Holding

The High Court correctly exercised its jurisdiction to strike out the vague, unspecific election petition and reject it under Order VII Rule 11 because it failed to disclose any cause of action under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, and no amendment was permissible after the statutory limitation period.

Summary

M.L. Agarwal challenged the 1981 Lok Sabha election of Rajiv Gandhi alleging various corrupt practices. The High Court struck out the petition as vague, frivolous and lacking a cause of action under Order VI Rule 16 and rejected it under Order VII Rule 11. Agarwal appealed, contending that the court had no jurisdiction before a written statement was filed, that he was denied a chance to amend, and that the allegations did disclose a cause of action. The Supreme Court held that the election petition must contain precise particulars of corrupt practices as required by Sections 81, 83 and 100 of the Representation of the People Act, and that the High Court was empowered to strike out and reject the petition at the preliminary stage even without a written statement. The Court also ruled that no amendment could be allowed after the statutory 45‑day filing period, and that the petition failed to disclose any actionable corrupt practice. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain preliminary objections and strike out pleadings under Order VI Rule 16 and reject an election petition under Order VII Rule 11 before the respondent filed a written statement.
Whether the appellant was deprived of the opportunity to amend the election petition to supply necessary particulars of alleged corrupt practices.
Whether the election petition disclosed any cause of action under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Whether amendment of an election petition is permissible after the statutory limitation period prescribed in Section 81.
Whether the specific allegations alleged constitute corrupt practices under Sections 123(5), 123(6) and 123(7) of the Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VII Rule 11, s. Order VI Rule 16, s. Order VI Rule 17
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961s. Rule 90
Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 100, s. 123, s. 77, s. 80, s. 81, s. 83, s. 86, s. 87, s. 98, s. 99

Subjects

election petitioncorrupt practiceRepresentation of the People ActOrder VI Rule 16Order VII Rule 11limitation periodamendment of petitioncause of actionstatutory rightparliamentary legislation

Judgment

\I
DHARTJPAKAR MADAN LAL AGARWAL

J v.
RAJIV GANDHI

MAY II, 1987
A

[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.] B

). Representation of the People Act, 1950: ss. 77, 80 to 87, 100 and
123-Election petition-Allegations of corrupt practice-Not to be
vague or general-scrutiny by Court in a strict manner-Jurisdiction of
~ Court to strike out pleadings-Empowered at any stage of proceeding
even before filing of written statement-Time limit for enquiry-
.. Desirability for suitable Parliamentary legislation . c
Code of Civil Procedure: 0. VI R. 16, 0. VII R. Il, Striking out
't- of pleadings-Rejection of election petition-Jurisdiction of the Court.
The election of the respondent, who was returned to the Lok D
Sabha in a bye election in 1981, was challenged by the appellant under
s. 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, on a number of
)- grounds, including the allegations of corrupt practice of undue influe-
nee, hiring and procuring of vehicles for carrying voters and obtaining
the assistance of Government servants and incurring expenses at the
election in excess of the permissible limit. Upon a preliminary objection E
raised by the respondent the High Court struck off the pleadings as
vague, general, unnecessary, frivolous and vexatious within the mean·
ing of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure and rejected the
~,...,

petition under Order VII Rule 11 read with s. 87 of the Act on the ground
that it did not disclose any cause of action.
·~ F
In the appeal under s. 116-A of the Act against the order of the
High Court, it was contended for the appellant that the High Court had
no jurisdiction to entertain preliminary objections under Order VI Rule
16 or to reject the election petition under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code
before the respondent had med his written statement to the petition'
which deprived him of the opportunity of amending the petition by G
supplying material facts and particulars, that allegations contained in
> ~various paragraphs of the petition constituted corrupt practices which
disclosed cause of action within the meaning of s. 100 of the Act and the
High Court committed error in holding that the petition was defective,
on the premise that it did not disclose any triable issue, and that the
election petition disclosed primary facts regarding corrupt practice and H
369
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS I1987] 3.S.C.R.
if there was absence of any particulars or details the High Court should
A
have afforded opportunity to the appellant to amend the petition.

The respondent was subsequently returned to the .Lok Sabha in

-
the general election held in 1984 and the validity of that election has
been upheld in Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1986 SC 1253 and
B Bhagwati Prasad v. Rajiv Gandhi, [1986] 4 SCC 78. The reliefofsetting
aside the impugned election hlid thus become infrnctuous by lapse of -4.
time as the subsequent election could not be set aside on the grounds
raised in the petition. But since s. 98 read with s. 99 of the Act mandates
investigation of charges of corrupt practice, if any, raised against the
returned candidate, and as proof thereof entails incurring of disqualifi-
'
• -
c cation from contesting subsequent election for a p€riod of six years, the
Court heard the appeal at length.
~
On the questions: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to
strike out pleadings under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure and to reject an election petition under Order VII Rule 11 of that
D Code at the preliminary stage, even though no written statement had
been filed by the respondent, whether in the instant case in entertaining -f
the preliminary objections and rejecting the election petition the High
Court deprived the appellant of an opportunity to amend the petition
and to make good the deficiencies by supplying necessary particulars
and details of the corrupt practices alleged in the petition, and whether
E the various paragraphs of the said election petition disclosed any cause
of action.
~-..

Dismissing the appeal,
~.
HELD: l.1 Right to contest election or to question the election by
F means of an election petition is neither common law nor fundamen-
tal right, instead it is a statutory right regulated by the statutory
provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, which is
a complete and self contained Code. Outside the statutory provisions,
there is no right to dispute an election. The provisions of the Civil
Procedure Code are applicable to the extent as permissible by s. 87 of
G the Act. [387H-388B] -1 '
1.2. The scheme of the Act shows that an election can be ques-
tioned under the statute as provided by s. 80 on the grounds as con-
tained ins. 100. The pleadings are regulated bys. 83, which lays down a
mandatory provision in providing that an election petition shall contain
H a concise statement of material facts and set forth full particulars of
-
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI 371

·.)- corrupt practices with exactitude. [388C]
A
1.3 Since allegations of corrupt practice are in the nature of
criminal charges, it is necessary that each and every corrupt practice
must be clearly and specifically pleaded and it should be complete in
itself so that the returned candidate may know the case he has to meet.
If the allegatipns are vague and general and the particulars of corrupt B
).. practice are not stated in the pleadings the trial of the election petition
cannot proceed for want of cause of action. (388DE]

N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, [1952] SCR 218; Jagan
Nath v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1954 SC 210 and Jyoti Basu v. Debi
Ghosa/, [1982] 3 SCR 318, referred to.
c
~ 2.1 A combined reading ofss. 81, 83, 86 and 87 of the Act makes
it apparent that an election petition is liable to be dismissed in limine at
the initial stage if it does not disclose any cause of action. Cause of
action in questioning the validity of election must relate to the grounds
specified ins. 100 of the Act. If the allegations contained in the petition D
)-' do not set out grounds of challenge as contemplated by s. 100 and if the
allegations do not conform to the requirement of ss. 81 and 83 the plead-
ings are liable to be struck off under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. If after striking out defective pleadings the Court finds
that no cause of action remains to be tried it would be duty bound to
reject the petition under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. (382H, 386A-C] E

Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1986 SC 1253; Bhagwati
Prasad v. Rajir Gandhi, [1986] 4 SCC 78; Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao
Scindia, [1976] 2 SCR 246 and Charan Lal Sahu & Ors. v. Giani Zail
Singh & Anr., (1984] 2 SCR 6, referred to.
F
2.2 In the instant case, the appellant failed to plead complete
details of corrupt practices which could constitute a cause of action as
contemplated by s. 100 of the Act. He also failed to give the material
facts and other details of the alleged corrupt pradices. The High Court,
therefore, rightly exercised its power in rejecting the election petition
>--under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. [401G, 403G-H] G

3.1 Order VI Rule 16 of the Civil Procedure Code permits strik-
ing out of pleadings which are unnecessary, scandalous, frivolou•,
or vexatious or which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay a
fair trial at any stage of the proceedings. It does not admit of any
exception that the respondent must file written statement before the H
..
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987) 3.S.C.R.

A
preliminary objections could be entertained. If, therefare, a preli- ~
minary objection is raised before commencement of the trial, the
court is duty bound to consider the same. It need not wait for the filing
of the written statement by the defendant and point out defects.
Instead it can proceed to hear the preliminary objection and strike
out the pleadings. [387BC, 3860, 383AB, CD)
B
3.2. The High Court, therefore, had jurisdiction in the instant -"'
case to strike out pleadings at the preliminary stage even though no
written statement had been filed by the respondent. [382CD I -~

c
K.Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar & Ors., [1959) SCR 583,
referred to. Union of India v. Surjit Singh Atwal, [1979) 2 SCR 1002, -
distinguished. Vidya Charan Shukla v. G.P. Tiwari & Ors., AIR 1963
'.\IP 356 overruled. ---4
4.1 The Court did not deprive the appellant of the opportunity to
amend the petition and to make good the deficiencies by supplying the
D necessary particulars and details of the corrupt practices alleged in the
petition. He was free to file amendment application, but at no stage did ~
he express any desire to make any amendment application nor he made
any application to that effect before the High Court. It was open to him
to have made that application but he himself did not make any such
application. [387DE)
E
4.2 The High Court was under no legal obligation to direct the
appellant to amend pleadings or ta sua mata grant time for the same.
'.\loreover, the allegations of corrupt practice as required by Section 83
were not complete and did not furnish any cause of action. [387E]

F 5.1 The petition was drafted in a highly vague and general man·
ner. Various paragraphs of the petition presented disjointed averments
and it is difficult to make out as to what actually the petitioner intended
to plead. [401H)

5.2 The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 to 7 contain narra·
G lion of facts as to when the election took place and the petitioner's desire ~· ··1' .:F
to file his nomination paper and the obstruction raised by the autho·
rities and the allegation that the police were shadowing the appellant do
not make out any ground under s. IOO of the Act. [388H)

5.3 The allegation in para 8 that food was given to the workers of
H the respondent at some places assuming to be true does not make out a

- - - --------· __,.,,,,,d.,~-- ~ •..
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAHV GANDHI 373

J. case of corrupt practice or any other ground of challenge under s. 100
A
of the Act. A corrupt practice as contemplated by s. 123(6) contemp-
Iates incurring or authorising expenditure beyond the prescribed limit.
The impugned allegation drn;s not contain any averment that the
respondent incurred or authorised expenditure beyond the prescribed
limit. [389B-D]
B
)._ 5.4 Paras 9 to 19 merely show that a number of vehicles were
plying with party flags of the respondent in the constituency on diffe-
rent dates which by itself do not constitute any corrupt practice. The
~ basic ingredients to make out a ground for challenging the election
under s. 100 of the Act in these paras were totally lacking. They,
_. therefore, disclosed no cause of action. [389E-G]
c
S.S The allegations in paras 20 and 21 that the mother of the
) returned candidate, who was the Prime Minister, had toured the consti-
tuency alongwith him and in her speeches had appealed to the voters to
vote for him do not constitute undue influence or any other corrupt
practice. It is always open to a candidate or his supporters to appeal to
the electors to vote for a particular candidate for the development and D
}"' progress of the area. This would he a legitimate appeal. [389H-390A]

5.6 The allegations in paras 22 to 26 of the petition relate to the
relationship of the appellant with his agent. These do not make out any
ground under s. 100 of the Act. [390BC]
E
5. 7 The statement in para 27 that the appellant as well as his
election agent were being followed by police does not refer to any viola-
tion of law or rule or commission of any electoral offence by the re-
turned candidate or his workers with his consent. [390C]

5.8 The allegation in para 28 that on the polling day a lady went F
to the polling booth alongwith a voter where he affixed stamp on ballot
paper and returned with her does not amount to any corrupt practice
with consent of the returned candidate unless it could be shown that it
materially affected the result of the election. [3900]

;j~. 5.9 The allegation in para 29 that on the polling day drinking G
,, water and batashas were being distributed to the voters at the polling
·· station does not show that it was being done with the consent of the
respondent or that he spent money over it or that the said action
influenced the voters or that it materially affected the result of the
election. In the absence of such allegations it disclosed no cause of
action. [390F] · H

l
-
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1987] 3.S.C.R.

A 5.10 The allegations in paras 31 to 35 that workers of the respon- ~
dent helped voters to cast their votes in favour of the respondent, do not
amount to any corrupt practice unless there was further allegation that
it materially affected the result of the election. [390G I

5.11 The averments made in paras 37 and 38 contain narration of
B facts which have no bearing on any corrupt practice. [391A]

5.12 The allegations in paras 39 to 49 that neither the appellant
nor his election agent had appointed any counting agents but a number
of persons had acted as his counting agents in an unauthorised manner

c
and that complaints made by him were not considered by the Returning
Officer, even if assumed to be tr•ie do not make out any case of commis-
sion of corrupt practice. [391B]
-
The High Court, was, therefore, justified in striking out all these
paragraphs.

D 6.1 In order to constitute a corrupt practice as contemplated by
ss. 77 and 123(6) it is necessary to plead requisite facts showing authori- _.
sation or undertaking of reimbursement by the candidate or his election 1
agent. A mere vague and general statement that the candidate and his
workers with his consent spent money in election in excess rif the
permissible ceiling would not be sufficient to constitute corrupt
E practice. [392G-393A]

Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh, (1955] 1 SCR 671; Smt. A......;
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1976] 2 SCR 347 and Kunwar Lal Gupta
v. A.N Chawla, (1975] 2 SCR 259, referred to.

F 6.2 Any voluntary expense incurred by a political party, well-
"ishers, sympathisers or association of persons does not fall within the
mischief of s. 123(6), instead only that expenditure which is incurred by
the candidate himself or authorised by him is material for the purpose
ofs. 77. [392B]

G Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Terah v. Union of India & Ors., [1985[ J ,
Supp. SCC 189, referred to. ~

6.3 The allegations contained in various sub-paras of para 50
merely allege that a number of vehicles were plying with the flags of the
party to which the returned candidate belonged and food was served in
H connection with the election meetings, distribution of badges and

..,_ _ _ ~-l'I •.• - Jhst-1!11!~- -~ r;-:;.,,_ _ _
..... -
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI 375

leaflets. There is no allegation .that the returned candidate incurred
A
or authorised incurring of expenditure for the aforesaid purposes.
Unless the allegations are specific that the candidate or his election
agent authorised the expenses before the money was actually spent and
that the candidate or his election agent reimbursed or undertook
to reimburse the same the· necessary ingredient of corrupt practice
would not be complete and it would provide no cause of action to B
~ plead corrupt practice. The High Court was justified in striking out the

.-
I same. [393G-394A]

7 .1 If some developmental activity was carried on in the consti-

-
I

~·
tuency and If it was completed during the election period it could not
amountto anyaift or promise to the voters. [394G]

7 .2 The •llegatlon in para S3(1)(A) does not disclose any material
c
fact or particular regarding the alleged corrupt practice of making gift
I which may amount to bribery within the meaning of s. 123(1)(A). It
I merely states that Amethi railway station was being constructed and
I during the electiqn its work was speeded up which persuaded the voters D
I
I 't to cast their votes in favour of the returned candidate. There ls no
I allegation thltt Ille returned candidate or his workers with his consent
I made any gift, offer or promise to any elector to vote or refrain from
I voting at an election. [394E~]

8.1 A candidate, his workers and supporters have every right E
under the law to canvass for the success of a particular candidate saying
that if elected he would work for the development of the constituency.
I
Such a promise does not in any way interfere with the free exercise of
I electoral right of the electors. [39SE] /
I'-'(
8.2 The allqatlons in paras 53(1)(B) and (C) that the returned F
candidate, his mother and their wor.kers with their consent made pro-
mise through newspapers, pamphlets and speeches that voters should
cast their votes In favour of the respondent for the sake of progress
and development of the constituency, merely amounts to a representa-
tion being nrade by the party leader and the returned candidate and his
~workers. Such a statement of promise is a legitimate one and it does not G
I

I
I fall within the definition of bribery and undue influence under
I

I
s. 123(1)(A) ors. 123(2). [39SB, D} •
I

I 8.3 Declaration of public policy or a promise of public action or
I
promise to develop the constituency in general do not interfere with free
I

I
exercise of electoral rights as the same do not constitute bribery or H
I
undue influence. [3968]
I

I
.
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1987] 3.S.C.R.

A Shiv Kirpal Singh v. V. V. Giri, (1971] 2 SCR 197 and H. V.
Karnath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh, [1969] 3 SCR 813, referred to.

9.1 Hiring or procuring of a vehicle by a candidate or his agent or
by any other person with his consent is the first essential ingredient of
the corrupt practice under s. 123(5), the second such ingredient is that
B the hiring or procuring of the vehicle must be for conveyance of the
voters to and from the polling station, and the third that conveyance of
electors is free from any charge. If any of the three ingredients is not
pleaded to make out a case of corrupt practice under s. 123(5) the
charge must fail. [39'7E, 399C]

C
9.2 The allegations contained in paras 30 and 53(1)(D) conspicu-
ously do not contain any pleading regarding hiring and procuring of the
-
vehicles by the returned candidate or any of bis workers with his -f
consent for conveyance of the voters to and from polling station free
of cost. No particulars of any kind have been specified. The paras,
therefore, do not make out .my charge of corrupt practice as contem-
D plated by s. 123(5) and the High Court was justified in striking out the
same. [399G-400A] "(

Joshbhai Chunnibhai Patel v. Anwar Bel( A. Mirza, [1969] 2 SCR
97; Ch. Razik Ram v. Ch. J.S. Chauhan & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 667;
Balwant Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, (1960] 3 SCR 91; Dadasaheb Dat-
E tatraya Pawar & Ors. v. Pandurang Raoji Jagtap & Ors., (1978] 2 SCR
524; Dharmesh Prasad Verma v. Faiyazal Azam, (1985] I SCR 11;
Rajendra Singh Yadav v. Chandra Sen & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 882 and
Ba/wan Singh v. Prakash Chand & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1187, referred
to.

F 10 .1 In order to constitute a corrupt practice under s. 123(7), it
is essential to clothe the petition with a cause of action which would call
for an answer from the returned candidate and it should, therefore,
plead mode of assistance, measure of assistance and all facts pertaining
to the assistance. The pleading should further indicate the kind or form
of assistance obtained and in what manner the assistance was obtained
G or procured or attempted to be procured by the candidate for promo!- ~
ing the prospect of his election. The petitioner most state with exactness
the time of assistance, the manner of assistance and the persons from
whom assistance was obtained or procured by the candidate. [400DE]

10.2 The allegations in sub-paras 1, 2 and 3 of para 53(1)(E) that
H though the appellant bad not appointed any counting agent but still
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI 377

)- certain persons acted as his counting agents and the returning officer
did not hold any inquiry into his complaint, in sub·para 4 that there A
was fear psychosis and it looked as if the police and other government
officials wanted to help the returned candidate, in sub-para 5 of certain
persons helping the voters to cast their votes on the polling day and that
S!!me persons cast votes 100 to 200 times and their signatures were not
obtained do not make out any charge of corrupt practice within the B
)..
provisionsofs.123(7). [400FG]

-" 11. The allegations in para 53(2) that the presiding officers did not
perform their duties in accordance with law inasmuch as they failed in
their duty to remove the posters and other propaganda material from
the polling booth and that the election symbol of the returned candidate
was displayed within 100 metres of the polling booth in violation of c
+· the rules do not make out any charge of corrupt practice. If at all,
it could be a ground under s. lOO(l)(d)(!v) for setting aside election
on the ground of its being materially affected but. no such plea was
raised. [401EF]
D
)" 12. The allegation in para 52 that the returned candidate had
polled cent per cent votes in his favour in certain villages of the
constituency do not make out any corrupt practice or any ground
of challenge under s. 100 and it was rightly struck off by the High
Court. [394B]
E
.......... 13. Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure permits
amendment of an election petition but the same is subject to the provi·
sions of the Act. Section 81 prescribes a period of 45 days from the date
of the election for presenting election petition calling in question the
- -< election of the returned candidate. After the expiry of. that period no
election petition is maintainable and the High Court or this Court has F
no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation. An order of amend•
ment permitting a new ground to be raised beyond the time specified in
s. 81 would amount to contravention of these provisions and is beyond
the ambit of s. 87 of the Act. A new ground cannot, thus, be raised or
' inserted in an election petition by way of amendment after the expiry of
the period of limitation. [402CD]
~ G

In the instant case, the election petition was presented to the
Registrar of the High Court on the last day of the limitation. The
amendments claimed by him are not in the nature of supplying particu-
lars instead those seek to raise new grounds 'of challenge. Various paras
of the election petition whieh are sought to be amended do not disclose H

-- •. :WWW & ..
·-
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A
any cause of action. Therefore, it is not permissible to allow amendment
after expiry of the period oflimitation. [402A, El
-'-·
14.1 Court should not undertake to decide an issue unless it is a
living issue between the parties, for if an issue is purely academic in that
its decision one way or the other would have no impact on the position of
B the parties, it would be waste of public time to engage itself in deciding .......
it. [380D]

Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada v. Jervis, [1944] AC 111, ~
referred to.

14.2 Election is the essence of democratic system and purity of
c elections must be maintained to ensure fair election. Election petition is
-
a necessary process to hold inquiry into corrupt practice to maintain
the purity of election. But there should be some time limit for • 1"'ng
-+
this inquiry. [381E]

D 14.3 Parliament should consider the desirability of amending the
election law to prescribe time limit for inquiry into the allegations of
corrupt practice or to devise means to ensure that valualtle time el this
Conrt is not consumed in election matters which by afllu el thm are
reduced to mere academic interest. [381D]

E 15. A large number of independent candidates contest the
election for the mere sake of contesting, with a view to make out
grounds for challenging the election. They poll only paltry number of
votes. Parliament should devise ways and means to meet the onslaught
of such independent candidates who are not quite serious about their
business. [402G, 403B, G]
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 430
of 1982.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12. 10.1981 of the
Allahabad High Court in E.P. No. 1of1981.
G Appeallent in person ~.

Dr. Y.S. Chitale, N. Nettar, G.S. Narayan Rao and R.B. Datar
for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the.Court was delivered by
H SINGH, J. This appeal under Section 116-A of the Representa-
•

M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI (SINGH, J.) 379

tion of the People Act 1951 is directed against the order of the Higl. A
Court of Allahabad (Lucknow Bench) dated 12.10.1981 rejecting the
election petition filed by the appellant questioning the election of the
/ respondent as member of the Lok Sabha.

A bye election was held on June 14, 1981 to fill up the vacancy to
>-. the Lok Sabha caused by the death of Sanjay Gandhi in the 25th B
Amethi Constituency in District Sultanpur in the State of Uttar
Pradesh. The appellant, the respondent and 13 other candidates con-
~ tested the election. On 15th June 1981 Rajiv Gandhi was declared
elected having polled 258884 votes while the appellant polled 2728
votes only. The appellant filed an election petition under Section 80 of
the Representation of the People Act 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the
Act) questioning the validity of the election of the respondent on a num-
c
+ her of grounds, including the allegations of corrupt practice of undue in-
fluence, hiring and procuring of vehicles for carrying voters and obtaining
the assistance of Government servants and incurring expenses at the
election in excess of the permissible limit. The High Court issued
notice to the respondent who appeared before it and made an appli- D
)- cation under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
striking out the pleadings contained therein as the same were vague,
general, unnecessary, frivolous and vexatious which did not disclose
any cause of action. Respondent further prayed that the election peti-
tion be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code
read with Section 87 of the Act. E
-~
A learned Single Judge of the High Court before whom the pre-
liminary objections were raised caused service of the copy of the
-~ objections on the appellant who was appearing in person and granted
time to him to submit his reply. The appellant, however, did not sub-
mit any reply to the preliminary objections and in spite of date being F •
fixed for hearing arguments in his presence he did not appear before
the Court on the date fixed for arguments. The learned Judge after
hearing the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent passed an
order on 12th October 1981 holding that the various paragraphs con-
tained in the petition were vague and the same did not contain suffi-
~

} cient averments to constitute any corrupt practice and the various G
paragraphs of the petition were unnecessary, frivolous and vexatious
within the meaning of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure. The learned Judge struck off paragraphs 2 to 53, 55 to 57 and
rejected the petition under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 87 of
the Act on the ground that the election petition did not disclose any
cause of action. The appellant has preferred this appeal against the H
said order.

~
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A The election under challenge relates to 1981, its term expired in
1984 on the dissolution of the Lok Sabha, thereafter another general
election was held in December, 1984 and the respondent was again
elected from 25th Amethi Constituency to the Lok Sabha. The validity
of the election held in 1984 was questioned by means of two separate
election petitions and both the petitions have been dismissed. The
B validity of respondent's election has been upheld in Azhar Hussain v.
Rajiv Gandhi, AIR 1986 SC 1253 and Bhagwati Prasad v. Rajiv
Gandhi, [ 1986] 4 SCC 78. Since the impugned election relates to the
Lok Sabha which was dissolved in 1984 the respondent's election can-
not be set aside in the present proceedings even if the election petition
is ultimately allowed on triafas the respondent is a continuing member
of the Lok Sabha not on the basis of the impugned election held in
C 1981 but on the basis of his subsequent election in 1984. Even if we
-
allow the appeal and remit the ca'e to the High Court the respondent's
election cannot be set aside after trial of the election petition as the
relief for setting aside the election has been rendered infructuous by
lapse of time. In this view grounds raised in the petition for setting
D aside the election of the respondent have been rendered academic.
Court should not undertake to decide an issue unless it is a living issue
between the parties. If an issue is purely academic in that its decision
one way or the other would have no impact on the position of the
parties, it would be waste of public time to engage itself in deciding it.
Lord Viscount Simon in his speech in the House of Lords in Sun Life
E Assurance Company of Canada v. Jervis, [1944] AC 111 observed; "I
do not think that it would be a proper exercise of the Authority which
this House possesses to hear appeals if it occupies time in this case in
deciding an academic question, the answer to which cannot affect the
respondent in any way. It is an essential quality of an appeal fit to be
disposed of by t.his House that there should exist between the parties
F a matter in actual controversy which the House undertakes to
decide as a living issue." These observations are relevant in exercising
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.

The main controversy raised in the present appeal regarding set-
ting aside of the respondent's election has become stale and academic,
G but precious time of the apex Court was consumed in hearing the '1
apJ?eal at length on account of the present state of law. Section 98 read
with Section 99 indicates that once the machinery of the Act is moved
by means of an election petition, charges of corrupt practice, if any,
raised against the returned candidate must be investigated. On conclu-
sion of the trial if the Court finds that a returned candidate or any of
H his election agent is guilty of commission of corrupt practice he or his
~.

M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI [SINGH, J.] 381

) •. election agent, as the case may be, would be guilty of electoral offence
A
incurring disqualification from contesting any subsequent election for
a period of six years. In this state of legal position we had to devote
considerable time to the present proceedings as the appellant insisted
that even though six years period has elapsed and subsequent election
has been· held nonetheless if the allegations made by him make out a
case of corrupt practice the proceedings should be remanded to the B
)...
High Court for trial and if after the trial the Court finds him guilty of
corrupt practice the respondent should be disqualified. If we were to
~ remand the proceedings to the High Court for trial for holding inquiry

-
into the allegations of corrupt practice, the trial itself may take couple
of years, we doubt if any genuine and bona fide evidence could be
produced by the parties before the Court, in fact, during the course of
hearing the appellant himself stated before us more than once, that it c
t-- would now be very difficult for him to produce evidence to sub~
stantiate the allegations of corrupt practice but nonetheless he insisted
for fhe appeal being heard on merits. Though the matter is stale and
academic yet having regard to the present state of law, we had to hear
the appeal at l.ength. D
)"
Before we consider the submissions on merit, we would like to
say that Parliament should consider the desirability of amending the
law to prescribe time limit for inquiry into the allegations of corrupt
practice or to devise means to ensure that valuable time of this Court is
not consumed .in election matters which by efflux of time are reduced E
--.4(
to mere academic interest. Election is the essence of democratic
system and purity of elections must be maintained to ensure fair elec-
tion. Election petition is a necessary process to hold inquiry into cor-

-~ rupt practice to maintain the purity of election. But there should be
some time limit for holding this inquiry. Is it in public interest to keep
sword of Damocles hanging on the head of the returned candidate for F
an indefinite period of time as a result of which he cannot perform his
public duties and discharge his obligations to his constituents? We do
not mean to say that the returned candidate should be permitted to
~
delay proceedings and to plead later on the plea of limitation. Ways
and means should be found to strike a balance in ascertaining the
purity of election and at the same time in preventing waste of public G
}- time and mone~' and keeping the sw.ord of Damocles hanging on the
head of returned candidate for an indefinite period of time.

'!'he appellant appeared in person and argued the case vehemen-
tly for a number of days. He made three submissions: (i) The High
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain preliminary objections under H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

Order VI Rule 16 or to reject the election petition under Order VII
A Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure before the respondent had filed
his written statement to the petition. In rejecting the petition under
Order VII Rule 11 the High Court deprived the appellant opportunity
of amending the petition by supplying material facts and particulars.
(ii) Allegations contained in various paragraphs of the election peti-
B tion constituted corrupt practice which disclosed cause of action within
the meaning of Section 100 of the Act. 1be High Court committed
error in holding that the petition was defective on the premise that it
did not disclose any triable issue. (iii) The election petition disclosed
primary facts regarding corrupt practice and if there was absence of
any particulars or details the High Court should have afforded
C opportunity to the appellant to amend the petition.
-
The first question which falls for our determination is whether
the High Court had jurisdiction to strike out pleadings under Order VI
Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure and to reject the election
petition under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code at the preliminary stage
D even though no written ~tatement had been filed by the respondent.
Section 80 provides that no election is to be called in question except
by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of
Part VI of the Act before the High Court. Section 81 provides that an
election petition may be presented on one or more of the grounds
specified in Section 100 by an elector or by a candidate questioning
E the election of a returned candidate. Section 83 provides that an elec-
tion petition shall contain a concise statement of material facts on
which the petitioner relies and he shall set forth full particulars of any
corrupt practice that he may allege including full statement of the
names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice
and the date and place of the commission of each such practice. Sec-
F tion 86 confers power on the High Court to dismiss an election petition
which does not comply with the provisions of Sections 81 and 82 or
Section 117. Section 87 deals with the procedure to be followed in the
trial of the election petition and it Jays down that subject to the provi- r
sions of the Act and of aay rules made thereunder, every election
petition shall be tried by the High Court as nearly as may be in accord-
G ance with the procedure applicable to the trial of suits under the Code ~
of Civil Procedure, 1908. Since provisions of Civil Procedure Code
apply to the trial of an election petition, Order VI Rule 16 and Order
VII Rule 11 are applicable to the proceedings relating to the trial of an
election petition subject to the provisions of the Act. On a combined
reading of Sections 81, 83, 86 and 87 of the Act, it is apparent that
H those paragraphs of a petition which do not disclose any cause of
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJJV GANDHI [SINGH, J.] 383

>- action, are liable to be struck off under Order VI Rule 16, as the Court
is empowered at any stage of the proceedings to strike out or delete A
pleading which is unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or
which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the
petition or suit. It is the duty of the Court to examine the plaint and it
need not wait till the defendant files written statement and points out
' the defects. If the court on examination of the plaint or the election B
>- petition finds that it does not disclose any cause of action it would be
... justified in striking out the pleadings. Order VI Rule 16 itself em-
powers the Court to strike out pleadings at any stage of the proceed-
ings which may even be .before the filing of the written statement by

- the respondent or commencement of the trial. If the Court is satisfied
that the election petition does not make out any cause of.action and
that the trial would prejudice, embarrass and delay the proceedings, c
+- the court need not wait for the filing of the written statement instead it
can proceed to hear the preliminary objections and strike out the
pleadings. If after striking out the pleadings the court finds that no
triable issues remain to be considered, it has power to reject the elec-
tion petition under Order VII Rule 11. D
y
In K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar and Ors., (1959] SCR
583 the Election Tribunal and the High Court both refused to con-
sider preliminary objections raised by the returned candidate at the
initial stage on the ground that the same would be considered at the
trial of the election petition. This Court set aside the order and E
~ .. 4(__
directed that the preliminary objection should be entertained and a
decision reached thereupon before further proceedings were taken in
the election petition. Bhagwati, J. speaking for the Court observed
thus:
-.. ~
"We are of opinion that both the Election Tribunal and the F
High Court were wrong in the view they took. If the pre-
liminary objection was not entertained and a decision
reached thereupon, further proceedings taken in the Elec-
lion Petition would mean a full fledged trial involving
examination of a large number of witnesses on behalf of the
~ 2nd respondent in support of the numerous allegations of G
>- corrupt practices attributed by him to the appellant, his
agents or others working on his behalf; examination of a
large number of witnesses by or on behalf of the appellant
controverting the allegations made against him; examina-
tion of witnesses in support of the recrimination submitted
by the appellant ~gainst the 2nd respondent; and large H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

number of visits by the appellant from distant places like
A
Delhi and Bombay to Ranchi resulting in not only heavy
expenses and loss of time and diversion of the appellant
from his public duty in the various fields of activity includ-
ing those in the House of the People, It would mean
unnecessary harassment and expenses for the appellant
B which could certainly be avoided if the preliminary objec-
tion urged by him was decided at the initial stage by the
Election Tribunal."

In Udhav Singh v, Madhav Rao Scindia, (1976] 2 SCR 246 this
Court held that failure to plead even a single material fact leads to an
incomplete cause of action and incomplete allegations of such a charge -
C are liable to be struck off under Order VI Rule 16, Code of Civil
Procedure. If the petition is based solely on those allegations which
suffer from lack of material facts, the petition is lialJle to be summarily
rejected for want of a cause of action. In Charan Lal Sahu & Ors., v.
Ciani Zail Singh & Anr., [1984] 2 SCR 6 an election petition challeng-
D ing the election of Giani Zail Singh, President was rejected summarily
at the initial stage by a Constitution Bench of this Court on the ground
that the pleadings contained in the election petition even assuming to
be true and correct did not disclose any cause of action for setting aside
the election of the returned candidate. The precise question as raised
by the appellant was considered at length by this Court in Azhar Hus-
E sain v. Rajiv Gandhi and this Court held that the High Court while
dealing with the election petition has power to strike out pleadings
under Order VI Rule 16 and to reject the election petition under
Order VII Rule 11 if the petition does not disclose essential facts to
clothe it with complete cause of action. Failure to plead even a single
material fact would amount to disobedience of the mandate of Section
F 83(1)(a) and election petition could therefore be and must be dismissed
if it suffers from any such vice. The Court repelled the submission that
the power to reject an election petition summarily under the Code of
Civil Procedure should not be exercised at the threshold. The Court
observed as under:

G "In substance the argument is that the Court must proceed -{
with the trial, record the evidence, and only after the trial
of the election petition is concluded that the powers under
the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing appropriately with
the defective petition which does not disclose cause of
action should be exercised. With respect to the learned
H counsel, it is an argument which it is difficult to compre-
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI [SINGH, J.] 385

hend. The whole purpose of conferment of such powers is
A
to ensure that a litigation which is meaningless and bound
to prove abortive should not be permitted to occupy the
time of the court and exercise the mind of the respondent.
The sword of Damocles rieed not be kept hanging over his
head unnecessarily without point of purpose. Even in an
ordinary civil litigation the court readily exercises the B
power to reject a plaint if it does not disclose any cause of
action. Or the power to direct the concerned party to strike
out unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious parts of
the pleadings. Or such pleadings which are likely to cause
embarrassment or delay the fair trial of the action or which
is otherwise an abuse of the process of law. An order
directing a· party to strike out a part of the pleading would c
result in the termination of the case arising in the context of
the said pleadings. The courts in exercise of the powers
under the Code of Civil Procedure can also treat any point
going to the root of the matter such as one pertaining to
jurisdiction or maintainability as a preliminary point and D
can dismiss a suit without proceeding to record evidence
and hear elaborate arguments in the context of such evi-
dence, if the court is satisfied that the action would termi-
nate in view of the merits of the preliminary point of objec-
tion. The contention that even if the election petition is
liable to be dismissed ultimately it should be so dismissed E
only after recording evidence is a thoroughly misconceived
and untenable argument. The powers in this behalf are
meant to be exercised to serve the purpose for which the
same have been conferred on the competent court so that
the litigation comes to an end at the earliest and the con-
cerned litigants are relieved of the psychological burden of F
the litigation so as to be free to follow their ordinary
pursuits and discharge their duties. And so that they can
adjust their affairs on the footing that the litigation will not
make demands on their time or resources will not impede
their future work, and they are free to undertake and fulfil
other commitments. Such being the position in regard to G
matters pertaining to ordinary civil litigation, there is grea-
ter reason for taking the same in regard to matters pertain-
ing the elections."

In Bhagwati Prasad Dixit 'Ghorawala' v. Rajiv Gandhi, this Court
again reiterated that in an election petition pleadings have to be precise, H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987] 3.S.C.R.

specific and unambiguous and if the election petition does not disclose
A
a cause of action it should be rejected in /imine. These authorities have
settled the legal position that an election petition is liable to be dismis-
sed in /imine at the initial stage if it does not disclose any cause of
action. Cause of action in questioning the validity of election must
relate to the grounds specified in Section 100 of the Act. If the allega-
B tions contained in the petition do not set out grounds of challenge as
contemplated by Section 100 of the Act and if the allegations do not
conform to the requirement of Sections 81 and 83 of the Act. the
pleadings are liable to be strud off and the election petition is liable to
be rejected under Order VII Rule 11. A pleading if vague and general

c
is embarrassing. If the allegations contained in the election petition
even assuming to be true and correct do not make out any case of
corrupt practice or any ground under Section 100 of the Act. the
-
pleading would be unnecessary, frivolous and vexatious. It is always
open to strike out the same. If after striking out defective pleadings the
Court finds that no cause of action remains to be tried it would be duty
bound to reject the petition under Order VII Rule II of the Code of
D Civil Procedure. If a preliminary objection is raised before the comm-
encement of the trial, the court is duty bound to consider the same it
need not postpone the consideration for subsequent stage of the trial.
•
The appellant placed reliance on the decision of this Court in
Union of India v. Surjit Singh Atwa/, [1979] 2 SCR 1002 in support of
E his submission that unless a plea is raised by the respondent in the
written statement it is not open to the Court to strike out pleadings
contained in the election petition. In Surjit Singh Atwal's case plaintiff
had filed a suit for recovery of certain amount of money which he
claimed to be due to him from the Union of India under a contract.
The Union of India filed a written statement five years after the filing
F of the suit wherein they raised no plea that the contract between the
parties was hit by failure to comply with the provisions of Section
175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. More than a dozen years
after the institution of the suit and eight years after the filing of the
written statement, an application for amendment of the written state-
ment was filed on behalf of the Union of India raising a plea that the
G contract was hit by the failure to comply with the provisions of Section
175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. The trial court dismissed
the suit in view of the additional plea raised in the written statement,
but the High Court decreed the suit. On appeal by the Union of India
this Court upheld the order of the High Court, and in that connection
it observed that the illegality of the contract should have been specifi-
H cally pleaded as required by Order VI Rule 8 and Order VIII Rule 2 of
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI (SINGH, J.) 387

the Code of Civil Procedure. The decision has no relevance to the
A
question under consideration. The appellant then placed reliance on a
Division Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Vidya Cha·
ran Shukla v. G.P. Tiwari and Ors., AIR 1963 MP 356. In that case a
Division Bench of the High Court held that the preliminary objections
relating to non-maintainability of an election petition should not be
allowed to be raised by mere applications without filing a complete B
' >-- written statement. We do not find any justification to uphold this view.
As discussed earlier Order VI Rule 16 of Civil Procedure Code permits
..- striking of pleadings at any stage of proceedings. It does not admit of
any exception that the respondent must file written statement before

- the preliminary objections could be entertained. In view of this
Court's decisions as discussed earlier the view taken by the Madhya
Pradesh High Court in Vidya Charan Shukla' s case is no longer a good
C

law.
·\.-·
The appellant's grievance that in entertaining the preliminary
objections and rejecting the election petition under Order VII Rule 11
the High Court deprived the appellant's opportunity to amend the D
petition and to make good the deficiencies by supplying the necessary
'r particulars and details of the corrupt practice alleged in the petition, is
devoid of any merit. Firstly, the appellant was free to file amendment •
application, but at no stage he expressed any desire to make any
amendment application nor he made any application to that effect
before the High Court. It was open to the appellant to have made that E
application but he himself did not make any such application. The
....- ·~ High Court was under no legal obligation to direct the appellant to
amend pleadings or to suo moto grant time for the same. Secondly, the
allegations of corrupt practice as required by Section 83 were not
complete and the same did not furnish any cause of action, any amend·
men! made after the expiry of the period of limitation could not be F
permitted which would amount to raising a new ground of challenge.
The question, however, does not arise as the appellant did not file any
amendment application. During the course of hearing of this appeal
• before us the appellant has made applications for amendment of the
~ election petition which we shall deal later.
-o;~·"""")- G
Before we consider various paragraphs of the election petition to
determine the correctness of the High Court order we think it neces·
sary to bear in mind the nature of the right to elect, the right to be
elected and the right to dispute election and the trial of the election
petition. Right to contest election or to question the election by means
of an election petition is neither common law nor fundamental right H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A instead it is a statutory right regulated by the statutory provisions of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951. There is no fundamental or
common Jaw right in these matters. This is well-settled by catena of
decisions of this Court in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer,
[1952] 1SCR218; Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1954 SC 210 and
Joyti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, [1982] 3 SCR 318. These decisions have
B settled the legal position that outside the statutory provisions there is >
no right to dispute an election. The Representation of the People Act is
a complete and self contained code within which any rights claimed in
relation to an election or an election dispute must be found. The
provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the extent as
permissible by Section 87 of the Act. The scheme of the Act as noticed
C earlier would show that an election can be questioned under the sta-
tute as provided by Section 80 on the grounds as contained in Section
-
100 of the Act. Section 83 lays down a mandatory provision in provid-
ing that an election petition shall contain a concise statement of mate-
rial facts and set forth full particulars of corrupt practice. The plead-
ings are regulated by Section 83 and it makes it obligatory on the
D election petitioner to give the requisite facts, details and particulars of
each corrupt practice with exactitude. If the election petition fails to
make out a ground under Section 100 of the Act it must fail at the
threshold. Allegations of corrupt practice are in the nature of criminal
charges, it is necessary that there should be no vagueness in the allega-
tions so that the returned candidate may know the case he has to meet.
E If the allegations are vague and general and the particulars of corrupt
practice are not stated in the pleadings, the trial of the election petition
cannot proceed for want of cause of action. The emphasis of law is to
avoid a fishing and roving inquiry. It is therefore necessary for the
Court to scrutinise the pleadings relating to corrupt practice in a strict
manner.
F
Now we would consider the various paragraphs of the election
petition to determine as to whether the allegations contained therein
disclosed any cause of action. The election. petition runs into 58
paragraphs containing allegations of various corrupt practices known
to the law. The averments contained in the various paragraphs are in
G disjointed form and in order to ascertain true intention of the election -(
petitioner, one has to read several paragraphs and connect the same
with the other to ascertain the correct import of the allegations. The
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 to 7 contain narration of facts as
to when the election took place and the petitioner's desire to file his
nomination paper by wearing only a "langot" and the obstruction
H raised by the authorities and the allegation that the police were
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI (SINGH, J.] 389

').. shadowing the appellant and two of them always kept company to him.
These paragraphs do not make out any ground under Section IOU of A
the Act. In paragraph 8, the appellant alleged that on 5th, 6th and 10th
June he saw a number of jeeps plying in the Parliamentary cons ti-
tuency of Amethi bearing flags of Congress (I) which were being used
for electioneering purposes in support of Rajiv Gandhi. The allega-
lions further state that the appellant noticed that food was being given B
).. to the workers of Rajiv Gandhi at the kothi of Sanjy Singh at Amethi.

.- Assuming the allegations to be true, these do not make out any case of
corrupt practice or any other ground of challenge under Section 100 of
the Act. During the course of arguments the appellant urged that the

- allegations contained in paragraph 8 indicate that Rajiv Ganhi had
been using a large number of vehicles and feeding workers and thereby
he had been incurring expenses beyond the permissible limit. This c
·\--- inference is not permissible as each and every corrupt practice must be
clearly and specifically pleaded and it should be complete in itself. No
corrupt practice can be inferred from reading one sentence here and
the other sentence there. A corrupt practice as contemplated by Sec-
tion 123(6) contemplates incurring or authorising expenditure beyond D
y the prescribed limit. The allegations contained in paragraph 8 do not
contain any averment that the respondent incurred or authorised expen-
diture beyond the prescribed limit. Neither any details of incurring
expenses or authorising have been stated therein. Paragraph 9 of the
petition stated that on 5th June 1981 the appellant had seen a number
of cars mentioned therein carrying Congress (I) flags. Similarly, ~lie- E
gations contained in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19
--~ stated that on the dates mentioned in those paragraphs the election
petitioner namely the appellant has seen a number of vehicles plying in
the constituency carrying Congress (I) flagSc These allegations merely
.
~ show that a number of vehicles were plying with Congress (I) flags in
the constituency which by itself do noi constitute any corrupt practice. F
It appears that the appellant intended that the returned candidate had
spent money over the plying of vehicles and thereby he exceeded the
limit prescribed by Section 123(6) read with Section 77 of the Act. In
the absence of requisite allegations in the aforesaid paragraphs the
basic ingredients to make out a ground for challenging the election
)"under Section 100 of the Act was totally lacking. These paragraphs G
therefore disclosed no cause of action.

In paragraphs 20 and 21 the appellant stated that Smt. Indira
Gandhi toured the constituency along with the respondent and in her
speeches she appealed to the voters to vote for Rajiv Gandhi. We fail
to appreciate how these allegations constitute any corrupt practice. It H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A is always open to a candidate or his supporter to appeal to the electors
to vote for a particular candidate for the development and progress of
the area. This would be a legitimate appeal and in any view, it could
not constitute undue influence or any other corrupt practice. The
appellant further stated that the Station Officer of Amethi took him in
a jeep to Munshi Ganj crossing on the pretext that Smt. Indira Gandhi
B had given time to see the appellant but later on the Station Officer left
him there. These allegations are wholly irrelevant.

Allegations contained in paragraphs 22 to 26 relate to the rela-
tionship between the appellant and one Ram Pal Singh whom he had

C
appointed his election agent. These allegations refer to matters which
do not make out any ground under Section 100 of the Act. In para-
graph 27 the appellant stated that he as well as his election agent both
-
were being followed by police but it does not refer to any violation of
law or rule or commission of any electoral offence by the returned
candidate or his workers with his consent. In paragraph 28 the appel-
lant alleged that on the polling day a lady went to the polling booth
D along with a person, and the accompanying person affixed stamp on
the ballot paper and returned with her. Even if that be so, we fail to
understand as to how those facts would amount to any corrupt practice
with consent of the returned candidate. Even assuming that this consti-
tutes violation of provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereun-
der, there is no pleading that it materially affected the result of the
E election. In fact the difference of votes between the petitioner and the
returned candidate was of such great magnitude that there could be
no question of election being materially affected on the basis of the
aforesaid incident. In paragraph 29 the appellant stated that on the
polling day drinking water and 'batashas' were being distributed to the
voters at the polling station in Amethi. There is no allegation that the
F water and batashas were being distributed with the consent of Rajiv
Gandhi or that he spent mc>ney over it or that the said action
influenced the voters or that it materially affected the result of the
election. In the absence of any such allegations paragraph 29 dis-
closed no cause of action.

G Allegations contained in paragraphs 31 to 35 relate to alleged --(
irregularities committed on the polling day. According to these allega-
tions, workers of the respondent helped voters to cast their vote in
favour of the respondent. The averments contained therein do not
amount to any corrupt practice, instead if at all these allegations relate
to irregularities and illegalities alleged to have been committed on the
H polling day which would at best be relevant if there was further allega-
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI (SINGH, J.] 391

}- lion that it materially affected the result of the election. Since respon-
dent's term has already expired, and as his election cannot be set A
aside, these allegations do not survive and it is not necessary to con-
sider them in detail. Similarly averments contained in paragraphs 37-
38 contain narration of facts which have no bearing on any corrupt
practice. Allegations contained in paragraphs 39 to -49 relate to the
)._ appointment of counting agents. In substance the appellant has alleged B
that neither he nor his election agent had appointed any counting
agents but a number of persons had acted as the appellant's counting
liJ agents in an unauthorised manner and complaints made by him were
not considered and the Returning Officer failed to perform his duty.

- These allegations even if assumed to be true do not make out any case
of commission of corrupt practice.
c
Allegations contained in paragraphs 50, 51 and 53 (l)(F) of the
election petition purport to state that Rajiv Gandhi and his workers
with his consent spent money on the election in excess of the ceiling
limit and major portion of which was not shown by him in his election
expenses return. It was alleged that in all Rs.3, 15,500 had been spent D
y' by Rajiv Gandhi in his election but he did not include the same in his
-return. Details of the expenditure are mentioned in the sub-paragraphs
(a) to (g) of paragraph 50. In these paragraphs the appellant alleged
that Rajiv Gandhi used at least 100 jeeps for thirty days and his work-
ers with his consent used 40 jeeps and spent money on propaganda
badges, leaflets, making arrangements for holding meetings for Smt. E
_.. _. Indira. Gandhi ~hroughout the Amethi constit~~ncy and _money was
· spent ID prov1d1Dg food to 100 workers of RaJIV Gandhi, ID all the
returned candidate and his workers with his consent spent a sum of
, -...(
Rs.3, 15,500 but the same was not accounted for in the election return.
The allegations contained in these paragraphs relate to the corrupt
practice under Section 123(6) of the Act read with Section 77. Section F
123(6) provides that incurring or authorising of expenditure in contra-
vention of Section 77 is a corrupt practice. Section 77 lays down that
every candidate at the election shall keep a correct and separate ac-
count of all expenditure in connection with the election incurred or
authorised by him or by his election agent between the date of nomina-
... )!ion and the date of declaration of result. The account shall contain G
· such particulars as prescribed by Rules. Sub-section (3) lays down that
expenditure shall not exceed such amount as may be prescribed. Rule
90 of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 prescribed that the expenses
shall not exceed a sum of Rs. 1 lakh for Lok Sabha election in the State
of Uttar Pradesh. Section 77 and the Rules therefore prescribed a
ceiling limit for election expe•1ses and if any candidate incurs or H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

authorises expenses in excess of the ceiling limit, he would be guilty of
A
corrupt practice under Section 123(6) of the Act. The allegations con-
tained in various paragraphs of para 50 merely allege that a number of
0

vehicles were plying with Congress (I) flags and food was served in
connection with the election meetings, distribution of badges and
leaflets. There is, however, no allegation that Rajiv Gandhi incurred
B or authorised incurring of expenditure for the aforesaid purposes. Any
voluntary expense incurred by a political party, well-wishers, '°1"
sympathisers or association of persons does not fall within the mischief
of Section 123(6) of the Act, instead only that expenditure which is
incurred by the candidate himself or authorised by him is material for
the purpose of Section 77. In Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh,
[ 1955] 1 SCR 671 this Court pointed out that expenses must be incur-
c red or authorised by the candidate or his election agent. In that case
-
the Manager, the Assistant Manager, 20 Ziladars and their peons were
alleged to have worked for the election of the returned candidate. This
Court held that the employment of extra persons and the incurring or
authorising of extra expenditure was not by the candidate or his elec-
D tion agent. It was further pointed out that persons who volunteer to
work cannot be said to be employed or paid by the candidate or his
election agent. In Smt. Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1976] 2 SCR 347
Ray, C.J. observed "Authorisation means acceptance of the responsi-
bility. Authorisation must precede the expenditure. Authorisation
means reimbursement by the candidate or election agent of the person
E who has been authorised by the candidate or by the election agent of
the candidate to spend or incur. In order to constitute authorisation
the effect must be that the authority must carry with it the Jight of
reimbursement."

Section 77 requires a candidate to keep a separate and correct ~ •
F account of all expenditure "in connection with the election incurred or
authorised by him or by his election agent" between the date of his
nomination and the date of declaration of the result of the election.
The candidate is required to maintain account of only that expenditure
which he or his election agent may have authorised before the
expenditure was actually incurred, which would imply that the candi-
G date or his election agent undertook to reimburse the expenses which -1
may have been authorised by him or his election agent to be spent at
the election. In order to constitute a corrupt practice as contemplated
by Sections 77 and 123(6) it is necessary to plead requisite facts show-
ing authorisation, or undertaking of reimbursement by the candidate
or his election agent. A mere vague and general statement that the
H candidate and his workers with his consent spent money in election in
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI [SINGH, J.] 393

excess of the permissible ceiling would not be sufficient to constitute
corrupt practice. A

In Kunwar Lal Gupta v. A.N. Chawla, [1975] 2 SCR 259 this
Court held that what Section 77(1) prescribed was not only the incur-
ring but also the authorising of excessive expenditure and that such
~ authorisation may be implied or express. Fhe Court held that when a B
political party sponsoring a candidate incurs expenditure in connection
with his election as distinguished from expenditure on a general party
ii'" propaganda, and the candidate knowingly takes advantage of it or
participates in the programme or activity or consents to it or acquiesc-
ence to it, it would be reasonable to infer that he impliedly authorised
the political party to incur such expenditure and he could not escape
the rigour of the ceiling by saying that he bad not incurred the expendi- C
-Ir- ture and the political party had done so. The result of the judgment
was that the expenditure incurred by political party in connection with
the general party propaganda was deemed to have been incurred by
the candidate himself. The Parliament amended Section 77 by the
Representation of the People (Amendment) Act, 1974 by adding two D
y explanations to the Section. Explanation ! lays down that any expendi-
ture incurred or authorised in connection with the election of a candi-
date by a political party or by any association or body of persons or by
any individual other than the candidate or his election agent, shall not
be deemed to be incurred or authorised by the candidate or his elec-
tion agent. The validity of the Amending Act was upheld by a Con- E
- ~- stitution Bench of this Courfin Dr. P. Nalla Thampy Terah v. Union
of India & Ors., [1985] Supp. SCC 189. After the amendment of
Section 77( 1) any expenditure at the election by a political party,
sympathisers or friends cannot be held to have been incurred by the
candidate or his election agent unless it is shown that the money
which they spent belonged to the candidate or bis election agent or F
that he reimbursed the same. It is thus evident that unless the allega-
tions are specific that the candidate or bis election agent authorised the
expenses before the money was actually spent and that the candidate
or his election agent reimbursed or undertook to reimburse the same
the necessary ingredient of corrupt practice would not be complete
.,._ and it would provide no cause of action to plead corrupt practice. In G
the instant case paragraph 50 and its various sub-paragraphs contain
mere assertion of facts relating to expenditure but there is no allega-
tion that the expenditure was incurred or authorised by Rajiv Gandhi
or that he undertook to reimburse the same. The appellant made an
attempt to jumble up various allegations regarding incurring of expen-
diture by the returned candidate and his workers. The allegations H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A contained therein do not make out any case of corrupt practice and the -""
High Court was justified in striking out the same.

Allegations contained in paragraph 52 disclose that the appellant
had come to know that the villages in the constituency of Amethi, Rajiv
Gandhi polled cent percent votes in his favour. This statement does
B not make out any corrupt practice or any ground of challenge under 1
Section 100 of the Act, it was rightly struk off by the High Court. "'

Paragraph 53 of the election petition stated that Rajiv Gandhi ~
committed corrupt practice as set out in sub-paragraphs (A) to (F).
These paragraphs are under the heading of "Grounds''. It appears the
C appellant intended to challenge the election of the returned candidate
on the grounds mentioned in various sub-paragraphs of paragraph 53,
-
it is therefore necessary to consider the allegations contained in each -1
of the sub-paragraphs to ascertain as to whether any corrupt practice
was pleaded which could disclose cause of action to maintain the peti-
tion. Paragraph 53(1)(a) stated that Rajiv Gandhi "tried to make gift"
D to the voters in the following manner to make them vote in his favour
which is illegal under Section 123(1)(A) of the Representation of the '1
People Act. After making this general statement the appellant stated
that on 15th June 1981 prior to the declaration of election and also
du1ing the election period workers of Rajiv Gandhi with his consent
speeded up the construction work of Amethi Railway Station, and this
E was done only to persuade the voters to cast their vote in his favour.
This was a gift to the voters of the constituency. Besides that certain
other works were also done which fall within the definition of gift to .J~-
the voters of the constituency. The petition does not disclose any
material fact or particular regarding the alleged corrupt practice of
making gift which may amount to bribery within the meaning of Sec-
F tion 123(1)(A) of the Act. The allegationr merely disclose that Amethi
Railway Station was being constructed and during the election its
work was speeded up which persuaded the voters to cast their vote in
favour of the returned candidate. There is no allegation that Rajiv
Gandhi or his workers with his consent made any gift, offer or promise
to any elector to vote or refrain from voting at an election. If some
G developmental activity was carried on in the constituency and if it was-1
· completed during the election period it could not amount to any gift or
promise to the voters.

It would be noticed that the allegations contained in sub-para-
graph 53( l)(A) open with the qualification "Respondent No. 1 (Rajiv
H Gandhi) tried to make gift to the voters," which means that attempt was
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI [SINGH, J.) 395
'
~ made to make gift to the voters and not that it was actually done. It
A
indicates that the appellant who made the allegations was himself not
sure that any corrupt practice had been committed. Sub-paragraphs (A)
and (C) of paragraph 53 (I) of the election petition alleged that Rajiv
Gandhi and Smt. Indira Gandhi and their workers with the consent of
Rajiv Gandhi and Smt. Indira Gandhi made promise through news-
papers, pamphlets and speeches that voters should cast their vote in B

J '
),.
favour of Rajiv Gandhi for the development of Amethi because his
victory will ensure progress and development. Further Rajiv Gandhi
~ and Smt. Indira Gandhi and the workers of Rajiv Gandhi in all their
speeches and particularly Smt. Indira Gandhi in her speech of

- 11.6.1981 said that for the development of Amethi Constituency they
should vote for Rajiv Gandhi. On account of these speeches voters
could not cast their vote impartially, instead they cast their vote in c
+ favour of Rajiv Gandhi. Since Rajiv Gandhi and Smt. Indira Gandhi
both attended the meetings together voters got the impression that as
Smt. Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister and her son Rajiv Gandhi was
a candidate, there was bound to be development of Amethi area if
Rajiv Gandhi was elected. These allegations merely amount to re- D
y presentation being made by Smt. Indira Gandhi and the returned
candidate and his workers that if Rajiv Gandhi was elected the consti-
tuency would be developed. Such a statement of promise is a legiti-
mate one and it does not fall within the definition of bribery or undue
influence under Section 123(1)(A) or 123 (2) of the Act. A candidate,
his workers and supporters have every right under the law to canvass E
for the success of a particular candidate saying that if elected he would
-.~ work for the development of the constituency. Such a promise does
not in any way interfere with the free exercise of electoral right of the
,., electors. Smt. Indira Gandhi who was the leader of the party was
~ entitled to ask the electors to vote for Rajiv Gandhi and the fact that
she was the Prime Minister made no difference to her to make an F
appeal of that nature. There is no allegation that there was any ele-
ment of bargaining or undue influence in making appeal to the voters
for casting their vote in favour of Rajiv Gandhi. Section 123(2)(6)
itself provides that a declaration of public policy, or a promise of
public action or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to
interfere with the electoral right shall not be deemed to be interference G
~ with the exercise of electoral right.

In Shiv Kirpal Singh v, V. V. Girl, [1971] 2 SCR 1971, a Constitu-
tion Bench of this Court held that the expression "free exercise of the
electoral right" does not mean that voter is not to be influenced. This
expression has to be read in the context of an election in a democratic H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1987) 3,S.C.R.

society and the candidates and their supporters must naturally be
A
allowed to canvass support by all legitimate and legal means. This
exercise of the right by a candidate or his supporters to canvass sup-
port does not interfere or attempt to interfere with the free exercise of
the electoral right. What does amount to interference with the exercise of
an electoral right is "tyranny over the mmd". Declaration of public
B policy or a promise of public action or promise to develop the consti-
tuency in general do not interfere with free exercise of electoral rights
as the same do not constitute bribery or undue influence. In H. V.
Karnath v. Ch. Nitiraj Singh, [1969] 3 SCR 813 the State Government
during the election period issued an Ordinance granting exemption to
certain agriculturists from payment of land revenue and during the
election the Chief Minister announced increased dearness allowance
c to Government employees. Referring to these facts the election
petitioner therein alleged that th~ same amounted to corrupt practice
under Section 123(1)(A) of this AcL This Court repelled the conten-
tion and held that the Ordinance did not amount to a gift, offer or
promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section 123(1)(A).
D Similarly, increase in dearness allowance could not be regarded as a
gift, offer or promise of any gratification within the meaning of Section
123(1)(A). A general promise made by the Prime Minisier or Minister
to redress public grievance or to provide for public amenities for
developing the constituency if elected, does not amount to corrupt
practice. In paragraph 53( l)(B) and (C) material facts relating to
E alleged "gift and promise and undue influence" have not been stated
in the petition and for that reason also paragraphs 53(l)(B) and (Cl
were righlty struck off.

Paragraph 53(1)(0) stated "the workers of Rajiv Gandhi with his
consent on 14th June 1981 at about 2 p.m. tried to bring voters in truck }-
I' for casting votes and dropped them back at their houses. The appellant
noted the number of such truck which is mentioned in the paragraph.
This truck had brought about 20-22 voters to the Junior High School
Polling Centre of Amethi constituency and took them back without
charging fare from them. The truck was used by Rajiv Gandhi and this
amounted to corrupt practice. This paragraph contains substantially the
G same allegations as contained in paragraph 30 of the petition, it
purports to convey that Rajiv Gandhi and with his consent his workers ~
"tried to bring voters". In substance the allegation amounts to saying
that Rajiv Gandhi and his workers made attempt to carry voters in a
truck. He further alleged that they carried the voters. It appears that
the appellant /ntended to lay charge of corrupt practice against Rajiv
H Gandhi under Section 123(5) of the Act for hiring or procuring of a
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI [SINGH, J.) 397

truck for the use of same for free conveyance of electors to and from A
the polling station. The necessary particulars with regard to corrupt
practice as contemplated by Section 123(5) are however, totally lack-
ing. The petition does not contain any material facts with regard to
hiring or procuring of the vehicle. Further there is no allegation as to
when the vehicle was hired or procured, by whom, and at what place
or that the said vehicle in furtherance of hiring or procuring was used B
for free conveyance of electors to and from polling station. The allega-
tions made in paragraphs 30 and sub-paragraph (D) of paragraph
53( 1) merely show that some voters were brought to the polling station
Amethi m a truck without charging any fare from them and the truck
was used by the workers of Rajiv Gandhi. Does this make out a
corrupt practice under Section 123(5)? Section 123(5) reads as under:
c
"The hiring or procuring, whether on payment or other-
wise, of any vehicle or yessel by a candidate or his agent ,or
by any other person (with the consent of a candidate or his
election agent) (or the use of such vehicle or vessel for the
free conveyance) of any elector (other than the candidate D
himself, the members of his family or his agent) to or from
any polling station provided under Section 25 or a place
fixed under sub-section ( 1) of Section 29 for the poll ..... "

It would be noticed that hiring or procuring of a vehicle by a candidate
or his agent or by any other person with his consent is the first t '5ential E
ingredient of the corrupt practice, the second essential ingredieni is
that the hiring or procuring of the vehicle must be for conveyance of
the voters to and from the polling station and the third necessary
ingredient is that conveyance of electors is free from any charge. All
the truee ingredients must be pleaded to make out a case of corrupt
practice under Section 123(5). II any of the three ingredients is not F
pleaded there would be no pleading of corrupt practice. In Joshbhai
Chunnibhai Patelv. Anwar Beg A. Mirza, (196912 SCR 97. Hidayatul-
lah, C.J. speakmg for the Court a!:alysed this Section and observed:
"it will therefore, appear that the Section requires three things, (i)
hiring or procuring of a vehicle; (ii) by a candidate or his agent etc, and
~ (iii) for the free conveyance of an elector. It will be noticed that the G
Section also speaks of the use but it speaks of the use of such vehicle
which connects the two parts, namely, hiring or procuring of vehicle
and its use. The requirement of the law therefore is that in addition to
proving the hiring or procuring and the carriage of electors to and from
any polling station, should also be proved that the electors used the
vehicle free of cost to themselves." In Ch. Razik Ram v. Ch. J.S. H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

Chouhan & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 667 the Court considered the decision ,.\_
A of this Court in Ba/wan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain, [1960] 3 SCR 91 and
the effect of 1966 amendment and thereupon it held as under:

"On analysis, clause 5 of Section 12~ falls into two parts.
The requirements of the first part are: (i) the hiring or
B procuring whether on payment or otherwise, of any vehicle
or vessel for the free conveyance of voters, (ii) such hiring
or procuring must be by a candidate or his election agent or by
any other person with the consent of a candidate or of his
election agent. The second part envisages the "use of such
vehicle or vessel for the free conveyance of any elector
(other than the candidate himself, the members of his
c family, or his election agent) to or from any polling sta-
tion." The two parts are connected by the conjunction "or"
which is capable of two constructions. In one sense it is a
particle coordinating the two parts of the clause and creat-
ing an alternative between them. In the other sense which
D is akin to the sense of "and"-it can be construed as con-
joining and combining the first part of the clause with the
second. The latter construction appears to comport better
with the aim and object of the amendment of 1966. In this
connection, it is noteworthy that even before the amend-
ment, this Court in Shri Ba/wan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain,
E [1960] 3 SCR 91 held that in considering whether a corrupt
practice described in Section 123(5) is committed, conve-
ying of electors cannot be dissociated from the hiring of a
vehicle.

Even if the word "or" is understood as a coordinating con-
F junction introducing alternatives, then also a petitioner in
order to succeed on the ground of a corrupt practice under
the second part of the clause, must prove in addition to the
use of the vehicle or vessel for the free conveyance of any
elector to or from any polling station, the hiring or procur-
ing of that vehicle or vessel. This is so because the word
G "such" in the phrase introduced by the 1966 amendment, ~
expressly imports these elements of the first into the second
part of the clause."

Same view was taken by this Court in Dadasaheb Dattatraya Pawar &
Ors. v. Pandurang Raoji Jagtap & Ors., [1978] 2 SCR 524 and the
H Court emphasised that it was necessary for an election petitioner to
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI (SINGH, J.J 399

prove (i) that any vehicle or vessel was hired or procured, whether on
payment or otherwise, by the returned candidate or by his election A
agent or by any other person with the consent of the candidate or of his
election agent; (ii) that it was used for the conveyance of the electors
to or from any polling station, and (iii) that such conveyance was free of
cost to the electors. Failure to substantiate any one of these ingre-
dients leads to the collapse of the whole charge. Standard of proof B
required to establish a corrupt practice is strict, as imputation of
corrupt practices is quasi-criminal and the charge of corrupt practice
under Section 123(5) has to be scrutinised in a strict manner. In
Dharmesh Prasad Verma v. Faiyazal Azam, [ 1985) l SCR 11 this Court
again reaffirmed the aforesaid view. There is thus good authority for
holding that if any of the three ingredients as noted earlier is not
pleaded the charge of corrupt practice must fail. In the absence of any C
of the three ingredients being pleaded it would not be open to the
election petitioner to adduce evidence to sustain the charge of corrupt
practice as was held by this Court in Rajendra Singh Yadav v. Chandra
Sen & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 882.
D
The appellant placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court
in Ba/wan Singh v. Lakshmi Narain. This case was decided prior to the
amendment of Section 123(5) but even in that case this Court observed
that the corrupt practice under Section 123(5) being the hiring or
procuring of a vehicle for the conveyance of the electors, full state-
ment of the hiring or procuring must be given by the election peti- E
tioner. Ba/wan Singh's case was considered and discussed in Ch. Razik
Ram v. Ch. J.S. Chauhan & Ors. The appellant then placed reliance
on the observations of this Court in Ba/wan Singh v. Prakash Chand &
Ors., AIR 1976 SC 1187. We have persued the decision but we do not
find any support for the appellant's contention that the pleadings con-
tained in paragraphs 30 and 53(1)(0) are sufficient to constitute charge F
of corrupt practice. In Ba/wan Singh v. Prakash Chand & Ors., this
Court interpreted the word "procure" to mean "to obtain, as by re-
quest, loan, effort, labour, or purchase, get, gain, come into possesion
of". Thus the hiring of a vehicle must be to procure the same for the
purpose of conveyance of the voters free of cost. The hiring and pro-
curing the vehicle is a necessary ingredient which must be pleaded G
before the charge can be tried. The allegations contained in para-
graphs 30 and 53(1)(0) conspicuously do no contain any pleading re-
garding hiring and procuring of the vehicles by Rajiv Gandhi or any of
his worker with his consent for conweyance of the voters to and from
polling station free of cost. No particulars of any kind have been
specified in the paragraphs under consideration. The paragraphs as H
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

A they stand do not make out any charge of corrupt practice as contemp-
lated by Section 123(5) of the Act and the High Court was therefore
justified in striking out the same.

In paragraph 53(1) (E) of the election petition the appellant stated
"that as per Section 123(7) of the Representation of the People Act, Raj iv
B Gandhi's workers with his consent took help from the Government
officers and high police officers and people of Government depart-
ments for securing votes of the electors. These officials flouted all
rules and laws particulars of which are as under." Thereafter particu-
lars of the help taken from the Government officers are detailed in
sub-paragraphs (I) to (8). A corrupt practiCe as contemplated by Sec-
C tion 123(7) contemplates obtaining or procuring by a candidate or his
election agent, assistance from the Government servants belonging to
the classes specified in sub-section (7) of Section 123 for the further-
ance of the prospect of the candidate's election. In order to constitute
a corrupt practice under Section 123(7), it is essential to clothe the
petition with a cause of action which would call for an answer from the
D returned candidate and it should therefore plead mode of assistance,
measure of assistance and all facts pertaining to the assistance. The
pleading should further indicate the kind or form of assistance
obtained and in what manner the assistance was obtained or procured
or attempted to be procured by the candidate for promoting the
prospect for his election. The election petitioner must state with exact-
E ness the time of assistance, the manner of assistance and the persons
from whom assistance was obtained or procured by the candidate as
held by this Court in Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh, [1972] 2 SCR 743
ano Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv G{lndhi. Allegations contained in sub-
paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of the paragraph 53( 1) (E) raise a grievance that
though the appellant had not appointed any counting agent but still
F certain persons acted as his counting agents and the Returning Officer
did not hold any inquiry into his complaint. Sub-paragraph 4 states
that in the Amethi Constituency, there was fear psychosis and "it
looked as if the police and other Government officials wanted to help
Rajiv Gandhi". Sub-paragraphs 5 to 8 refer to certain illegalities and
irregularities alleged to have been committed by certain persons on the
G polling day in helping voters to cast their votes and it further alleged
that some persons cast votes 100 to 200 times and their signatures were
not obtained. These allegations do not make out any charge of corrupt
practice within the provisions of Section 123 (7) of the Act, As regards
paragraph 53(1)(G) it purports to allege a corrupt practice under
Section 123(6) of the Act on the ground that Rajiv Gandhi spent
H Rs.3,15,500 in excess of the amount permitted under the law. We have
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJIV GANDHI {SINGH, J.] 401

already discussed this matter earlier.
A
Paragraph 53(2) of the petition is as under:

"That Presiding Officer is duty bound under Sections 27,
28 and 139 of the Representation of the People Act to ensure
that the polling is fair, but it has not been so in this case. B
According to the rules, the Presiding Officer should have
not removed the posters and other propaganda material
from the polling booth. But the hand symbol was being
displayed by every Presiding Officer, and other persons
and the agents of the candidates and voters. By reason of
this, the voters were influenced and Rajiv Gandhi got very
many votes. The hand symbol influenced the voters to a C
great extent because Rajiv Gandhi's workers were trying to
display\ the hand symbol in the polling booth as well as
within \100 meters of the polling booth. The hand symbol
was visible to every voter everywhere. This influenced the
voters very much and they cast votes in favour of Rajiv D
Gandhi."

The aforesaid allegations do not amount to any corrupt practice
as contemplated by Section 123 of the Act. At best these allegations
raise a grievance that the Presiding Officers did not perform their
duties in accordance with law in as much as they failed in their duty to E
remove the posters and other propaganda material from the polling
booth and the hand which was the election symbol of Rajiv Gandhi
and the same was displayed within 100 meters of the polling booth in
violation of the rules. The allegations do not make out any charge of
corrupt practice. If at all the allegations could be a ground under
Section lOO(l)(d)(iv) of the Act for setting aside election on the F
ground of its being materially affected but no such plea was raised.
Paragraphs 54 to 58 do not deal with any corrupt practice.

The above scanning of the election petition would show that the
appellant failed to plead complete details of corrupt practice which
could constitute a cause of action as contemplated by Section 100 of G
~ the Act and he further failed to give the material facts and other details
of the alleged corrupt practices. The allegations relating to corrupt
practice, even if assumed to be true as stated in the various paragraphs
of the election petition do not constitute any corrupt practice. The
petition was drafted in a highly vague and general manner. Various
paragraphs of the petition presented disjointed averments and it is H
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3.S.C.R.

difficult to make out as to what actually the petitioner intended to
A plead. At the conclusion of hearing of the appeal before us appellant
made applications for amending the election petition, to remove the
defects pointed out by the High Court and to render the allegations of
corrupt practice in accordance with the provisions of Section 83 read
with Section 123 of the Act. Having given our anxious consideration to
B the amendment applications, we are of the opinion that these applica-
tions cannot be allowed at this stage. It must be borne in mind that the
election petition was presented to the Registrar of the High Court, at
Lucknow Bench on the last day of the limitation prescribed for filing
the election petition. The appellant could not raise any ground of
challenge after the expiry of limitation. Order VI Rule 17 no doubt
permits amendment of an election petition but the same is subject to
c the provisions of the Act. Section 81 prescribes a period of 45 days
from the date of the election for presenting election petition calling in
question the election of a returned candidate. After the expiry of that
period no election petition is maintainable and the High Court or this
Court has no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation. An order
D of amendment permitting a new ground to be raised beyond the time
specified in Section 81 would amount to contravention of those provi-
sions and is beyond the ambit of Section 87 of the Act. It necessarily
follow that a new ground cannot be raised or inserted in an election
petition by way of amendment after the expiry of the period of limita-
tion. The amendments claimed by the appellant are not in the nature
E of supplying particulars instead those seek to raise new grounds of
challenge. Various paragraphs of the election petition which are
sought to be amended, do not disclose any cause of action, therefore it
is not permissible to allow their amendment after expiry of the period
of limitation. Amendment applications are accordingly rejected.
Before we close we would like to express our anxiety on a feature
Fwhich of late has assumed great proportion. In Parliamentary form of
democracy political parties play vital role and occassionally they
sponsor candidates for the election. But under the existing law it is
open to any elector to contest election from any parliamentary consti-
tuency in the country and it is not necessary that the candidate should
be sponsored by a political party. It is permissible for an elector to
G contest election on his own as an independent candidate. Some inde-
pendent individuals contest election genuinely and some of them have
succeeded also but experience has shown that a large number of inde-
p,endent candidates contest the election for the mere sake of contest-
ing, with a view to make out grounds for challenging the election.
Presence of a number of independent candidates results in confusion,
H for the millions of the illiterate and ignorant electors who exercise

_ _ _ ,.. ~'·----~-,-~ _., . -"""'"""'"',__,, ___ - -·-=--- '=" -
M.L. AGARWAL v. RAJJV GANDHI [SINGH, J.] 403

,l their electoral right on the basis of 'symbols' printed on the ballot
papers. The presence of large number of independent candidates makes A
the ballot paper of unmanageable size and ordinary elector is confused
in the election booth while exercising his franchise. This leads to con-
fusion. In the instant case out of 14 candidates who contested the
election 11 of them including the appellant contested as independent
candidates and they all polled only paltry number of votes. This shows B
.l the genuineness of the candidature of independent candidates. The
appellant is a resident of Gwalior in Madhya Pradesh and he is a
~ lawyer by profession. He contested election as an independent candi-
date and on the date of filing of nomination paper he insisted to file his
nomination paper by stripping off himself completely and by putting
-- on only a 'langot'. This caused consternation in the office of the Re-
turning Officer, and it has also been raised as a ground of attack in the c
~ election petition. In fact the appellant has filed certain photographs
before us showing himself in a 'langot' only. When this appeal came up
for hearing before us the appellant insisted that he should be allowed
to argue the case by putting on a crown (an artificial one) on his head.
According to him without the crown he would not be able to make his D
y submissions in a satisfactory manner. We refilsed to grant the permis-
sion to the great dissatisfaction of the appellant. A court of law is a
solemn place where proceedings are held in a solemn manner and the
time of the court especially in the apex court is precious time which
belongs to the people and it would be wholly abnoxious to judicial
propriety to allow a litigant to appear in court wearing a crown to E

-"""' argue the case. The court cannot be converted into a dramatic or
theatrical stage. We accordingly refused to grant the permission to the
appellant to wear his crown. During the arguments the appellant glibly
stated that he had contested the election for the offices of President
~ and Vice-President and that he would be contesting each and every
election as an independent candidate with a view to reform the society F
and the election law. This is not uncommon as a number of other
persons have been contesting elections as independent candidates for
the high office and some of them filed election petition disputing the
election. These factors have given cause for anxiety to us and we hope
that the Parliament will take these matters into consideration to devise
. ways and means to meet the on-slaught of independent candidates who G
~ are not quite serious about their business.
In view of our discussion, we are of the opinion that the High
Court rightly exercised its power in rejecting this petition under Order
VII Rule 11. The appeal fails and accordingly dismissed with costs
which we quantify at Rs.2,000. H
P.S.S. Appeal dismissed.