Holding

The rescinding order was valid, no hearing was required, and the order did not cast any stigma on the appellant.

Summary

Dr. J. Shashidhara Prasad was appointed Vice Chancellor of Mysore University on 20 August 1997, effective 4 September 1997, by the Governor (Chancellor) under Section 11 of the Karnataka State Universities Act, 1976. The next day the Chancellor learned of a pending criminal case against the appointee and rescinded the appointment without giving him a hearing, stating it was not desirable to appoint him. The appellant challenged the rescission, alleging a violation of natural justice and that the order stigmatized him. The Supreme Court held that no vested right had arisen and that the Chancellor could validly cancel the appointment without a prior hearing, and that the order did not cast any stigma. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The Chancellor was required to afford the appellant an opportunity of hearing before rescinding his appointment.
Whether the rescinding order stigmatized the appellant, invoking principles of natural justice.
Whether a pending criminal case justified cancellation of the appointment before it became effective.
Whether the appellant had any vested right to the appointment that necessitated a hearing before cancellation.

Subjects

service lawnatural justiceappointment cancellationvice chancellorKarnataka State Universities Acthearing requirementstigmaadministrative law

Judgment

DR. J. SHASHIDHARA PRASAD A
v.
GOVERNOR OF KARNATAKA AND ANR.

NOVEMBER 27, 1998

[M. SRINIVASAN AND A.P. MISRA, JJ.] B

- Service Law:

Mysore University-Vice Chancel/or-Appointment-Appel/ant
appointed on 20.8.1997 as Vice Chancel/or w.e.f 4.9.1997-0n 21.8.1997 C
order dated 20.8.1997 rescinded as it came to notice of Chancellor that a
criminal case was pending against appellant-Order challenged on the
grounds that before passing the order no opportunity of hearing was given
and the order cast stigma on the appellant-Held, there was no necessity to
give opportunity of hearing to appellant-Order does not cast any stigma on D
appellant-Administrative Law-Principles of natural justice-Opportunity
of hearing.

The appellant was appointed as Vice Chancellor of the Mysore University
by the order dated 20.8.1997 passed by the Governor of Karnataka who was
also the Chancellor of the University, for a period of3 years w.e.f. 4.9.1997. E
However, on 21.8.1997 the Chancellor noticed a news item stating that the
appellant had been facing a criminal case and had been nominated as a Vice
Chancellor. The Chancellor passed another order rescinding the earlier
order of appointment of the appellant stating that he found-it not desirable
to appoint the appellant as Vice Chancellor. The appellant challenged the F
order in the High Court by filing a writ petition which was dismissed. The
review partition was also dismissed on the ground that the acquittal of the
appellant in the criminal case was subsequent to the order of the Chancellor.
Aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal.

It was contended for the appellant that he was entitled to notice before G
the impugned order was passed by the Cliancellor and; that the order would
cast stigma against the appellant and principles of natural justice required
an opportunity to be given to the appellant before the order was passed.

Dismissing the appeal, this Court
165
H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A HELD : I. There was no necessity for giving an opportunity to the
appellant before the Chancellor passed the order dated 21.8.1997 rescinding
the earlier order dated 20.8~1997. [172-D]

Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh, [1993] 1 SCC 154 •
and State of U.P. and Anr. v. Girish Bihari and Ors., [1997] 4 SCC 362, relied
B on.

S. Govindaraju v. Karanataka S.R.TC. and Anr., [1986] 3 SCC 273;
Shrawan kumar Jha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., [1991] Supp 1 SCC
330; Dr. Boo/ Chand v. The Chancellor, Kurukshetra University, [1968) 1
-
SCR 434 and D. Subba Rao v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1975) SC
·c 94, held inapplicable.

Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India, AIR (1964) SC 449, cited.

2. The impugned order does not cast any stigma on the appellant. It
D only indicated that in view of the facts stated in the order it was not desirable
on the part of the Chancellor to appoint this particular person. If in future
any vacancy arises and an occasion arises for the selection panel to consider
different names to the post, nothing prevents that panel from considering the
name of the appellant also. [172-E-F, G]

E 3. The order passed on August 21, 1997 rescinding the earlier order
of appointment is valid. It is not disputed that the Chancellor has appointed
respondent no. 2 as Vice Chancellor after cancelling the appointment of the
appellant. It is also not disputed that a criminal case was pending against the
appellant on the date on which the order of cancellation of his appointment
was made. [174-B; 173-H; 174-A[
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5988-
5989 of 1998.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.8.97 and 16.1.98 of the Kamataka
High Court in W.A. No. 4831/97 in C.P.No. 820of1997.
G
P.P. Rao and P.R. Ramasesh for the Appellant.

S. Vijay Shankar, Advocate General for Karnataka and N. Ganpathy for
the Respondent No. I.

H K.K. Venugopal, (G.V. Chandrashekhar) and P.P. Singh for the Respondent
DR. J.S. PRASAD v. GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 167
No.2. A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

I. Delay condoned. Leave granted.

2. Heard learned counsel on both sides at length. B
3. The facts which are necessary for the purpose of this judgment are
as follows:

The Governor of Karnataka, who is the Chancellor of the Mysore
University, selected the appellant herein, who was Professor in Physics in the C
University of Mysore to be the Vice Chancellor of the said University while
exercising his powers under Section 11 of the Karnataka State Universities
Act, 1976. An order was passed by him on August 20, 1997 by which he
appointed the appellant herein as Vice Chancellor for a period of three years
with effect from September 4, 1997. But on the very next day, i.e. on August
21, 1997, he passed another order referring to a news item which appeared in D
the Times of India in respect of the appellant herein stating that he had been
facing a criminal case and had been named as the Vice Chancellor. The order
passed by the Chancellor stated that he was not aware earlier of the pendency
of the criminal case as against the appellant herein and that he found it not
desirable to appoint the appellant as Vice Chancellor. Consequently, the earlier E
order of appointment was rescinded by the later order.

4. Aggrieved thereby the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court
of Karnataka which was taken on file as writ Petition No. 23086 of 1997. In
the writ petition It was contended by the appellant that in the criminal case
he was acquitted later as the charge was found to be unsustainable and that F
the order of the Chancellor rescinding the earlier order was not valid inasmuch
as he hao not been given any opportunity to be heard before it. The High
Court dismissed the writ petition taking the view that it was for the Chancellor
to decide whether the appellant could be appointed as the Vice Chancellor
and even the pendency of the criminal case was sufficient for him to cancel G
the order of appointment inasmuch as it had been passed immediately and
much before the date on which the appointment could become effective. The
appellant challenged the said order in a writ appeal. That was dismissed by
a Division Bench of the High Court. The appellant brought it to this Court
by way of a special leave petition. The appellant had also filed a review
petition in the High Court. In the special leave petition, the appellant made H
168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A a submission that in the review petition, filed before the High Court, notice
had been issued and therefore, he would withdraw the special leave petition,
Consequently, this Court dismissed that special leave petition as withdrawn.
Subsequently, the review petition, filed by the appellant, was dismissed by
the High Court on the ground that the acquittal of the appellant in the criminal
B case was subsequent to the order of the Chancellor and o~ the date on which
that order was made, the proceedings in the criminal case were pending and,
therefore, it was supported by proper reasons. Consequently, the review
petition was dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has preferred these
appeals on special leave against both the original order in the writ appeal and
-
the order on the review petition .
c
5. Mr. P P Rao, learned senior counsel has put forward two contentions:
(I) the appellant was entitled to notice before the order was passed by the
Chancellor; and (2) the order casts a stigma against the appellant and principles
of natural justice required an opportunity to be given to the appellant before
such an order was passed. It was contended that if such an opportunity had
D been given, the appellant would have brought to the notice of the Chancellor
that "in the criminal case the judgment would be pronounced within a few
days and would have requested the Chancellor to wait for a few days before
passing any order. So far as this factual aspect "is concerned, there is no such
averment in the writ petition filed by the appellant in the High Court. However,
E it is not necessary for us to go into that aspect of the case.

6. In support of his contention, Mr. Rao has cited various decisions.
First in the line is the decision in S. Govindaraju v. Karnataka S.R.T.C. and
Anr., [1986] 3 SCC 273. In that case the appellant therein was selected for
appointment as Conductor in the Kamataka State Road Transport Corporation .
.F He was not given a regular appointment but he was appointed to work as
Conductor in temporary vacancy. He continued to work for a period of more
than 240 days. An order was passed against him terminating his services. But
the said termination order also directed that he would forfeit his chance for
appointment in terms of selection and his name shall stand deleted from the
G select list. In such a situation, the Bench of this Court held that the appellant
therein had the right to be given an opportunity before such an order of
termination was passed. The relevant passage in the judgment reads thus :

"There is no dispute that the appellant's services were terminated
on the ground of his being found unsuitable for the appointment and .
H as a result of which his name was deleted from the select list, and he
DR.J.S. PRASADv. GOVT.OFKARNATAKA 169

forfeited his chance for appointment. Once a candidate is selected and A
his name is included in the select list for appointment in accordance
with the Regulations he gets a right to be considered for appointment
as and when vacancy arises. On the removal of his name from the
select list serious consequences entail as he forfeits his right to
employment in future. In such a situation even though the Regulations
do not stipulate for affording any opportunity to the employee, the B
principles of natural justice would be attracted, and the employee
would be entitled to an opportunity of explanation, though no elaborate
enquiry would be necessary. Giving an opportunity of explanation
would meet the bare minimal requirement of natural justice. Before the
services of an employee are terminated resulting in forfeiture of his C
right to be considered for employment, opportunity of explanation
must be afforded to the employee concerned."

7. This ruling will not have any application in the present case as it is
seen that the appellant therein was working as Conductor for some time and
the order of termination itself precluded 4is chances for appointment in future D
also and his name was deleted from the select list. In the background of such
facts, the ruling was given. It is not necessary for us to consider whether the
observation regarding a person in the select list is still good law in view of
the subsequent rulings of this Court.
E
8. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant has invited our attention to
the judgment in Shrawan Kumar Jha & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., [ 1991]
Supp. 1 SCC 330. In that case the appellants, who were 175 in number were
appointed as Assistant Teachers by the District Superintendent of Education,
Dhanbad by order dated May 28, 1988. They were to join specified schools
by July, 4, 1988. By order dated November 2, 1988, the Deputy Development F
Commissioner cancelled their appointments. The question whether they had
joined duty or not was a disputed one and the Court did not go into the same.
On the other hand, the Court held that the principles of natural justice
demanded opportunity to be given to them before their appointments were
cancelled. While allowing the appeal, the Court also directed the Secretary G
(Education), Government of Bihar or other p~rsons nominated by him to give
an opportunity of hearing to the appellants and give a finding as to whether,.
they were validly appointed as Assistant Teachers. They were also directed
to determine as to whether any of the teachers had joined their respective
schools and for how much duration and that in case some of them had joined
their schools and worked, they should be paid their salary for such period. H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A 9. This ruling does not help the appellant in the present case as it is
seen that the order of cancellation came long after the date specified in the
order of appointment for the appellants to join their respective posts. In the
present case the order of cancellation was passed the very next day, long
before the date on which the appellant was to take charge as Vice Chancellor.

B I 0. As against this Mr. K.K. Venugopal learned senior counsel appearing
for the second respondent, drew our attention to the judgment in Union
Territory of Chandigarh v. Dilbagh Singh, (1993] I SCC 154. Reliance is
placed on paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment, which read as follows :

"11 . In Shankarasan Dash v. Union of India, a Constitution
c Bench of this Court which had occasion to examine the question
whether a candidate seeking appointment to a civil post can be regarded
to have acquired an indefeasible right to appointment in such post
merely because of the appearance of his name in the merit list (select
list) of candidates for such post has answered the question in the
D negative by enunciating the correct legal position thus :

"It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies ~re notified
for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the
successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed
which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely
E amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment
and on their selection they do not acquire dny right to the post.
Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under
no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does
not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary
manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona
F fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are
filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the
candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination
can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed
by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions
G in the State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha, Nee/ima
Shangla (Miss) v. State of Haryana or Jitender Kumar v. State of
Punjab.,"

"12. If we.tiave regard to the above enunciation that a candidate
who finds a place in the select list as a candidate selected for
H appointment to a civil post, does not acquire an indefeasible right to
DR. J.S. PRASADv. GOVT.OFKARNATAKA 171
be appointed in such post in the absence of any specific rule entitling A
him for such appointment and he could be aggrieved by his non-
appointment only when the administration does so either arbitrarily or
for no bona fide reasons, it follows as a necessary concomitant that
such candidate even if has a legitimate expectation of being appointed
in such posts due to his name finding a place in the select list of B
candidates, cannot claim to have a right to be heard before such
select list is cancelled for bona fide and valid reasons and not arbitrarily.
In the instant case, when the Chandigarh Administration which received
the complaints about the unfair and injudiciou3 manner in which
select list of candidates for appointment as conductors in CTU was
prepared by the Selection Board constituted for the purpose, found C
those complaints to be well founded on an enquiry got made in that
regard, we are unable to find that the Chandigarh Administration had
acted either arbitrarily or without bona fide and valid reasons in
cancelling such dubious select list. Hence, the contention~ of the
learned counsel for the respondents as to the sustainability of the
judgment of CAT under appeal on the ground of non-affording of an D
opportunity of hearing to the respondents (candidates in the select
list) is a misconceived one and is consequently rejected."

11. Mr. S Vijay Shankar, learned Advocate General ofKarnataka appearing
for respondent No. I has placed reliance on the judgment in State of U.P. & E
Anr. v. Girish Bihari & Ors., [1997] 4 SCC 362. In that case the respondent
was an !PS officer and was due to retire on superannuation on 31.3.96. An
order was issued by the Governor on 20.3.1996 granting an extension of
service for six months from 31.3.96. But on 23.3.1996, the order of extension
was cancelled. The question was, whether the respondent therein was entitled
to have an opportunity of hearing before the order of cancellation was made. F
The Court answered the question in negative. The Court also referred to the
judgment in Shrawan Kumar's case (supra) and observed thus:

"A Division Bench of this Court comprising Kuldip Singh and K.
Ramaswamy, JJ. observed that the candidates sl:ould have been given G
an opportunity of hearing before their appointments were cancelled.
The court accordingly directed the Solicitor General to ask the Secretary
(Education), Government of Bihar to grant an opportunity of hearing
to the candidates and to give a finding as to whether they were
validly appointed as Assistant Teacher. The Court also ordered that
if anyone had actually worked as a Teacher, he or she would be H

_,
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A entitled to the salary for ~hat period. It is interesting to note that this
Court while directing that a hearing be given to those app9inted as ·
Assistant Teachers did not grant any relief in terms of actual
appointment in pursuance to the appointment letters. Nor did the
Court order for any pecuniary benefits being given to those appellants
pursuant to the appointment letters. Salary, etc. were ordered to be
B paid only in case any one of those candidates had actually joined and
worked."

12.The Court held that till the order of extension of service could
become operative no right under the order had vested in the incumbent and
C it was therefore, not necessary to grant him hearing before the extension order
was cancelled. The Court also pointed out that the respondent therein may
or may not have accepted the offer and till the order came into force, no
vested right could have arisen. Consequently, the Court held that no
opportunity was required to be given to the incumbent before cancelling the
said order. The principles laid down in the aforesaid two cases will certainly
D apply in the present case and in our opinion, there was no necessity for
giving an opportunity to the appellant before the chancellor passed the order
dated 21.8.97 rescinding the earlier order dated 20.8.97.

13. Turning to the second aspect of the matter, the contention of
E learned counsel for the appellant is that the order casts a stigma and therefore,
the principles of natural justice should have been satisfied. We are of the
opinion that there is no merit in this contention. The relevant part of the order
cancelling the appointment reads thus:

"Whereas under the above circumstances, I do not find it desirable
F to appoint Dr. J Shashidhara Prasad as the Vice Chancellor."

It is entirely different from saying that the appellant was an undesirable
person and that he should not be appointed. But what the order meant was
only that in view of the facts stated earlier in that order it was not desirable
on the part of the Chancellor to appoint this particular person. It does not,
G in our opinion, cast any stigma on the appellant. If in future any vacancy
arises and an occasion arises for the selection panel to consider different
names to the post, nothing prevents that panel from considering the name of
the appellant also.

14. Learned counsel for the appellant cited the judgment in Jagdish
H Mitter v. Union of India, AIR (1964) Supreme Court 449 in support of his
DR. J.S. PRASAD v. GOVT. OF KARNATAKA 173
contention. It is seen that the facts of that case are entirely different and in A
the view which we have expressed on the facts of this case. It is not necessary
· to consider the said ruling.

15. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Dr. Boo/ Chand
v. the chancellor, Kurukshetra University, [1968] I SCR 434 and drew our
attention to certain passages in that judgment but we find that on the facts B
of that case, it was held theit sufficient opportunity had been given to the
person aggrieved and the order of termination was upheld. The ruling will not
have any bearing in the present case.

16. Learned counsel invited our attention to the Judgment in D. Subba
Rao v. The State ofAndhra Pradesh, AIR (1975) SC 94. The Division Bench C
in that case, while quashing the removal of the President of Panchayat Samithi
on the ground that he was denied an opportunity to be heard, directed the
concerned authority to give an opportunity to him to make his representation
against the charges set out in the notice and till an order was passed, the
position which was then obtained was to be maintained provisionally. The D
facts of the case are entirely different and will not help the appellant herein.

17. The next decision referred to is the judgment in C L Kapoor v.
Jagmohan & Ors.. [1981] I SCR 746. Reliance was placed on the following
passage in the judgment:
E
"In our view the principles of natural justice know of no
exclusionary rule dependent on whether it would have made any
difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance
of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice
independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It
will come from a person who has denied justice that the person who F
has be'!n denied justice is not prejudiced. As we said earlier where on
the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and
under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue
its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it is
not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not G
issue futile writs."

The aforesaid passage itself shows that the Court will refuse to issue
a writ which will be futile even after there had been failure to observe the
principles of natural justice. On the facts of the present case, it is not disputed
that the chancellor has appointed the second respondent as Vice chancellor H
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A after cancelling the appointment of the appellant. It is also not disputed that
the criminal case was pending against the appellant on the date on which the
order of cancellation of the appellant was made.

18. As we have come to the conclusion that the order passed on
August 21, 1997 rescinding the earlier order of appointment is valid, we do
B not find any merit in these appeals and the same are accordingly dismissed.
/
There will be no order as to costs.

R.P. Appeals dismissed.
I