Holding

In an eviction suit based on landlord‑tenant relationship, the court must only determine the existence of privity of contract; the title of the landlord is not germane, and a second appeal cannot disturb factual findings absent a substantial question of law.

Summary

The appellant, Dr. Ranbir Singh, purchased a property from Shri Hemant Singh, the adopted son of the late Maharaja of Dholpur, and served notice to the tenant, Asharfi Lal, for rent default. The trial court and first appellate court upheld the eviction, finding a landlord‑tenant relationship and greater hardship to the landlord. The Rajasthan High Court reversed, holding that the adoption did not confer title to the private property and that the appellant’s claim of ownership was untenable. The Supreme Court held that in an eviction suit based on the landlord‑tenant relationship, the court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining the existence of privity of contract; the question of title is not germane, and the High Court cannot re‑appreciate evidence or substitute its own findings of fact absent a substantial question of law. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court judgment set aside, and the trial court decree restored.

Issues considered

The relevance of the plaintiff's title to the property in an eviction suit under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950.
Whether the appellant qualifies as a landlord within the meaning of Section 3(iii) of the Act.
Whether the adoption of Shri Hemant Singh conferred title to the private property of the late Maharaja, enabling a valid transfer to the appellant.
Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact on a second appeal under Section 100 of the CPC.
The comparative hardship of landlord versus tenant.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100(1), s. 100(2)
Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937

Subjects

evictionlandlord-tenant relationshipprivity of contracttitle of propertyRajasthan Premises ActCivil Procedure Code Section 100adoption and successioncomparative hardshipsecond appealreappreciation of evidence

Judgment

DR. RANBIR SINGH A
v.
ASHARFI LAL

SEPTEBER 21, 1995

[KULDIP SINGH AND FAIZAN UDDIN, JJ.) B

Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Ss.100(1) & (2)-Second ap-
peal-Reapreciation of evidence and substituting its own conclusion by High
Court-Held: Nonnally not within jurisdiction of High Cowt-{fl~less it could
f onnulate substantial question of law. C
Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 195(}-Section 3
(iii) & (iv)-'Landlord' & 'Tenant'-Proof of relationship between Property
sold by legally adopted son-duly infonned by purchaser to tenant-Enhanced
rent paid to the purchase1~Jn notice of eviction fact of adoption mentioned
-Not denied by tenant in his reply-Circwnstances established privily of D
contract between landlord and tenant.

Eviction Suit-Based on privily of contract of tenancy-Proof of
title-Held : Not gemiane though may be gone into, to decide relationship of
tenant and landlord.
E
The widow of ex-Maharaja of Dholpur adopted her daughter's son
'H' vide an adoption deed. The Govt. recognised him, the successor to the
'Gaddi' and appointed the widow as his adoptive mother, legal and natural
guardian.

The .property in dispute (private property of Maharaja) let on rent F
by his widow, was sold to the appellant by 'H' after having inherited the
same by virtue of adoption deed.

... The appellant immediately brought the factum of purchase to the
notice of the respondent and the respondent started paying enhanced rate. G
After some time, when the respondent defaulted, appellant served notice,
terminating his tenancy in which the factum of adoption was specifically
mentioned, and in reply to the notice the same was not denied.

A suit for eviction was filed by the appellant. The pleadings were
reiterated by his evidence and P.W. 2 clarified privity of contract by H
847
848 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A deposing that the respondent had agreed to pay the rent to appellant at (

enhanced rate, the Trial Court decreed the suit on the ground of denial of
title and bonafide need.

In the first appeal by the respondent, the court remanded the case
to the Trial Court for finding on the question as to who will face greater
B hardship. The Trial Court held the question in favour of the appellant. On
the basis of finding of Trial Court, the 1st Appellate Court dismissed the
appeaL

The Respondent filed a second appeal to the High Court which
C allowed the appeal holding that 'H' acquired no title over the property so
as to entitle him to transfer the same, as the widow of the late Maharaja
was the sole owner of the private property of late Maharaja by virtue of
Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1937. It further held that recogni-
tion of rulership by the Govt. does not amount to recognition of any right
to private property of the ruler.
D
In appeal to Supreme Court, the Appellant contended that in an
eviction suit proof of title is not germane but relationship between the
landlord and tenant is to be proved; and that on the basis of adoption
deed 'H' also become successor to the private property of late Maharaja.
E The respondent contended that recognition by Govt. did. not make
'H' successor to the private property and that attaining ownership to the
suit property by 'H' could not be established.

Allowing the appeal, this Court
F
HELD : 1.1. The question of title of the property is not germane for
decision of the eviction suit. In a case where a plaintiff institutes a suit for
eviction of his tenant based on the relationship of the landlord and tenant,
the scope of suit is very much limited in which a question of title cannot
be gone into because the suit of plaintiff would be dismissed even if he
G succeeds in proving his title but fails to establish the privity of contract of
tenancy. In a suit for eviction based on such relationship, the .court has
only to decide whether the defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff or not,
though the question of title if disputed, may incidentally be gone into, in
connection with the primary question for determining the main question
H about the relationship between the litigating parties. [855-F-G]
RANBIR SINGH v. ASHARFI LAL 849

1.2. It is established from the fact and dn:umsiauces of the case, that A
the defendant had accepted himself to be a tt:nant of the plaintiff on a
monthly rent of Rs.40 and thus there was a privity of contract of tenancy
between the plaintiff and the defendant after due atfornment. Thus, it has
been sufficiently established that the plaintiff is the landlord within the
meaning of clause (iii) of section 3 of the Rajasthan Premises Control of
Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 and defendant is tenant within the meaning of
B
clause (vii) of section 3. [858-D]

LIC v. Indian Automobiles & Co., [1990] 4 SCC 288, referred to.

2. The deed of adoptionplima facie goes to show that 'H' was adopted C
as son of late Maharaja. That being so plima facie, the Appellant inherited
the private properties of the late Maharaja besides being his successor to
the gaddi. In these facts and circumstances of the case even if it is accepted
that Hindu Law and Hindu Woman's Right to property Act, 1937 were
applicable to Dlwlpur, inheritance of the private prnpt•rties of Late
Maharaja in any case devolved upon 'H'. 'H' therefore, had a right to make D
a transfer of the s!!it property to the appellant. Thoug.1 it is trne that his
recognition as the ruler to succeed to the gaddi of Dhoipur was not as-
sociated with any act of recognition of right to private properties. [857-A-B]

Rajendra Singh v. U.O.J. AIR (1970) SC 1946, referred to. E
3. The High Court was not justified in reappreciating the evidem:e
and substituting its own conclusions for the well reasoned findings
recorded by the courts of fact. The High Court formulated no such
question of law on the basis of which it proposed to interfere with the
findings of facts. There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on F
the ground of erroneous finding of fact, based upon an application of the
relevant evidence. [857-F]

Ramachandra v. Ramalingam, AIR (1963) SC 302 and Bhagwan Das
v. Jiley Kaw; AIR (1991) SC 266, referred to.
G
4. In this case there is no such evidence or any material produced
by the defendant to show that he will not be in a position to get alternative
accommodation in the town of Dholpm for his residence. The two courts
below on a careful comparison and assessment of tht relative advantages
and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant, recorded a clear finding H
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A that the hardship of the plaintiff would be greater and the said finding
should have been accepted to by the High Court. [858-E]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7151 of
1993.

B From the Judgm~nt and Order dated 27.5.92 of the Rajasthan High
Court in S.B.C.S.A. No. 90 of 1990.

Subhag Mal Jain, Vipin Gogia, A.P. Dhamija and S.K. Jain, for the
Appellant.
c V.B. Joshi, V.C. Saxena and N.S. Bisht for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

FAIZAN UDDIN, J.1. The material facts leading to this appeal are
D that Maharaja Rana Udaibhan Singhji of the erstwhile State of Dholpur
died in the year 1954 leaving behind him his widow Smt. Malvender Kaur
and daughter Smt. Urmila Devi. Late Maharaja Udaibhan Singh had no
natural male child and according to the appellant the late Maharaja
Udaibhan had great attachment with Shri Hemant Singh, the son of his
only daughter and during his life time had expressed his wish to adopt Shri
E Hemant Singh as a son to him and had advised his widow accordingly
giving her the authority to adopt Shri Hemant Singh as his son. Conse-
quently. Shri Hernant Singh (s/o. Srnt. ·urmila Devi, daughter of late
Maharaja Rana Udaibhan Singh) was adopted by Srnt. Malvender Kaur
according to the wishes of her late husband vide Deed of Adoption dated
F 5.11.1954. Further case of the appellant .is that a High Power Committee
was constituted to examine the contentions of various claimants for succes-
sion to the gaddi of Dholpur, The said committee consisting of the then
Chief Justice of Rajasthan High Court, Maharaja of Bharatpur and
Maharaja of Doongarpur recommended the name of Shri Hemant Singh
as a ruler of the erstwhile State of Dholpur. The Government of India
G accepted the recommendation of the said committee and by letter dated
13/14.12.1956 recognised Shri Hemant Singh the adopted son of late
Maharaja Udaibhan as successor to the gaddi of Dholpur with effect from
22.10.1954. The Government of India· by another letter dated 13.12.1956
addressed to Smt. Malvender Kaur stating that she has been appointed as
H the new ruler's adoptive mother to be the natural and legal guardian of
RANBIR SINGH v. ASHARFI LAL [FAIZANUDDIN, J.) 851

Shri Hemant Singh who was then minor with instructions to take care of A
his interest in every way.

2. Shri Hemant Singh being the adopted son of late Maharaja Udaib-
han Singh. The appellant purchased certain property including the proper-
ty in dispute in this appeal from Shri Hemant Sing1' by a registered
sale-deed dated 10.10.1972. On such sale being made the rent note ex-
B
ecuted by respondent in favour of Smt. Malvender Kaur was handed over
to the appellant by the landlord Shri Hemant Singh. According to the
appellant after he purchased the suit property he immediately intimated
the same to the respondent who on demand of enhancement of rent,
agreed to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 40 P.M. of the suit premises. The c
respondent had paid rent to him for the month of November and Decem-
ber, 1972 but did not pay any rent thereafter. The appellant, therefore,
served a notice dated 6.1.1976 to the respondent terminating the tenancy
and demanded vacant possession of the suit premises, specifically mention-
ing that he was the adopted son of late Maharaja Udaibhan Singh of D
Dholpur. The respondent in his reply dated 30.1.1976 did not dispute the
factum of adoption of Shri Hemant Singh But denied the title of the
appellant as also any privity of contract of tenancy with him.

3. The appellant filed suit for eviction against the respondent on E
the grounds of denial of title, bonafide necessity of the premises in suit,
default in payment of rent and material alterations. The respondent
contested the suit by filling the written statement denying all the grounds
of eviction alleged by the appellant. The respondent took the stand that
he was the tenant of Smt. Malvender Kaur and that Shri Hemant Singh
... was not legally constituted successor to late Maharaja Udaibhan Singh
F
and as Shri Hemant Singh was the son of ~he daughter of Maharaja
Udaibhan Singh, he inherited no interest in the property. The respondent
took the stand that on the death of Shri Udaibhan Singh, his widow Smt.
Malvender Kaur became successor. He also denied attornment of tenancy
by oral notice or that he agreed to pay rent at Rs. 40 per month to the G
appellant.

4. The Trial Court decreed the appellant's suit on the ground of
denial of title and bonafide need by recording findings that Shri Hemant
Singh was the legal representative and successor of late Shri Udaibhan H
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
...
A Singh and that the plaintiff-appellant had purchased the suit property from -~-

Shri Hemant Singh. In appeal preferred by the defendant-respondent, the
first appellate Court remanded the case to the Trial Court for recording - -,
findings on the questio'n of greater hardship. The Trial Court after record-
ing the evidence of the parties held that greater hardship will be cased to
B the plaintiff-appellant in case the decree for eviction was not passed.
Thereafter the first appellate Court dismissed the appeal preferred by
defendant respondent affirming the judgment and decree on the ground of
denial of title and bonafide need of the appellant. The respondent went up ;

in Second Appeal before the High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench. The
High Court by the impugned judgment dated 27.5.1992 allowed the appeal
c of the respondent, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial
Court and the first appellate Court and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-
appellant by holding that Hindu Law and the Hindu Women's Rights to
Property Act of 1937 were applicable to the erstwhile State of Dholpur and
as the family of late Udaibhan Singh admittedly was governed by Mitakshra
D rule and, therefore, Shri Hemant Singh being daughter 's son was not
entitled to succeed to late Udaibhan Singh since his· widow Smt. Malvender
Kaur (since deceased) and daughter Smt. Urmila Devi were alive. On these \
findings the High Court held that Smt. Malvender Kaur became the sole
owner of the private properties of late Maharaj a U daibhan Singh and Shri ·
E Hemant Singh did not become the owner of the properties and, therefore,
he acquired no title over the properties so as to entitled him to transfer ....
the. suit property in favour of the plaintiff-appellant herein. The High Court
further held that the recognition of Rulership by the President would not
amount to recognition of any right to private property of the ruler but such
recognition only entitles the ruler to the enjoyment of the Privy Purse
F
contemplated under article 291 of the Constitution and the personal rights,
privileges and dignities of the ruler of an Indian State. The High Court 1
.
held that the decision in the case of . Rajendra Singh v. Union of India,
AIR (1970) SC 1946 is of no help to the appellant on the proposition that
Shri Hemant Singh became successor to late Shri Udaibhan Singh in
G respect of his private properties also. In view of these findings the High
Court took the view that the question of denial of title of the plaintiff-ap-
pellant did not arise and, therefore, set aside the findings of the two courts
below on the question of denial of title. The High Court also set aside the
findings of the two courts below with regard to the bonafide necessity of -.-,..
H the plaintiff-appellant in respect of the suit premises by holding that
RANBIR SINGH v. ASHARFI LAL [FAIZANUDDIN, J.) 853

~ sufficient accommodation is available with the plaintiff- appellant and he A
had failed to establish that his alleged need is genuine or bonafide. On
these findings the High Court set aside the judgment and decree of the two
courts below and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-appellant against which
this appeal has been directed.

5. At this stage it may be noted that LA. No. 3 of 1995 has been filed
B
on behalf of the appellant in this Court under order 47 Rule 27 of Civil
Procedure Code read with Rules 1 and 6 of the Supreme Court Rules along
with the certified true copy of the Deep of Adoption dated 5.11.1954. The
application is allowed after consideration and the deep of adoption is taken
oore~ C
6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant vehemently urged that
the proof of title is not germane in a suit for eviction between the landlord
and tenant but it is the relationship which has to be proved coupled with
grounds of eviction provided under the law and, therefore, it is not neces- D
sary to make elaborate pleadings with regard to the title in a suit for
eviction. He submitted that so far as the question of relationship of
landlord and tenant between the appellant and respondent is concerned
it has been sufficiently proved by the plaintiff-appellant as held by the Trial
Court and affirmed by the first appellate Court and the High Court was,
therefore, not justified in going into the question of ownership of the suit E
property as if it was a suit for establishment of title. The appellant has
produced of certified copy of the deed of adoption dated 5.11.1954 which
has been taken on record and on that basis submitted that having regard
to the evidence on record, oral and documentary, it has been sufficiently
established that Shri Hemant Singh was not only recognised as ruler of the F
erstwhile State of Dholpur but he also became the successor and owner
of private properties of late Maharaja Udaibhan Singh and as such the
High Court committed a serious error in taking a contrary view. He
submitted that the sale of the suit property made by Shri Hemant Singh in
favour of the plaintiff-appellant was, therefore, legal and valid by all means G
and the denial of title of the plaintiff-appellant by the respondent con-
stituted a ground for his eviction under the Law. He further submitted that
the High Court committed a serious error in reappreciating the evidence
... and upsetting the well reasoned judgments and concurrent findings of fact
recorded by the two Courts with regard to the bonafide necessity of the
suit accommodation by. the plaintiff-appellant which was not permissible by H
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A virtue of the mandate contained in the provisions of Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.

7. As against this learned counsel appearing for the defendant -
respondent submitted that the plaintiff-appellant did not plead as to how
Shri Hemant Singh became the owner of the suit property belonging t<'
B Late Maharaja Udaibhan Singh and there was no proof that he was
adopted as a son to Shri Udaibhan Singh and that by mere recognition of
Shri Hemant Singh by the President of India as successor to Late Udaibhan
Singh, it does not make him successor to personal properties of the Late
Maharaja. He submitted that in fact the respondent had obtained the suit
c premises on rent from Late Smt. Malvender Kaur, the widow of Late
Maharaja Udaibhan Singh and there was no privity of any contract between
Shri Hemant Singh and the respondent. He also contended that since the
view taken by the Trial Court and the first appellate Court is contrary to
the weight of the evidence on record and perverse and, therefore, the High
Court was fully justified in reappreciating the evidence and recording its
--
D own findings.

8. After giving our anxious and serious consideration to the
aforementioned rival contentions we find considerable force and substance
in the submissions made by learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant.
E
9. It may be pointed out that it is well settled law that the question
of title of the property is not germane for decision of the eviction suit. In
a case where a plaintiff instituted a suit for eviction of his tenant based on
the relationship of the landlord and tenant, the scope of the suit is very
much limited in which a question of title cannot be gone into because the
F suit of the plaintiff would be dismissed even if he succeeds in proving his
title but fails to establish the privity of contract of tenancy. In a suit for
eviction based on such relationship the Court has only to decide whether
the defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff or not, though the question of
title if disputed, may incidentally be gone into, in connection with the
G primary question for determining the main question about the relationship
between the litigating parties. In L.l.C. v. India Automobiles & Co., [1990)
4 SCC 288 at para 21, this Court had an occasion to deal with similar
controversy. In the said decision this Court observed that in a suit for
eviction between the landlord and tenant, the Court will take only a plima
H f acie decision on the collateral issue as to whether the applicant was
RANBIR SINGH v. ASHARFI LAL (FAIZANUDDIN, J.] 855

landlord. If the Court finds existence of relationship of landlord and tenant A
between the parties. It will have to pass a decree in accordance with law.
It has been further observed that all that the Court has to do is to satisfy
itself that the person seeking eviction is a landlord, who has p1ima f acie
right to receive the rent of the property in question. In order to decide
whether denial of landlord's title by the tenant is bonafide the Court may B
have to go into tenant a contention on the issue but the Court is not to
decide the question of title finally as the Court has to see whether the
tenant's denial of title of the landlord is bonafide in the circumstances of
the case.

10. Here it may be pointed out that Rajasthan Premises (Control of C
Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 was also extended and made applicable to

- Dholpur at the relevant time when the present suit was instituted in the
year 1977. Clause (III) of Section 3 of the said Act defines landlord to
mean any person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive
the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or as an agent, D
trustee, guardian or receiver or any other person or who would so receive
or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant.
Clause (VII) of Section 3 further defines tenant as the person by whom or
on whose account on behalf rent is, or but for a contract express or implied
would be, payable, for any premises to his landlord including the person
who is continuing in its possession after the termination of his tenancy E
otherwise than by a decree for eviction passed under the provisions of this
Act having regard to the aforementioned facts and circumstantial and the
provisions of law it has to be seen whether the plaintiff has been successful
in establishing that he is the landlord of the suit premises and the defendant
is a tenant thereof.
F
11. It cannot be disputed that the plaintiff had brought the suit for
eviction of the respondent-respondent on the basis of tenancy. The plaintiff
clearly pleaded that he purchased the suit premises from Shri Hemant
Singhji Ex-Ruler of Dholpur and successor of Late Maharaja Udaibhan
Singhji on 10-10-1972, which fact was brought to the notice of the defen- G
dant who attorned the tenancy and agreed to pay the rent at the rate of
Rs. 40 per month (vide para - 2 and 3 of the Plaint). The defendant paid
the rent for the months of November and December, 1972 but defaulted
-... . ._ thereafter. The plaintiff, therefore, served a notice date 6.1.1976 on the
defendant terminating his tenancy. In the notice it was specifically men-
tioned that Shri Hemant Singh was adopted as a son of Late Maharaja H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Udaibhan Singh. The defendant gave a reply dated 30.1.1976 to the
aforementioned notice of the plaintiff but did not dispute the factum of
adoption of Shri Hemant Singh though he denied the title of the plaintiff-
appellant and contract of tenancy. These facts and pleadings are reiterated
by the plaintiff in his evidence also as PW 1. It may may be noted that the
defendant a:dmits that he obtained the suit premises from Late Smt.
B Malvcndcr Kaur, the widow of Late Maharaja Udaibhan. The evidence of
Ramesh Chand, PW 2 reveals that the defendant is the tenant of the
plaintiff and that the respondent agreed to pay rent to the plaintiff and the
rate of Rs. 40 per month. There is no rebuttal of this evidence except the
statement of the defendant himself which according to us is not trust-wor-
thy as compared to plaintiffs evidence supported by PW 2, from which it
c is established that the defendant had accepted himself to be a tenant of
the plaintiff on a monthly rent of Rs. 40 and thus there was a privity of
contract of tenancy between the plaintiff and the defendant after the
attornment. Thus, it has been sufficiently established that the plaintiff is
the landlord within the meaning of Clause (iii), of Section 3 of the Act, and
-
D the defendant is tenant within the meaning of Clause (VII) of Section 3.

12. Apart from the facts stated above it may also be noted that the
Government of India by its letter dated 13/14th December, 1956 addressed
to Shri Hemant Singh communicated that President has been pleased be
E recognise his succession to the gaddi of Dholpur with effect from
22.10.1994 and that the same was being punished in the Gazette of India
for general information. By another letter on 13.12.1956 by the Government
of India addressed to late Maharani Malvender Kaur stated that the
-
President has been pleased to recognise Maharaja Kumar Hemant Singh
as the ruler of Dholpur in succession to his Late Highness Maharaja
F Udaibhan Singh and said Maharani as the new ruler's adoptive mother will
be his natural and legal guardian to take care of the minor ruler's a interest
in every way as Shri Hemant Singh, was then a minor. It was on the basis
of these orders of the President or India that Shri Hemant Singh was
recognised as successor to the Late Maharaja Udaibhan Singh. It is true
G that his recognition as the Ruler to succeed to the gaddi of Dholpur was
not associated with any act of recognition of right to private properties as
held by this Court in Rajendra Singh v. Union of India, (supra) in which
Shri Hemant Singh was arrayed as respondent No. 2, being the adopted
son of Late Ruler of Dholpur. But in the present case, as said earlier, the
H plaintiff has filed certified true copy of the deed of adoption dated
RANBIR SINGH v. ASHARFI LAL [FAIZANUDDIN, J.] 857

5.11.1954 which p1ima facie goes to show that Shri Hemant Singh was A
adopted as son of late Maharaja Udaibhan Singh. Not only this, but the
appellant in his notice served on the respondent terminating his tenancy
specifically stated that he was the adopted son of Late Maharaja Udaibhan
of Dholpur, which fact was not refuted by the respondent in his reply
thereto. That being so p1ima facie the appellant inherited the private B
properties of the late Maharaja besides being his successor to the gaddi.
In these facts and circumstances even if it is accepted that Hindu Law and
Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 were applicable to Dholpur,
inheritance of the private properties of Late Maharaja in any case,
devolved upon Shri Hemant Singh, Shri Hemant Singh therefore, had a
right to make a transfer or the suit property to the appellant.
c
13. Admittedly, the defendant denied the title of the plaintiff in
respect of the suit premises, which in the facts and circumstances discussed
above, furnished a ground for eviction of the respondent, as such denial of
title by the respondent was not bonafide. The Trial Court and the first D
appellate Court on a close analysis of the evidence also recorded a definite
finding that the plaintiffs requirement of the suit premises was genuine
and bonafide but the High Court set aside the same on unreasonable
grounds.

14. Sub-section (i) of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure E
contemplates that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree
passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High
Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
Sub-section (4) of Section 100 further provides that when the High Court
is satisfied that a substantial question of Law is involved in any case, it shall F
formulate that question, but it may be pointed out that the High Court
formulated on such question of Law on basis of which it proposed to
interfere with the findings of facts. It has been the consistent view of this
Court that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal ~m the
ground of erroneous finding of fact, based upon an appreciation of the
relevant evidence. There is a plethora of case law in support of this view. G
To quote a few references may be made to the decision in Ramachandra
v. Ramalingam, AIR (1963) SC 302 wherein this Court took the view that
even if the appreciation of evidence made of the lower appellate Court is
patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is
grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or H
. 858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A defect in the procedure and the High Court cannot interfere with the
conclusions of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court. This view has
been reiterated by this Court in Bhagwan Das v. Jiley Kaur, AIR (1991) SC
266. This being the position, the High Court was not justified in reap-
preciating the evidence and substituting its own conclusions for the well
reasoned findings recorded by the Courts of fact.
B
15. As regards the question of comparative hardship the Trial Court
and the first appellate Court both on appreciation of evidence have taken
a consistent view that the hardship to the plaintiff would be greater than
the hardship to the tenant as the need of the landlord is greater than that
C of the tenant. This also being a finding of fact was not open to challenge
in the second appeal before the High Court and the High Court should
not have interfered with the said finding also on the principles stated above.
In Bada Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan, AIR (1979) SC 272 this Court
observed that the tenant has to prove that he will not be able to get any
accommodation anywhere in the city or town concerned, before it could
D be legitimately contended that he had a greater hardship as compared to
that of the landlord. In the present case there is no such evidence or any
material produced by the defendant to show that he will not be in a position
to get alternative accommodation in the town of Dholpur for his residence.
The two courts below on a careful comparison and assessment of the
E relative advantages and disadvantage of the fandlord · and the tenant
recorded a clear finding that the hardship of the plaintiff would be greater
and the said finding should have been accepted by the High Court.

16. For the reasons stated above the appeal succeeds and is hereby
allowed. The impugned Judgment and order of the High Court is set aside
F and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is restored. We, however,
make no order as to costs.

K.K.T. Appeal allowed.