DR. PRABHA ATRIversusTHE STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

                          DR. PRABHA ATRI                                        A
                                 v.
                     THE STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.

                          DECEMBER 11, 2002

                                                                                 B
       [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, JJ.]


      Service Law:

      Resignation-Charge of negligence against Doctor-Suspended pending          C
domestic enquiry-Lei/er expressing her intention to resign-Treated as
resignation-Held, the lei/er would not amount to resignation since it did not
convey any spontaneous intention to give up or relinquish office accompanied
by any act of relinquishment.

      Words and Phrases-'Resignation'-Meaning of                                 D

      Appellant-doctor was charged for negligence and for acting against
medical ethics. She was placed under suspension pending institution of
domestic enquiry. She wrote a letter expressing her intention to resign if
her claims in respect of the alleged lapse are not viewed favourably.            E
Competent authority treated her letter as letter of resignation and accepted
the resignation. In response to the letter withdrawing the domestic enquiry
in view of her resignation appellant stated that she never resigned but had
shown only intention to resign and she requested for rectifying the
mistaken understanding of her earlier letter. The authority declined to
reconsider the matter. She filed writ petition before High Court which was       F
dismissed.

       In appeal to this Court the question for consideration was whether
the letter by the appellant could be construed to mean or would amount
to a letter of resignation or merely an expression of her intention to resign.
                                                                                 G
     Allowing the appeal, the Court

     HELD: I.I. The letter by the appellant cannot be construed to convey
any spontaneous intention to give up or relinquish her office accompanied
by any act of relinquishment. (33-CJ
                                     27
                                                                                 H
    28                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A         1.2. To constitute a 'resignation', it must be unconditional anri with
    an intention to operate as such. At best it may amount to a threatened
    offer more on account of exasperation, to resign on account of a feeling
    of frustration born out of an idea that she was being harassed
    unnecessarily but not, at any rate, amounting to a resignation, actual and
B   simple. The appellant had put in about two decades of service in the
    Hospital, that she was placed under suspension and exposed to disciplinary
    proceedings and proposed domestic enquiry and she had certain benefits
    flowing to her benefit, if she resigns but yet the letter does not seek for
    any of those things to be settled or the disciplinary proceedings being
    scrapped a sequel to her so-called resignation. The words 'with immediate
C   effect' in the said letter could not be given undue importance dehors the
    context, tenor of language used and the purport as well as the remaining
    portion of the letter indicating the circumstances in which it was written.
                                                                   (33-C, D, E(

          1.3. That the management of the Hospital took up such action
D forthwith, as a result of acceptance of the resignation is not of niuch
    significance in ascertaining the true or real intention of the letter written
    by the appellant. Consequently, it appears to be reasonable to view that
    the respondents have seized an opportunity to get rid of the appellant the
    moment they got the letter without due or proper consideration of the
E   matter in a right perspective or understanding of the contents thereof. The
    High Court also seems to have completely lost sight of these vital aspects
    in rejecting the Writ Petition. (33-F; G)

          1.4. However the respondent-Hospital authorities shall be at liberty
    to pursue the disciplinary proceedings initiated against her in accordance
F   with law. (34-AI

         P.K. Ramachandra Iyer and Ors. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., etc.
    (19841 2 sec 141, relied on.

          Moti Ram v. Param Devi and Anr., (1993) 2 SCC 725, referred to.
G         Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition) Vol. 37 476; Black's law
    Dictionary-6th Edition and Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 77, page 311-
    referred to.

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION                 Civil Appeal Nos. 8317-
H   83I8 or2002.
             PRABHAATRI v. STATE[DORAISWAMYRAJU,J.]                        29
     From the Judgment and Order dated 8.3 .2002 of the Allahabad High            A
Court in C.M.R. Appln. No. 6025 of 2002.

     Rakesh Dwivedi and Ms. Niranjana Singh, for the Appellant.

      Ranjit Kumar, Arjun Bhandari, Rakesh Singh and Arun K. Sinha,
for the Respondents.                                                              B
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      RAJU, J. Leave granted.

        The appellant, who was working as Anaesthetist in Kamla Nehru             C
Memorial Hospital, Allahabad, was issued with a Memo dated 5.1.1999,
bringing to her· notice a lapse in that she left without infonning even Dr.
Banerjee, when he requested her around 1300 hrs. to give anaesthesia to one
patient admitted in emergency with shock due to ruptured uterus, which
needed urgent operation, and such conduct not only amounted to negligence         D
as per Hospital Service Rule JO(i) but also was against medical ethics. She
was also asked to submit her explanation by 5.00 P.M. on 6.1.1999, failing
which it would be taken that she accepted the lapse and the Hospital would
be at liberty to proceed against her as per Service Rules. Since the appellant
did not respond, on 8.1.1999 the appellant was placed under suspension with
immediate effect, pending institution of a domestic enquiry pertaining to the     E
above incident. On receipt of the said Memo on 9.1.1999, the appellant
replied to the Secretary of the Hospital that she had already clarified her
position verbally in his presence that on that day she was sick and very tired,
that Dr. Navneeta Banerjee also denied having made any complaint as such
except writing for purposes of record about the incident and that formal reply    F
in writing was not sent since .she had already explained the position and
nothing more was required. She further added in her letter as hereunder:-

       "Your letter is uncalled for and should be withdrawn. I have been
       working in this Hospital since May 10, 1978 and have always worked
       in the best interest of the patients. It is tragic instead of taking a     G
       lenient view of my sickness you have opted to punish me.

       If the foregoing is not acceptable to you then I have no option left but
       to render my resignation with immediate effect."

      Thereupon, by an Order dated 9. 1.1999, the appellant was infonned          H
    30                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A
    that the suspension order could not be withdrawn since her explanation was
    not found to be satisfactory. A separate order dated 9.1.1999 was also said
    to have been passed as hereunder: "Reference is invited to letter dated 9.1.1999
    of Dr. Prabha Atri, Anaesthetist, vide which she has submitted her resignation
    is accepted with immediate effect as requested. Dr. P. Atri is advised to
B   s~bmit No Dues Certificate as per Hospital Service Rules so that her terminal
    benefits may be processed for payment."

           Yet another order was also said to have been passed on the same udy
    wherein after adverting to the acceptance of the resignation, it has been stated
C   that the domestic enquiry ordered on 8. I.1999 to enquire into the incident
    pertaining to Dr. Atri should not be proceeded with. In response to the same
    in her letter dated 14.1.1999, the appellant stated that she never resigned and
    not only she nowhere stated that she is resigning but unnecessarily something
    has been read between the lines. Reiterating her stand that she had not resigned
    but shown only intention to resign, the appellant requested for rectifying the
D   mistaken understanding of her earlier letter by taking necessary steps in the
    correct perspective. The Secretary of the Hospital by his communication
    dated 16.1.1999 reiterated the correctness of the action taken and declined to
    reconsider the matter.

          Thereupon, the appellant filed Civil Misc. W.P. No.13186 of 1999
E before the High Court of Allahabad, but without success and has come up
    before this Court challenging the order dated 18.12.200 I of the High Court,
    declining to interfere and dismissing the Writ Petition.

         Heard Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel for the appellant,
F   and Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents.

         The only question that mainly requires to be considered is as to whether
  the letter dated 9.1.1999 could be construed to mean or amounted to a letter
  of resignation or merely an expression of her intention to resign, if her claims
  in respect of the alleged lapse are not viewed favourably. Rule 9 of the
G Hospital Service Rules provided for resignation or abandonment of service
  by an employee. It is stated therein that a permanent employee is required to
  give three months notice of resignation in writing to the appointing authority
  or three months salary in lieu of notice and that he/she may be required to
  serve the period for such notice. In case of non-compliance with the above,
  the employee concerned is not only liable to pay an amount equal to three
H months salary but such amount shall be realizable from the dues, if any, of
             PRABHAATRI v. STATE[DORAISWAMYRAJU,J.)                         31
the employee lying with the Hospital. In Words and Phrases (Permanent A
Edition) Vol. 37 at page 476, it is found stated that, "To constitute a
"resignation", it must be unconditional and with intent to operate as such.
There must be an intention to relinquish a portion of the term of office
accompanied by an act of relinquishment. It is to give back, to give up in a
fonnal manner, an office." At page 474 of the very same book, it is found B
stated: "Statements by club's President and corresponding Secretary that they
would resign, if constant bickering among members did not cease, constituted
merely threatened offers, not tenders, of their resignations." It is also stated
therein that "A 'resignation' of a public office to be effective must be made
with intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by act of
relinquishment". In the ordinary dictionary sense, the word 'Resignation' C
was considered to mean the spontaneous relinquishment of one's own right,
as conveyed by the maxim: Resignation est Juris proprii spontanea refutatio
[Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition]. In Corpus Juris Secundum. Vol.77,
page 311, it is found stated "It has been said that 'Resignation' is a term of
legal art, having legal connotations which describe certain legal results. It is D
characteristically, the voluntary surrender of a position by the one resigning,
made freely and not under duress and the word is defined generally as meaning
the act of resigning or giving up, as a claim, possession or position."

        In P.K. Ramachandra Iyer and Ors., etc. v. Union of India and Ors.,
etc. (1984] 2 SCC 141, this Court had an occasion to consider the nature and E
character of a letter written by one of the petitioners in that case who after
stating in the letter that he has been all along patiently waiting for the redressal
of his grievance, yet justice has not been done to him and "as such, after
showing so much patience in the matter, I am sorry to decide that I should
resign from the membership of the Faculty in protest against such a treatment F
and against the discrimination and victimization shown to me by the Head of
the Division in the allotment of students of 1968 and 1969 batches and
departmental candidates". In that context, this Court observed that the callous
and heartless attitude of the Academic Council in seizing an opportunity to
get rid of him by treating the said lette1 to be a letter of resignation when G
really he was all along making representations seeking justice to him and
"out of exasperation the said person wrote that letter stating that the only
honourable course left open to him was to resign rather than suffer". In Moti
Ram v. Param Devi and Anr., (1993] 2 SCC 725, this Court observed as
hereunder:-
                                                                                 H
    32                         SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A            "As pointed out by this Court, ·resignation' means the spontaneous
            relinquishment of one's own right and in relation to an office, it
            connotes the act of giving up or relinquishing the office. It has been
            held that in the general juristic sense, in order to constitute a complete
            and operative resignation there must be the intention to give up or
            relinquish the office and the concomitant act of its relinquishment. It
B
            has also been observed that the act of relinquishment may take different
            forms or assume a unilateral or bilateral character, depending on the
            nature of the office and the conditions governing it: [See: Union of
            India Vs. Gopal Chandra Misra]. If the act of relinquishment is of
            unilateral character, it comes into effect when such act indicating the
c           intention to relinquish the office is communicated to the competent
            authority. The authority to whom the act of relinquishment is
            communicated is not required to take any action and the relinquishment
            takes effect from the date of such communication where the resignation
            is intended to operate in praesenti. A resignation may also be
D           prospective to be operative from a future date and in that event it
            would take effect from the date indicated therein and not from the
            date of communication. In cases where the act of relinquishment is
            of a bilateral character, the communication of the intention to
            relinquish, by itself, would not be sufficient to result in relinquishment
            of the office and some action is required to be taken on such
E           communication of the intention to relinquish, e.g., acceptance of the
            said request to relinquish the office, and in such a case the
            relinquishment does not become effective or operative till such action
            is taken. As to whether the act of relinquishment of an office is
            unilateral or bilateral in character would depend upon the nature of
F           the office and the conditions governing it."

         In traversing the contention on behalf of the appellant that the letter
  in question dated 9.1.1999 could not be construed as a letter of resignation,
  on behalf of the respondent-Hospital authorities it is strenuously contended
  that such a letter coming from the appellant in the teeth of suspension order
G and proposed domestic enquiry expressing a desire to tender resignation and
  that too with immediate effect, cannot but be a resignation outright and
  simpliciter to avoid facing disciplinary proceedings and that, therefore, the
  competent authority acted well within its rights in treating it to be a resignation
  and accepting the same forthwith and as a consequence thereof, directing'
H further not to proceed with the domestic enquiry already ordered. Finally, it
             PRABHA ATRI v. STATE [DORAISWAMY RAJU, J.)                      33

has been submitted that if this Court is pleased to interfere in the matter the     A
right of the Hospital Authorities to pursue the disciplinary action already
initiated from the stage at which it stood on the date of acceptance of the
resignation should not be jeopardized and liberty may be granted in this
regard.

        We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel         B
appearing on either side, in the light of the materials and principles, noticed
supra. This is not a case where it is required to consider as to whether the
relinquishment envisaged under the rules and conditions of service is unilateral
or bilateral in character but whether the letter dated 9.1.1999 could be treated
or held to be a letter of resignation or relinquishment of the office, so as to     C
severe her services once and for all. The letter cannot be construed, in our
view, to convey any spontaneous intention to give up or relinquish her office
accompanied by any act of relinquishment. To constitute a 'resignation', it
must be unconditional and with an intention to operate as such. At· best, as
observed by this Court in the decision in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer (supra) it
may amount to a threatened offer more on account of exasperation, to resign         D
on account of a feeling of frustration born out of an idea that she was being
harassed unnecessarily but not, at any rate, amounting to a resignation, actual
and simple. The appellant had put in about two decades of service in the
Hospital, that she was placed under suspension and exposed to disciplinary
proceedings and proposed domestic enquiry and she had certain benefits              E
flowing to her benefit, if she resigns but yet the letter dated 9.1.99 does not
seek for any of those things to be settled or the disciplinary proceedings
being scrapped as a sequel to her so-called resignation. The words 'with
immediate effect' in the said letter could not be given undue importance de
hors the context, tenor of language used and the purport as well as the
remaining portion of the letter indicating the circumstances in which it was        F
written. That the management of the Hospital took up such action forthwith,
as a result of acceptance of the resignation is not of much significance in
ascertaining the true or real intention of the letter written by the appellant on
9.1.1999. Consequently, it appears to be reasonable to view that as in the
case reported in P.K. Ramachandra Iyer (supra) the respondents have seized          G
an opportunity to get rid of the appellant the moment they got th.e letter dated
9.1. I 999, without due or proper consideration of the matter in a right
perspective or understanding of the contents thereof. The High Court also
seems to have. completely lost sight of these vital aspects in rejecting the Writ
Petition.
                                                                                    H
    34                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A          For all the reasons stated above, the order of the High Court under
    challenge in this appeal is set aside and the appeals are allowed. The
    communication dated 9.1.1999 purporting to accept a non-existent resignation
    is set aside. But, the respondent-Hospital authorities shall be at liberty to
    pursue the disciplinary proceedings initiated against her in accordance with
    law. No costs.
B
    K.K.T.                                                     Appeals allowed.