DINESH KUMAR GUPTAversusUNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ORS.

                [201 OJ 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 599


                  DINESH KUMAR GUPTA                                A
                               V.
     UNITED !NOIA INSUFU,t·iCE CO. LTD. AND ORS.
            (Civil Appeal No. 8839 of 2010)

                      OCTOBER 8, 2010
                                                                    B
    [J.M. PANCHAL AND GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.) .

      Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - s.2(b) - Civil contempt
- Alleged disobedience of Court order - Interim stay order
passed by High Court in favour of Insurance Company against         C
implementation of compensation award granted by Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) - Order not complied with
- Reason for non-compliance fastened upon the appellant,
 who joined the High Court registry, as Deputy Registrar
 (Judicial), about four years after the interim order of stay had   D
 been passed - Suo motu contempt proceedings against the
 appellant on the a/legation that he had obstructed the course
 of administration of justice - Justification of - Held: Not
justified - On the relevant date, and even thereafter, for four
 years, the appellant was not functioning in the High Court in      E
 any capacity, therefore, even though the inierim stay order was
not complied, the reason or liability for its non-compliance
 cannot be fastened on the appellant -Appellant did not
commit any misconduct or even unintentional disobedience
 of the interim order of stay - The ingredient of willfui
                                                                    F
 disobedience must be there before anyone can be hauled up
for the charge of contempt of a civil nature - Contempt of a
civil nature can be held to have been made out only if there
has been a willful disobedience of the order - Even though
there may be disobedience, but if the same does not reflect
that it has been a conscious and willful disobedience, a case       G
for contempt cannot be held to have been made out - If an
order is capable of more than one interpretation giving rise
to a variety of consequences, non-compliance of the same

                              599                                   H
    600    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   cannot be held to be willful disobedience to constitute a case
    of contempt - When the courts are confronted with a question
    whether a given situation could be treated to be a case of willful
    disobedience or a case of lame excuse, it would not be legally
    correct to be too speculative based on assumption.
B
       A Single Judge of the High Court passed an interim
  order of stay against implementation of a compensation
  award granted by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
  (MACT). The order was not complied with. The reason for
  non-implementation of the order of stay was fastened
C upon the appellant, who joined the High Court registry as
  Deputy Registrar (Judicial) approximately four years after
  the interim order of stay had been passed. Consequently,
  the Single Judge of the High Court initiated suo motu
  contempt proceedings against the appellant on the
D allegation that he had obstructed the course of
  administration of justice by ensuring that the interim
  order of stay should not be implemented and by shielding
  the MACT judge concerned, against whom vigilance
  inquiry had been ordered.
E
       Allowing the appeal, the Court

       HELD:1.1. The contempt alleged against the appellant
  would not amount to a criminal contempt because the
  alleged contempt, even if made out, would clearly at the
F best be of a civil nature, which is evident from Section 2
  of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. [Para 12] [613-A-B]

      1.2. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 postulates the
  existence of preconditions before a person can be held
G to have committed civil contempt. Contempt of a civil
  nature can be held to have been made out only if there
  has been a wilful disobedience of the order and even
  though there may be disobedience, yet if the same does
  not reflect that it has been a conscious and wilful
H
      DINESH KUMAR GUPTA v. UNITED INDIA               601
              INSURANCE CO. LTD.
disobedience, a case for contempt cannot be held to have      A
been made out. In fact, if an order is capable of more than
one interpretation giving rise to variety of consequences,
non-compliance of the same cannot be held to be wilful
disobedience of the order so as to make out a case of
contempt entailing the serious consequence including          B
imposition of punishment. However, when the Courts are
confronted with a question as to whether a given
situatfon could be treated to be a case of willful
disobedience, or a case of a lame excuse, in order to
subvert its compliance, howsoever articulate it may be,       c
will obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of
a particular case; but while deciding so, it would not be
legally correct to be too speculative based on
assumption as the Act clearly postulates and emphasizes
that the ingredient of willful disobedience must be there     D
before anyone can be hauled up for the charge of
contempt of a civil nature. [Paras 12, 13] [614-8-C; 615-
A-E]

     1.3. Taking note of a letter dated 22-12- 2005, by
which the appellant, who was functioning as Deputy            E
Registrar (Judicial) on the said date, had enquired about
the case number and the date of the order which was
required by the Registrar General (Vigilance), the Single
Judge initiated contempt proceedings on the inference
that it is the appellant who was instrumental due to which    F
the interim order of stay passed by the single Judge way
back on 22-3-2001 was not implemented. If the Single
Judge had called the appellant with files and perused the
same, he himself would have been satisfied that on the
relevant date, the appellant was not Deputy Registrar and     G
it was not necessary to initiate contempt proceeding
against him. [Para 14] [615-G-H; 616-A-C]                         •
   1.4. The appellant was not functioning in the High
Court in any capacity in the year 2001 or thereafter until
                                                              H
   602   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A 2005 and hence he cannot be attributed with an ulterior
  motive to scuttle or ensure that the interim order of stay
  may not be implemented as for several years thereafter,
  at least upto the year 2003, when the MACT Judge
  superannuated, the appellant was not even posted in the
B High Court. Even though the order was not complied, the
  reason or liability for its non-compliance cannot be
  fastened on the appellant so as to justify initiation of
  contempt proceeding against him. The appellant could
  not have been expected to orally remember the
c particulars of each and every order passed by the High
  Court on judicial side and sent to the registry, which was
  not implemented. Hence, if he wrote to the Registrar
  (Vigilance) seeking the case number of the pending
  matter as also the date of the stay order, the said letter
0 cannot be treated to have been written with an intention
  to obstruct implementation of the interim order of stay
  which was passed four years earlier in the year 2001.
  [Para 15] [616-D-H; 617-A-D]

       1.5. If the single Judge of the High Court was of the
E view that the interim order of stay granted by the Court
  on 22-03-2001 in favour of the Insurance Company
  staying execution of the award of compensation in favour
  of the claimant was obstructed, the single Judge ought
  to have hauled up those officers in the registry for
F contempt who had been functioning in the registry at the
  relevant time. [Para 16] [617-D-F]

      1.6. The first and foremost onus to communicate an
  order of stay is on the counsel or the party in whose
G favour the order was passed by obtaining a certified
  copy of the order passed by the court and although the
  registry is also required to communicate the order to the
  court concerned where it is required to be implemented,
  the same essentially is in the nature of a formal
  communication and if the same had not been
H
     DINESH KUMAR GUPTA v. UNITED INDIA                    603
             INSURANCE CO. LTD.
communicated by the erstwhile officers of the registry for       A
any reason whatsoever, including an assumed motive of
its non-implementation, a proceeding for contempt could
have been initiated against the officer who was posted
at the relevant time and had failed to communicate the
order to the court ·concerned which had to implement it.         B
But, after an unusually long lapse of time, which in this
case is more than four years, an officer like the appellant
who subsequently joined the registry, cannot be
                                                       '
attributed with an oblique motive of obstructing the cause
of justice merely because he had sought the case                 c
number and date of the order of stay from the Registrar
(Vigilance) in order to furnish a copy of the order which
was required by the Registrar (Vigilance). In fact, when
the Registrar (Vigilance) sought a copy of the interim
order of stay, it was his duty to specify the case number        D
and the date of the order as it cannot be expected that
the copy of the order could be sent to the Registrar
(Vigilance) without the case number or its date. In any
view, it would be too far fetched to infer that the same
was done to shield the MACT Judge against whom
vigilance enquiry was ordered, and who had already               E
superannuated two years earlier after which the Single
Judge himself had ordered for closure of the vigilance
enquiry against him. [Para 17] [618-B-G]

     1.7. A proceeding for civil contempt would not lie if       F
the order alleged to have been disobeyed itself provides
scope for reasonable or rational interpretation of an order
or circumstance which is the factual position in the
instant matter. It would equally not be correct to infer that
a party although acting due to misapprehension of the            G
correct legal position and in good faith without any
motive to defeat or defy the order of the Court, should be
viewed as a serious ground so as to give rise to a
contempt proceeding. [Para18] [619-A-C]
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    604    'SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A       1.8. The single Judge of the High Court inferred and
   assumed erroneously that the appellant had the intention
   to obstruct the administration of justice by being
  ·instrumental in ensuring that the interim order passed in
   2001 may not be implemented oblivious of the fact that
B the appellant was posted in the regist,.Y of the High Court
   only four years later in 2005 and hence non-
   implementation of the interim order of stay cannot be
   attributed to the appellant to shield the MACT Judge who
   had retired in the year 2003 itself against whom the
c enq•..1iry was ordered to be closed by the Single Judge
   himself. Thus, initiation of the contempt proceeding
   against the appellant by the single Judge is based on a
   wholly wrong premise based on unsustainable and
   unfounded facts which cannot be treated sufficient
   material so as to initiate contempt proceeding in absence
0
   of any degree of fault or misconduct or even
   unintentional disobedience to the order. The impugned
   order passed by the single Judge by which the
   proceeding for contempt has been ordered to be initiated
   by registering a regular contempt proceeding against the
E appellant is set aside. [Paras 20, 21] [619-H; 620-A-E]

        Ahmad Ali v. Supdt., Jail Crl. L.J. and B.K. Kar vs.
    Hon'ble The Chief Justice and His companion Judges of the
    Orissa High Court, AIR 1961 SC 1367 - relied on.
F
        State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari AIR 1954 Patna
    513 and N. Bakshi v. O.K. Ghosh. AIR 1957 Patna 528 -
    approved.
                        Case Law Reference:
G
          AIR 1987 SC 1491     relied on           Para 19
          AIR 1954 Patna 513   approved            Para 19
          AIR 1957 Patna 528   approved            Para 19
H
      DINESH KUMAR GUPTA v. UNITED INDIA                     605
              INSURANCE CO. LTD.
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.                 A
8839 of 2010.

    From the Judgment & Order dated 8.12.2006 of the High
Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur in SBCWP No. 1072 of 2001.

    M.R. Calla, Pratiksha Sharma and Annam D.N. Rao for the         B
Appellant.

    Aneesh Mittal, Yash Pal Dhingra and Sunil Kumar Jain for
the Respondents.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                    c
     GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted.

      2. This appeal by special leave has been filed against an
interim order dated 08.12.2006 passed by the Jaipur Bench           D
of the High Court of Rajasthan in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.
1072 of 2001 whereby the learned single Judge initiated suo
moto contempt proceeding against the appellant and directed
issuance of notice to him after which a separate Contempt
Petition was ordered to be registered against him. This
                                                                    E
initiation apparently was based on the assumption and
impression gathered by the learned single Judge to the effect
that the appellant had obstructed the course of administration
of justice by ensuring that the interim order of stay dated
22.03.2001 passed by the learned single Judge against
                                                                    F
implementation of the award of compensation as also direction
to the Registrar General (Vigilance) to initiate inquiry against
the then Judge of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaipur,
be not implemented. The learned Judge further inferred that this
was an attempt on the part of the appellant herein to shield the
Judge of the MACT from facing the vigilance inquiry and hence       G
contempt proceeding has been initiated against the appellant.

      3. As the appellant was not a party in the writ petition in
the High Court in which contempt proceeding has been
initiated, he sought leave of this Court to file Special Leave      H
    606    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   Petition which was granted and an order of stay against
    initiation of contempt proceeding was also passed by this
    Court on 19.01.2007.

       4. The matter thereafter was heard finally at the admission
  stage itself with consent of the counsel for the parties. At the
8
  outset, the appellant assailed the impugned order on the plea
  that he had joined as Deputy Registrar (Judicial) in the Jaipur
  Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan only on 05.01.2005 and
  the order which is alleged to have been not implemented at the
  instance of the appellant, is dated 22.03.2001 from which it is
C clearly established that the initiation of contempt proceeding
  alleging non-implementation of the order dated 22.03.2001 on
  the face of it, was not justified at all since the communication
  by him to the Registrar (Vigilance) for ascertaining the number
  of the case as also the date of the order sheet - a copy of which
D was to be sent to the Registrar (Vigilance), was the normal
  requirement without which the order shP.et could not have been
  sent and hence the same would not amount to contempt of
  Court.

E       5. The substantial question of law therefore which emerges
  for determination in this appeal is whether the learned single
  Judge of the High Court was justified in initiating suo moto
  contempt proceeding against the appellant judicial officer in
  absence of even prima facie material to the effect that there
F was at all a case of disobedience to the order of the High Court
  - much less wilful disobedience and whether issuance of notice
  to initiate contempt proceeding would be justified merely on
  assumption, speculation and inference drawn from facts without
  existence of a clear case of wilful disobedience to the order of
G the High Court so as to treat it as a case of contempt of Court
  of civil nature.

         6. The details of facts and circumstances of the matter in
    so far as it is essential for adjudicating the substantial question
    of law formulated hereinbefore are stated herein as follows:
H
   DINESH KUMAR GUPTA v. UNITED INDIA                    607
INSURANCE CO. LTD. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
 (i) A writ petition bearing S.S. Civil Writ Petition No. 1072   A
 of 2001 was filed by an Insurance Company, namely,
 United India Insurance Company Limited challenging the
 award passed by the MACT, Jaipur in favour of the
 claimant Smt. Kaushalya Devi and others. The writ petition
 came up for hearing before a learned single Judge on            s
 22.3.2001 who was pleased to admit the writ petition and
 issued notice to the original claimants and other
 respondents therein. Simultaneously, an order of stay was
 also passed in favour of the Petitioner-Insurance Company,
 directing that there shall be stay of recovery against the      c
 award dated 15.01.2001 by which compensation was
 awarded to the respondents/claimants therein. The learned
 single Judge was further pleased to direct that a copy of
 the said order be sent to the Registrar (Vigilance) of the
 High Court who shall look into the matter from the              D
 administrative side implying enquiry against the learned
 Judge, MACT who had passed the award in favour of the
 claimants/respondents. It would be appropriate to highlight
 at this stage that the Appellant, Shri Dinesh Gupta was not
 functioning as Deputy Registrar (Judicial) in the High Court    E
 on the said date in the year 2001 as he was posted as
 Deputy Registrar (Judicial) at Jaipur Bench in the High
 Court several years later on 05.01.2005.

 (ii) However, during the intervening period in order to
 comply the order of the High Court dated 22.03.2001, the        F
 Registrar General (Vigilance) vide letter dated
 20.04.2001, requested for a copy of the Memo of the writ
 petition and a copy of the Award of the MACT, Jaipur
 dated 15.01.2001 passed in Claim Petition No 1782 of
 1999. In response to the same, a certified copy of the writ     G
 petition was sent by the then Deputy Registrar (Judicial)
 but in view of Rule 883 of The Rules of the High Court of
 Judicature for Rajasthan 1952, a request was made to the
 Registrar General (Vigilance) to obtain a copy of the
                                                                 H
    608     SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         Award from the MACT, Jaipur directly. Thereafter, the
          Registrar General (Vigilance) did obtain a certified copy
          of the MACT judgment/Award from the office of the MACT,
          Jaipur directly on 25.7.2001 and then vide letter dated
          11.01.2002, directed the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) to
B         inform whether the Writ Petition bearing S.B. Civil Writ
          Petition No. 1072 of 2001 entitled United India Insurance
          Company Ltd. Vs. MACT, Jaipur and others had been
          disposed of or not and in case it was disposed of, a copy
          of the order of the Court was directed to be sent to him.
c         This letter was responded by the then Deputy Registrar
          (Judicial) who informed that the matter is pending
          consideration before the High Court and the next date of
          hearing in the matter was fixed for 05.04.2002. It was
          further informed vide letter dated 16.03.2002 that as and
D         when the matter is disposed of, the copy of the judgment
          would be sent to him. The Writ Petition however remained
          pending without further progress even upto the year 2005.
          Subsequently, on 31.05.2003, the then Presiding Officer
          of the MACT, Shri S.K. Bansal, R.H.J.S. who had passed
          the award of compensation in favour of the respondent-
E
          claimant Smt. Kaushalya Devi, retired from service and
          matter remained sub-judice as already indicated
          herein before.

       7. The Appellant Shri Dinesh Gupta thereafter joined the
F post of Deputy Registrar (Judicial) in the High Court of
  Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur on 05.01.2005.
  On 09.05.2005 the Registrar General (Vigilance) vide
  communication dated 09.05.2005 directed the Deputy Registrar
  (Judicial) that the copy of the required judgment of the High
G Court passed in the writ petition be sent to the office of the
  Registrar General (Vigilance) within 20 days. This letter,
  however, neither mentioned the case number nor the date of
  the ord.er of the Court which was to be sent to the Registrar
  General (Vigilance) which would be evident from the translated
H version of the said letter which reads as under:
     DINESH KUMAR GUPTA v. UNITED INDIA                    609
  INSURANCE CO. LTD. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
          "Ref:- Letter of this Office No. 848 dt. 28.6.04 & A
    reminder No. 1223 dt. 4.9.04 & No.1464 dt. 8.11.04 & your
    Letter No.147 dt. 01.07.04.

          Subject:- For sending copy or Required Judgment.

          Sir                                                     B

          On the above subject by drawing your attention
    towards the referred letter, it is ordered that you please
    take pain to forward the copy of required Judgment to this
    office within twenty days from receipt of this letter         c
    compulsorily.
                                                Yours truly,
                                                      SD/-
                                    REG. GEN (VIGILANCE)"
     The letter thus merely stated that the Deputy Registrar D
should take pains to forward the copy of required judgment and
the same be sent to the office of the Registrar General
(Vigilance) positively within 20 days of receipt of the said letter.

    (i) In response to the aforesaid letter dated 09.05.2005, E
    the appellant traced out the number of the concerned writ
    petition and informed the Registrar General (Vigilance)
    vide his response letter dated 18.05.2005 that the matter
    was pending consideration and as and when it is disposed
    of, the copy of the judgment would be sent. Six months F
    thereafter, the Registrar General (Vigilance) again wrote
    a letter on 13.12.2005 that the desired judgment be sent
    positively within 20 days of the receipt of the letter but he
    again failed to indicate the number of the case in which
    the judgment was required by him. However, the appellant G
    this time responded to the same by writing to the Registrar
    (Vigilance) vide letter dated 22.12.2005, that the writ
    petition entitled United India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs.
    MACT, Jaipur City, Jaipur and Ors. had been admitted
    in which notice had been issued and recovery of the H
    610    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A         amount passed by the Award of the MACT had been
          stayed by the High Court vide order dated 22.03.2001 but
          the case was still pending in the category of incomplete
          service matters because the notice upon the respondent
          Nos. 2 to 8 was not served and the next date fixed by the
B         Hon'ble Court was 20.02.2006.

          (ii) In the meantime, the claimant Smt. Kaushalya Devi had
          also filed an application for vacating the order of stay
          passed by the High Court in the concerned writ petition i.e.
          S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1072 of 2001 which came up
c         for hearing before the learned single Judge on 16.10.2006.
          The learned single Judge on this date ordered that as the
          Presiding Officer Shri S.K. Bansal had retired and was no
          more in service, the order of the Court dated 22.03.2001
          directing to conduct the enquiry by the Registrar General
D         (Vigilance) against the then Judge of the MACT, Jaipur be
          treated as closed and no further action need be taken. It
          was also ordered that this be brought to the notice of the
          Deputy Registrar (Judicial).

E        8. The matter/the writ petition thereafter came up before
    the Court on 08.12.2006 for considering the application of the
    claimant for vacating the order of stay passed by the learned
    single Judge on 22.03.2001. The learned single Judge on this
    occasion i.e. on 08.12.2006 suddenly inferred that although an
F   order had been passed on 22.03.2001 staying implementation
    of the award passed in favour of the claimant, yet the copy of
    the order and stay had not been sent for compliance. Hence, it
    was inferred by the learned single Judge that it appeared to
    be an attempt on the part of the Officer concerned to ensure
G   that the Registrar (Vig:lance) should not proceed with the
    enquiry against the MACT Judge which had been directed by
    the Court on the judicial side vide its interim order of stay and
    direction dated 22.03.2001, and this not only amounted to
    contempt of the order of the Court dated 22.03.2001, but was
H   an attempt to shield the then MACT Judge Shri S.K. Bansal
     DINESH KUMAR GUPTA v. UNITED INDIA                      611
  INSURANCE CO. LTD. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
who had passed the award and later retired from service. The        A
learned single Judge, therefore, observed that this was an
attempt on the part of the officer concerned (Deputy Registrar
(Judicial)/the appellant herein) who had written the letter dated
22.12.2005 to the Registrar (Vigilance) seeking case number
and date of the order which was to be sent to him due to which      B
it was observed by the learned single Judge that it had to be
taken note of seriously as it was an attempt to overreach the
directions of the Court and prevent its compliance creating
obstructions in the administration of justice. The learned single
Judge therefore ordered to issue notice to the then Deputy          c
Registrar (Judicial) who had sent the letter dated 22.12.2005
enquiring about the case number and the date of the order after
tracing out the name and his present designation as to why
contempt proceeding should not be initiated against him and
he be not punished for contempt of court. The learned Judge         D
further ordered that a separate Contempt Petition be registered
and notice be issued to the contemnor making it returnable
within six weeks. The writ petition was ordered to be listed a
week thereafter.

      9. Since, the appellant Shri Dinesh Kumar Gupta was the E
Deputy Registrar (Judicial) on the relevant date i.e. 22.12.2005,
a contempt notice was served on him which took him by
surprise as according to him, he had neither acted in any
 manner which could lead to obstruction to the cause of justice
nor had role in any manner whatsoever to ensure that the F
interim order of stay dated 22.03.2001 staying execution of the
award be not implemented. Since the order initiating contempt
proceeding against the appellant was bound to affect him, he
approached this court seeking permission to challenge the
order passed by the learned singie Judge initiating contempt G
proceeding against him by submitting that no useful purpose
would be served by filing a reply to the show cause notice before
the High Court as the relevant record although was before the
learned single Judge, yet a proceedirtg for contempt was
initiated against him.                                            H
    612    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A        10. On a scrutiny of the aforesaid facts, it is apparent that
    the learned single Judge has initiated contempt proceedings
    against the appellant essentially on impression and assumption
    that he was instrumental in ensuring that the order of stay
    passed in favour of the Insurance Company on 22.3.2001
B   passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1072 of 2001 was not
    implemented and further the letter dated 22.12.2005 by which
    the appellant herein as the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) had
    sought the case number of the writ petition for which the order
    sheet was to be sent, was treated as an attempt on the part of
c   the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) causing obstruction in the way
    of administration of justice. It was further inferred that he had
    done so in order to shield the then Judge, MACT Shri S.K.
    Bansal from facing the vigilance enquiry.

          11. The grounds relied upon by the appellant for assailing
D   the initiation of contempt proceedings against him, is ·first of
    all based on the technical plea that Section 18 of the Contempt
    of Courts Act, 1971 has not been taken note of by the learned
    single Judge as in Section 2 (c) (iii), it has been laid down that
    every case of criminal contempt is required to be heard and
E   determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges, and
    therefore, the learned single Judge erred in passing the
    impugned order dated 08.12.2006 without there being any
    occasion for the same. The initiation of contempt proceeding
    was further challenged on the ground that it is the Registrar
F   (Vigilance) who had failed to ensure compliance of the interim
    order dated 22.3.2001 and the direction therein until
    31.05.2003, on which date the concerned officer Shri S.K.
    Bansal, R.H.J.S. who passed the award h;:id retired. Hence, the
    appellant who had joined the post of Deputy Registrar (Judicial)
G   in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench,
    Jaipur on 5.1.2005 could have possibly no role for shielding or
    protecting the officer who had retired on 31.05.2003 and the
    enquiry against him was ordered to be closed even by the
    learned single Judge himself vide order dated 16.10.2006.
H
      DINESH KUMAR GUPTA v. UNITED INDIA                         613
   INSURANCE CO. LTD. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
     12. On a scrutiny of the sequence of events narrated A
hereinbefore, we are clearly of the view in the first place that
the contempt alleged against the appellant would not amount
to a criminal contempt because the alleged contempt even if
made out would clearly at the best be of a civil nature, which is
evident from Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 B
which lays down as follows:

      (a)   "contempt of court" means civil contempt or criminal
            contempt;

      (b)   "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any C
            judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other
            process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking
            given to a court;

      (c)   "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether D
            by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by
            visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter
            or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-

            (i) scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or
            tends to lower the authority of, any court; or               E

            (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with,
            the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

            (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs    F
            or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in
            any other manner;

     On perusal of the aforesaid provision enumerated under
Section 2 quoted hereinbefore, it can clearly be inferred that
the initiation of contempt proceeding against the petitioner even G
as it stands, would not give rise to a proceeding for criminal
contempt and in any event the alleged contempt cannot be
stretched beyond civil contempt under the prevailing facts and
circumstances of the case discussed hereinbefore.
Nevertheless, it would not be correct on behalf of the appellant H
    614   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A   to contend that the learned single Judge was not authorised to
    initiate contempt proceeding against the appellant merely
    because he was sitting in a single Bench although he might
    have been in a position to notice whether the alleged action at
    the instance of any pa:iy or anyone else who obstructed the
B   cause of justice, amounted to contempt of Court of a civil or
    criminal nature and yet would be precluded from initiating suo
    moto contempt proceedings. The Contempt of Courts Act 1'971
    clearly postulates the existence of only the following
    preconditions before a person can be held to have committed
c   civil contempt:

          "(i)    There must be a judgment or order or decree or
                  direction or writ or other process of a court; or

                  An undertaking given to a court;
D
          (ii)    The judgment etc. must be of the court and
                  undertaking must have been given to a court;

          (iii)   There must be a disobedience to such judgment,
                  etc. or breach of such undertaking;
E
          (iv)    The disobedience or breach, as the case may be,
                  must be wilful."

         Hence, it would not be right to contend that even though
    the learned single Judge might have found material which
F
    persuaded him to form an opinion that a contempt has been
    committed, yet the learned Judge had no authority or jurisdiction
    to initiate a proceeding for contempt against the person who
    indulged in such action. Thus we find no substance in the plea
    which has been raised on behalf of the appellant on this count.
G
         13. This now leads us to the next question and a more
    relevant one, as to whether a proceeding for contempt initiated
    against the appellant can be held to be sustainable merely on
    speculation, assumption and inference drawn from facts and
H   circumstances of the instant case. In our considered opinion,
     DINESH KUMAR GUPTA v. UNITED INDIA                   615
  INSURANCE CO. LTD. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
the answer clearly has to be in the negative in view of the well- A
settled legal position reflected in a catena of decisions of this
court that contempt of a civil nature can be held to have been
made out only if there has been a wilful disobedience of the
order and even though there may be disobedience, yet if the
same does not reflect that it has been a conscious and wilful 8
disobedience, a case for contempt cannot be held to have been
made out. In fact, if an order is capable of more than one
interpretation giving rise to variety of consequences, non-
compliance of the same cannot be held to be wilful
disobedience of the order so as to make out a case of contempt C
entailing the serious consequence including imposition of
punishment. However, when the Courts are confronted with a
question as to whether a given situation could be treated to be
a case of wilful disobedience, or a case of a lame excuse, in
order to subvert its compliance, howsoever articulate it may be,
                                                                  0
will obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of a
particular case; but while deciding so, it would not be legally
correct to be too speculative based on assumption as the
Contempt of Courts Act 1971 clearly postulates and
emphasizes that the ingredient of wilful disobedience must be
there before anyone can be hauled up for the charge of E
contempt of a civil nature.

     14. In view of the aforesaid legal position, when the facts
of the instant case are analyzed, it is clear that the learned
single Judge had passed an interim order of stay in favour of F
the Insurance Company against implementation of the award
passed in favour of the claimant and the said order was not
complied with even upto the year 2003 and the reason for non-
implementation of the order of stay was not communicated by
the registry of the High Court for which th~ appellant-Deputy G
Registrar (Judicial) has been held to be instrumental. The
learned single Judge further has taken note of the letter dated
22.12.2005 by which the appellant herein-Shri Dinesh Kumar
Gupta, who was functioning as Deputy Registrar (Judicial) on
the said date had enquired about the case number and the date H
    616    SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A   of the order which was required by the Registrar General
    (Vigilance) and the learned single Judge has initiated the
    contempt proceedings on the inference that it is the appellant
    who was instrumental due to which the interim order of stay
    passed by the learned single Judge way back on 22.3.2001 in
B   S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1072 of 2001 was not implemented.
    If the learned single Judge had called the appellant with files
    and perused the same, he himself would have been satisfied
    that on the relevant date, the appellant was not Deputy Registrar
    and it was not necessary to initiate contempt p~oceeding
c   against him.

        15. However, we cannot lose sight of the most relevant and
  important fact that when the interim order of stay was passed
  on 22.03.2001 by the learned single Judge, it was first of all
  the duty of the counsel for the petitioner United India Insurance
D Company Ltd. or the petitioner Insurance Company itself to
  obtain a certified copy of the interim order of stay and then
  communicate the same to the Presiding Judge of the MACT
  who was Shri S.K. Bansal. The petitioner herein Shri Gupta
  admittedly was not functioning in the High Court in any capacity
E in the year 2001 or thereafter until 2005 and hence he cannot
  be attributed with an ulterior motive to scuttle or ensure that the
  interim order of stay may not be implemented as admittedly for
  several years thereafter, at least upto the year 2003, when the
  MACT Judge Shri Bansal superannuated, the petitio~er was
F not even posted in the High Court as he was posted in the High
  Court, Jaipur Bench as Deputy Registrar (Judicial) for the first
  time in the year 2005. Hence, what transpired between the date
  of the order of interim stay passed in 2001 upto 2003 when
  the learned Judge, MACT Shri Bansal retired, no malafide or
G ulterior motive can at all be attributed to the appellant herein
  Shri Gupta so as to initiate a contempt proceeding against him. ·
  Therefore, even though the order was not complied, the reason
  or liability for its non-compliance cannot be fastened on the
  appellant herein- Shri Gupta so as to justify initiation of
H contempt proceeding against him. Hence, non-compliance of
     DINESH KUMAR GUPTA v. UNITED !NOIA                         617
  INSURANCE CO. LTD. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
the interim order of stay passed by the learned single Judge            A
way back in the year 2001 which was passed much prior to
2005, when the appellant joined as Deputy Registrar (Judicial)
in the High Court cannot be attributed to him. The appellant
obviously could not have been expected to orally remember the
particulars of each and every order passed by High Court on             B
judicial side and sent to the registry, which was not
implemented. Hence, if he wrote to the Registrar (Vigilance)
seeking the case number of the pending matter as also the date
of the stay order, the said letter cannot be treated to have been
written with an intention to obstruct implementation of the             c
 interim order of stay which was passed four years earlier in the
year 2001. Hence, it would be a wholly unfounded assumption,
so as to infer that the appellant did so, to obviate or obstruct
implementation of the stay order or forestall the same in any
manner.                                                                 0
      16. In our view, if the learned single Judge was of the view
that the interim order of stay granted by the Court on 22.03.2001
in favour of the Insurance Company staying execution of the
award of compensation in favour of the claimant was
obstructed, the learned single Judge ought to have hauled up            E
those officers in the registry for contempt who had been
functioning in the registry at the relevant time and factually it was
not correct for the learned Judge to assume that it was the
petitioner who obstructed the administration of justice so as to
justify initiation of contempt proceedings against an officer who       F
joined five years later on the ground that he had sought the case
number and the date of the order which was to be implemented
in order to forestall the same when in fact it was already not
implemented for a long number of years which was more than
four years prior to the appellant's posting in the High Court. As       G
already stated, an officer in the registry who joined
approximately five years later prior to the interim order of stay
which was passed, he cannot legitimately be hauled up for
contempt merely on unfounded assumption and speculation that
it was he who was instrumental in obstructing the administration        H
    618    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A of justice by ensuring that the order of stay may not be
  implemented.

          17. As already observed, the first and foremost onus to
    communicate an order of stay is on the counsel or the party in
B   whose favour the order was passed by obtaining a certified
    copy of the order passed by the court and although the registry
    is also required to communicate the order to the concerned
    Court where it is required to be implemented, tne same
    essentially is in the nature of a formc>I communication and if the
C   same had not been communicated by the erstwhile officers of
    the registry for any reason whatsoever, including an assumed
    motive of its non-implementation, a proceeding for contempt
    could have been initiated against an officer who was posted
    at the relevant time and had failed to communicate the order
    to the concerned Court which had to implement it. But, after an
D   unusually long lapse of time, which in this case is more than
    four years, an officer like the appellant who subsequently joined
    the registry, cannot be attributed with an oblique motive of
    obstructing the cause of justice merely because he had sought
    the case number and date of the order of stay from the Registrar
E   (Vigilance) in order to furnish a copy of the order which was
    required by the Registrar (Vigilance). In fact, when the Registrar
    (Vigilance) sought a copy of the interim order of stay, it was
    his duty to specify the case number and the date of the order
    as it cannot be expected that the copy of the order could be
F   sent to the Registrar (Vigilance) without the case number or its
    date. In any view, it would be too far fetched to infer that the
    same was done to shield the learned Judge of the MACT Shri
    Bansal against whom vigilance enquiry was ordered,
    completely missing the relevant point that he had already
G   superannuated two years earlier after which the learned Single
    Judge himself had ordered for closure of the vigilance enquiry
    against him.

       18. Besides this, it would also not be correct to overlook
H or ignore an important statutory ingredient of contempt of a civil
     DINESH KUMAR GUPTA v. UNITED INDIA                        619
  INSURANCE CO. LTD. [GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J.]
nature given out u/s 2 (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971         A
that the disobedience to the order alleging contempt has to
satisfy the test that it is a wilful disobedience to the order.
Bearing this important factor in mind, it is relevant to note that
a proceeding for civil contempt would not lie if the order alleged
to have been disobeyed itself provides scope for reasonable           8
or rational interpretation of an order or cirqumstance which is
the factual position in the instant matter. It would equally not be
correct to infer that a party although acting due to
misapprehension of the correct legal position and in good faith
without any motive to defeat or defy the order of the Court,          C
should be viewed as a serious ground so as to give rise to a
contempt proceeding.

      19. To reinforce the aforesaid legal position further, it would
be relevant and appropriate to take into· consideration the
settled legal position as reflected in the judgment and order D
delivered in the matter of Ahmad Ali Vs. Supdt., Jail, Crl. L.J.
1845 as also in the case of B.K. Kar vs.· Hon'ble The Chief
Justice and His Companion Judges of the Orissa High Court,
AIR 1961 SC 1367 that mere unintentional disobedience is not
enough to hold anyone guilty of contempt and although, E
disobedience might have been established, absence of wilful
disobedience on the part of the contemnor, will not hold him
guilty unless the contempt involves a degree of fault or
misconduct. Thus, accidental or unintentional disobedience is
not sufficient to justify o.ne for holding guilty of contempt. It is F
further relevant to bear in mind the settled law on the law of
contempt that casual or accidental or unintentional acts of
disobedience under the circumstances which negate any
suggestion of contumacy, would amount to a contempt in theory
only and does not render the contemnor liable to punishment G
an'd this was the view expressed also in cases reported in AIR
1954 Patna 513, State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari and
AIR 1957 Patna 528, N. Bakshi Vs. O.K. Ghosh.

    20. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the
                                                                      H
    620     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.


A view that the learned single Judge inferred and assumed
  erroneously that the appellant had the intention to obstruct the
  administration of justice by being instrumental in ensuring that
  the interim order passed in 2001 may not be implemented
  oblivious of the fact that the appellant was posted in the registry
B of the High Court only four years later in 2005 and hence non-
  implementation of the interim order of stay cannot be attributed
  to the appellant to shield the Judge of the MACT, Jaipur who
  had retired way back in the yec:u 2003 against whom the
  enquiry was ordered to be closed by the learned Single Judge
C himself. Thus, initiation of the contempt proceeding against the
  petitioner by the learned single Judge is based on a wholly
  wrong premise based on unsustainable and unfounded facts
  which cannot be treated sufficient material so as to initiate
  contempt proceeding in spite of absence of any degree of fault
  or misconduct or even unintentional disobedience to the order
D for the reasons assigned hereinbefore.

       21. Hence, we set aside the impugned order dated
  08.12.2006 passed by the learned single Judge by which the
  proceeding for contempt has been ordered to be initiated by
E registering a regular contempt proceeding against the appellant
  and the same shall be treated as dropped. Consequently, the
  appeal is allowed directing the parties to bear their cost.

   B.B.B.                                          Appeal allowed.