DELHI ADMINISTRATIONversusGURDIP SINGH UBAN AND ORS. ETC.

A                        DELHI ADMINISTRATION
                                    v.
                     GURDIP SINGH UBAN AND ORS. ETC.

                                 AUGUST 20, 1999

B        [SUJATA V. MANOHAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.]


        Land Acquisition Act, 1894-Sections 4(1), 5A, 6-Quashing of the
  declaration under Section 6 in certain cases by the High Court on the
  ground· that Section 5A inquiry was vitiated-Subsequently respondents                   -
C claiming in another writ petition that such quashing would also enure to
  their benefit despite not having filed objections under Section SA-Held, in
  respect of those who did not object to Section 4(1) notification by filing
  objections under Section 5A, the said notification and declaration under
  Section 6 therein must be deemed to be in force-Quashing the notification
D in the cases of individual writ petitions cannot be treated as quashing the         1

  whole of it.

           A notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was issued
    on 25-11-1980 in respect of 50,000 bighas of land in 13 villages in Delhi. A
    declaration under Section 6 was published around 5 years later, on 7-6-1985.
E   The said declaration under Section 6 was challenged by way of several writ
    petitions in the High Court. On reference, the Full Bench by its order dated
    25-7-1987 upheld the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration made
    under Section 6. The Full Bench negatived the contention that the declaration
    was time barred having been issued more than 3 years after the notification.
    It held that the scheme for which the land was acquired was an integrated one
F   and the stay orders even if obtained in individual cases necessarily resulted
    in precluding any further proceedings under Section 6. The said petitions
    were sent back to the Division Bench for decision on the other points raised.
    The Division Bench by its judgment dated 18-11-88 allowed the writ petitions
    thereby quashing the Section 6 declaration. The said judgment was not
G   appealed against by the Delhi Administration.

          Another writ petition was filed before the High Court on 23-4-1986 for
    quashing the aforesaid notification dated 25-11-1980 and the declaration
    dated 7-6-1985. The Division Bench by its judgment dated 17-12-1996 allowed
    the said writ petition. It held that the earlier judgment dated 18-11-1988
H                                        650
                        DELHI ADMINIST. v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN                    651

      resulted in the entirety of the Section 6 declaration being quashed and was      A
      a judgement in rem and hence the petitioners therein could rely on that
      judgment even though they had not filed any objections under Section SA.
      Against the aforesaid judgement, the Delhi Administration has preferred the

--    present appeals.

            On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that the result of Section   B
      6 declaration being quashed would be that the Section 4(1) notification would
      also lapse. It was further contended that in a similar case decided by a Three
      Judge Bench in respect of the same group of notifications it was held that
      in the case of owners who had not filed objections under Section SA, they
      could not take advantage of the judgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11-      C
      1988; and that upon a proper understanding of the judgment of the Division
      Bench dated 18-11-88, it could not be held that the entirety of the Section
      6 notification stood quashed by tl:e said judgement.

           On behalf of the respondents, it was contended that the notification
      could not remain partially stayed or partially suspended and it was clear D
      from the language employed in judgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11-
      1988 that the entire Section 6 declaration had been quashed.

 ,,         Allowing the appeals, the Court

            HELD : J. J. Quashing the notification in the case of individual writ E
      petitions cannot be treated as quashing the whole of it. In connection with
      owners or persons interested who have not filed objections under section SA
      of the Land Acquisition Act in principle, it must be accepted that they had
      no objection to Section 4 notification operating in respect of their property.
      On the other hand, in respect of those who filed objections, they might have
      locus standi to contend that Section SA inquiry was not conducted properly. F
      Those who have not filed objections under Section SA could not be allowed
      to contend that the Section SA inquiry was bad and that consequently Section
      6 declaration.must be struck down and that the Section 4 notification would
      lapse. In respect of those who did not object to the Section 4 notification and
      the Section 6 declaration by filing objections under Section SA, the said G
      notification and the declaration must be treated as being in force. The writ
      petitioners cannot be permitted to contend that in some other cases, the
      notification was quashed and that such quashing would also enure to their
      benefit. (655-H; 656-A-D)

            1.2. It is true that in Sudan Singh 's case a Two Judge Bench of this      H
    652                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A court confirmed another judgement of the Delhi High Court wherein the
    High Court had allowed the writ petition on the basis that the judgment of
    the Division Bench dated 18-11-1988 had quashed the Section 6 declaration




B
    wholly. It is also true that in Sudan Singh 's case too no objections were filed
    by the owners under Section SA. But, the present case would be governed
    by the judgment of the Three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram's case where the
    said bench not only referred to the effect.of the Division Bench judgment of
                                                                                       -
    the High Court dated 18.11.1988 but also referred .to the j~dgement of the
    Two Judge Bench of this court in Sudan Singh 's case. The Three Judge
    Bench in Abhey Ram is binding on the Court in preference to the judgment
    of two judges in Sudan Singh. The opinion of the legal department of
C   Government or the Delhi Development Authority which is relied upon-apart
    from not having binding force, cannot override Abheji Ram 's case.
                                                                          [655-E-GJ

          Abhey Ram & Ors. v. Union of India, JT (1997) 5 SC 354, followed.

O        B.R. Gupta v. Union of India 37 (1989) DLT 150; Balak Ram Gupta
    v. Union of India, AIR (1987) DELHI 239; N. Narasimhaiah v. State of
    Karnataka, [1996) 3 SCC 88; Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh,
    (1991) DLT 602(SC) = [1997) SCC 430, referred to and Oxford English
    School v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, (1995) 5 SCC 206, held inapplicable.
E        CIVIL APPEL LA TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4656 of
    1999 Etc.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.96 of the Delhi High Court
    in W.P. No. 920of1986.

F        Ravinder and V.B. Saharya, for Mis. Saharya & Co., Ms. Geeta Luthra
    and D.N. Goburdhan, for the Appellant.

          P.N. Lekhi, M.K. Garg and Subhash Mittal for the Respondent.

          Arun Khosla and S. Rajappa for the Respondent No. 3.

G         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J. Leave granted.

            These two Civil Appeals have been filed by the Delhi administration
    against the judgment of the Delhi High Court in C.W.P. No. 920of1986 dated
H   17 .12.1996. The respondents are the owners of an extent of about 2.50 acres
          DELHI ADMINIST. v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN [M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.) 653

     in Chattrapur village. The notifications, in fact, covered land of an extent of       A
     about 50,000 Bighas in thirteen villages. The Writ petition was allowed under
     the impugned judgment and the notifications were quashed.
           The brief facts of the case are follows:
            The Notification under Section 4( I) of the Land Acquisition Act was
     issued on 25.11.1980 while the declaration under Section 6 was published on           B
     7.6.1985. Initially, the declaration under Section 6 was challenged in C. W.P.
     No.1639 of 1985 and 76 other writ petitions and were referred to a Full Bench
     of the Delhi High Court on a certain legal issue. The Full Bench decided the
     point and upheld the Section 6 declaration. The contention before the Full
     Bench was that the declaration under Section 6 was issued more than 3 years           C


..
     after the Section 4( I) notification and was, therefore, bad in law. The submission
     was that even though there were various stay orders in several Writ petitions
     by the High Court in relation to the operation of the Section 6 declaration,
     they were all individual orders passed in the cases of various Writ petitioners
     and hence these orders could not be treated as amounting to a suspension
     of the entire Section 6 declaration and hence the said declaration must be            D
     struck down as time barred in respect of others· who did not obtain stay
     orders. The Full Bench of the High Court rejected the above contention
     holding that the scheme for which the land was acquired was an integrated
     one and the stay orders even if obtained in individual cases necessarily
     resulted in precluding any further proceedings being taken under the Section          E
     6 declaration. Excluding the time covered by the stay orders, the Section 6
     declaration must, it was held, be deemed to have been issued in time. On that
     reasoning, the notification under Section 4( I) and Section 6 were declared
     valid by the Full Bench. The other points raised by individual Writ petitioners,
     namely that the inquiry under Section SA was vitiated etc., were not decided
     by the Full Bench and for that purpose the matters were sent back to a                F
     Division Bench. The judgment of the Full Bench dated 25.7.87 is reported in
     Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Delhi 239. Thereafter, the 73
     matters were listed before a Division Bench which finally disposed of the writ
     petitions by a separate judgment reported as B.R. Gupta v. Union of India
     on 18. I J.1988 ( 37 (1989) DLT 150). The Writ petitions were allowed and th$!        G
     Section 6 declaration was quashed on the ground that the Section 5A inquiry
     was vitiated etc. ( There is dispute as to whether the declaration was wholly
     quashed). The said judgment was not appealed against by the Delhi
     Administration. The present Writ petition was filed on 23.4.1986 for quashing
     the same notification dated 25.11.1980 and 7.6.1985 issued under Sections 4( I)
     and 6. It related to Khasra Nos. 704/1, 706/2, 706/3, 707/2, 714, 715/2, 909/2,       H
    654                     SUPREME COURT REPOR!S [1999) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A   10/2 and 693.
           When the present Writ petition came up for hearing before a Division
    Bench on 17.12.1996, the writ petitioners contended that by the judgment of
    the Division Bench rendered in B.R. Gupta dated 18.11.88 - i.e. after the Full
    Bench judgment dated 25.7.87 - the entire Section 6 declaration stood quashed
B   and that even though these writ petitioners (respondents in these Civil
    Appeals) had not filed any objections under Section SA of the Act, they were
    entitled to rely upon the earlier Division Bench judgment 9f 18.11.88 and
    contend that the entire Section 6 declaration was quashed. This contention
    was accepted by the Division Bench under the impugned judgment dated
    17.12.1996. The Division Bench held that the earlier judgment resulted in the
C   entirety of the Section 6 declaration being quashed and was· a judgment in
    rem and hence the writ petitioners could rely on that judgment even though
    they had not filed any objections under Section 5A. The result, according to
    the appellants, of Section 6 declaration being quashed wo11ld be that the
    Section 4(1) notification would also lapse. It is against the above judgment
D   that the Delhi Administration has preferred these appeals.

            In these appeals, the learned counsel for the appellant Ms. Geeta
    Luthra contended before us that in a similar appeal preferred to this Court
    decided by a three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram and Ors. v. Union of India
    J.T. (1997) 5 SC 354, in respect of the same group of notifications it was held
E   that in the case of owners who had not filed objections under Section 5A,
    they could not take advantage of the judgment of the Division Bench in
    B.R.Gupta's case dated 18.11.1988. It was also held that upon a proper
    understanding of the judgment of the Division Bench dated 18.11.1988, it
    could not be held that the entirety of the Section 6 notification stood quashed
    by the said judgment. The above contention of the learned counsel for the
F   Delhi Administration was supported by the learned senior counsel for the
    Delhi Development Authority, Sri Ravinder Sethi.

            On the other hand, it was contended by Sri P.N. Lekhi, learned senior
    counsel for the respondents (Writ petitioners ) that the Division Bench of the
G   High Court in its impugned judgment was right in holding that the Division
    Bench in B.R. Gupta's case, in its judgment dated 18.11.1988, had quashed the
    entire Section 6 declaration and this was clear from the language employed
     in that judgment. The appellant could not be permitted to blow hot and cold
    for, in order to say that the Section 6 declaration was not time barred, the
    appellant had contended before the Full Bench in B.R.Gupta's case that stay
H   orders obtained by some would amount to stay of the entire Section 6
     DE.LHI ADMINIST. v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN [M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.] 655

declaration and that on the same parity of reasoning, the subsequent judgment A
of the Division Bench in B.R. Gupta's case must be deemed to have quashed
the entirety of the Section 6 declaration. A passage in the Full Bench judgment
that the notification could not remain partially stayed or partially suspended
was also relied upon. Reference was also made to another judgment of this
Court in Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh, (1991) D.L.T. 602 SC B
= (1997) 5 SCC 430 dated 20.9.91 where a two Judge Bench of this Court
upheld another judgment of the High Court. In that case, as in the present
case before us, the High Court had allowed the Writ petition filed by Sudan
Singh who had contended that the entire Section 6 declaration was quashed.
by the Division Bench in B.R. Gupta's case in the judgment dated 18.11.88.
Sudan Singh did not also file objection under Section 5A. It was argued that C
in Abhey Ram's case decided by the three Judge Bench on 22.4.97, though
Sudan Singh 's case was referred to, the appropriate paragraphs were not
noticed. The appropriate paragraphs in the Division Bench judgment in B.R.
Gupta's case dated 18.11.88 were also not noticed. In yet another case relating
to one B.L. Sharma, another writ petition, C.W.P. 2365/90 was allowed on
6.12.90 and special leave petition (C) 3604/92 was dismissed by this Court D
following the judgment in Sudan Singh's case. It is also contended that in the
letter of the Joint Secretary dated 31.3.1989, the legal opinion obtained by the
department was that the judgment of the Di~sion Bench dated 18.11.88 would
cover cases where land was not taken possession of - as in the present case.
It is accepted that the respondent did not file objections under Section 5A E
but it is said that this was because he was an Anny Officer who at that time
was working in the forward areas.

       We may state that it is true that in Sudan Singh's case a two Judge
Bench of this Court confinned another judgment of the Delhi High Court
wherein the High Court had allowed the writ petition on the basis that the         F
judgment of the Division Bench dated 18.11.1988 had quashed the Section 6
declaration wholly. It is also true that in Sudan Singh's case too no objections
were filed by the owners under section 5A. But, we are governed by the
judgment of the three Judge Bench in Abbey Ram's case where the said
Bench not only referred to the effect of the Division Bench judgment of the        G
High Court dated 18.11.88 but also referred to the judgment of the two Judge
Bench of this Court in Sudan Singh's case. The three Judge Bench in Abhey
Ram is binding on us in preference to the judgment of two Judges in Sudan
Singh.

      In connection with owners or persons interested who have not filed           H
                                                                                     I-
                                                                                     ,

    656                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A   objections under Section 5A, in principle, it must be accepted that they had
    no objection to Section 4 notification operating in respect of their property.
    On the other hand, in respect of those who filed objections, they might have
    locus standi to contend that Section 5A inquiry was not conducted properly.
    We, therefore, agree in principle with the view of the three Judge Bench in
B   Abhey Ram's case that those who have not filed objections under Section 5A,
    could not be allowed to contend that the Section 5A inquiry was bad and that
    consequently Section 6 declaration must be struck down and that then the
                                                                                     r'
    section 4 notification would lapse. If, therefore, no objections were filed by
    the respondents, logically the Section 6 declaration must be deemed to be in
    force so far as they are concerned.
c
           But learned senior counsel for the respondents contends that the
    judgment of the Division Bench dated 18.11.1988 in B.R. Gupta's ca~e had
    quashed the entire Section 5A proceedings and that even in case the
    respondents had filed objections, the position would not have been different.
    We cannot accept this contention. We are of the view that in respect of those
D   who did not object to the Section 4(1) notification by filing objections under
    Section 5A, the said notification must be treated as being iri force. The writ
    petitioners cannot be permitted to contend that in some other cases, the
    notification was quashed and that such quashing would also enure to their
    benefit.                         <l!l

E
           Then coming to the effect of the judgment of the Division Bench dated
     18.11.88 of the High Court, we are of the view that the three Judge Bench
    judgment in Abhey Ram's case has interpreted or declared the effect of the
    said High Court judgment dated 18.11.88. That judgment is binding on us. We
    cannot go by the two Judge Bench judgment in Sudan Singh's case because
F   we are bound by the judgment of the three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram's
    case. Further, the judgment in Abhey Ram's case takes notice of Suda.n
    Singh's case and it cannot be contended that they have not looked fully into
    the judgment in Sudan Singh' s case or fully into the judgment of the Division
    Bench of the High Court dated 18.11.88 in B.R.Gupta's case. Nor is the
G   dismissal of the special leave petition in B.L.Sharma's case a precedent which
    can outweigh Abhey Ram. The opinion of the legal department ofGovernmei:it
    or _the Delhi Development Authority which is relied upon - apart from· not
    having binding force, cannot override Abbey Ram's case.

          Reliance was then placed by the learned senior counsel for the             r
                                                                                     J
H   respondents on Oxford English School v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu, [1995] 5 SCC
             DELHI ADMINIST. v. GURDIP SINGH UBAN [M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.) 657

      206) but it has no relevance to the question before us viz whether a notification   A
      under Section 6 can be upheld in respect of only some of the lands covered
      by it. Also a three Judge Bench in N. Narasimhaiah v. State of Karnataka
      [1996] 3 sec 88 has held that the said judgment has been rendered per
      incuriam. So far as the other contention that the Government cannot blow hot
      and cold, we are of the view that the reasoning given by the Full Bench in
      its judgment dated 25.7.87 was confined to the question whether Section 6           B
      declaration was time barred. The Court held that as the scheme was an
      integrated one, stay of parts of it precluded the authorities from going ahead
      with the entire section 6 declaration. That reasoning cannot help the
      respondents to contend that the same thing would apply to the quashing of
      the declaration by the Division Bench in its judgment dated 18.11.1988.             C
      Quashing the notification in the cases of individual writ petitions cannot be
      treated as quashing the whole of it. That was what was held in Abhey Ram's
      case. The main points raised before us are fully covered by the judgment of
      the three Judge Bench in Abhey Ram's case.

           For the aforesaid reasons, these Civil Appeals are allowed and the             D
      judgment of the High Court is set aside and the Writ petition is dismissed.
      There will be no order as to costs.

      M.P.                                                          Appeals allowed.




=/-