter alia that the averments in the plaint that the shop
occupied by Krishnabai and Krishna Gopal was not vacant and that he had
filed a civil suit for the purpose was a mis-statement of fact because the shop
occupied by these persons was already vacant when the plaint was filed. F
Indeed the shop room was lying vacant for the last three years. The Court
also found that the shop occupied by Kailash Jatav was also in possession
of the landlord. The High Court further observed that no attempt had been
made by the landlord to offer any explanation as to why the shop room No.
31 which was concededly allotted to his son Pradeep Kumar Gupta was not
suitable for opening the shop for sale of clothes and tailoring materials.
G
Referring to the sketch map attached to the plaint, the High Court came to
the conclusion that sufficient alternative accommodation was already available
..I
with the plaintiff-landlord at the time of filing the suit and also due to the
subsequent development of one more shop room being vacated by Kailash
Jatav during pendency of the suit. The High Court was of the view that ti-, H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] 3 S.C.R.

A courts below had ignored the relevant fact situation which is manifest from
the materials on record and the finding accepting the plea of bonafide
requirement of the landlord by the courts was vitiated on that ground. The
High Court being conscious of the position that bonafide requirement in
ordinary circumstances is a question of fact which is not to be interfered with
B in second appeal felt persuaded to hold to the contrary in the facts and
circumstances on record in view of the glaring mistake leading to manifest
injustice in the present case. Accordingly, the High Court set aside the
concurrent judgments of the courts below and dismissed the suit for eviction
of the defendant. The High Court maintained the decree passed by the courts :..-..
below for recovery of rent by the plaintiff from the defendant.
c Hence this appeal by the plaintiff.

We have heard learned counsel appearing for both sides at length. The
main thrust of the argument of Shri K.N. Shukla, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant, was that the High Court committed an error in
D interfering with the concurrent judgments of the Courts below holding that
the plaintiff had successfully established his bonafide requirement for the
non-residential accommodation. He further contended that the judgment of
the High Court is clearly unsustainable in view of the limited jurisdiction i
vested under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

E Per contra Shri H.S. Parihar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent
supported the judgment of the High Court. He urged that in the facts and
circumstances of the case as found from the evidence the High Court rightly
held that the concurrent judgments of the Courts below were manifestly
erroneous and patently illegal.
F From the discµssions in the foregoing paragraphs , the question that
arises for determination is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the High Court was justified in interfering with the concurrent judgments of
the courts below in holding that the plaintiff required the premises bonafide
for use of his son? Section 12(1)(f) of the Act under which the eviction of
G the tenant was sought and granted by the lower Courts, reads as follows:
"Sec.12. Restriction on eviction of tenants.-(1) Notwithstanding
anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no
suit shall be filed in any Civil Court ag~inst a tenant for his eviction
from. any accommodation .except ""' on one or more of th.e following
H grounds only namely:-
DEENA NATH v. POORAN LAL [MOHAPATRA, J.) 931

..... (a)xxxx JQ(X xxx A
·~ (b)xxxx xxx xxx

(c)xxxx xxx xxx

(d) xxxx xxx xxx
B
(e)xxxx xxx xxx

(f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required
bona-fide by the 1.andlord for the purpose of continuing or starting
his business or that any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if
he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the C
accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no
other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own
in his occupation in the city or town concerned;"

The section, on a plain reading, is clear and specific. The criteria to
be fulfilled for an order of eviction under the provision are : D
(i) that the non-residential accommodation is required bonafide by
the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business
or that of any of his major sons; and
(ii) that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably E
suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his
occupation in the city or town concerned.
(emphasis supplied)

The Legislature in enacting the provision has taken ample care to avoid any
)- arbitrary or whimsical action of a landlord to evict his tenant. The statutory F
mandate is that there must be first a requirement by the landlord which means
that it is not a mere whim or a fanciful desire by hirn;.further, such requirement
must be bonafide which is intended to avoid the mere whim or desire. The
'bonafide requirement' must be in presenti and must be manifested in actual
need which would evidence the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical G
desire. The legislative intent is made further clear by making the provision
that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation
of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. This requirement
lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable
alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the
accommodation. Similar statutory provision is made in sub-section (e) of H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [200 I] 3 S.C.R

A Section 12( 1) of the Act in respect of 1ccommodation let for residential
purposes. Thus, the legislative mandate being clear and unambiguous, the
-->i;.
Court is duty-bound to examine not merely the requirement of the landlord
as pleaded in the eviction petition but also whether any other reasonably
suitable non-residential accommodation in his occupation in the city/town is
B available. The judgment/order of the court/authority for eviction of a tenant
which does not show that iliecourt/authority has applied its mind to these
statutory requirements cannot be sustained and the superior court will be
justified in upsetting such judgment/order in appeal/second appeal/revision.
Bonafide requirement, on a first look, appears to be a question of fact. But ~ _
in recording a finding on the question the court has to bear in mind the
C statutory mandate incorporated in Section 12( 1)( f). If it is found that the court
has not applied the statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its
proper perspective then the finding regarding bonafide requirement would
cease to be a mere finding of fact, for such erroneous finding illegally arrived
at would vitiate the entire judgment. In such case the High Court cannot be
faulted for interfering with the finding in exercise of its second appellate
D jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

In this connection, we may refer to the decision of this Court in the case
of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999] 6 SCC 222, in which -l
it was held, inter alia, that "the term 'bona fide' or 'genuinely' refers to a '
E state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity
contemplated by "requires" is much higher than in mere desire. The phrase
"required bonafide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire
which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control
legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of
a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext
F to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises
for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment
of the. ~enant". Therein it was further held : "the High Court in revision is
obliged to test the order of the Rent Controller on the touchstone of "whether
it is according to law". For that limited purpose it may enter into reappraisal
G of evidence, that is, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion
arrived at by the Rent Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no
reasonable person acting with objectivity could have reached on the material
available."

Coming to the case on hand, the judgment of the High Court clearly
H bears out the position that the lower courts had failed to consider the
.~-

DEENA NATH v. POORAN LAL [MOHAPATRA, J.] 933

requirement of the section regarding availability of reasonable accommodation A
in occupation of the landlord-appellant As noted earlier, at the time of filing
the suit, one vacant shop-room was in occupation of the landlord and in
course of the proceedings one more shoproom, on being vacated by the
tenant, came in his occupation. The High Court has found that the landlord·
could easily make arrangements for starting the shop which his son Pradeep B
Kumar Gupta intends to open in the vacant shoprooms. If any adjustment was
necessary, then the tenant-respondent could also have been offered an alternate
shoproom for his occupation. No such step was taken by the landlord during
all these years. During the hearing of this appeal, we made a suggestion to
the learned counsel appearing for the landlord-appellant, whether he is willing
to permit the tenant-respondent to occupy the shoproom presently in his C
(landlord) occupation so that he may have a block of four shoprooms for the
business of himself and his son. The learned counsel stated that the landlord,
who was present in the Court, declined to accept the .suggestion.

On the discussions in the judgment there is hardly any scope for doubt
that the requirement of the landlord cannot be termed to be a bonafide D
requirement within·the meaning of the Statute (noticed above). The High
Court was justified in interfering with the concurrent judgments in the
contextllal facts and the same does not warrant any interference under Article
136 of the Constitution of India.

Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment/decree passed by E
the High Court stands confirmed. No order however as to costs.

S.V.K. Appeal dismissed.