Holding

A promise that is contrary to law cannot be enforced under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.

Summary

Dr. Ashok Kumar Maheshwari, a Demonstrator in the Pharmacy Department of a Government Medical College, filed a writ petition with five colleagues seeking that at least fifty percent of Lecturer posts be filled by promotion of Demonstrators, relying on an alleged promise by the Uttar Pradesh State Government and the Director of Medical Education & Training. The High Court dismissed the petition, holding that no statutory rule or executive instruction provided for such promotion and that no specific promise could be proved. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel could be invoked to enforce a promise that is contrary to law. The Court reiterated that promissory estoppel requires a clear promise that induces a party to alter its position and that the doctrine cannot be used to defeat a statutory scheme. Since the promotion of Demonstrators to Lecturer posts is not authorized by any statute or rule, any alleged promise is unenforceable. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked to enforce a promise made by the State Government to promote Demonstrators to Lecturer posts when such promotion is not provided for by law.
Whether the appellant established a clear promise and a detrimental reliance sufficient to attract promissory estoppel.

Legislation cited

Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 115

Subjects

promissory estoppeladministrative lawpublic service recruitmentgovernment promisestatutory interpretationestoppelcivil service promotionequity

Judgment

I

~

DR. ASHOK KUMAR MAHESHWARI A
v.
STATE OF U.P. AND ANR.

JANUARY 14, 1998

[S. SAGHJR AHMAD AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.] B

Administrative Law :
-(

Promissory Estoppel-Rule-Invoking of-Held: It has to be shown
that there was a declaration or promise made which induced the party to C
whom the promise was made to alter its position to its disadvantage.

Promissory Estoppel-Doctrine-Bar against invoking of-The
prescribed mode of recruitment to the post of Lecturer in the Pharmacy
Department of Government Medical College was by direct recruitment only D
and not by promotion-Promise allegedly made to Demonstrators by State
Government or Director, Medical Education & Training to promote them to
posts of lecturers-Validity of -Held: Rule of Promissory Estoppel cannot
be invoked to enforce a promise made contrary to law-Hence, the said
''promise" not enforceable against the State or the Director-In the facts and
circumstances of the case, no case made out for invoking the said doctrine. E
Doctrines:

Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel-Essence of-Stated-Case law
reviewed.
F
Evidence Act, I973: Section JJ5

Estoppel and Promissory Estoppel-Rule-Invoking of-Held: Even
a
though case does not fall under S. 115 the rule can be invoked.

Words and phrases:
G
"Promissory Estoppel"-Meaning of

The appellant was a Demonstrator in the Pharmacy Department of the
. Government Medical College. The appellant and five of his other colleagues
filed a writ petition in the High Court for a direction to ,the respondent to H
147
148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R.

A fill up at least fifty per cent of the posts of Lecturers in Pharmacy by
promotion of Demonstrators. It was claimed that the respondents, namely, the
State Government and the Director, Medical Education and Training, assured
the appellant and his colleagues that they would be promoted to the posts of
Lecturer.

B The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that neither there
--'--
were any statutory rules nor were there any executive instructions issued
by the Government that fifty per cent posts of Lecturers in the Pharmacy
Department would be filled up by promotion of Demonstrators. The High
Court further held that none of the respondents had promised that the
C appellant or any of his colleagues would be promoted as Lecturers. Hence
this appeal.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the Government having
itself assured the appellant and his other colleagues that they would be
promoted as Lecturers, the Government was bound by its promise and,
D therefore, ought to have issued a notification that the posts of Lecturers ~
would be filled up by promotion; and that the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel
was applicable to this case.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court

E HELD: 1.1. The Doctrine of"Promissory Estoppef' has been evolved
by the courts, on the principles of equity to avoid injustice. 1153-B]

1.2. The definition of "Estopel" and Promissory Estoppel in Black's
Law Dictionary which are based on decided cases, indicate that before the
p rule of "promissory Estoppel" can be invoked, it has to be shown that there
was a declaration or promise made which induced the party to whom the J.... •
promise was made to alter its position to its position to its disadvantage.
(153 8-E]

Black's Law Dictionary, referred to.
G
2. Even though the case would not fall within the terms of Section 115
of the Evidence Act, 1872 which enacts the Rule of Estoppel, it would still
be open to a party who had acted on a representation made by the Government
to claim that the Government should be bound to carry out the promise made
H by it even though the promise was not recorded in the form of a formal
DR. A.K. MAHESHWARI v. STATE 149
contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution.1154-F-G] A
Union of India v. Inda-Afghan Agencies, AIR (1968) SC 718, Century
Spinning Co. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council. AIR (1971) SC 1021 and
Radhakrishna v. State of Bihar, AIR (1977) SC 1496, relied.on.

3. In order .to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel it is not B
----;... necessary for the promisee to show that he suffered detriment as a result
of acting in reliance on the promise. The detriment in ~uch a case is not
some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise, but t!Je
prejudice, which would be caused to the.promisee, if the promisor were
allowed to go b!lck on the promise. 1155-B-CI
c
Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. ltd. v. State of UP., I1979] 2 SCR
641, relied on.

Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., 11985] 4 SCC 369; Delhi
Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR (1987) SC 2414; Kasinka
Trading v. Union of India, [1995] l SCC 274; Darshan Oil (P) Ltd. v. Union D
of India, [1995] 1 SCC 345; Shabi Construction Co. v. City & Industrial
Development Corporation, [1995] 4 SCC 301; Shrijee Sales Corporation v.
Union ofIndia, [1997] 3 SCC 398; Pawan Alloys & Castings (P) Ltd. v. UP.
State Electricity Board, [1997] 7 SCC 251; referred to Grundt v. The Great
Boulder Pty. Gold Mines Ltd. v. High Trees House ltd., (1947) KB 130 and E
Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd. v. Unity Finance ltd., (1956) 3 All ER
905, referred to.

4. Even if it is accepted that the State Government or the Director,
Medical Education & Training, assured the appellant or any of his colleagues

... _,.,;
that they would be promoted to the posts of Lecturer, such a 'promise' cannot
be enforced against the respondents as the avenue of promotion for
F

Demonstrators to the post of Lecturers was not provided either under the
Statute or any executive instruction. Moreover, if the post of Lecturer were
filled up by promotion of Demonstrator, it would defeat the existing mode of
recruitment, namely, that it can be filled up by direct recruitment only and
not by promotion . It may also be stated that the appellant did not make any G
clear, sound and positive averment as to which offi..:er of the Government,
when and in what manner gave the assurance to the appellant or any of his
colleagues that they would be promoted as Lecturers. It was also not stated
tha't the appellant had, at any time, acting upon the promise, altered his
position, in any manner, especially to his detriment. Bald plea~ings cannot H
r

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1998] 1 S.C.R.

A be made the foundation for invoking the Doctrine of Promissory Estopel. The
basic principle is that the plea of estoppel cannot be raised to defeat the
provisions of Statute. The rule of "Promissory Estoppel" cannot be invoked
to enforce a "Promise" made contrary to law .
•
G.H.C. Ariff v. Jadunath Majumdar Bahadur, AIR (1931) PC 78; Mis.
B Mathra Parshad & Sons v. State of Punjab, AIR (1962) SC 745; Bishabh
Kumar v. State of UP., AIR (1987) SC 1576, R.C.D' Souza, AIR (1987) SC ""·-
1172; Kasinka Trading & Anr. v. Union of India, 119951 1 SCC 274 and
Shabi Construction Co. Ltd. v. City & Industrial Development Corporation
& Anr., 119951 SCC 301, relied on. 1156 B-E; 155 E-FJ
c CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 25of1991.

From the Judgment and Order dated 1.1.90 of the Allahabad High Court
inC.M.W.P.No.17049of1987.

Ms. Sandhya Goswami and P.K. Chakraborty for the Appellant.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J. "Magnificent promises are always to be
suspected" is an adage which was forgotten by ·the appellant and his
colleagues who not only belie·•ed such a promise but approached the Court·
E for its enforcement in writ proceedings which have since reached this Court
requiring us to decide whether the doctrine of "Promissory Estoppel" can be
invoked for the enforcement of a "promise" made contrary to law.

The appellant is a Demonstrator in the Pharmacy Department of S.N.
Medical College, Agra where he was appointed on 11.01.73 and his services
F on that post were regularised on 28.6.76.

The appellant and five of his other colleagues, working as Demonstrators
in various Government Medical Colleges in U.P., filed a Writ Petition in the
Allahabad High Court that the State Government as also the Director, Medical
G Education and Training, may be directed not to fill the posts of Lecturers in
Pharmacy by direct recruitment and the same may be filled up, at least to the
extent of fifty per cent, by promotion of Demonstrators working in the
Department as is done in other Departments where posts of Readers are filled
up, to the extent of fifty per cent by promoting the Lecturers, while the posts
of Professors are filled up, to that extent, by promoting the Readers. It was
H pleaded before the High Court that the Government, by its Order dated 31. J. 77
DR. A.K. MAHESHWARI v. STATE [S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J.] 151

and 23.12.77, had provided, in respect of all posts of Readers and Professors A
.--<.. in the Government Medical Colleges, that they shall be filled up by direct
recruitment to the extent of fifty per cent, and remaining fifty per cent would
be filled up by promotion from amongst persons working as Lecturers in the
Department provided they are qualified for the post. It was contended that
the Government has not made bay provision for filling up the posts of
Lecturers in the Department of Pharmacy by promotion from amongst the
B
'?'-- Demonstrators and that the Government had not passed any specific_ order
to that effect although such an order should have been passed particularly
in view of the fact that in all other Government services, avenue of promotion
has been provided for. It was also claimed that the Government, by its Order
dated 24.6.86 had made provision for time-bound promotions of the teachers c
of Government Medical Colleges as it was provided that a Lecturer, on
completing a particular period of service, would become entitled to the scale
of pay admissible for Readers and Readers would become entitled to be paid
salary in the pay scale applicable to Professors. It was claimed that these
benefits should also be made applicable to the persons working as
Demonstrators in the Various Government Medical Colleges and they should D
also be provided an avenue of promotion by providing, as is done in the other
Departments, that the post of Lecturer in the Department of Pharmacy would
be filled up, to the extent of fifty per cent, by promotion from amongst the
Demonstrators.

It was also claimed that in 1980 \vhen 4 posts of Lecturers were filled
E
up by the respondents, namely the State Government and the Director, Medical
Education and Training, by direct recruitment, the appellant and his Other
colleagues made representations to the Director, and it was on this
representation that the respondents assured them that the remaining posts
would be filled up by promotion. It was for this reason that a seniority list F
F ...
.of Demonstrators, working in the Phamiacy Department of various Government
Medical Colleges, was drawn up. Since th~ State Government did not, thereafter,
::l issue any instruction or order for pronwtion of Demonstrators to the posts
of Lecturers in the Pharmacy Department, the petitioner filed the Writ petition
in the High Court which, by the impugned judgment dated January I, 1990
was dismissed with the findings that there were neither any statutory rules G
nor were any executive instructions ever issued by the Government that fifty
~ per cent posts of Lecturers in the Pharmacy Department in various Government
Medical Colleges would be filled up by promotion of Demonstrators, working
therein, and that the case that any of the respondent had promised that
petitioner or any of his colleague would be promoted as Lecturer was not H
152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1998] I S.C.R.

A made out.
Learned counsel for the appellant has raised, as was done in the High
Court, the plea of Promissory Estoppel before us and has contended that the
Government having itself assured the appellant and his other colleagues that
they would be promoted as Lecturers and having itself taken steps to prepare
B the seniority list of Demonstrators, working in various Government Medical
Colleges, was bound by its promise and, therefore, ought to have issued the
necessary notification that the posts of Lecturers in the Department of Pharmacy
would be filled up by promotion of Demonstrators. Since this was not done
the High Court should itself have commanded the Government to issue such
C a notification so that the promise, which was made to the appellant, was
fulfilled. It is contended that the Government had already issued such
Notification in respect of the posts of Professors and Readers by providing
that they would be filled up, to the extent of fifty per cent, by promotion of
Readers and Lecturers and, therefore, in respect of the Department of Pharmacy;
the same policy should have been adopted.
D ~
It is not disputed that the posts of Lecturers in the Department of
Pharmacy as also in other Departments of the Medical Colleges are filed up
by direct recruitment. It is also not disputed that so far as Demonstrators are
concerned, there are no rules, statutory or otherwise, which provide that they
E would be promoted to the posts of Lecturers. The High Court has also
considered this aspect of the matter and has recorded a finding that medical
education in Government Medical Colleges is a three-tier system consisting
of the posts of Professors, Readers and Lecturers. While these posts were,
earlier, filled up by direct recruitment by the two Government Notifications,
issued in 1977, it was provided that the posts of Professors and Readers
F would be filled up, to the extent of fifty per cent, by promotion of Readers ....,.
and Lecturers and the remaining fifty per cent would be filled up by direct
recruitment. The scheme of personal promotion was also introduced under
which a Lecturer or Reader w.ho had put in service for a specified period, was
r
to be automatically promoted to the next higher grade available to the Readers
or Professors, as the case may be. No such provision was made for the
G promotion of Demonstrators not was the scheme of personal promotion made
applicable to them. The High Co(fff has also found it as a fact that the
respondents, or any of them, had not given any assurance to the appellant
or other Demonstrators that they would be promoted to the posts of Lecturers.
In view of these findings, which are findings, of fact, we need not enter into
H the factual dispute once again.
DR. A.K. MAHESHWARI v. STATE [S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J.] 153

Assuming, however, that any such assurance was given to the appellant A
either by the State Government or by the Director that the appellant or any
of this colleague who had joined him in filing the Writ Petition, would be
promoted as Lecturers, let us examine whether the Rule of Promissory Estoppel
could be invoked in the particular circumstances of the case.

Doctrine of "Promissory Estoppel" has been evolved by the courts, on B
the principles of equity, to avoid injustice.

"Estoppel" in Black's Law Dictionary, is indicated to mean that a party
is prevented by his own acts from claiming a right to the detriment of other
party who was entitled to rely on such conduct and has acted accordingly.
Section 115 of!he Indian Evidence Act is also, more or less, couched in a C
language which conveys the same expression.

"Promissory Estoppel" is defined as in Black's Law Dictionary as "an
estoppel which arises when there is a promise which promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial D
character on the part of promisee, and which does induce such action or
forbearance, and such promise is binding if injustice can be avoide<!._only by
enforcement of promise."

These definitions in Black's Law Dictionary which are based on decided
cases, indicate th.e before the Rule of "Promissory Estoppel" can be invoked, E
it has to be shown· that there was a declaration or promise made which
induced the party to whom the promise was made to alter its position to its
disadvantage.

In this backdrop, let us travel a little distance into the past to understand
the evolution of the Doctrine of "Promissory Estoppel." F
• -+ Dixon, J., an Australian jurist, in Grundt v. The Great Boulder Pty. Gold
Mines Ltd., (1938) 59 CLR 641, laid down as under:-

"It is often said simply that he party asserting the estoppel must have
been induced to act to his detriment. Although substantially such a G
statement is correct and leads to misunderstanding, it does not bring
out Clearly the basal purpose of the doctrine, That purpose is to
·--..,: avoid or prevent a detriment to the party asserting the estoppel by
compelling the opposite party to adhere to the assumption upon
which the former acted or abstained from acting. This means that the
real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to given protection H

I
154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] l S.C.R.

A is that which would flow from the change of position if the assumption
were deserted that led to it."

The principle, set out above, was reiterated by Lord Denning in Central
London Properties Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. 1947 KB 130, when he stated
as under :-
B
"A promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted upon, ~
and in fact acted upon is binding .... "

Lord Denning approved the decision of Dixon, J. (supra) in Central
Newbury Car Auctions Ltd. v. Unity Finance Ltd., (1956) 3 ALL ER 905. Apart
C from propounding the above principle 0n judicial side, Lord Denning wrote
out an article, a classic in legal literature, on "Recent Developments in the
Doctrine of Consideration", Modem Law Review, Vol. 15, in which he expressed
as under :-

"A man should keep his word. All the more so when the promises
D is not a bare promise but is made with the intention that the other
party should act upon it. Just a contract is different from tort and from
estoppel, so also in the sphere now under discussion promises may
give rise to a different equity from other conduct.

The difference may lie in the necessity of showing "detriment".
E . Where one party deliberately promises to waive, modify or discharge
his strict legal rights, intending the other party to act on the faith of
promise, and t~e other party actually does act on it, then it is contrary,
not only to equity but also to good faith, to allow the promisor to go
back on his promise. It should not be necessary for the other party
to show that he acted to his detriment in reliance on the promise. It
F should be sufficient that he acted on it."

So far as this Court is concerned, it invoked the doctrine in Union of
India v. Inda-Afghan Agencies & Ors., AIR (1968) SC 718 =, [ 1968] 2 SCR 366,
in which it was, inter alia, laid down that even though the case would not fall
G within the terms of Section 115 of the Evidence Act which enacts the Rule
of Estoppel, it would still be open to a party who had acted on a representation
made by the Government to claim that the Government should be bound to
carry out the promise made by it even though the promise was not recorded
in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution.
To the same effect are the decisions in Century Spinning Co. v. Ulhasnagar
H Municipal Council, AIR (1971) SC 1021 and Radhakrishna v. State o/Bihar,
DR. A.K. MAHESHWARI v. STATE (S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J.] 155
AIR (1977) SC 1496. A
In Moti/al Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P, [1979] 2 SCR
641 = [1979] 2 SCC 409 =AIR (1979) SC 621, while reiterating the above
principles and quoting with approval the passage of Dixon, J., extracted
above, it was observed as under :-
B
"We do not think that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory
estoppel it is necessary for the promisee to show that he suffered
detriment as a result of acting in reliance on the promise. But we may
make it clear that if by detriment we mean injustice to the promisee
which could result if the promisor were to recede from his promise
then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient, The C
detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee
by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused
to the promisee, if the promisor were allowed to go back on the
promise."
D
·./ Thereafter, in successive cases, as for example, Union ofIndia v. Godfrey
Philips India Ltd., [1985] 4 SCC 369 = [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 123 =AIR (1986)
SC 806; Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR (1987) SC
2414; Kasinka Trading & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., [1995] I SCC 274;
Darshan Oil (P) Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., [1995] 1 SCC 345; Shabi
Construction Co. Ltd. v. City & Industrial Development Corporation & Anr., E
[1995] 4 sec 301; Shrijee Sales Corporation V. U.0.1. [1997] 3 sec 398;
Pawan Al/ovs & Castings (P) Ltd. v. UP. State Electricity Board, [1997] 7
SCC 251, the Rule of "Promissory Estoppel" ·was discussed, explained and
elaborated.

There are many aspects of "Promissory Estoppel", but in the instant F
. ·:{ case we are concerned only with one aspect which is to the effect that if any
"promise" has been made contrary to law, can it still be enforced by invoking
this rule.

The basic principle is that the plea of estoppel cannot be raised to G
defeat the provisions of a Statute. (See: G.H.C. Ariffv. Jadunath Majumdar
Bahadur, AIR ( 1931) PC 79; Mf.s Mathra Parshad & Sons v. State of Punjab
& Ors., AIR (1962) SC 745; Rishabh Kumar v. State ofU.P., AIR (1987) SC
1576 = [1987] (Supp.) sec 306.

This principle was reiterated in Union of India v. R.C. D'Souza, AIR H
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] 1 S.C.R.

A (1987) SC 1172 = [ 1987] 2 SCC 211, where a retired anny officer was recruited
as Assistant Commandant on temporary basis and was called upon to exercise (<
his option for regularisation contrary to the statutory rules. It was held that .
it would not amount to estoppel against the Department.

Whether a Promissory Estoppel, which is based on a 'promise' contrary
B to law can be invoked has already been considered by this Court in Kasinka
Trading & Anr. v. Union ofIndia & Ors., (1995] l SCC 274, as also in Shabi ~
Construction Co. Ltd v. City & Industrial Development Corporation &
Anr., [ 1995] 4 SCC 30 l wherein it is laid down that.the Rule of "Promissory
Estoppel" cannot Le invoked for the enforcement of a 'promise' or a
C 'declaration' which is contrary to law or outside the authority or power of the
Government or the person making that promise.

Applying the above principles to the instant case, even if it is accepted
that the State Government or the Director, Medical Education & Training,
assured the appellant or any of his colleagues that they would be promoted
_D to the posts of Lecturer, such a ' promise' cannot be enforced against the
respondents as the avenue of promotion for Demonstrators to the post of
Lecturers was not provided either under the Statute or any executive
instruction. Moreover, if the post of Lecturer was filled up by promotion of I
Demonstrator, it would defeat the existing mode of recruitment, namely, that
it can be filled up by direct recruitment only and not by promotion. It may 1

E aho be stated that the appellant did not make any clear, sound and positive
averment as to which officer of the Government, when and in what manner
gave ·the assurance to the appellant or any of his colleague that they would
be promoted as Lecturers. It was also not stated that the appellant had, at
any time, acting upon the promise, altered his position, in any manner, specially
F to his detriment. Bald Pleadings cannot be made the foundation for invoking
the Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel.

The appeal being without merits has to be dismissed reminding the
appellant that a mind, conscious of integrity, scorns to say more than it means
to perform and the Government and Director were not of that material. No
costs.

v.s.s. Appeal dismissed.