DR. AMI LAL BHATversusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.

                          DR. AMI LAL BHAT                                       A
                                      v.
                  STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.

                               JULY 8, 1997
                                                                                 B
          [SUJATA V. MANOHAR AND V.N. KHARE, JJ.)


        SERVICE LAW-Rajasthan Medical Services (Collegiate Branch)
Rules 1962--Appointment-Age-Cut off date for detennining maximum or
minimum age-Fixation of-Discretion of rule making authority or the
employel'-Scope of-Held, the cut off date is valid unless it is so capricious    C
or whimcial as to be wholly unreasonable-Cut off date fixed with reference
to beginning of calender year fallowing the date of application-Whether capri-
cious or unreasonable-Held, No.

       Rule B(A)--Appointmel!ts-Delay in issuing advertisement-Effect            D
of-Held, so long as advertisement is issued within a reasonable time and
there is no malafide-Action of the appointing authority in issuing the adver-
tisement cannot be challenged simply because the maximum age qualification
is fixed with reference to a fixed date.

       The a11pellants challenged fixation of a cut off date with reference to E
the calender year for determining the maximum age of a candidate who is
to be considered for direct recruitment to a service under the State.
Different Rules of service in the State of Rajasthan provided that the cut
off date for deciding the maximum age prescribed for a candidate for
appointment will be 1st date of January following the date of application. F
Some candidates challenged such a cut off date, uniformally fixed under
all the Service Rules of the State, as arbitrary or unreasonable, and liable
to be struck down. The appellant's case was that the cut off date should
only be fixed with reference to the last date of making the application in
question; that all vacancies must be advertised soon after they are G
determined and that if on the date when the vacancy occurred, the
candidates were within the maximum age prescribed by reference to the
cut off date, then if the advertisement is· delayed, their age should be
considered with reference to the cut off date of 1st January following the
date of occurrence of vacancy and corresponding age relaxation should be
given to all candidates in the case of all those persons who are adversely H
                                    543
    544                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. l S.C.R.
A affected because the advertisement for recruitment was issued later than
    the occurrence of the vacancy.

         The High Court held that the portion of rule 11 of the Rajasthan
    Medical Services (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962, which prescribed
    determination of the maximum age with reference to 1st January following
B   the last day fixed for receipt of applications, was arbitrary and
    unreasonable and struck it down.

          The present appeal had been filed against the judgment of the High
    Court. The question raised for consideration was weather a Rule-making
C   Authority can fix a cut off date with reference to the calendar year for
    determining the maximum age of a candidate who is to be considered for
    direct recruitment to a service under the State.

           Dismissing the appeals of the candidates and allowing the appeals
    filed by the State, this Court
D
           HELD : 1.1. The fixing of a cut off date for determining the maximum
    or minimum age prescribed for a post is not per se, arbitrary. Basically,
    the fixing of a cut off date for determining the maximum or minimum age
    required for a post, is in the discretion of the Rule making Authority or ·
E   the employer as the case may be. Such a cut off date cannot be fixed with
    any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship
    in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cut off date is fixed there will be some
    persons who fall on the right side of the cut off date and some persons
    who will fall on the wrong side of the cut off date. That cannot make the
    cut off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut off date is so wide off the mark
F   as to make it wholly unreasonable. [548-B-D]

         1.2. In the present case, the cut off date had been fixed by the State
  of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to
  1st of January following the year in which the applications were invited. All
  Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on
G which different departments and different heads of administration may
  issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cut off date has been
  fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year
  following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed
  under All Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective
H candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in ques-
                           AMI LAL v. STATE                            545

tion. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly A
unreasonable or arbitrary. The time gap between the advertisement and the
cut off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the
advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their
scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of
selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cut off date, therefore, B
cannot be considered as unreasonable. (549-D·G]

       1.3. The last date for receipt of applications under a given advertise·
ment undoubtedly, can be a possible cut off date, but there is no basis for
urging that this is the only reasonable cut off date. Even such a date is
liable to question in given circumstances. Making a cut off date dependent C
on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to
vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date
when each department issues an advertisement, and the date whfoh each
department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A
person who may fall on the wrong side of such a cut off date may well
contend that the cut off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have D
been issued earlier, or in the alternative that the cut off date could have
been fixed later at the point of selection or appointrhent. Such an argument
is always open, irrespective of the cut off date fixed and the manner in
which it is fixed. The cut off date is valid unless it is so capricious or
whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cut off date
can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any E
basis. The cut off date which is fixed in the present case with reference to
the beginning of the calende1' year following the date of application, cannot
be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less
prone to vagaries and is less uncertain. (550-A-C]

      1.4. While construing the validity of any given Rule, this Court cannot F
desire the reasonableness or unreasonableness of that rule by looking at
borderline cases. There is no allegation that the advertisement was
deliberately postponed to eliminate the writ petitioner or that there was any
deliberate delay in advertising the post. The delay between September and
the following January cannot be considered as unreasonable. Role 8(A) ia G
merely for the purpose of determining the actual number of vacancies occur·
ring during the financial year. It does not cast any obligation on the appoint·
ing authority to issue an advertisement within any specific time for
recruitment to such a vacancy. So Icing as such an advertisement is issued
within a reasonable time, and there is no mala fide delay, the action of the
appointing authority in issuing the advertisement cannot be challenged H
    546                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997) SUPP."1 S.C.R.

A   simply because the maximum age qualification is fixed with reference to a
    fixed date, The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public
    interest, or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special
    circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after
    referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There can-
    not be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or
B   because the vacancy occurred earlier especiallywhen there is no allegation of
    any ma/a fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This
    kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in
    determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large
    number of candidates who might be similarly situated, .but who may not
C   apply, thinking that they are age-barred.
                                         [550-G-H; 551-A-B; 551-G; H; 552-A-B]
            Union of India and another etc. v. Mis Parameswaran Match Works etc.,
    AIR (1974) S.C. 2349; A.P. Public Service Commission, Hyderabad and
    another v. B. Sharat Chandra and Ors., [1990] 2 SCC 669 and Union of India
D   andAnr. v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal, [1994] 4 sec 212, relied on.

            Surinder Singh v. 7'1:!e State of Rajasthan (1995) 1WLR197, approved.

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2691 of
    1991.

E        From the Judgment and Order dated 14.2.91 of the Rajasthan High
    Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1058 of 1988.

          S.K. Bhattacharya, Kamini Jaiswal, K.M. Bas~ L.M. Sharma, T.N.
    Singh, Aruneshwar Gupta, Manoj Swarup, Lalita Kohli, B.D. Sharma, M.S.
    Dahiya and Sushil Kr. Jain for the appearing parties.
F
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

            MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.

            Leave granted.
G         In all these appeals the common question which arises for considera-
    tion is whether a Rule-making Authority can fix a cut off date with
    reference to the calendar year for determining the maximum age of a
    candidate who is to be considered for direct recruitment to a service under
    the State. The petitions and appeals before us deal with different Rules of
H   service in the State of Rajasthan pertaining to various services under the
             AMI LAL v. STATE [SUJATA V. MANO HAR, J.]                  547

State. Some of the Rules which are under challenge before u> are the           A
Rajasthan Medical Services (Collegiate Branch) Rules. 1962. Rajasthan
Panchayat Samiti and Zila Parishad Service Rules 1959, Rajasthan Class
IV Services (Recruitment and other service conditions) Rules, 1963, and
Rajasthan Educational Subordinate Service Rules, 1971. All these Rules
provide the cut off date for deciding the maximum age prescribed for a         B
candidate for appointment will be the Ist day of January following the date
of application. The affected candidates who are before. us contend that
such a cut off date which is uniformly fixed under all the Service Rules of
the State of Rajasthan, is arbitrary or unreasonable and mus< be struck
down.
                                                                               c
       For the sake of convenience we are citing Rule 11 (1) of the Rajas-
than Medical Services (Collegiate Branch) Rules, 1962 which came up for
consideration in a writ petition filed by Dr. Rajeev Mathur before the
Rajasthan High Court. The Rajasthan High Court, held that the portion of
Rule 11 which prescribes determination of the maximum age with refer-
ence to Ist of January following the last date fixed for receipt of applica-   D
tions, was arbitrary and unreasonable and struck it down. The appeal
before us from this judgment and order is Civil appeal No. 2691/91 which
is filed by the candidate who was 2nd in the order of merit for that
particular selection. Rule 11 (1) provides as follows:-

        "11 (1) : A candidate for direct recruitment to a Juior post
                                                                               E
        enumerated in part C of the Schedule must not have attained the
        age of 35 years on the first day of January following the last date
        fixed for receipt of applications.

                                                                               F
        Provided

        (1) That the upper age limit mentioned in Sub-rule (1) and (2)
        above, may be relaxed by 5 years in exceptional cases by Govem
        ment in consultation with the Commission.''                            G
The High Court held that the words "the first day of January following" in
Rule 11 (1) must be deleted.

      Is such a cut off date fixed by the Rules applicable to the relevant
service, arbitrary? It has been urged before us by the petitioners and/or      H
    548                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A   appellants that the cut off date of 1st of January following the last date
    fixed for receipt of applications is arbitrary. The cut off date should only
    be fixed with reference to the last date of making the application in
    question. It is submitted before us that· the date of 1st of January has no
    nexus with the application in question and, therefore, must be struck down.

B        This contention. in our view. is not sustainable. In the first place the
  fixing of a cut off date for determining the maximum or minimum age
  prescribed for a post in not per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut
  off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post,
  is in the discretion of the Rule making Authority or the employer as the
C case may be. One must accept that such a cut off date cannot be fixed with
  any inathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship
  in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cut off date is fixed there will be
  some persons who fall on the right side of the cut off date and some
  persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cut off date. That cannot
  make the cut off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut off date is so wide
D off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed
  by this Court in Union of Indian and another etc. v. M/s. Parameswaran
  Match Works etc., AIR (1974) S.C. 2349 and has been reiterated in sub-
  sequent cases. In the case of A.P. Public Service Commission, Hyderabad
  and another v. B. Sharat Chandra and Ors. (1990) 2 SCC 669, the relevant
E service rule stipulated that the candidate should not have completed the
   age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is
   made. Such a cut off date was challenged. This Court considered the
   various steps required in the process of selection and said, "when such are
   the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum
   age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend
F upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed
   and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible
   on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage
   for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must,
   therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates
   to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinize the applications''. This
G Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum
   or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to
   the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that
   such a cut off date should be with reference to a fixed date. Therefore, fixing
   an independent cut off date, far from being arbitrary, makes for certainty in
H determining the maximum age.
              AMI LAL v. STATE[SUJATAV.MANOHAR,J.]                       549

         In the case of Union of Indian and Anr. v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal,       A
  (1994] 4 sec 212, the date for determining the age of eligibility was fixed
  at Ist of August of the year in which the examination was to be held. At
  the time when this cut off date was fixed, there used to be only one
  examination for recruitment. Later on, a preliminary examination was also
  introduced.Yet the cut off date was not modified. The Tribunal held that      B
. after the introduction of the preliminary examination the cut off date had
  become arbitrary. Negativing this view of the Tribunal and allowing the
  appeal, this Court cited with approval the decision of this Court in
  Panneshwar Match Works case (supra) and said that fixing of the cut off
  date can be considered as arbitrary only if it can be looked upon as so
  capricious or whimsical as to invite judicial interference. Unless the date   C
  is grossly unreasonable, the court would be reluctant to strike down such
  a cut off date.

        In the present case, the cut off date has been fixed by the State of
 Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the D
1st of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All
Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates 011
which different departments and different heads of administration may
 issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cut off date has been
fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year
following. This is to make for .certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed E
 under All Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective
candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in
question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as
grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The time gap between the advertisement
and the cut off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that F
after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications,
for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel
of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cut off date,
therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however,
strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut off date is the last
date for receipt of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, G
this can be a possible cut off date. But there is 'no basis for urging that this
is the only reasonable cut off date, Even Such a date is liable to question
in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cut off date dependent
on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries
of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each H
    550                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. lS.C.R.

A department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department
    concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who
    may fall on the wrong side of such a cut off date may well contend that the
    cut off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued
    earlier: Or in the alternative that the cut off date could have been fixed
B   later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always
    open, irrespective of the cut off date fixed and the manner in which it is
    fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameshwaran Match
    Works (supra) and later cases that the cut off date is valid unless it is so
    capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreason'able. To say that the only'
    cut off date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be
C   without any basis. In our view the cut off date which is fixed in the present
    case with reference to the beginning of the Calendar year following the
    date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable.
    On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain.

D         Learned advocate for Dr. Rajeev Mathur in Civil Appeal No. 2691/91
    drew our attention to Rule 8 (A) of the Rajasthan Medical (Collegiate
    Branch) Rules, 1962. Under Rule 8 (A) as originally framed the appointing
    authority was required to determine each year the number of vacancies
    anticipated during the following 12 months and the number of persons
    likely to be recruited by each method. This rule was amended at the
E   material time under a notification dated 21st of February, 1981. Under the
    amended rule 8 (A) the appointing authority shall determine on 1st April
    every year the actual number of vacancies occurring during the financial
    year. He contended that in the light of this rule all vacancies must be
    advertised soon after they are determined. In the case in question, the
F   vacancy had occurred in September, 1987. It was, however, advertised only
    in January, 1988. Dr. Rajeev Mathur became over aged on 1st of January
    of the following year. It was submitted that had the vacancy been advertised
    in 1987. the cut off date would have been the 1st of January 1988, and Dr.
    Rajeev Mathur would have been eligible.

G       In the first place, while construing the validity of any given Rule, we
  cannot decide the reasonableness or unreasonableness of that rule by
  looking at borderline cases. There is no allegation that the advertisement
  was deliberately postponed to eliminate Dr. Rajeev Mathur or that there
  was any deliberate delay in advertising the post. The delay between
H September and the following January cannot be considered as
               AMI LAL v. STATE(SUJATAV.MANOHAR,J.]                      551

  unreasonable. Rule 8 (A) is merely for the purpose of determining the A
  actual number of vacancies occurring during the financial year. It does not
  cast any obligation on the appointing authority to issue an advertisement
 within any specific time for recruitment to such a vacancy. So long as such
  an advertisement is issued within a reasonable time, and there is no ma/a
 fide delay, the action of the appointing authority in issuing the B
  advertisement cannot be challenged simply because the maximum age
  qualification is fixed with reference to a fixed date.

        It is next contended on behalf of the appellants/petitioners that undeY
 all the concerned service rules there is a provision for age relaxation. In
 Rule 11 (A) of the Rajasthan Medical Services (Collegiate Branch) Rules, C
 there is a provision for age relaxation by 5 years by the Government in
 consultation with the Commission. There is also Rule 35 in the said Rules
 which gives a general power to relax rules in exceptional cases where the
 Government is satisfied that it is necessary, inter alia, to relax any provision
 of these Rules with respect to age or experience of any person and this can D
 be done with the concurrence of the Department of Personnel and
 Administrative Reforms and in consultation with the Rajasthan Public
 Service Commission. It is urged that in the case of all those persons who
 are adversely affected because the advertisement for recruitment is issued
 later than the occurrence of the vacancy, corresponding age relaxation
 should be given to all candidates. In other words, what is contended is that E
 if on the date when the vacancy occurred, the candidates were within the
 maximum age prescribed by reference to the cut off date, then if the
 advertisement is delayed, their age should be considered with reference to
 the cut off date of 1st January following the date of occurrence of vacancy.
 For example, if the vacancy has occurred on 1st of April of a given year, F
 and the applicant would be within the maximum age on the 1st of January
 of the following year, then such a candidate will be considered as eligible
 even if the advertisement is issued not in April of that year but say February
 of the following year. All the candidates will get age relaxation of one year.

         In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule G
  for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised
  in public interest in a given case: as for example, if other suitable
, candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is
. suitable has crossed the maximum age limit; or to mitigate hardship in a
  given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to H
    552                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan
    Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation
    because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred
    earlier especially when there is no allegation of any ma/a fides in
    connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power
    of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the
B   maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of
    candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply, thinking
    that they are age barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can
    be exercised in the manner contended.

C         In the premises we do not see any reason to set aside the cut off date
    fixed by the relevant rules. The judgments of the Division Benches of the
    Rajasthan High Court in so far as they strike down 1st of January of the
    following year as the cut off date for determining the maximum age of a
    candidate for selection, require to be set aside.

D         Of the various judgments of the Rajasthan High Court which are
    before us, it is necessary to note that a Division Bench of the Rajasthan
    High Court, differing from the view taken by the earlier Division Benches
    referred this question to a Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the
    case of Surinder Singh v. The State of Rajasthan, (1995) 1 WLR 197. The
E   Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court overruled the earlier judgments
    of the two Division Benches of the Rajasthan High Court and upheld the
    relevant service Rules. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the
    Full Bench of the Rajasthan High Court.

          It was however, pointed out to us by the third respondent (Dr. Rajeev
F Mathur) in C.A. No. 2691/1991 that from the decision of the Division
    Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in his own case (Dr. Rajeev Mathur v.
    The State of Rajasthan,) the Rajasthan Public Service Commission filed a
    Special Leave Petition before this Court being Special Leave Petition No.
    6931 of or 1991. In the Special Leave Petition, on 30th of April, 1991 this
G   Court passed the following order:

                "We express no views on the question of law raised but on facts
             found we decline to interfere. The Special Leave Petition is dis-
             missed."
                                                                                   [
H         It is contended by Dr. Mathur that in view of the dismissal of the
              AMILAL v. STAIB[SUJATAV.MANOHAR,J.]                         553
 Special Leave Petition filed by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission, A
  the decision of the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case
  of Dr. Rajeev Mathur v. The State of Rajasthan has become final and cannot
 be set aside. Hence the appointment of Dr. Rajeev Mathur cannot now be
 challenged. Dr. Rajeev Mathur was over age on the 1st of January of the
 year following the date of application. And his application was rejected by B
 the Rajasthan Public Service Commission on the ground that he was over
 age. Immediately he preferred a writ petition before the Rajasthan High
 Court. In the writ petition he averred that his case was being considered
 by the Government of Rajasthan for age relaxation. The High Court, under
 an interim order, directed the Rajasthan Public Service Commission to
 consider his application and interview Dr. Rajeev Mathur. Accordingly he C
 was interviewed. His application for a relaxation has been rejected by the
 Rajasthan Public Service Commission as well as by the State. But in view
 of his being interviewed, his case was considered and he was selected. His
 position was 1st in the merit list. The High Court has directed that he
should be appointed. Does the dismissal of special leave petition filed by D
 the Rajasthan Public Service Commission against this decision makes this
decision final as far as Dr. Mathur is concerned? In the order dismissing
 the special leave petition this Court has left the question of law open. But
what is more relevant, the candidate who was second in the merit list in
 that case also thereafter filed a special leave petition before this Court from E
 the same judgment. He was granted leave and his appeal is numbered as
 C.A. 2691/1991. This appeal, which is before us, directly challenges the
appointment of Dr. Rajeev Mathur and the High Court judgment under
which he is appointed. If Dr. Rajeev Mathur is not eligible, then the
appellant in this appeal is entitled to be appointed to that post. Therefore,
at the instance of the Rajasthan Public Service Commission this Court was F
not inclined to examine the merits of the individual case before it; though
it left the question of law open. But when the affected candidate came up
before this Court asking for special leave to appeal against the same
judgment of the Division Bench, leave was granted and the appeal has been
entertained. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that the decision of the G
Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Dr. Rajeev
Mathur v. The State of Rajasthan is final on the facts of that case and the
appointment of Dr. Rajeev Mathur cannot be challenged. This
appointment is directly under challenge in C.A.No. 2691/1991 which
requires to be considered and decided on merit. Therefore, we do not see H
    554                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1997] SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A any reason to make any exception in the case of Dr. Rajeev Mathur.                -
          Lastly, in the appeal arising from Special Leave Petition No. 10659
    of 1995, the respondent contended that he was in fact not over age on the
    cut off date which was, in that case 1st of January, 1992. This contention
    was raised on a wrong reading of the date of birth. It is now accepted by
B   the parties that the correct date of birth of the petitioner in that case was
    1st of January, 1959 and not 19th. January 1959 as originally urged. The
    petitioner would, therefore, complete 33 years of age which was the
    maximum age prescribed in the concerned advertisement, on 1st of
    January, 1992, the cut off date. His case, therefore, is not different from
C   the case of other aggrieved candidates before us who are age barred on
    the cut off date.

         In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged          •
  the cut off date under the relevant Rules are dismissed while the appeals
  filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the concerned
D Rules relating to the cut off date being fixed with reference to 1st of
  January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no
  order as to costs.

    R.A.                                          Candidates appeals dismissed
                                                       States appeals allowed.