Holding

A contractual ad‑hoc appointment ends on the expiry of its stipulated period and the employee has no inherent right to continue, though the Court may, on compassionate grounds, allow temporary continuation.

Summary

The respondent was repeatedly appointed on an ad‑hoc contractual basis for limited periods at the Institute of Management Development. After a committee recommended abolition of redundant posts, the institute abolished her post, and the High Court ordered her reinstatement and regularisation. The institute appealed, arguing that a contractual ad‑hoc appointment ends automatically on expiry and the respondent had no right to continue. The Supreme Court held that such appointments indeed terminate at the end of the stipulated period, so the High Court order was set aside. However, considering the respondent's age and length of service, the Court compassionately directed that her services may be continued until the end of the calendar year on the same terms, without mandating regularisation. The appeal was disposed of accordingly.

Issues considered

Whether a contractual ad‑hoc appointment terminates automatically on expiry, depriving the employee of any right to continue in the post.
Whether the Institute had the authority under its rules to abolish the post of Training Executive.
Whether the respondent was entitled to regularisation of service after continuous service beyond the contractual period.
Whether the High Court's mandamus directing reinstatement and regularisation was legally valid.

Subjects

ad‑hoc appointmentcontractual employmenttermination of serviceregularisationredundancymandamusjudicial reviewemployment law

Judgment

A DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT
\.
U.P. >-.....r-
v.
SMT. PUSHPA SRIVASTAVA

AUGUST 4, 1992
B
[L.M. SHARMA, S. MOHAN AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.J

Civil Services :

c Appointment purely on ad-hoc and on contractual basis-Person ap-

-
pointed from time to time-Right to remain in such post-Whether comes to
on end on expiry of the period for which appointed.

The Respondent was appointed in the appellant-Institute on contract
basis initially for a period of three months. The appointment was purely
D ad hoc and was extended from time to time. At one stage she submitted ~
her resignation and the same was accepted. Despite this, she made a
further request that her services may be continued for some more time,
and she was appointed on a contractual basis as a Training Executive on
a consolidated compensation. This appointment was also purely on ad hoc
E basis, terminable without notice.
-y
However, a Committee of the appellant-Institute, which went into the
question of abolition of redundant posts, recommended the abolition of

F
certain posts including the one held by the Respondent. The recommenda-
tion was accepted and the posts were abolished. The Respondent preferred
a Writ Petition before the High Court challenging the action of the appel-
lant-Institute.
-
---;--
The High Court directed ttie arpellant-Institute to put back the
Respondent on duty on the post held by her and to regularise her services
within three months.
G
The appellant-Institute preferred the present appeal by special leave
against· the High C!>Drt's order, contending that the appointment of
Respondent was purely on a{:i hoc basis and she had no right to continue
in the post beyond six months for which period she was appointed; that
,_...
H the appellant had to abolish the post because of financial constraints as
712
DIRECTOR, 1.M.D. v. SMT. PUSHPA (MOHAN, J.] 713

it wa~ tinding it difficult to disburse salary even to its regular employees; A
1

----•, and that the posts abolished were found to be redundant.

Disposing of the appeal, this Court,

HELD : 1.1. It is clear that where the appointment is contractual and I

by emux of time the appointment comes to an end, the respondent could B
have no right to continue in the post. (717-G]

1.2. In the instant case, the appointment was purely ad hoc and on
- '( \
a contractual basis for a limited period. Therefore, by expiry of the period
of six months, the right to remain in the post comes to an end. (719-D]
c
I

- Jacob M. Puthuparambil and ors. etc. etc. v. Kera/a Water Authority and
ors. etc. etc., (1990) 1 Suppl. SCR 562, distinguished.

2. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case and taking
into consideration that the Respondent is already 41 years of age, it is '
>- directed that the services of the Respondent may be continued till the end D
of this calender year on the same terms as spelt out in the appointment
order dated 1.9.90. Of course, it would be open to the appellant to consider
the regularisation of her services, should it so desire. In that event, this
judgment will not stand in the way of such regularisation. [719G,H]
... y ~ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2923 of
E
1992.

- From the Judgment and Order dated 30.11.1991 of the Allahabad
High Court in W.P. No. 1041 of 1991.

S. Muralidha~ for the Appellant.
F

~--
R.F. Nariman and Ms. Meenakshi Arora, for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G
MOHAN, J. Special leave granted.

The civil appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the
1

~· High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow da~ed 30th Novem-
ber, 1991 rendered in Writ Petition No.1041 of 1991. It was filed by the1
respondent in which the prayer was for a mandamus to the appellant-In-, H
714 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992] 3 S.C.R.

A stitute to regularise the services of the respondent forthwith as Executive
in the Institute of Management Development, Uttar Pradesh.

The appellant is an Institute established inter alia with the object of
undertaking applied scientific, industrial and management research, more
particularly, in the field of applied sciences with the emphasis on technical
B management including production management, financial management,
marketing management etc. It is an autonomous body. It is governed by
the rules of the Association of the Institute.

The respondent was first appointed in the appellant-Institute as a
Research Executive on a consolidated fixed compensation of Rs. 1,250 per
c month on contract basis for a period of three months. It was specifically
stated in the order that it was purely on ad hoc basis, liable for termination
without any notice on either side. -
By an order dated 18th of July, 1988 the appointment of respondent
D was extended for a further period of three months with effect from 2nd
August, 1988 on the same terms and conditions. Here again, it requires to
be noted that the appointment was purely on ad hoc basis. On 28th of
Junuary, 1989 a fresh Office Order was made appointing the respondent
as Training Executive on a contract basis for a period of thre~ months. The
E consolidated pay was fixed at Rs.1,500 per month. Here also, the appoint-
ment was purely on ad hoc basis and terminable without notice by either
side. On 20th June, 1989 she was appointed on a newly created post of
Executive carrying a pay scale of Rs. 770-1600. This appointment was also

F
on ad hoc basis for a period of six months and it was terminable by one
month's notice on either side. On 5th J~ary, 1990 another ad hoc
appointment was made for a period of three months. Though by efflux of
time the appointment came to an end on 21st of March, 1990 yet she was
--
continued beyond the prescribed period.

On 13th July, 1990 she submitted a resignation letter. This letter of
G resignation was forwarded to the Director of the Institute who accepted
the same by an order dated 31st July, 1990.

Notwithstanding the acceptance of resignation, on 25th of August,
1990, the respondent made a further request that her services might be Y
continued for some more time in the appellant-Institute. On this request,
H the respondent was appointed on a contractual basis as a Training Execu-
DIRECTOR, l.M.D. v. SMT. PUSHPA [MOHAN J.] 715

tive on a consolidated compensation of Rs.2,400 per month. On this A
-'--" occasion also, the appointment was purely on a ad hoc basis terminable
without notice.

On 3rd of January, 1991 a Committee of the Institute went into the
question of abolition of redundant posts. The report was submitted by the
Committee to the effect that several posts including the posts of Training B
Supervisors and Research Executive had become .redundant. Therefore,
the committee recommended their abolition. Accepting the report of the
_, -~ committee on 14th January, 1991 five posts were abolished including the
\
post of Training Supervisors and Research Executive with effect from the
last training programme of the current financial year. c
- Since the appointment of the respondent was coming to an end at
the end of February 1991 she preferred W.P: 1041of1991.

Inter alia it was urged that there was no justification for not giving a
I

>- regular or a permanent appointment to her. She was compelled to submit D
her resignation and thereafter was given a permanent consolidated salary.
.....
Thus, the action of the Institute was arbitrary, unreasonable and dis-
criminatory. It was further urged that there was every need for continuing
the post.

The learned Judge accepted this contention and ultimately; making E
the rule absolute, directed that she be put back on duty on the post hitherto
held by her. A further direction was issued to regularise her services within
three months. It is under these circumstances special leave petition was
preferred by the Institute.
F
The argument on behalf of the appellant and the counter argument
~· on behalf of the respondent, centred mainly round the question whether
the Director of the appellant-Institute was competent to abolish the pos~.
While the contention on behalf of the appellant was that Rule 16(viii) of
the Rules of the Association of the appellant-Institute would enable the
Director to create technical post. Per contra it was urged on behalf of the
G
respondent that Rule 11, conferring powers on the Board for creating
y
research post, would apply.

However, without elaborating the arguments on the scope of the
Rules it was urged on behalf of the appellant that the order dated 1.9.90 H
716 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1992) 3 S.C.R.

A was specific in its terms limiting the period of appoilltment for six months
from the date of joining. This was purely on a contractual basis. The
consolidated pay was Rs. 2,400. Therefore, the respondent had no right to
continue whatsoever in the post beyond the period of six months irrespec-
tive of the fact as to who had the right to abolish the post.
B The appellant-Institute came to abolish the post because of the
financial constraints. The report of the committee makes it very clear that
the Institute was finding it difficult to disburse pay etc. even to its regular
employees. Hence, the posts which were redundant including the one
occupied by the respondent came to be abolished. If that be so, the High
c
-
Court was incorrect in directing that the respondent be put back in service
and further directing that her services be regularised.

In meeting these submissions, Mr. Nariman, learned counsel for the
respondent would urge that the case did not proceed on this line before
D the High Court yet he would endeavour to establish that the respondent
has a right to be regularised. The respondent's service had continued right
from 20th June, 1989 at any·rate for more than one year. Though it was on
ad hoc basis this Court has taken the view that having regard to the length
of service the respondent has a right to bt: regularised. In support of this
submission reliance is placed on Jacob M. Puthuparambil and ors. etc. etc.
E v. Kera/a Water Authority and Ors. etc. etc., [1990) 1 Suppl. .SCR page 562.
Thus it is submitted that no interference is called for with the impugned
judgment.

In any event, should the Court be inclined to accept the contention
F of the appellant, the case of the respondent may be viewed with sympathy
as she is 41 years of age. If she is thrown out of job she will be literally on
the streets. Therefore, the Institute may be directed to consider her
regularisation.

G For our part, we do not think it is necessary to decide the question
as to who has the power to abolish the post of Training Executive; whether
under Rule 16(viii), the Director or under Rule 11,_ the Board since we
propose to limit the controversy to the terms of appointment.

H The order dated 1.9.90 reads as follow :
DIRECTOR, l.M.D. v. SMT. PUSHPA [MOHAN, J.] 717

"1-168D/1132 1.9.1990 ,A
OFFICE ORDER

With effect from the date of joining Smt. Pushpa Rani Srivas-
tava is appointed a consolidated fixed pay of Rs. 2400 per
month on contract basis for a period of six months in the 1B
Institute.

The appointment of Smt. Srivastava is purely on ad hoc basis
and is terminable without any notice.

- The following are clear from the above order :
sd/- C
( K.K.N. SINGH)
DIRECTOR"

(i) The respondent was appointed on a contractual basis. b-
(ii) The post was to carry a consolidated pay of Rs. 2400 per
month.

(iii) The duration of appointment was six months from the date
of the respondent joining charge. E
(iv) It is purely on ad hoc basis.

- (v) It is terminable without any notice.

Because the six months' period was coming to an end on 28th F
February, 1991, she preferred the Writ petition a few days before and I
prayed for mandamus which was granted by the learned Judge under the
impugned judgment. The question is whether the directions are valid in
law. To our mind, it is clear that where the appointment is contractual and
by efflux of time, the appointment comes to an end, the respondent could
have no right to continue in the post. Once this conclusion is arrived at, G
what requires to be examined is, in view of the services of the respondent
:t
- . .....,
'
being continued from time to time on 'ad hoc' basis for more than a year
whether she is entitled to regularisation? The answer _should be in the
negative. However, reliance is placed by learned counsel on behalf of the
• responden~ on the case in Jacob v. Kera/a Water Authority (supra). H
718 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1992) 3 S.C.R.

A This ruling, in our considered view, does not advance the case of the
respondent, as it turned on the interpretation of Rule 9(a)(i) of Kerala
State and Subordinate Service R1,1les of 1958. The relevant portion of the
judgment is at page 569 which is extracted below :

"The claims made by the employees in this group of cases is
B
contested mainly on the plea that their tenure and service
conditions were regulated by Rule 9(a)(i) of the Kerala State
and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 (hereinafter called 'the
Rules') which were statutory in character and were, therefore,
binding on the Authority as well as the employees. It is con-
c tended that the employees belonging to different categories
were appointed on different dates by the PHED prior to. 1st
April, 1984 under this rule and, therefore, their services cduld
only be regulated thereunder."
-
D In dealing with this, at page 577 the Court observed:

"If any person who does not possess the requisite qualifications
is appointed under the said clause, he will be liable to be
replaced by a qualified person. Clauses (iii) of Rule 9 states
that a person appointed under clause (i) shall, as soon as .,
E possible, be replaced by a member of the service or an ap-
proved candidate qualified to hold the post. Clause (e) of Rule
9, however, provided for regularisation of service of any person

F
appointed under clause (i) of sub-rule (a) if he had completed
continuous service of two years on Dec..:mber 22, 1973, not-
withstanding anything contained in the rules. This is a clear
-
indication that in the past the Government also considered it
just and fair to regularise the services of those who had been
in continuous service for two years period to the cut-off date.
The spirit underlying this treatment clearly shows that the
Government did not consider it just, fair or reasonable to
G terminate the services of those who were in employment for a
period of two or more years period to the cut-off date. This
approach is quite consistent with the spirit of the rule which 7-·-.
was intended to be invoked to serve emergent situations which
could not brook delay. Such appointments were intended to be
H stop-gap temporary appointments to serve the stated purpose

.I
DIRECTOR, l.M.D. v. SMT. PUSHPA [MOHAN, J.] 719

and not long term ones. The rule was not intended to fill a A
large number of posts in the service but only those which could
not be kept vacant till regular appointments were made Di
accordance with the rules. But once the appointments con~
tinned for long, the services had to be regularised if the incum~
bent possessed the requisite qualifications as was done by B
sub-rule (e). Such an approach alone would be consistent with
the consitutional philosophy adverted to earlier. Even other-
wise, the rule must be so interpreted, if the language of the rule
permits, as will advance this philosophy of the Constitution. If:
the rule is so interpreted it seems clear to us that employees,

-- who have been working on .the establishment since long, and, C
who possess the requisite qualifications for the job as obtaining ,
on the date of their employment, must be allowed to continue
on their jobs and their services should be regularised." ·

In the instant case, there is no such rule. The appointment was purely '
ad hoc and on a contractual basis for a limited period. Therefore, by expiry · D
of the period of six months, the right to remain in the post comes to an
end.

If the matter is viewed from this angle, that being the only view, we
fuld no difficulty whatever in setting aside the impugned judgment which ' E
is accordingly set aside.

- Lastly, what is appealed to us 1>y the respondent is sympathetic ,
consideration.

George Eliot said : F.
"More helpful than all wisdom or counsel is one draught of '
simple human pity that will not forsake us."

Here is one draught from us. In the facts and circumstances of this
case, we direct that her sercices may be continued till the end of this G
calendar year on the same terms as spelt out in the order dated 1.9.90. Of
course, it would be open to the appellant to consider the regularisation of
her services, should it so desire. In that event, this judgment will not stand
in the way of such regularisation. However, we make it clear that it is not
to be understood that we have directed the regularisation. ,H
SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1_992) 3 S.C.R.

A The appeal is disposed of in the above terms. There shall be no order
as to costs.

G.N. Appeal disposed of. I
i
I

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