Holding

The limitation period under Article 136 starts from the date the decree becomes enforceable, so the execution application filed within twelve years of the sale deed execution was timely.

Summary

The respondent obtained a decree for specific performance of a contract that directed the sale deed to be executed before possession could be taken. The decree stipulated that it would become enforceable only after the sale deed was executed, which occurred on 23 March 1984. The decree‑debtors failed to comply with payment terms and did not deliver possession, prompting the decree‑holder to file several execution applications, the last of which was in April 1994. The executing court dismissed it as barred by the 12‑year limitation under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but the High Court allowed the revision, holding the application was within time. The Supreme Court affirmed that the limitation period under Article 136 starts from the date the decree becomes enforceable and, therefore, the 1994 application was timely, dismissing the appeal.

Issues considered

The period of limitation under Article 136, 1963, begins to run from the date a decree becomes enforceable, especially when the decree is conditioned on a future event such as execution of a sale deed.
Whether the execution application filed in April 1994 was barred by the 12‑year limitation period.
How ambiguous language in a decree should be interpreted for the purpose of execution, favouring the decree‑holder's right to obtain the fruits of the decree.
Whether an executing court may dismiss an execution application on technical grounds when the limitation period has not expired.

Legislation cited

Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 136

Subjects

LimitationArticle 136Execution of decreeSpecific performanceSale deedDecree enforceabilityStatutory interpretationCivil Procedure

Judgment

A DEEP CHAND AND ORS.
v.
MOHAN LAL

APRIL 3, 2000

B (S. SAGHIRAHMAD AND R.P. SETIH, JJ.]

limitation Act, 1963 : Article 136.

Decree Execution of-Period oflimitation-Decree became enfon::eable
only after execution ofsale deed-Held : Generally a decree becomes enfon::e-
c able from its date but court may prescribe in appropriate cases offuture date
from which the decree becomes enfon::eable-Period of limitation in such cases,
therefore, runs from the date when the decree becomes enforr:eable-Hence,
-
application for execution ofdecree filed within 12 years after execution ofsale
deed maintainable.
D
Decree Execution of-General principles-Held: Executing court should
no, find ways to dismiss the execttiion application as barred by time unless such
an application is beyond limitation-Where the language of the decree is
capable of two interpretations, the one which assists the decree-holder to
obtain the fruits ofthe decree should be preferred-A rational approach should
E be taken in view of rhe prolonged litigation-Interpretation of Statutes.

The respondent's suit for specific performance of contract was de·
creed. The decree for possession of the land became enforceable only after
the execution of the sale deed as per court's direction. The appeal filed by
the appellant-judgment debtors was dismissed on merits subject to the
F condition that in case the judgment-debtors made the payment to the
decree-holder in two instalments, the plaintiff's suit would stand dismissed.
However, the judgment-debtors failed to abide by the terms of the said
decree.

Thereafter, the respondent-decree-holder filed successive execution
G applications within the period of limitation, which were dismissed. But the
decree-holder got the sale deed executed vide court order dated 23.3.1984.
Despite the mutation of ownership sanction in favour of decree-holder, the
judgment-debtors did not deliver the possession of the land in question.
Therefore, the respondent filed an application for execution in April 1984
H which was dismissed by the executing court holding that the same was
890
DEEP CHAND v. MOHAN LAL 891
barred by limitation as provided under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, A
1963. The revision petition filed by the respondent was allowed by the
High Court. Hence this appeal.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1. The period of limitation prescribed by Article 136 of
B
the Limitation Act, 1963 starts to run from the date when the decree
becomes enforceable provided the case does not fall Within the scope of the
latter part of the provision in the third column. Generally a decree or
order becomes enforceable from its date, but in appropriate cases the
court passing the decree may prescribe time wherefrom the decree be-
comes enforceable on a future date. [894-A-B] c
1.2. The purpose of execution proceeding is to enable the decree-holder
to obtain the fruits of his decree. In case where the language of the decree is
capable of two interpretations, the one which assists the decree-holder to
obtain the fruits of the decree and the other preventing him from taking the
benefits to the decree, the interpretation which assists the decree-holder D
should be accepted. The execution of the decree should not be made futile
on mere.technicalities which does not, however, mean that where a decree is
incapable of being executed under any provision oflaw it should, in all cases,
be executed notwithstanding such bar or prohibition. A rational approach
is necessitated keeping in view the prolonged factum of litigation resulting
in the passing of the decree in favour of a litigant. The policy of law is to give
E
a fair an liberal and not a technical construction enabling the decree-holder
to reap the fruits of his decree. [894-C-D]

Akshoy Kumar Debi v. Nalini Ranjan Mukherjee, AIR (1950) Cal. 473;
Annapumamma v. Venkamma, AIR (1939) Mad. 323 and Mst. Panneshri v.
Mst Att~ AIR (1958) Punj. 79, approved. F

2. In this case the decree for possession of land became enforceable
only after the execution of the sale deed as was the direction of the court
decreeing the suit. Before the execution of the sale deed in his favour on
23.3.1984, the decree-holder was not entitled to possession in terms of the
decree. The decree, therefore, itself directed its execution after the execu- G
tion of the sale deed in favour of the decree-holder. The decree-holder has

-- been proved to have tiled successive applications for the execution of the
decree within the period of limitation. The language of Article 136 cannot
be strained in favour of the judgment-debtors who have been found to
have not availed of the benefits of decree conferred upon them as they are H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2000] 2 s. C.R.
A proved to have failed to pay the amount even in instalments. The decree in
the instant case is not capable of any other interpretation. As a general
rule the executing court should not find ways to dismiss the execution
application as barred by time unless it is established, beyond doubt, that
such an application was beyond limitation. [895-J?-EJ

B CIVIL APPELLiXIB JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2356 of 2000.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.8.99 of the Punjab & Haryana
High Court in C.R. No. 4958 of 1998.

B.S. Malik, Altaf Hussain, Prem Malhotra and Rishi Malhotra for the
c Appellants.

R.K. Kapoor, P. Verma, S.K. Srivastava, Swnit Kumar and Anis Ahmed
Khan for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
D
SETHI, J. Leave granted.

Suit for specific performance of contract filed by the respondent was
decreed on 22nd February, 1973. The decree-sheet was amended vicie' order
E dated 5.5.1973. The appeal filed by the appellants-Judgment Debtors was
dismissed in default on 15.9.1979 which was restored and finally dismissed
on merits by the District Judge, Gurgaon on 11.3 .1981 subjec.t to the condition
that in case the judgment-debtors make the payment of Rs.15,500/- to the
decree-holder, plaintiffs' suit shall stand dismissed and appeal accepted. The
first instalment was to be deposited on or before 15.4.1981 and second on or
F before 15.5.1981. The judgment-debtors failed to abide by the terms of the
said decree. The decree-holder was, therefore, entitled to get the decree
executed in lieu of Rs.25,000/- out of which he was stated to have already
deposited a sum of Rs.10,218/- as earnest money at the time of the agreement
and had deposited the balance amount on 12.1.1982. The amount was
deposited in favour of the mortgagee with the result that the land was
G
redeemed. Thereafter the decree-holder filed execution applications on
17.12.1982, 12.6.1984 and 21.9.1992 which were dismissed. However, the
decree-holder got the sale deed executed and registered in his favour through
the process of execution of the decree from the executing court. As despite
the mutation of ownership sanctioned in favour of decree-holder, the judg-
H ment-debtors did not deliver the possession of the land in question, he filed
DEEP CHAND v. MOHAN LAL [SETHI, J.J 893
an application for execution in April, 1994 which was dismissed by the A
executing court on 24th September, 1998 holding ·that the same was barred by
limitation.
Not satisfied with the order of the executing court, the decree- holder
filed a revision petition in the High Court which was allowed vide the order
impugned in this appeal. The High Court has held that the execution B
application has been filed within time. Directions have been issued to the
executing court for taking further steps in the execution of the decree passed
in favour of the decree-holder.
The judgment of the High Court has been assailed in this appeal on the
ground that as the execution application was filed after 12 years from the date C
of the decree, the same was baned by time, and revisional Court was not
justified in allowing the revision petition by setting aside the order of the
executing court.
Article 136 of the Limitation Act is a specific Article prescribing and
dealing with the applications for the execution of decrees and orders. In
D
Govind Prasad & Anr v. Pawankumar the Privy Council held that successive
applications for execution are permitted to be filed but only within the period
of limitation provided by law. Article 136 provides:

For the execution of Twelve Years When the decree or order
any decree (other becomes enforceable or E
than a mandatory where the decree or any
injunction) or order subsequent order directs any
of any Civil Court payment of money or the
delivery of any property to
be made at a certain date or
at recurring periods when F
default in making the pay-
ment or delivery in respect
of which execution is sought
takes place:
G
Provided that an ap-
plication for the enforcement
of a decree granting a per-
petual injunction shall not
be subject to any period of
limitation. H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2000] 2 S.C.R.
A A perusal of the Article shows that the period of limitation prescribed
by it starts to run from the date when the decree becomes enforceable
provided the case does not fall within the scope of the latter part of the
provision in the third column. Generally a decree or order becomes enforce-
able from its date, but in appropriate cases the court passing the decree may
prescribe time wherefrom the decree becomes enforceable on a future date. It
B
must, however, be remembered that the purposes of execution proceeding is
to enable the decree-holder to obtain the fruits of his decree. In case
where the language of the decree is capable of two interpretations, one of
which assist· the decree-holder to obtain the fruits of the decree and the
other preventing him from taking the benefits of the decree, the interpretation
C which assists the decree- holder should be accepted. The execution of the
decree should not be made futile on mere technicalities which does not,
however, mean that where a decree is incapable of being executed under
any provision of law it should, in all cases, be executed notwithstanding
such bar or prohibition. A rational approach is necessitated keeping in view
0
D the prolonged factum of litigation resulting in the passing of a decree
in favour of a litigant. The policy of law is to give a fair and liberal and
not a technical construction enabling the decree-holder to reap the fruits of
his decree.

It has been held in Akshoy Kumar Debi v. Alini Ranjan Mukherjee, AIR
E (1950) Cal 473; Annapumamma v. Venkamma, AIR (1939) Mad. 323 and
Mst.Panneshri & Ors. v. Mst. Atti, AIR (1958) Punjab 79 that "It is the policy
of law that Article 182 (now Aiticle 136) should receive a fair and liberal and
not a technical construction so as to enable the decree-holder to reap the fruits
of his decree. It will not be in consonance with the principles of just
p interpretation, to strain the language of Article 182 in favour ofajudgment-
debtor who has not paid his just debt".

In the instant case the suit of the respondent was decreed m the
following terms:

G "It is ordered that the defendant is directed to get executed the sale
deed as per agreement Exhibit PWl/2 dated 13.8.69 to sell the suit
land for Rs~25,000 in favour of the plaintiffs. The defendant will get
only Rs. l 4, 782 before the Sub Registrar at the time of registration.
He had received Rs. l 0,218. The plaintiff will pay the expenses on
H account of stamp and registration of the sale deed in question and
DEEP CHAND v. MOHAN LAL [SETHI, J.] 895
plaintiff is also entitled to possession of this land as soon as the sale A
deed is executed and registered. The defendant is now directed that
he should execute and get registered the sale deed by 22.3.73 on the
above terms failing which the plaintiff can get the sale deed executed
through court. Suit of the plaintiff is accordingly decreed with costs."

As noted earlier, the appellants-judgment debtors are found to have B
committed defaults in the payment of the instalments as agreed upon. The
decree-holder was, therefore, entitled to get the sale deed executed in terms
of the decree passed in his favour. He was held "entitled to possession" of the
land as soon as the sale deed was executed and registered. It is not disputed
that sale deed was executed in favour of the decree-holder vide court order c
dated 23rd March, 1984. The execution application seeking possession of the
land, the subject matter of the decree, was filed in April, 1994, admittedly,
within a period of twelve years as prescribed under Article 136 of the
Limitation Act. The High Court has rightly held that the decree for possession
of land became enforceable only after the execution of the sale deed as was
the direction of the court decreeing the suit. Before the execution of the sale D
deed in his favour on 23.3.1984, the decree-holder was not entitled to
possession in terms of the decree. The decree, therefore, itself directed its
execution after the execution of the sale deed in favour of the decree-holder.
The decree-holder has been proved to have filed successive applications for
the execution of the decree within the period of limitation. The language of E
Article 136 cannot be strained in favour of the judgment-debtors who have
been found to have not availed of the benefits of decree conferred upon them
as they are proved to have failed to pay the amount even in instalments. The
decree in the instant case is not capable of any other interpretation. As a
general rule the executing court should not find ways to dismiss the execution
application as barred by time unless it is established, beyond doubt, that such
F
an application was beyond limitation.

We find no infirmity in the order of the High Court requiring interfer-
ence in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but without any order
as to costs. G
v.s.s. Appeal dismissed.