Holding

The 1966 amendment exempts temples from proving personal cultivation under Section 9(2)(a), which suffices to rebut the presumption of ryoti land under Section 65(1), allowing the grant of ryotwari patta to the temple.

Summary

Dr. Devadoss (deceased) claimed ryotwari patta on land in Thanjavur district, asserting Kudikani cultivation rights, while the Veera Makali Amman temple claimed ownership under Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963. The Inam Tribunal, the Appellate Tribunal and the Madras High Court held the temple to be the landholder and the appellant only a tenant, granting the patta to the temple. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the 1966 amendment exempting religious institutions from proving personal cultivation applied only to Section 2(13)(ii)(a) and not to (ii)(b), and that the presumption under Section 65(1) that land is ryoti should prevail. The Court examined the amendment (Act 27 of 1966), the Statement of Objects and Reasons, and held that the exemption removes the personal‑cultivation requirement for temples, thereby rebutting the presumption in Section 65(1). Consequently, the temple’s claim was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

The amendment of 1966 exempts religious institutions from the personal cultivation requirement under Section 9(2)(a); does this exemption apply to the temple’s claim?
Does the exemption apply only to Section 2(13)(ii)(a) or also to Section 2(13)(ii)(b)?
Can the presumption under Section 65(1) that land is ryoti be rebutted by the exemption granted to temples?
Whether the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amending Act may be used for statutory interpretation.

Legislation cited

Madras Estates Land Act, 1908
Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959s. Section 6(18)

Subjects

Ryotwari pattaPrivate landPersonal cultivation exemptionReligious institutionTamil Nadu Estates ActSection 65 presumptionLand reformTenancy

Judgment

A DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ANR.
v
VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOIL ATHALUR

DECEMBER 9, 1997
B
(S.B. MAJMUDAR AND M. JAGANNADHA RAO, JJ.]

Tenancy and Land Laws :
-
Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act,
c 1963) : Section 9(2)(a) proviso (as amended by T.N. Act 27 of 1966) and
2( 13)(ii)(a) and 65(1).

· New inam estate-Private land as defined in S.
2( 13)(ii)(a)-Patta-Grant of~To temple as landholder-Land under per-
D sonal cultivation of temple not proved-Held: Amended proviso to S. 9(2)(a)
applied-Hence, temple exempted from proving personal cultivation for pur-
pose of grant of patta-It makes no difference that exemption from proof of
personal cultivation is introduced in S. 9(2) (a) and not in S.
2( 13)(ii)(a)-T71e presumption under S. 65( 1) regarding the land being 1yoti
is rebuttable-This presumption gets rebutted because of the introduction of
-
E the exemption to the temple-Cowt can refer to the Statement of Objects and
Reasons accompanying the Act to take notice of the evil which was sought to
be remedied-Interpretation of Staflttes.

Th~ appellant, before the lnam Tribunal (Sub-Court), claimed ryot-

F wari patta in a private laud ou the basis that he had cultivation rights over
the said laud. The Tribunal held that the appellant was only a tenant and
granted ryotwari patta to the respondent-temple as landowner under
Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition and Conversion into
Ryotwari) Act, 1963.

G The Appellate Tribunal (Sub-Court) dismissed the appeal filed by
the appellant. The Appellate Tribunal relied on the amendment by the T.N.
Amending Act 27 of 1966 relating to exemption in favour of a temple from
proving personal cultivation and granted the said exemption to the respon-
dent-temple. The High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant.
H · Hence this appeal.
282

r
•

DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS. v. VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOIL ATHALUR 283

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the proviso added A
in Section 9(2)(a) of the 1963 Act by T.N. Amending Act 27/1966 applied
only to Section 2(13)(ii)(a) and not to Section 2(13)(ii)(b) of the 1963 Act
and would not help the respondent-temple, that the legislative intention
behind T.N. Act 27/1966 was not to grant any exemption in favour of
B
-
religious institutions and the respondent had to prove personal cultivation
for 3 years within a continuous period of 12 years immediately before
1-4-1960, and that there was a presumption under Section 65(1) of the 1963
Act to the effect that land in an estate was ryoti land, unless it was proved
to be a private land by the landholder.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court c
HELD : 1.1. With a view of avoiding hardship to temples in proving
personal cultivation as required by Section 9(2)(a) of the Tamil Nadu
Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963, the Legisla·
ture introduced a new provision of exemption by which it sought to exclude D
temples from the need to prove personal cultivation under the proviso to
Section 9(2) (a) of the 1963 Act inserted by the Tamil Nadu Amending Act
27 of 1966. It is seen from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Amending Act that an exemption from personal cultivation became neces-
sary in respect of temples for proving land as private land. It is, therefore, E
permissible for the court to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons
to take notice of "the evil which was smight to be remedied" by the
Amending Act by removing the said hardship experienced by t~mples.
[295-E-G]
Narain Khamman v. Parduman Kumar Jain, [1985) 1 SCC 1 and F
Kumar Jagdish Chandra Sinha v. Eileen K Patlicia D' Rozmie, [1995) 1 SCC
164, relied on.

1.2. The plain reading of the proviso to Section 9(2)(a) of the 1963
Act after its insertion by the Amending Act 27 of 1966 is that the proof of
personal cultivation even for 3 years within a continuous period of 12 years G
immediately before 1.4.1960 was not required for purposes of grant of
ryotwari patta to the temple under Section 9(2)(a). [295-G-H; 296-A]

Shanmugham v. Thintvadutlmrai Adheenam Madam, (1997) 1 L.W.
287 (Mad.), approved. H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A 2. It is true that Section 65(1) of the 1963 Act raises a mandatory
presumption that until the contrary is proved, land is to be presumed to be
ryoti land. But this presumption is a rebuttable one. The exemption carved
out in the body of Section 9(2) (a) helps the temple to rebut the presumption
in Section 65(1) of the 1963 Act. While the presumption under Section 65(1)
might operate against other landholders claiming ryotwari patta under
B Section 9(2)(a), so far as the respondent-temple is concerned, proof of
personal cult.ivation is statutorily dispensed with, even for the period of
-
three years mentioned in Section 9(2)(a). That is how, the statutory
presumption gets rebutted. It makes no difference that exemption from
proof of personal cultivation has been introduced in Section 9(2)(a) and
C not in Section 2(13)(ii)(a) which defines private land.
[296-G-H; 297-A-C; 298-A-B]
Pollisetti Pullamma v. Ka/lwi Kameshwaramma, AIR (1991) SC 604;
Chidambaram Chettiar v. Santanaramaswami Odaym; [1968] 2 SCR 754; P.
Venkataswami v. D.S. Ramireddy, [1976] 3 SCC 665; Periannan v. Amman
D · Kail, AIR (1952) Mad. 323; Narayudu v. Venkta Ramanamwthi, (1949) 2
MW 623; Mallikmjuna Prasad v. Somaya's Case, ILR 42 Mad. 400 (PC);
Zamindar of Chellapalli v. Rajakapati Somaya, ILR 39 Mad. 341;
Jagadeesam Pillai v. Kuppammal, _ILR (1946) Mad. 687; Pmish P1iest v.
Thiagagaswam, Appeals Nos. 176 to 178; Khajamian Wakf Estates v. State of
Madras, [1970] 3 SCC 894 and S. 77lenappa Chettiar v. State of T.N., [1986]
E 2 sec 275, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8581 of
1997.

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.l.97 of the Madras High
F Court in S.T.A. No. 4 of 1993.
R Sundaravaradhan, Mrs. Revathy Raghavan, Ms. Kalpana K.
Tripathy for the Appellants.

A.T.M. Sampht and V. Balaji for the Respondent.
G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J. Leave granted.

This appeal has been preferred by the legal representative of one Dr.
H Devadoss against the Judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High
DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS. >·. VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOIL ATHALUR [ M. JAGANNADHA RAO. 1.]285

Court in Special Tribunal Appeal No. 4of1993 dated 21.1.1997, dismissing A
the appeal of the said Dr. Devadoss a legal representative. That was an
appeal preferred against the order of the Inam abolition Tribunal
(Sub.Court) Thanjavur in CMA No. 23 of 1985, by which the said Tribunal
had confirmed the order of the Asst. Settlement Officer (Asst. Law Tax
Officer dated 4.5.1985 in T..8.5./EO/PKT 94 (on remand) granting ryotwari B
patta to the respondent temple as a landholder under Section 9 of the
Tamil Nadu Estates (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963
(Act 26/1963) hereinafter called the 1963 Act).

The dispute relates to the 0.84 cents in S. No. 10/2 and 0.79 cents in
S. No. 75, Athaloor Village, Peravoorani Taluk, Thanjavur District. C

1he decisioiz of the tribunals :

• Before the primary tribunal, the respondent temple claimed patta
under Section 9 as the landholder, Dr. Devadoss (hereinafter called the D
appellant for convenience) claimed ryotwari patta on the basis that he was
having the Kudikani or kudivaram rights. He examined himself as PW 1
and five other witnesses as PW 2 to 6. The temple examined its accountant
as RW 1. The appellant claimed that he cultivated the land under orders
of the Collector under the Grow More Food Scheme, spent Rs. 5,000 and
brought the rocky and waste land under cultivation from 1944 onwards. In E
his evidence, he stated that he did not know that the Second of Rights
showed that the land belonged to the temple. He had not filed any
document to show that he came into possession through proceedings of the
Collector under the Grow More Food Campaign. Except to say he was
cultivating the land. He admitted he had no document to prove Kudikani
rights nor were there any muchilakas executed by the temple in his favour. F
He expressed ignorance of the fact that the Revenue Divisional Record
described him as a 'tenant'. He denied the suggestion that the land
belonged to the temple. He admitted that in a case filed by the temple
against him, the temple claimed it had turvaram-rights. He admitted that
Exs. 9 and 10 adangals for 1960, 1961 showed the temple as pattadar and G
himself as tenant. PW 2 to 6 supported his case, PW 4, the village account-
ant from 1946 to 1980 admitted that column 8 of Record of Rights showed
the temple as pattadar, the land was inam and that column 8 would record
who has got kudikani rights. Column 9 of Record of Rights only indicates
the mclwaram rights. RW 1, the present temple Accountant stated that in
the Record of Rights, the temple's name was recorded in Column 8. In H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A column 9 - relating to melwaram right - nobody's name is mentioned. He
stated that the appellant was only a cultivating tenant and it was so
recorded in D.C.P. accounts of temple from 1959 to 1984, the rent being
10 kulams of paddy per year. From 1973, no rent was paid till date and
demand notices were issued. The appellant even filed petitions for fixation
of fair rent under the Tamil Nadu Fair Rent Act during 1965 and 1981 but
B he withdrew the same and suddenly started claiming kudikani rights. The
appellant was not a cultivating tenant under the Grow More Food Cam-
paign.

On this material, the primary authority held that it was clearly
C established that the temple was having iruvaram rights and the appellant
was only a tenant. It then referred to the exemption in favour of temple
from proving self-cultivation in T.N. Act 27/1966 and said :

· "Under the Act 27/66, religious institutions have been exempted •
from proving personal cultivation. Enjoyment of the petitioner
D shows enjoyment and possession of the temple".

The primary authority finally held that the temple was entitled to patta
under Section 9.

On appeal by the appellant,the appellate Tribunal (Sub-Court) dis-
E missed the appeal. During the hearing, it allowed an application by the
appellant for adducing additional evidence consisting of an order dated
1.7.72 in Petition No. 23/72 filed by the temple before the Record Officer,
Pattugottai. In the counter thereto (a copy of which was placed before us
by the appellants' counsel), the appellant admitted : "No doubt, the
F applicant (temple) was the landholder" but pleaded that once the Act 26/63
came into force, the land vested in the State and he therefore denied that
the temple was the landlord on that the appellant was only a tenant. The
application No. 23/72 of the temple above stated "was allowed" and it was
held that the appellant was only a tenant. Thal order has become final. The
other document produced as additional evidence was the tenancy Register
G which again showed the appellant only as a tenant. The appellate Tribunal
thus relied on the additional evidence produced by the appellant to hold
against the appellant. Appellant relied upon the statut01y presumption in
Section 65 of the 1963 Act to say that the land must be presumed to be
ryoti. The appellate Tribunal said that in the present ca!.e, "it has been
H proved clearly that the entire properties mentioned in the appeal are the
DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LR.'i '· VEER.AMAKALI AMMAN KOILATHALURj M.JAGANNADHAR.AO.J.J287

private properties, belonging to the Respondent. Further, it has been A·
proved by the Respondent through documentary evidence, that the appel-
lant has been cultivating the entire properties mentioned in the appeal, in
the capacity as a tenant only. The appellate Tribunal also relied on the
amendment by T.N. Act 27 of 1966 relating to exemption in favour of
temple from provilling self-cultivation and observed : B
"We could grant exemption to the Respondent, being a Hindu
temple, in respect of the lands for which patta is requested as per
the Amendment act 27/66, even though the entire properties are
not in the enjoyment of Respondent directly."

The decision of the High Cnwt :
c
The appellant appealed to the High Court, which again held that the
appellant had no evidence to prove kudikani rights in himself or his
predecessors-in-interest except the kist receipts, that on the other hand,
the records produced would belie the claim of the appellant and the so D
called kudikani rights and that this was an indication that the appellant
was only a cultivating tenant and not a ryot holding kudivaram interest in
the lands in question. The High Court further held that the "very tenancy
records produced and marked in the proceedings, militate against such a
claim and it only would go to show that, if at all, possession of the lands
by the appellant was only as a cultivating tenant and not as a holger of E
kudivaram interest or as a ryot lawfully admitted into any ryoti land by
conferring kudikani rights."

As regards the plea of the appellant that the temple had no personal
cultivation, the High Court too referred to the exemption by T .N. Act 27
of 1966 as follows : F

"The tribunal below has rightly placed reliance upon the provisions
of Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966 under which, the religious institu-
tions recognised and as defined within the meaning of the Tamil
Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, are G
exempted from proving personal cultivation as a condition prece-
dent for getting patta in respect of irervaram pannai lands belong-
ing to it."

The High Court, in that respect stated that it had elaborately considered
this question in Shamnugham v. 171i1Uvavaduthurai Adheenam Madam H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A (since reported in 1997 (1) L.W. 287) and following the same, the High
Court dismissed the appellant's apeal.

171e contentions in this Cowt :

In this appeal, learned Senior counsel for the appellant Shri R.
B Sundaravaradan contended that the High Court had not noticed that the
claim of the temple was not under Section 2(13)(ii)(a) but was one under
Section 2(13)(ii)(b) and that the proviso added in Section 9(2)(a) of Act
26/63 byT.N. Act 27/66 applied only to Section 2(13)(ii)(a) and not Section
2(13)(ii)(b) and would not help the temple. It was also contended that the
C legislative intention behind Act 27/66 was not to grant any exemption in
favour of religious institutions and they had to prove personal cultivation
for 3 years before 1.4.1960. It was also contended that the temple must
prove self cultivation as required by the decisions of this Court in Pollisetti
Pu/lamma v. Kallwi Kameswaramma, AIR (1991) SC 604, Chidambaram
Chettiar v. Sallthanaramaswami Odayar & Others, (1968) 2 SCR 754 and P.
D Venkataswamy v. Dr. S. Rami Reddy, (1976) 3 SCC 665. Counsel also relied
upon the presumption in Section 65 of the Act 26/63 to the effect that land
in an estate was ryoti land, unless the contrary was proved and also relied
upon sub-clause (2) of Section 65 which states that certain expressions to
the effect that a tenant had no occupancy right etc. in leases executed
E before 19.4.49 would be inadmissible. Counsel, also referred to sub-clause
r'
(3) of Section 65 to the effect that such expression in leases executed after
19.4.49 would not by themselves be sufficient to prove that the land was
private land at the commencement of tenancy.

On the other hand, it was contended by the learned counsel for the
F respondent Sri A.T.M. Sampath that, before the lower tribunal and the
High Court, the respondent temple relied only upon Section 2(13)(ii)(a)
and not upon Section 2(13)(ii)(b) as contended by the appellant's counsel
and hence T .N. Act 27/66 squarely applied and on a proper interpretation
of the said Act 27/1966 temples were "exempt" from proving self cultivation
G even for the 3 year period and it was never intended otherwise. Even
assuming that the presumption on Section 65 applied, the propositions 4,
5, 6 laid down by the Full Bench in Pe1iamza11 v. Amman Kail, AIR (1952)
Mad. 323 (FB) were still applicable not only because of the exemption
provided in T.N. Act 27 of 1966 but also because the decisions in
H Chidambaram Chettiar v. Santhanaramaswami Odayar & Others, (1968] 2
DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS. >. VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOJL ATHAL UR [ M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.] 289

SCR 754, P. Venkataswamy V. Dr. B. Rami Reddy, (1976] 2 sec 665 and A
Pollisetti Pullamma v. Kallwi Kameswaramma, AIR (i991) SC 604
imported a wrong test. The said decisions had applied the theory of lands
attached to the manors of English nobleman into Indian law and this was
not the intention of the legislature either in 1908 or thereafter as pointed
out by Viswanatha Sastri, J. in Narayudu v. Venkatas Ramanamwthi, (1949) B
2 MU 6233 (approved by the majority in ReTiannan 's case), Viswanatha
Sastri, J. had observed :

"It is all very well when talking of the de mesne lands of an
English Duke or marquis to use the term as denoting land
appurtenant to the mansion of the lord of the manor. The C
menorial system was not prevalent in this country. Zamindar
lived in cities and forts for reasons of security and their private
lands were not confined to vacant spaces surrounding their
palaces or residence."
D
It is also pointed out that Satyanarayana Rao, J. in the Full Bench stated
(at p. 329) that in fact, these lands granted to the Zamindars were not
granted near their houses nor at one place but "were distributed very often
to each village to make the supervision effective." Satyanarayana Rao, J.
therefore held that the contention on behalf of the ryot that it was neces-
sary for the landholder to prove that atleast at some time or other, the E
lands were under actual personal cultivation of the landholder, could not
be accepted. It was also pointed out by the learned counsel for the
respondent-temple that the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908 applied to
Zamindars etc. and even assuming that for proving land as private land
they had to prove that the land was appurtenant to manors or castles, such F
a principle of self cultivation of lands around manors could not be extended
to landholders in whose favour grants of whole villages (which were
brought under the definition of estate in 1936) were made nor to palts of
main villages which now under Madras Act 26/1963 are to be treated as
new inam estates. The legislature must have known that these small
landholders had to manors. Nor could, it is argued for the respondent, a G
deity in a temple be equated with an English hopleman having manors and
land appurtenant thereto. It was also pointed out that the case decided by
the Privy Council in Mallikmjune Prasad V. Soma)J'a's case (!LR 42 Mad.
400 (PC)) which affirmed the decision of the Madras High Court in
Zamindar of Chellapalli v. Rajakapati Soma>J•a, (ILR 39 Mad. 341) and H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A which was relied upon by this Court in Clzidambaram Chettiar's case (1968]
2 SCR 754, was as case of conversion of ryoti land into private land for
which actual cultivation had to be proved and it was not a case where
Section 3(10) fell for interpretation. This aspect was pointed out by
Satyanarayana Rao, J. in the Full Bench case (at p. 329). It was also
contended that this Court in Chidambaram Chettiar's case adopted the law
B
as stated in Jagadeesan pillai, v. Kuppammal, ILR (1946) Mad. 687 of the
Madras High Court (though no express reference was made to that
decision) and that that decision related to lands in a village which were in
fact part of Tanjore Palace Estate and it might be that the manorial concept
applied to the lands connected with the Tanjore Palace. It was pointed out
C for the respondent that the other judgment of the Madras High Court in
Pmish P1iest v. Thiagagaswam (appeal No. 176 to 178) merely followed
Jagadeesan Pillai's case relating to Tanjore Palace Estate, and that, even
Chidambaram chettiar's case decided by this Court related to lands in

D
Orathur Padugal in Tanjore Palace Estates to which perhaps the manorial
concept could apply. It was contended for the respondent further that the
-
later decision of this Court in P. Venkataswami v. Dr. S. Rammi Reddy,
AIR (1976) SC 1060 merely followed Chidambaram Chettiar's case and that
Pollisttli's case which related to an inam estate also wrongly applied the
manorial concept by following Chidambaram Chettiar's case and that it was
not the intention of the legislature to import these concepts into the
E Madras Estates Land Act in 1906 or thereafter.

Contention by respondent - landholder based on Pe1ianna11 's case need not
be gone into :

F In view of the alternative submission of the respondent based on
T.N. Act 27, 1966, it is not necessary for us to go into the above contention
that the decisions of this Court, ought not have applied the concept of lands
appurtenant to the manors of English nobleman, to the case of private land
of landholders under the Madras Estates Lands Act, 1908. Nor is it
G necessary for us to deal with the contention based on Pe1ia11na11's case, we
therefore do not propose to go into the said controversy. We are of the
view that for the purpose of the case before us, it will be sufficient, as
shown hereinafter, to rely upon the T.N. Act 27/1966. We shall therefore
proceed to deal with this alternative submission made on behalf of the
H learned counsel for the respondent -temple.
DEVADOSS (DEAD) RY LRS. » VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOILATHALUR f M. JAGANNADHA RAO. J.J 291
• Altemative contention of temple landholder based 011 exemption by T.N. Act, A
27/66 :

We shall start with T.N. Act 26 of 1963. The legislative history behind
the abolition of existing inam estates and new inam estates specified in the
T.N. Act 26/63 has been set out in detail in two decisions of this Court in B
Klza;amian Wakf Estates Etc. V. State of Madras and Anot/1e1; (1970] 3 sec
894 a11d in S. Tlzenappa Chettiar & Othe1~· v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1986] 2
SCC 275 where the vires of the Act and its amendment of 1969,
respectively, were upheld. There is an elaborate discussion in these rulings
about melvaram and kudivaram rights and rights of ryots in ryoti land
under the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, its amendment in 1936 and the C
Madras Estates (Abolition & Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 and
about different types of inam estates and their abolition from time to time.

Existing and new inam estates :
D
Under the T .N. Act 26 of 1963, estates which were sought to be
abolished and converted into ryotwari and for which ryotwari pattas were
proposed to be granted related to existing inam estates and new inam
estates. Section 2(4) defined existing inam estates as an inam village which
became an estate by viltue of the Madras Estates Land (Tl1ird Amendment) E
Act, 1936 while new inam estate was defined in Section 2(9) as 'part village
inam estate or a pudukottai inam estate'. Section 2(11) defined pa1t village
inam estate as a part of a village (including a part of a village in the merged
territory of pudukottai) the grant of which part has been made, confirmed
or recognised by the Government, notwithstanding that subsequent to the
F
grant, such part had been partitioned among the grantees or the successor
-in-title of the grant of grantees. (This definition was amended by T.N. Act
23/69 w.e.f. 15.2.65 in certain respects). Section 2(11) contains two
Explanations. I and II .
•
'Private land' in new 'inam estates' : G

We next come to the crucial definition of private land in respect of
new inam estates in Section 2(13) of Act 26/1963 and to the proviso in
Section 9(2) which deals with grant of ryotwari patta to landholders in
respect of new inam estates. H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP. 6 S.C.R .

.,__ A At the outset, we may make it clear that our reading of the judg- •
ments of the tribunals below and of the High Court shows that the
respondent-temple nowhere relied upon Section 2(13)(ii)(b) of the !963
Act as contended for by the appellant and that the parties on both sides
proceeded on the basis that the case of the temple was based only on
B Section 2(13)(ii)(a). We shall therefore examine the contentions of the
respondent-temple with reference to Section 2(13)(ii)(a). We shall there-
fore refer to the definition of private land as applicable to new inam est<ites
and to the rights of landholders for grant of ryotwari patta in new inam
·estates.

C So far as new inam estates are concerned Section 2(13)(ii) defines
p1ivate land as :

"(a) the domain or home farm land of the landholder by whatever
designation known, such as Kambattam, Khas, Sir or Pannai; or

D (b) Land which is proved to have been cultivated by the
landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired labour, with
his own or hired stock for a continous period of twelve years
immediately before the 1st day of April, 1980, provided that the
landholder has retai11ed the kudivaram ever since and has not
converted the land into ryoti land or ........ "
E
It will be noticed that, we are here concerned with Section 2(13)(ii)(a) only.

Grant of 1yotwari patta to la11dholder i11 11ew i11am estates :

So far as grant fo ryotwari patta in respect of new inam estates to .
F the landholder is concerned, the same is provided in Section 9(2)(a). Before
amendment by Act 27/66, Section 9(2) of the Act of 1963 provided that the
landholder will be entitled to grant of ryotwari patta in respect of.

"(a) all land which immediately before the notified date belonged
to him as private land; provided that in the case of private land
G specified in clause 13(ii)(a) of Section 2, such land is proved to
have been cultivated by the landholder himself, by his own servants
or by hired labour, with his own or hired stock, in the ordinary
course of husbandry, for a continuous period of three years within
a period to twelve years immediately before the 1st day of April,
H 1960; ........."

J
DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS." VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOIL ATHALUR [M. JAGANNADHA RAO,J.)293

We are here concerned with the proviso in Section 9(2)(a) which, for the A
purpose of proof of private land under Section 2(13)(ii)( a), permits proof
of cultivation for 3 years out of 12 years before 1.4.1960,
\

The next question is whether, by virtue of the Amending Act 27/66,
even the requirement of 3 years cultivation was dispensed with, so far as B
claims for ryotwari patta by temples under Section 9(2)(a)? We shall
accordingly refer to the amendment brought out by the T,N, Amendment
Act 27/66 which amended Act 23/63. Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 3
of the amending Act 27 of 1966 brought into force the following
amendments to Section 9(.!)(a) and Section 9(2)(a) of the Principle Act
26/63. Section 3 stated : c
"In Section 9 of the Principal Act,

(i) In item (2) of the proviso to clause (a) of sub- section (i) for
the words is proved to have been cultivated by the landholder D
himself', the word "is, in the case of the landholder other than a
religious institution, proved to have been cultivated by the
landholder himself' should be substituted.

(ii) In the proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (2) for the expression
"provided that in the case of private land specified in clause E
l3(ii)(a) of Section 2, such land is proved", the expression
"provided that in the case of a landholder other than a religious
institution, the private land specified in clause (13)(ii)(a) is proved".
shall be substituted."
F
We are concerned here with the second para, extracted above which
concerns the proviso in Section 9(2)(a) and to the Explanation added by
sub-clause (iii) of Section 3 which states that for the purposes of the
proviso in Section 9(2)(a) "religious institution" shall mean a religious
institution as defined in clause ( 18) of Section 6 of the Madras Hindu
Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Madras Act 22 of 1959), G

In order to understand the background of the abovesaid Amending
Act 27/1966 we shall refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
Bill which preceded T.N. Act 27/66. It is stated in para 6 of the said
Statement as follows : H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.
A "According to the proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (1) and the
proviso to clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 9 of the Act, in
the case of private land, in order that the landholder shall be
entitled to ryotwari patta, the land must be proved to have been
cultivated by the landholder himself or by his own servants or by
hired labour with his own or hired stock in the ordinary course of
B
husbandry for a continuous period of three years within a period
·Of twelve years immediately before 1st April, 1960. This applies to
religious institutions also."

It was explained in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, as follows :
c
"So far as religious institutions governed by the Madras Hindu
Religious and' Charitable Endowments Act, 1959 (Madras Act 22
of 1959) are concerned, under the rules made under that Act, such
religious institutions are prohibited from canying on pannai cultiva-
tion without obtaining the previous approval of the Deputy Com-
D missioner of the division concerned. In view of this, the religious
institutions have not been canying on pannai cultivation and conse-
quently they will not be satisfying the requirement of the provisos
refe1red to above, this causes undue hardship to such institutions
and it is proposed not to insist on personal cultivation for three
E years for the purpose of grant of ryotwari patta in the case of
private lands of religious institutions governed by the Madras
Hindu Religious and Charitable Endownments Act, 1959.

The bill seeks to achieve the above objects."

F It is therefore seen from the said Statement of Objects and Reasons
that an exemption from personal cultivation became necessary in respect
of temples for proving land as private land, inasmuch as, temples were,
under the Rules made under the Madras HR & CE Act, 1959 prohibited
from having pa11nai cultivation except with permission of competent
G authority.

Whether Statement of Objects & Reasons of Act 27166 could be looked
into :

Question arises naturally whether the Court can refer to the State-
H ment of Objects and Reasons mentioned in a Bill when it is placed before

I
I
DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS. ,, VEERA MAKALI AMMAN KOILAIBALUR [M JAGANNADHA RAO, J.]295

the Legislature and even if it is permissible, to what extent the Court can A
make use of the same. On this aspect, the law is well settled. In Narain
Knamman v. Panduman Kumar Jain, [1985] 1 SCC 1 (B). It was stated that
though the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a Legislative
Bill could not be used to determine the true meaning and effect of the
substantive provisions of a statute, it was pennissible to refer to the same B
for the purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent state of
affairs, the sorrounding circumstances in relation to the statute, and the
evil which the statute sought to remedy. (See also Kumar Jagdish Chandra
Sinha v. Eileen K. Pat1icia D'Rozarie, [1995] 1 SCC 164.

In our view, the Legislature of Tamil Nadu was aware that in almost C
every case where a temple landholder was contending that certain land was
private land and not ryoti land. and where the landholder was claiming
ryotwari patta under Section 9 of T.N. Act 26/1963, the tenants were
invariably raising a plea that the temple must prove for purposes of Section
9(2)(a) that the land was before the notified date, being cultivated by the D
landholder himself, by his own servants or by hired Labour, with his own
or hired stock, in the ordinary course of husbandry, under Section 9(2)(a),
proof of personal cultivation was required atleast for a continuous period
of 3 years within a period of 12 years immediately before 1.4.1960.

The legislature, however, noticed that under the Rules made under E
the Madras HR & CE Act, 1959 temples were prohibited from pannai
cultivation without obtaining the previous approval of the Deputy commis-
sioner and that therefore it would be difficult for temples to prove personal
cultivation as required by Section 9(2)(a), with a view to avoid hardship to
temples in proving pannai cultivation, the legislature thefore thought of F
introducing new provision of exemption by which it sought to exclude
temples from the need to prove personal cultivation under tlie proviso to
Section 9(2)(a).

It is therefore permissible for the Court to take notice of "the evil G
which was sought to be remedied" by the Amending Act 27/1966 by
removing the said hardship experienced by temples. In our view the plain
meaning of the proviso, after the amendment of 1966 is that, so far as the
temples covered by the Madras HR & CE Act, 1959 were concerned, the
proof of personal cultivation even for 3 years within a continuous period
of 12 years immediately before 1.4.1960 was not required, for purposes of H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A grant of cyotwari patta to the temple under Section 9(2)(a).
In our opinion, the tribunals below and the High Court were right in
applying the Amending provisions of Act 27/1966 so far as the respondent-
temple was concerned, we may add that the judgment of the Madras High
Court in Shammugham's case (1997) 1 L.W. '2J37 in so far as it had taken
B the same view mentioned by us in this judgment, to that extent, is correct.

The presumption under Section 65, if rebutted :

Learned counsel for the appellant has strongly relied on the statutory
presumption in Section 65 of the T .N. Act 26/1963 to the effect that land
C is to be presumed to be ryoti land unless it is proved to be private land by
the landholder. Section 65 reads as follows :

"S. 65(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), when in any
proceeding under this Act it becomes necessary to determine
whether any land is a ryoti land or a priavate land, it shall be
D
presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such land is a ryoti
land.

(2)(i) any expression in a lease, patta or the like executed or issued
on or after the 1st day of July 1918 in the case of an existing inam
E estate and the 19th day of April 1949 in the case of a new inam
estate to the effect or implying that a tenant has no right of
occupancy or that his right of occupancy is limited or restricted in
any manner shall not be admisible in evidence for the purpose of
proving that the land concerned was private land at the commen-
cement of the tenancy.
F
(ii) any such expression in ·a lease, patta or the like executed or
issued before the 1st day of July 1918 in the case of an existing
inam esate and the 19th day of April 1949 in the case of a new
inam estate shall not by itself be sufficient for the purpose of
proving that the land concerned was private land at the commen-
G
cement of the tenancy."

Now, it is true that the Section 65(1) raises a mandatory presumption
that until the contrary is proved, land is to be presumed to be ryoti land.
But this presumption is a rebuttable one. In the normal course, to prove
H that the land is private land the landholder, so far as new inam estates are
DEVADOSS (DEAD) BY LRS." VEERAMAKALI AMMAN KO!LATHALUR[ M. JAGANNADHA RAO, J.]297

concerned, could establish, under Section 2(13)(ii)(a), that the land was A
domain land or home farm of the temple, by whatever designation known
such as, kamipattam, khas, sir or pannai. But the question is as to what
extent the exemption granted by Madras Act 27/66 helps in this behalf.

It is contended for the appellate that the respondent cannot rely B
upon the exemption from self cultivation introduced in Secti0n 9(2)(a)
inasmuch as the said exemption does not find a place in the definition of
private land in Section 2(13)(ii)(a).

It is true that the exemption from proof a personal cultivation has
been introduced by the legislature in the proviso to Section 9(2)(a) which C
deals with grant of ryotwari patta to the landholder and not in Section
2(13)(ii)(a) which defines private land'. But, as pointed by the Madras
High Court in Shanmugham 's case ( 1997) 1 L W 2B7 that makes no dif-
ference. In that case Raju, J. observed (at p. 295) :
D
"The contention of the learned Senior counsel for the appellants
that the amendments introduced by the provisions contained in
Section 9(2) without corresponding amendment of the definition
of private land in section 2(13) will not enure to the benefit of the
landholder Adheenam effectively, is a mere futile attempt to wrig-
gle out, some how, of the inevitable consequences flowing out of E
Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1966, enacted with a definite purpose and
aim and the legislature in our view, achieved the same effectively
by excepting the religious institutions from the necessity to prove
personal cultivation for the required period unlike the other class
or category of landholders and the efficacy of the amendments F
introduced to Section 9 which relates to the grant of ryotwari patta
in favour of a landholder religious institutions, does not in any way
depend upon any further amendment being made to Section 2(13)
of the Act. Irrespective of the definition clause in Section 2(13)
and the criteria laid down therein, it is always open to the legisla-
ture, to carve out a distinct class in the operative provisions of the G
Act by way of exception to meet out a special treatment."

and referred to the opening words in Section 2, "unless the context
otherwise requires." In our view, the approach of the High Court in this
behalf is perfectly justified. H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997) SUPP. 6 S.C.R.

A If therefore, we go by the exemption carved out in the body of
Section 9(2)(a), then the said provision itself helps the temple so far as new
inam estates with which we are concerned, to rebut the presumption in
Section 65(1) of the Act 26/1963. In other words, while the presumption
under Section 65(1) might operate against other land holders claiming
B ryotwari patta under Section 9(2)(a), the position so far as temples
governed by the Madras HR & CE Act, 1959 are concerned, proof of
personal cultivation is statutorily dispersed with, even for the period of
three years mentioned in Section 9(2)(a). That is now, the statutory
presumption gets rebutted.

C For the above reasons, we uphold the conlusion arrived at by the
Madras High Court which affirmed the grant of ryotwari patta to the
respondents.

It is· therefore held that the authorities were right in granting ryotwari
patta to the respondent-temple and in treating the Dr. Devadoss only as
D an ordinary cultivating tenant in the private land of the temple.
In the result, the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances,
without costs.

v.s.s. Appeal dismissed.