DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THROUGHITS SECRETARYversusISHWAR SHANDILYA & ORS.

                        [2020] 7 S.C.R. 299                              299


   DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THROUGH                            A
                         ITS SECRETARY
                                  v.
                  ISHWAR SHANDILYA & ORS.
          (Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5440 of 2020)              B

                       FEBRUARY 28, 2020
           [ARUN MISHRA AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
       Advocates – Strikes – Constitution of India – Art. 19(1)(a) –
The advocates in the entire District of Dehradun, in several districts   C
of Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar district in the State of
Uttarakhand were boycotting the Courts on all Saturdays – Writ
Petition before the High Court – The High Court directed the District
Bar Associations to withdraw their call for a strike and start
attending Courts on all working Saturdays – The Uttarakhand State
                                                                         D
Bar Council was also directed to initiate disciplinary action against
the office bearers of the aforesaid District Bar Associations – The
District Judges were also directed to submit reports to the High
Court, in case advocates do not start attending Courts, to consider
whether action should be initiated against the errant advocates
under the Contempt of Courts Act – Before the Supreme Court, it          E
was contended by the petitioner-District Bar Association that right
to go on strike/boycott Courts is a fundamental right to Freedom of
Speech and Expression guaranteed u/Art. 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution of India – Held: A right to Freedom of Speech cannot
be exercised at the cost of the litigants and/ or at the cost of the
                                                                         F
Justice Delivery System as a whole – To go on strike/boycott Courts
cannot be justified under the guise of the right to freedom of Speech
and Expression u/Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution – Nobody has
the right to go on strike/boycott Courts – Even, such a right, if any,
cannot affect the rights of others and more particularly, the right of
Speedy Justice guaranteed u/Art. 14 & 21 of the Constitution –           G
Therefore, boycotting Courts on every Saturday in the entire district
of Dehradun, in several districts of Haridwar and Udham Singh
Nagar district in the State of Uttarakhand is not justifiable and as
such tantamounts to contempt of the Courts – Therefore, the High
Court is justified in issuing the impugned directions.
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                                 299
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A           Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the Court
             HELD: 1. In spite of the law laid down by this Court in the
      Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC 45; Common
      Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India (2006) 9 SCC 295
      and Krishnakant Tamrakar v. State of M.P. (2018) 17 SCC 27, this
B     Court time and again deprecated the lawyers to go on strikes,
      the strikes were continued unabated. Even in the present case,
      the advocates have been boycotting the courts on all Saturdays,
      in the entire district of Dehradun, in several parts of the district
      of Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar district of the State of
      Uttaranchal. Because of such strikes, the ultimate sufferers are
C     the litigants. From the data mentioned in the impugned judgment
      and order, things are very shocking. Every month on 3-4
      Saturdays, the advocates are on strike and abstain from working,
      on one pretext or the other. If the lawyers would have worked on
      those days, it would have been in the larger interest and it would
D     have achieved the ultimate goal of speedy justice, which is now
      recognized as a fundamental right under Articles 14 and 21 of the
      Constitution. It would have helped in early disposal of the criminal
      trials and therefore it would have been in the interest of those
      who are languishing in the jail and waiting for their trial to
      conclude. When the Institution is facing a serious problem of
E     arrears and delay in disposal of cases, how the Institution as a
      whole can afford such four days strike in a month. [Para 6.6]
      [321-D-G]
             2. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the petitioner
      that to go on strike/boycott courts is a fundamental right of
F     Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the
      Constitution and it is a mode of peaceful representation to
      express the grievances by the lawyers’ community is concerned,
      such a right to freedom of speech cannot be exercised at the cost
      of the litigants and/or at the cost of the Justice Delivery System
G     as a whole. To go on strike/boycott courts cannot be justified
      under the guise of the right to freedom of speech and expression
      under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Nobody has the right
      to go on strike/boycott courts. Even, such a right, if any, cannot
      affect the rights of others and more particularly, the right of Speedy
      Justice guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
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       DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                  301
           ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA

In any case, all the aforesaid submissions are already considered               A
by this Court earlier and more particularly in the decisions
referred to hereinabove. Therefore, boycotting courts on every
Saturday in the entire District of Dehradun, in several districts of
Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar district in the State of
Uttarakhand is not justifiable at all and as such it tantamounts to
                                                                                B
contempt of the courts, as observed by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions. Therefore, the High Court is absolutely justified in
issuing the impugned directions. This Court is in complete
agreement with the view expressed by the High Court and the
ultimate conclusion and the directions issued by the High Court.
Therefore, the present Special Leave Petition deserves to be                    C
dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. [Para 6.7][321-G-H]
[322-A-D]
       Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC
       45 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 186; Common Cause, A
       Registered Society v. Union of India (2006) 9 SCC 295;                   D
       Krishnakant Tamrakar v. State of M.P. (2018) 17 SCC
       27 : [2018] 4 SCR 1098 – relied on.
                         Case Law Reference
[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 186                relied on               Para 6
                                                                                E
(2006) 9 SCC 295                       relied on               Para 6
[2018] 4 SCR 1098                      relied on               Para 6
       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 5440 of 2020.
                                                                                F
      From the Judgment and Order dated 25.09.2019 of the High Court
of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Writ Petition (PIL) No. 31 of 2016.
      Mahabir Singh, Sr. Adv., Ajai Kumar Bhatia, Vijay S. Bishnoi,
Advs. for the Petitioner.
       The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                               G
       M. R. SHAH, J.
      1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
and order dated 25.09.2019 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at
Nainital in Writ Petition (PIL) No. 31 of 2016, the District Bar Association,
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302            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 7 S.C.R.


A     Dehradun, through its Secretary, has preferred the present SLP. That by
      the impugned judgment and order, the High Court in the writ petition
      (PIL) filed by the private respondent herein has issued the following
      directions:
                    “The District Bar Associations of Dehradun, Haridwar and
B           Udham Singh Nagar shall, forthwith, withdraw their call for a
            strike, and start attending Courts on all working Saturdays. All the
            District Bar Associations in the State shall forthwith refrain from
            abstaining from Courts because of condolence references for
            family members of Advocates, or for other reasons. In case they
            do not start attending Courts, as directed hereinabove, the District
C           Judges concerned shall submit their respective reports to the High
            Court for it to consider whether action should be initiated against
            the errant Advocates under the Contempt of Courts Act.
                   The Bar Council of India shall at the earliest, and in any
            event within three months from today, take action against the
D           recalcitrant Bar Associations pursuant to its show-cause notice
            dated 12.07.2019, and ensure that these Bar Associations desist
            from continuing such strikes/boycott of Courts.
                    The Uttarakhand State Bar Council shall, within a period
            of four weeks from today, initiate disciplinary action against the
E           office bearers of the aforesaid District Bar Associations for their
            having given a call for illegal strikes/boycott of Courts on Saturdays
            in the judgeship of Dehradun, Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar.
                  The District Judges of these districts shall ensure that Courts
            function on Saturdays, and sufficient cases are listed and are
F           disposed of by Courts, under their judgeship, on all working
            Saturdays.
                   The Commissioner of Police/Senior Superintendent of Police,
            of the concerned districts, shall, as and when requested by the
            District Judge or a Judicial Officer, regarding the possibility of
G           Court proceedings being impeded because of strike/boycott of
            Courts by Advocates, forthwith provide necessary police protection
            to ensure smooth functioning of Courts, and thereby prevent any
            impediment to Court proceedings because of strikes/boycott by
            Bar Associations/Advocates.
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      DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                  303
  ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA [M. R. SHAH, J.]

            The High Court is requested to consider taking appropriate         A
      measures to ensure functioning of Courts on Saturdays, that judicial
      work is not hampered by such illegal strikes/boycott of Courts
      and wholly unjustified condolence references, and that the Circular
      issued by it earlier on 12.03.2019 is implemented.”
       2. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High              B
Court, it appears that the Advocates in the entire District of Dehradun,
in several districts of Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar district in the
State of Uttarakhand have been boycotting the Courts on all Saturdays
for the past more than 35 years. As the strikes are seriously obstructing
the access to justice to the needy litigants, respondent No. 1 was compelled
to approach the High Court by way of Writ Petition (PIL). Having noted         C
from the information sent by the High Court to the Law Commission
that with respect to the State of Uttarakhand for the years 2012-2016
showed that in Dehradun district, the Advocates were on strike for 455
days (on an average 91 days per year) and in Haridwar district it is 515
days (about 103 days per year), the High Court was of the opinion that         D
on all such working days on account of strikes and the conduct of the
Advocates in boycotting Courts, it has affected the functioning of the
Courts and it contributes to the ever-mounting pendency of the cases,
and therefore aforesaid directions have been issued by the High Court.
      3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment         E
and order passed by the High Court, the District Bar Association,
Dehradun has preferred the present SLP.
       4. Shri Mahabir Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on
behalf of the petitioner has vehemently submitted that the High Court
has not properly appreciated and considered the fact that the right to go      F
on strike/boycott courts is a fundamental right to Freedom of Speech
and Expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of
India.
      4.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned Senior Advocate
appearing on behalf of the petitioner that the strike is a mode of peaceful    G
representation to express the grievances by the lawyers’ community in
absence of no other forum is available.
      4.2 It is further submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing
on behalf of the petitioner that the High Court ought to have held that the
protection conferred by Section 48 of the Advocates Act is for any act
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304             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2020] 7 S.C.R.


A     done in good faith and therefore the directions issued by the High Court
      to take action against the Advocates on strike would be contrary to the
      protection conferred by Section 48 of the Advocates Act.
             5. The learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the
      petitioner has stated at the Bar that, as such, the Bar Association has
B     already withdrawn the strike and/or boycotting Courts on all Saturdays,
      his statement is taken on record.
             6. Having heard the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf
      of the petitioner and considering the impugned judgment and order passed
      by the High Court, more particularly, the directions issued by the High
C     Court, which are reproduced hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion
      that the High Court is absolutely justified in issuing such directions. As
      such, the directions issued by the High Court are absolutely in consonance
      with the decisions of this Court in the cases of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal
      v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC 45; Common Cause, A Registered
      Society v. Union of India (2006) 9 SCC 295 and Krishnakant
D     Tamrakar v. State of M.P. (2018) 17 SCC 27.
             6.1 In the case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal (supra), this Court
      has specifically observed and held that the lawyers have no right to go
      on strike or even token strike or to give a call for strike. It is also further
      observed that nor can they while holding Vakalat on behalf of clients,
E     abstain from appearing in courts in pursuance of a call for strike or
      boycott. It is further observed by this Court that it is unprofessional as
      well as unbecoming for a lawyer to refuse to attend the court even in
      pursuance of a call for strike or boycott by the Bar Association or the
      Bar Council. It is further observed that an Advocate is an officer of the
F     court and enjoys a special status in the society; Advocates have obligations
      and duties to ensure the smooth functioning of the court; they owe a
      duty to their clients and strikes interfere with the administration of justice.
      They cannot thus disrupt court proceedings and put interest of their clients
      in jeopardy.

G            6.2 While considering the role of the Bar Councils, it is observed
      in paragraphs 25 and 26 of the aforesaid decision as under:
                   “25. In the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of
             India [(1998) 4 SCC 409] it has been held that professional
             misconduct may also amount to contempt of court (para 21). It
             has further been held as follows: (SCC pp. 444-46, paras 79-80)
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    DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                 305
ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA [M. R. SHAH, J.]

          “79. An advocate who is found guilty of contempt of court         A
   may also, as already noticed, be guilty of professional misconduct
   in a given case but it is for the Bar Council of the State or Bar
   Council of India to punish that advocate by either debarring him
   from practice or suspending his licence, as may be warranted, in
   the facts and circumstances of each case. The learned Solicitor-
                                                                            B
   General informed us that there have been cases where the Bar
   Council of India taking note of the contumacious and objectionable
   conduct of an advocate, had initiated disciplinary proceedings
   against him and even punished him for ‘professional misconduct’,
   on the basis of his having been found guilty of committing contempt
   of court. We do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of          C
   the State or Bar Council of India, as the case may be, when
   apprised of the established contumacious conduct of an advocate
   by the High Court or by this Court, would rise to the occasion, and
   take appropriate action against such an advocate. Under Article
   144 of the Constitution ‘all authorities, civil and judicial, in the
                                                                            D
   territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court’. The Bar
   Council which performs a public duty and is charged with the
   obligation to protect the dignity of the profession and maintain
   professional standards and etiquette is also obliged to act ‘in aid
   of the Supreme Court’. It must, whenever facts warrant, rise to
   the occasion and discharge its duties uninfluenced by the position       E
   of the contemner advocate. It must act in accordance with the
   prescribed procedure, whenever its attention is drawn by this Court
   to the contumacious and unbecoming conduct of an advocate
   which has the tendency to interfere with due administration of
   justice. It is possible for the High Courts also to draw the attention
                                                                            F
   of the Bar Council of the State to a case of professional misconduct
   of a contemner advocate to enable the State Bar Council to proceed
   in the manner prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed
   thereunder. There is no justification to assume that the Bar
   Councils would not rise to the occasion, as they are equally
   responsible to uphold the dignity of the courts and the majesty of       G
   law and prevent any interference in the administration of justice.
   Learned counsel for the parties present before us do not dispute
   and rightly so that whenever a court of record records its findings
   about the conduct of an advocate while finding him guilty of
   committing contempt of court and desires or refers the matter to
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306             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 7 S.C.R.


A           be considered by the Bar Council concerned, appropriate action
            should be initiated by the Bar Council concerned in accordance
            with law with a view to maintain the dignity of the courts and to
            uphold the majesty of law and professional standards and etiquette.
            Nothing is more destructive of public confidence in the
            administration of justice than incivility, rudeness or disrespectful
B
            conduct on the part of a counsel towards the court or disregard
            by the court of the privileges of the Bar. In case the Bar Council,
            even after receiving ‘reference’ from the Court, fails to take action
            against the advocate concerned, this Court might consider invoking
            its powers under Section 38 of the Act by sending for the record
C           of the proceedings from the Bar Council and passing appropriate
            orders. Of course, the appellate powers under Section 38 would
            be available to this Court only and not to the High Courts. We,
            however, hope that such a situation would not arise.
                     80. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the
D           High Court, to prevent the contemner advocate to appear before
            it till he purges himself of the contempt but that is much different
            from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practise
            as an advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious,
            unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate-on-Record,
            this Court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules
E           itself, to withdraw his privilege to practise as an Advocate-on-
            Record because that privilege is conferred by this Court and the
            power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or
            suspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not
            amount to suspending or revoking his licence to practise as an
F           advocate in other courts or tribunals.”
             Thus a Constitution Bench of this Court has held that the Bar
      Councils are expected to rise to the occasion as they are responsible to
      uphold the dignity of courts and majesty of law and to prevent interference
      in administration of justice. In our view it is the duty of the Bar Councils
G     to ensure that there is no unprofessional and/or unbecoming conduct.
      This being their duty no Bar Council can even consider giving a call for
      strike or a call for boycott. It follows that the Bar Councils and even Bar
      Associations can never consider or take seriously any requisition calling
      for a meeting to consider a call for a strike or a call for boycott. Such
      requisitions should be consigned to the place where they belong viz. the
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      DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                   307
  ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA [M. R. SHAH, J.]

waste-paper basket. In case any Association calls for a strike or a call        A
for boycott the State Bar Council concerned and on their failure the Bar
Council of India must immediately take disciplinary action against the
advocates who give a call for strike and if the Committee members
permit calling of a meeting for such purpose, against the Committee
members. Further, it is the duty of every advocate to boldly ignore a call
                                                                                B
for strike or boycott.
       26. It must also be noted that courts are not powerless or helpless.
Section 38 of the Advocates Act provides that even in disciplinary matters
the final appellate authority is the Supreme Court. Thus even if the Bar
Councils do not rise to the occasion and perform their duties by taking
disciplinary action on a complaint from a client against an advocate for        C
non-appearance by reason of a call for strike or boycott, on an appeal
the Supreme Court can and will. Apart from this, as set out in Ramon
Services case [(2001) 1 SCC 118 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 3 : 2001 SCC (L&S)
152] every court now should and must mulct advocates who hold
vakalats but still refrain from attending courts in pursuance of a strike       D
call with costs. Such costs would be in addition to the damages which
the advocate may have to pay for the loss suffered by his client by
reason of his non-appearance.”
        6.3 In the aforesaid decision, this Court took note of the resolution
dated 29.09.2002 passed by the Bar Council of India, by which it was            E
resolved, inter alia, to constitute the Grievance Redressel Committees
at the Taluk/Sub-Division or Tehsil levels, at the District level, High Court
and Supreme Court levels. Thereafter, this Court further observed that
merely holding strikes as illegal would not be sufficient in the present-
days situation nor would it serve any purpose. Some concrete joint action
is required to be taken by the Bench and the Bar to see that there are no       F
strikes any more. That, thereafter, this Court directed that (a) all the Bar
Associations in the country shall implement the resolution dated
29.09.2002 passed by the Bar Council of India, and (b) under Section 34
of the Advocates Act, the High Courts would frame necessary rules so
that appropriate actions can be taken against defaulting advocate/              G
advocates.
       6.4 Despite the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions and even the concern expressed by this Court against the strikes
by the lawyers, things did not improve and again the issue of lawyers
going on strikes came to be considered in the case of Common Cause,             H
308            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                               [2020] 7 S.C.R.


A     A Registered Society (supra) and this Court in paragraph 4 of that
      judgment, held as under:
                   “4. The Constitution Bench has, in Ex Capt. Harish Uppal
            case [(2003) 2 SCC 45] culled out the law in the following terms:
            (SCC pp. 64 & 71-74, paras 20-21 & 34-36)
B                  “20. Thus the law is already well settled. It is the duty of
            every advocate who has accepted a brief to attend trial, even
            though it may go on day to day and for a prolonged period. It is
            also settled law that a lawyer who has accepted a brief cannot
            refuse to attend court because a boycott call is given by the Bar
C           Association. It is settled law that it is unprofessional as well as
            unbecoming for a lawyer who has accepted a brief to refuse to
            attend court even in pursuance of a call for strike or boycott by
            the Bar Association or the Bar Council. It is settled law that courts
            are under an obligation to hear and decide cases brought before
            them and cannot adjourn matters merely because lawyers are on
D           strike. The law is that it is the duty and obligation of courts to go
            on with matters or otherwise it would tantamount to becoming a
            privy to the strike. It is also settled law that if a resolution is passed
            by Bar Associations expressing want of confidence in judicial
            officers, it would amount to scandalising the courts to undermine
E           its authority and thereby the advocates will have committed
            contempt of court. Lawyers have known, at least since Mahabir
            Singh case [Mahabir Prasad Singh v. Jacks Aviation (P) Ltd.,
            (1999) 1 SCC 37] that if they participate in a boycott or a strike,
            their action is ex facie bad in view of the declaration of law by
            this Court. A lawyer’s duty is to boldly ignore a call for strike or
F           boycott of court(s). Lawyers have also known, at least since
            Ramon Services case [Ramon Services (P) Ltd. v Subhash
            Kapoor, (2001) 1 SCC 118 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 3 : 2001 SCC (L&S)
            152] , that the advocates would be answerable for the
            consequences suffered by their clients if the non-appearance was
G           solely on grounds of a strike call.
                   21. It must also be remembered that an advocate is an
            officer of the court and enjoys special status in society. Advocates
            have obligations and duties to ensure smooth functioning of the
            court. They owe a duty to their clients. Strikes interfere with
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    DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                309
ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA [M. R. SHAH, J.]

   administration of justice. They cannot thus disrupt court               A
   proceedings and put interest of their clients in jeopardy.
                                ***
           34. One last thing which must be mentioned is that the
   right of appearance in courts is still within the control and
   jurisdiction of courts. Section 30 of the Advocates Act has not         B
   been brought into force and rightly so. Control of conduct in court
   can only be within the domain of courts. Thus Article 145 of the
   Constitution of India gives to the Supreme Court and Section 34
   of the Advocates Act gives to the High Court power to frame
   rules including rules regarding condition on which a person             C
   (including an advocate) can practise in the Supreme Court and/or
   in the High Court and courts subordinate thereto. Many courts
   have framed rules in this behalf. Such a rule would be valid and
   binding on all. Let the Bar take note that unless self-restraint is
   exercised, courts may now have to consider framing specific rules
   debarring advocates guilty of contempt and/or unprofessional or         D
   unbecoming conduct, from appearing before the courts. Such a
   rule if framed would not have anything to do with the disciplinary
   jurisdiction of the Bar Councils. It would be concerning the dignity
   and orderly functioning of the courts. The right of the advocate to
   practise envelops a lot of acts to be performed by him in discharge     E
   of his professional duties. Apart from appearing in the courts he
   can be consulted by his clients, he can give his legal opinion
   whenever sought for, he can draft instruments, pleadings, affidavits
   or any other documents, he can participate in any conference
   involving legal discussions, he can work in any office or firm as a
   legal officer, he can appear for clients before an arbitrator or        F
   arbitrators etc. Such a rule would have nothing to do with all the
   acts done by an advocate during his practice. He may even file
   vakalat on behalf of a client even though his appearance inside
   the court is not permitted. Conduct in court is a matter concerning
   the court and hence the Bar Council cannot claim that what should       G
   happen inside the court could also be regulated by them in exercise
   of their disciplinary powers. The right to practise, no doubt, is the
   genus of which the right to appear and conduct cases in the court
   may be a specie. But the right to appear and conduct cases in the
   court is a matter on which the court must and does have major
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310      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 7 S.C.R.


A     supervisory and controlling power. Hence courts cannot be and
      are not divested of control or supervision of conduct in court merely
      because it may involve the right of an advocate. A rule can stipulate
      that a person who has committed contempt of court or has behaved
      unprofessionally and in an unbecoming manner will not have the
      right to continue to appear and plead and conduct cases in courts.
B
      The Bar Councils cannot overrule such a regulation concerning
      the orderly conduct of court proceedings. On the contrary, it will
      be their duty to see that such a rule is strictly abided by. Courts of
      law are structured in such a design as to evoke respect and
      reverence to the majesty of law and justice. The machinery for
C     dispensation of justice according to law is operated by the court.
      Proceedings inside the courts are always expected to be held in a
      dignified and orderly manner. The very sight of an advocate, who
      is guilty of contempt of court or of unbecoming or unprofessional
      conduct, standing in the court would erode the dignity of the court
      and even corrode its majesty besides impairing the confidence of
D
      the public in the efficacy of the institution of the courts. The power
      to frame such rules should not be confused with the right to practise
      law. While the Bar Council can exercise control over the latter,
      the courts are in control of the former. This distinction is clearly
      brought out by the difference in language in Section 49 of the
E     Advocates Act on the one hand and Article 145 of the Constitution
      of India and Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act on the other.
      Section 49 merely empowers the Bar Council to frame rules laying
      down conditions subject to which an advocate shall have a right
      to practise i.e. do all the other acts set out above. However, Article
      145 of the Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court to
F
      make rules for regulating this practice and procedure of the court
      including inter alia rules as to persons practising before this Court.
      Similarly Section 34 of the Advocates Act empowers High Courts
      to frame rules, inter alia to lay down conditions on which an
      advocate shall be permitted to practise in courts. Article 145 of
G     the Constitution of India and Section 34 of the Advocates Act
      clearly show that there is no absolute right to an advocate to appear
      in a court. An advocate appears in a court subject to such conditions
      as are laid down by the court. It must be remembered that Section
      30 has not been brought into force, and this also shows that there
      is no absolute right to appear in a court. Even if Section 30 were
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    DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                 311
ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA [M. R. SHAH, J.]

   to be brought into force control of proceedings in court will always     A
   remain with the court. Thus even then the right to appear in court
   will be subject to complying with conditions laid down by courts
   just as practice outside courts would be subject to conditions laid
   down by Bar Council of India. There is thus no conflict or clash
   between other provisions of the Advocates Act on the one hand
                                                                            B
   and Section 34 or Article 145 of the Constitution of India on the
   other.
           35. In conclusion, it is held that lawyers have no right to go
   on strike or give a call for boycott, not even on a token strike. The
   protest, if any is required, can only be by giving press statements,
   TV interviews, carrying out of court premises banners and/or             C
   placards, wearing black or white or any colour armbands, peaceful
   protect marches outside and away from court premises, going on
   dharnas or relay fasts, etc. It is held that lawyers holding vakalats
   on behalf of their clients cannot refuse to attend courts in pursuance
   of a call for strike or boycott. All lawyers must boldly refuse to       D
   abide by any call for strike or boycott. No lawyer can be visited
   with any adverse consequences by the Association or the Council
   and no threat or coercion of any nature including that of expulsion
   can be held out. It is held that no Bar Council or Bar Association
   can permit calling of a meeting for purposes of considering a call
   for strike or boycott and requisition, if any, for such meeting must     E
   be ignored. It is held that only in the rarest of rare cases where
   the dignity, integrity and independence of the Bar and/or the Bench
   are at stake, courts may ignore (turn a blind eye) to a protest,
   abstention from work for not more than one day. It is being clarified
   that it will be for the court to decide whether or not the issue         F
   involves dignity or integrity or independence of the Bar and/or the
   Bench. Therefore in such cases the President of the Bar must
   first consult the Chief Justice or the District Judge before advocates
   decide to absent themselves from court. The decision of the Chief
   Justice or the District Judge would be final and have to be abided
   by the Bar. It is held that courts are under no obligation to adjourn    G
   matters because lawyers are on strike. On the contrary, it is the
   duty of all courts to go on with matters on their boards even in the
   absence of lawyers. In other words, courts must not be privy to
   strikes or calls for boycotts. It is held that if a lawyer, holding a
   vakalat of a client, abstains from attending court due to a strike       H
312      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 7 S.C.R.


A     call, he shall be personally liable to pay costs which shall be in
      addition to damages which he might have to pay his client for loss
      suffered by him.
             36. It is now hoped that with the above clarifications, there
      will be no strikes and/or calls for boycott. It is hoped that better
B     sense will prevail and self-restraint will be exercised. The petitions
      stand disposed of accordingly.”
      The Court also dealt with the role of Bar Councils on the following
      terms: (SCC pp. 66-68, paras 25-26)
             “25. In the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of
C     India [(1998) 4 SCC 409 : AIR 1998 SC 1895 : 1998 AIR SCW
      1706] it has been held that professional misconduct may also
      amount to contempt of court (para 21). It has further been held as
      follows: (SCC pp. 444-46, paras 79-80)
             ‘79. An advocate who is found guilty of contempt of court
D     may also, as already noticed, be guilty of professional misconduct
      in a given case but it is for the Bar Council of the State or Bar
      Council of India to punish that advocate by either debarring him
      from practice or suspending his licence, as may be warranted, in
      the facts and circumstances of each case. The learned Solicitor
E     General informed us that there have been cases where the Bar
      Council of India taking note of the contumacious and objectionable
      conduct of an advocate, had initiated disciplinary proceedings
      against him and even punished him for “professional misconduct”,
      on the basis of his having been found guilty of committing contempt
      of court. We do not entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of
F     the State or Bar Council of India, as the case may be, when
      apprised of the established contumacious conduct of an advocate
      by the High Court or by this Court, would rise to the occasion, and
      take appropriate action against such an advocate. Under Article
      144 of the Constitution “all authorities, civil and judicial, in the
G     territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court”. The Bar
      Council which performs a public duty and is charged with the
      obligation to protect the dignity of the profession and maintain
      professional standards and etiquette is also obliged to act “in aid
      of the Supreme Court”. It must, whenever facts warrant, rise to
      the occasion and discharge its duties uninfluenced by the position
H     of the contemnor advocate. It must act in accordance with the
    DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                 313
ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA [M. R. SHAH, J.]

   prescribed procedure, whenever its attention is drawn by this Court      A
   to the contumacious and unbecoming conduct of an advocate
   which has the tendency to interfere with due administration of
   justice. It is possible for the High Courts also to draw the attention
   of the Bar Council of the State to a case of professional misconduct
   of a contemnor advocate to enable the State Bar Council to proceed
                                                                            B
   in the manner prescribed by the Act and the rules framed
   thereunder. There is no justification to assume that the Bar
   Councils would not rise to the occasion, as they are equally
   responsible to uphold the dignity of the courts and the majesty of
   law and prevent any interference in the administration of justice.
   Learned counsel for the parties present before us do not dispute         C
   and rightly so that whenever a court of record records its findings
   about the conduct of an advocate while finding him guilty of
   committing contempt of court and desires or refers the matter to
   be considered by the Bar Council concerned, appropriate action
   should be initiated by the Bar Council concerned in accordance
                                                                            D
   with law with a view to maintain the dignity of the courts and to
   uphold the majesty of law and professional standards and etiquette.
   Nothing is more destructive of public confidence in the
   administration of justice than incivility, rudeness or disrespectful
   conduct on the part of a counsel towards the court or disregard
   by the court of the privileges of the Bar. In case the Bar Council,      E
   even after receiving “reference” from the Court, fails to take
   action against the advocate concerned, this Court might consider
   invoking its powers under Section 38 of the Act by sending for the
   record of the proceedings from the Bar Council and passing
   appropriate orders. Of course, the appellate powers under Section
                                                                            F
   38 would be available to this Court only and not to the High Courts.
   We, however, hope that such a situation would not arise.
            80. In a given case it may be possible, for this Court or the
   High Court, to prevent the contemnor advocate to appear before
   it till he purges himself of the contempt but that is much different
   from suspending or revoking his licence or debarring him to practise     G
   as an advocate. In a case of contemptuous, contumacious,
   unbecoming or blameworthy conduct of an Advocate-on-Record,
   this Court possesses jurisdiction, under the Supreme Court Rules
   itself, to withdraw his privilege to practise as an Advocate-on-
   Record because that privilege is conferred by this Court and the         H
314             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 7 S.C.R.


A           power to grant the privilege includes the power to revoke or
            suspend it. The withdrawal of that privilege, however, does not
            amount to suspending or revoking his licence to practise as an
            advocate in other courts or tribunals.’
      Thus a Constitution Bench of this Court has held that the Bar Councils
B     are expected to rise to the occasion as they are responsible to uphold the
      dignity of courts and majesty of law and to prevent interference in
      administration of justice. In our view it is the duty of the Bar Councils to
      ensure that there is no unprofessional and/or unbecoming conduct. This
      being their duty no Bar Council can even consider giving a call for strike
      or a call for boycott. It follows that the Bar Councils and even Bar
C     Associations can never consider or take seriously any requisition calling
      for a meeting to consider a call for a strike or a call for boycott. Such
      requisitions should be consigned to the place where they belong viz. the
      waste-paper basket. In case any Association calls for a strike or a call
      for boycott, the State Bar Council concerned and on its failure the Bar
D     Council of India must immediately take disciplinary action against the
      advocates who give a call for strike and if the committee members permit
      calling of a meeting for such purpose, against the committee members.
      Further, it is the duty of every advocate to boldly ignore a call for strike
      or boycott.
E            26. It must also be noted that courts are not powerless or helpless.
      Section 38 of the Advocates Act provides that even in disciplinary matters
      the final Appellate Authority is the Supreme Court. Thus even if the Bar
      Councils do not rise to the occasion and perform their duties by taking
      disciplinary action on a complaint from a client against an advocate for
      non-appearance by reason of a call for strike or boycott, on an appeal
F     the Supreme Court can and will. Apart from this, as set out in Ramon
      Services case [Ramon Services (P) Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor, (2001) 1
      SCC 118 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 3 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 152] every court now
      should and must mulct advocates who hold vakalats but still refrain
      from attending courts in pursuance of a strike call, with costs. Such
G     costs would be in addition to the damages which the advocate may have
      to pay for the loss suffered by his client by reason of his non-appearance.”
            Apart from reiterating the above law, we do not propose to take
      any further action. The contempt notices stand discharged.”

H
      DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                 315
  ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       6.5 While considering the issue of delay/speedy disposal, in case      A
of Krishnakant Tamrakar (supra), this Court had the occasion to
consider how uncalled for frequent strikes obstructs the access to justice
and what steps are required to remedy the situation. In the aforesaid
decision, it is observed by this Court that access to speedy justice is a
part of the fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution
                                                                              B
of India. This Court was of the opinion that one of the reasons/root
cause for delay is uncalled for strikes by the lawyers. In the aforesaid
decision, this Court also took note of 266th Law Commission Report, in
which there was a reference to the strikes by the lawyers in the Dehradun
and Haridwar districts itself. In the aforesaid decision, this Court also
took note of the recommendations made by the Law Commission. This             C
Court further observed that since the strikes are in violation of the law
laid down by this Court, the same amounts to contempt and at least the
office bearers of the Associations who give call for the strikes cannot
disown their liability for contempt. In paragraphs 41 to 50, this Court
held as under:
                                                                              D
             “41. We may also deal with another important aspect of
      speedy justice. It is well known that at some places there are
      frequent strikes, seriously obstructing access to justice. Even cases
      of persons languishing in custody are delayed on that account. By
      every strike, irreversible damage is suffered by the judicial system,
      particularly consumers of justice. They are denied access to            E
      justice. Taxpayers’ money is lost on account of judicial and public
      time being lost. Nobody is accountable for such loss and
      harassment.
           42. Dr Ambedkar in his famous speech on 25-11-1949 had
      warned: (CAD Vol. 11)                                                   F

            “The first thing in my judgment we must do is to hold fast to
      constitutional methods of achieving our social and economic
      objectives. It means we must abandon the bloody methods of
      revolution. It means that we must abandon the method of civil
      disobedience, non-cooperation and satyagraha. When there was            G
      no way left for constitutional methods for achieving economic
      and social objectives, there was a great deal of justification for
      unconstitutional methods. But where constitutional methods are
      open, there can be no justification for these unconstitutional
      methods. These methods are nothing but the Grammar of Anarchy           H
      and the sooner they are abandoned, the better for us.”
316      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 7 S.C.R.


A             43. The above warning of the Constitution-maker needs to
      be adhered to at least by the legal fraternity. The Bar has the
      tradition of placing their professional duty of assisting the access
      to justice above every other consideration. How is the situation to
      be tackled. Competent authorities may take a final call.
B            44. In Harish Uppal v. Union of India [Harish Uppal v.
      Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45] , this Court held that lawyers
      have no right to go on strike or to give a call for boycott of courts
      nor can they abstain from the courts. Calls given by Bar
      Association or Bar Council for such purpose cannot require the
      court to adjourn the matters. Strike or abstaining from court is
C     unprofessional. Even though more than 15 years have passed after
      the said judgment was rendered, the judgment of this Court is
      repeatedly flouted and no remedial measures have been adopted.
      Regulation of right of appearance in courts is within the jurisdiction
      of the courts. This Court also asked the Law Commission to
D     suggest appropriate changes in the regulatory framework for the
      legal profession [Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P., (2016) 8
      SCC 335 : (2016) 4 SCC (Civ) 1 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 476 : (2016)
      2 SCC (L&S) 390] . The Law Commission has submitted 266th
      Report [Ed.: On The Advocates Act, 1961 (Regulation of Legal
      Profession)]. The problem continues seriously affecting the rule
E     of law.
             45. In Mahipal Singh Rana [Mahipal Singh Rana v.
      State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC 335 : (2016) 4 SCC (Civ) 1 : (2016)
      3 SCC (Cri) 476 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 390] , this Court noted
      that the High Courts can frame rules to lay down conditions on
F     which advocates can be permitted to practise in courts. An
      advocate can be debarred from appearing in court even if the
      disciplinary jurisdiction for misconduct is vested with the Bar
      Councils [Mahipal Singh Rana v State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC
      335, paras 20, 30 to 35]. This Court requested the Law Commission
G     to look into all relevant aspects relating to regulation of legal
      profession [Mahipal Singh Rana v. State of U.P., (2016) 8 SCC
      335, para 58].
            46. The Law Commission, accordingly, examined the
      relevant aspects relating to regulation of the legal profession. The
H     Law Commission in its 266th Report found that such conduct of
    DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                317
ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA [M. R. SHAH, J.]

   the advocates affects functioning of courts and particularly it         A
   contributes to pendency of cases. It analysed the data on loss of
   working days on account of call of strikes. The analysis is as
   follows:
            “7.2. In the State of Uttarakhand, the information sent
      by the High Court for the years 2012-2016 shows that in              B
      Dehradun District, the advocates were on strike for 455 days
      during 2012-2016 (on an average, 91 days per year). In
      Haridwar District, 515 days (103 days a year) were wasted
      on account of strike.
            7.3. In the case of the State of Rajasthan, the High Court     C
      of Judicature at Jodhpur saw 142 days of strike during 2012-
      2016, while the figure stood at 30 for the Jaipur Bench. In
      Ajmer District Courts, strikes remained for 118 days in the
      year 2014 alone, while in Jhalawar, 146 days were lost in 2012
      on account of strike.
                                                                           D
             7.4. The case of Uttar Pradesh appears to be the worst.
      The figures of strike for the years 2011-2016 in the subordinate
      courts are alarmingly high. In the State of Uttar Pradesh, the
      District Courts have to work for 265 days in a year. The period
      of strike in five years period in worst affected districts has
      been as Muzaffarnagar (791 days), Faizabad (689 days),               E
      Sultanpur (594 days), Varanasi (547 days), Chandauli (529
      days), Ambedkar Nagar (511 days), Saharanpur (506 days)
      and Jaunpur (510 days). The average number of days of strike
      in eight worst affected districts comes to 115 days a year.
      Thus, it is evident that the courts referred to hereinabove could    F
      work on an average for 150 days only in a year.
             7.5. In this regard, the situation in subordinate courts in
      Tamil Nadu had by no means, been better. The High Court of
      Tamil Nadu has reported that there are 220 working days in a
      year for the courts in the State. During the period 2011-2016,       G
      districts like Kancheepuram, 687 days (137.4 days per year);
      Kanyakumari, 585 days (117 days per year); Madurai, 577 days
      (115.4 days per year); Cuddalore, 461 days (92.2 days per
      year); and Sivagangai, 408 days (81.6 days per year), were
      the most affected by strike called by advocates.
                                                                           H
318      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 7 S.C.R.


A               7.6. As per the responses received from the High Courts
         of Madhya Pradesh and Odisha, the picture does not emerge
         to be satisfactory.
                7.7. The Commission noted that the strike by advocates
         or their abstinence from the court were hardly for any justifiable
B        reasons. It could not find any convincing reasons for which
         the advocates resorted to strike or boycott of work in the courts.
         The reasons for strike call or abstinence from work varied
         from local, national to international issues, having no relevance
         to the working of the courts. To mention a few, bomb blast in
         Pakistan school, amendments to Sri Lanka’s Constitution, inter-
C        State river water disputes, attack on/murder of advocate,
         earthquake in Nepal, to condole the death of their near relatives,
         to show solidarity to advocates of other State Bar Associations,
         moral support to movements by social activists, heavy rains, or
         on some religious occasions such as shraadh, Agrasen Jayanti,
D        etc. or even for kavi sammelan.
                7.8. The Commission is of the view that unless there
         are compelling circumstances and the approval for a symbolic
         strike of one day is obtained from the Bar Council concerned,
         the advocates shall not resort to strike or abstention from the
E        court work.”
             47. Thereafter, the Law Commission referred to
      observations in the judgment of this Court in Harish Uppal case
      [Harish Uppal v. Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45] that there
      should be no strikes by the Bar except in rarest of rare situations
F     which should also not exceed one day. The Bar Councils were
      called upon to take appropriate action in the matter. The Law
      Commission noted that the strikes were continuing and causing
      great obstruction to the access to justice. It was observed: (Report
      No. 266)

G              “8.3. In spite of all these, the strikes have continued
         unabated. The dispensation of justice must not stop for any
         reason. The strike by lawyers have lowered the image of the
         courts in the eyes of the general public. The Supreme Court
         has held that right to speedy justice is included in Article 21 of
         the Constitution. In Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar
H
    DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                 319
ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA [M. R. SHAH, J.]

     [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC                A
     81 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] ; and in some other cases, it was held
     that the litigant has a right to speedy justice. The lawyers’
     strike, however, result in denial of these rights to the citizens in
     the State.
           8.4. Recently, the Supreme Court while disposing of the          B
     criminal appeal of Hussain v. Union of India [Hussain v.
     Union of India, (2017) 5 SCC 702 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 638]
     deprecated the practice of boycotting the Court observing that:
               ‘27. One other aspect pointed out is the obstruction
        of court proceedings by uncalled for strikes/abstaining of          C
        work by lawyers or frequent suspension of court work after
        condolence references. In view of judgment of this Court
        in Harish Uppal v. Union of India [Harish Uppal v.
        Union of India, (2003) 2 SCC 45] , such suspension of
        work or strikes is clearly illegal and it is high time that the
        legal fraternity realises its duty to the society which is the      D
        foremost. Condolence references can be once in a while
        periodically say once in two/three months and not frequently.
        Hardship faced by witnesses if their evidence is not
        recorded on the day they are summoned or impact of delay
        on undertrials in custody on account of such avoidable              E
        interruptions of court proceedings is a matter of concern
        for any responsible body of professionals and they must
        take appropriate steps. In any case, this needs attention of
        all authorities concerned—the Central Government/State
        Governments/Bar Councils/Bar Associations as well as the
        High Courts and ways and means ought to be found out to             F
        tackle this menace. Consistent with the above judgment,
        the High Courts must monitor this aspect strictly and take
        stringent measures as may be required in the interests of
        administration of justice.’
            8.5. In Ramon Services (P) Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor               G
     [Ramon Services (P) Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor, (2001) 1 SCC
     118 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 3 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 152] , the Apex
     Court observed that if any advocate claims that his right to
     strike must be without any loss to him, but the loss must only
     be borne by his innocent client, such a claim is repugnant to          H
320     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 7 S.C.R.


A        any principle of fair play and canons of ethics. Therefore, when
         he opts to strike or boycott the Court he must as well be
         prepared to bear at least the pecuniary loss suffered by the
         litigant client who entrusted his brief to that advocate with all
         confidence that his cause would be safe in the hands of that
         advocate.”
B
            48. Examining other aspects of the regulation of legal
      profession, the Law Commission recommended review of
      regulatory mechanism of the Advocates Act as follows: (Report
      No. 266)
C               “17.1. There is a dire necessity of reviewing the
         regulatory mechanism of the Advocates Act, not only in matters
         of discipline and misconduct of the advocates, but in other areas
         as well, keeping in view the wide expanse of the legal profession
         being involved in almost all areas of life. The very constitution
         of the Bar Councils and their functions also require the
D        introduction of a few provisions in order to consolidate the
         function of the Bar Councils in its internal matters as well.”
                49. Since the strikes are in violation of law laid down by
         this Court, the same amount to contempt and at least the office-
         bearers of the associations who give call for the strikes cannot
E        disown their liability for contempt. Every resolution to go on
         strike and abstain from work is per se contempt. Even if
         proceedings are not initiated individually against such
         contemnors by the court concerned or by the Bar Council
         concerned for the misconduct, it is necessary to provide for
F        some mechanism to enforce the law laid down by this Court,
         pending a legislation to remedy the situation.
                50. Accordingly, we consider it necessary, with a view
         to enforce fundamental right of speedy access to justice under
         Articles 14 and 21 and law laid by this Court, to direct the
G        Ministry of Law and Justice to present at least a quarterly
         report on strikes/abstaining from work, loss caused and action
         proposed. The matter can thereafter be considered in its
         contempt or inherent jurisdiction of this Court. The Court may,
         having regard to the fact situation, hold that the office-bearers
         of the Bar Association/Bar Council who passed the resolution
H
      DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                 321
  ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA [M. R. SHAH, J.]

          for strike or abstaining from work, are liable to be restrained     A
          from appearing before any court for a specified period or until
          such time as they purge themselves of contempt to the
          satisfaction of the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned
          based on an appropriate undertaking/conditions. They may also
          be liable to be removed from the position of office-bearers of
                                                                              B
          the Bar Association forthwith until the Chief Justice of the
          High Court concerned so permits on an appropriate undertaking
          being filed by them. This may be in addition to any other action
          that may be taken for the said illegal acts of obstructing access
          to justice. The matter may also be considered by this Court on
          receipt of a report from the High Courts in this regard. This       C
          does not debar report/petition from any other source even
          before the end of a quarter, if situation so warrants.”
       6.6 In spite of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions, this Court time and again deprecated the lawyers to go on
strikes, the strikes were continued unabated. Even in the present case,       D
the advocates have been boycotting the courts on all Saturdays, in the
entire district of Dehradun, in several parts of the district of Haridwar
and Udham Singh Nagar district of the State of Uttaranchal. Because
of such strikes, the ultimate sufferers are the litigants. From the data
mentioned in the impugned judgment and order, things are very shocking.
Every month on 3-4 Saturdays, the Advocates are on strike and abstain         E
from working, on one pretext or the other. If the lawyers would have
worked on those days, it would have been in the larger interest and it
would have achieved the ultimate goal of speedy justice, which is now
recognized as a fundamental right under Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution. It would have helped in early disposal of the criminal trials   F
and therefore it would have been in the interest of those who are
languishing in the jail and waiting for their trial to conclude. When the
Institution is facing a serious problem of arrears and delay in disposal of
cases, how the Institution as a whole can afford such four days strike in
a month.
                                                                              G
       6.7 Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the petitioner that
to go on strike/boycott courts is a fundamental right of Freedom of Speech
and Expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and it is a
mode of peaceful representation to express the grievances by the
lawyers’ community is concerned, such a right to freedom of speech
                                                                              H
322             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2020] 7 S.C.R.


A     cannot be exercised at the cost of the litigants and/or at the cost of the
      Justice Delivery System as a whole. To go on strike/boycott courts cannot
      be justified under the guise of the right to freedom of speech and
      expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Nobody has the
      right to go on strike/boycott courts. Even, such a right, if any, cannot
      affect the rights of others and more particularly, the right of Speedy
B
      Justice guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. In any
      case, all the aforesaid submissions are already considered by this Court
      earlier and more particularly in the decisions referred to hereinabove.
      Therefore, boycotting courts on every Saturday in the entire District of
      Dehradun, in several districts of Haridwar and Udham Singh Nagar
C     district in the State of Uttarakhand is not justifiable at all and as such it
      tantamounts to contempt of the courts, as observed by this Court in the
      aforesaid decisions. Therefore, the High Court is absolutely justified in
      issuing the impugned directions. We are in complete agreement with the
      view expressed by the High Court and the ultimate conclusion and the
      directions issued by the High Court. Therefore, the present Special Leave
D
      Petition deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. We further
      direct all concerned and the concerned District Bar Associations to
      comply with the directions issued by the High Court impugned in the
      present SLP in its true spirit. It is directed that if it is found that there is
      any breach of any of the directions issued by the High Court in the
E     impugned judgment and order, a serious view shall be taken and the
      consequences shall follow, including the punishment under the Contempt
      of Courts Act.
             7. As observed hereinabove, in spite of the decisions of this Court
      in the cases of Ex-Capt Harish Uppal (supra), Common Cause, A
F     Registered Society (supra) and Krishnakant Namrakar (supra) and
      despite the warnings by the courts time and again, still, in some of the
      courts, the lawyers go on strikes/are on strikes. It appears that despite
      the strong words used by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, criticizing
      the conduct on the part of the lawyers to go on strikes, it appears that
      the message has not reached. Even despite the resolution of the Bar
G     Council of India dated 29.09.2002, thereafter, no further concrete steps
      are taken even by the Bar Council of India and/or other Bar Councils of
      the States. A day has now come for the Bar Council of India and the
      Bar Councils of the States to step in and to take concrete steps. It is the
      duty of the Bar Councils to ensure that there is no unprofessional and
H     unbecoming conduct by any lawyer. As observed by this Court in the
      DISTRICT BAR ASSOCIATION, DEHRADUN THR.                                 323
  ITS SECRETARY v. ISHWAR SHANDILYA [M. R. SHAH, J.]

case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal (supra), the Bar Council of India is            A
enjoined with a duty of laying down the standards of professional conduct
and etiquette for Advocates. It is further observed that this would mean
that the Bar Council of India ensures that advocates do not behave in an
unprofessional and unbecoming manner. Section 48 of the Advocates
Act gives a right to the Bar Council of India to give directions to the
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State Bar Councils. It is further observed that the Bar Associations may
be separate bodies but all advocates who are members of such
associations are under disciplinary jurisdiction of the Bar Councils and
thus the Bar Councils can always control their conduct. Therefore, taking
a serious note of the fact that despite the aforesaid decisions of this
Court, still the lawyers/Bar Associations go on strikes, we take suo moto     C
cognizance and issue notices to the Bar Council of India and all the
State Bar Councils to suggest the further course of action and to give
concrete suggestions to deal with the problem of strikes/abstaining the
work by the lawyers. The Notices may be made returnable within six
weeks from today. The Registry is directed to issue the notices to the
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Bar Council of India and all the State Bar Councils accordingly.


Ankit Gyan                                                   SLP dismissed.


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