Supreme Court of India

DWARKAPRASADversusNIRANJAN AND ANR.

Citation: 2003 INSC 142
Decided: 4 March 2003
Disposal: Appeal(s) allowed
Bench: R C LAHOTI

Holding

The term "himself" in Section 13(1)(g) includes the landlord’s family members in a joint Hindu family, allowing eviction for the entire premises.

Summary

Dwarkaprasad, the Karta of a joint Hindu family, owned a property in Nasik that he let to Niranjan under a lease deed executed by all family members. He filed an eviction suit on grounds of rent default and bonafide requirement of the premises for himself, his son and his younger brothers. The trial court granted eviction on both grounds; the High Court affirmed eviction only for the son’s requirement, rejecting the brothers’ claim, holding that they lacked proprietary interest. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "himself" in Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 must be liberally construed to include the landlord’s family members, especially in a joint Hindu family. Consequently, the landlord’s requirement for his son and brothers was deemed bona‑fide, and the decree for possession of the entire premises was restored.

Issues considered

The proper construction of the term "himself" in Section 13(1)(g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.
Whether the bonafide requirement of the landlord's brothers, who have no proprietary interest, can be considered under the said provision.
Whether exclusive ownership of the property by the landlord precludes invoking family members' needs for eviction.

Legislation cited

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947s. 13(1)(g)

Subjects

rent controlevictionbonafide requirementjoint Hindu familystatutory interpretationSection 13(1)(g)Bombay Rents Actlandlord's family

Judgment

A DWARKAPRASAD
·--
v.
NIRANJAN AND ANR.

MARCH 4, 2003

B [R.C. LAHOTI AND ARUN KUMAR, JJ.)

Rent Control and Eviction:

Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947-
C Section 13(J)(g)-Suitfor eviction on the ground ofbonafide requirement-
For establishment of busines.:: ofson and brothers-Plaintiffand all his brothers
and sisters memb~rs of Joint Hindu Family-Tenanted premises let out by
joint family-Suit decreed by trial court and lower appellate court-High
Court decreed the suit only in respect of bonafide requirement for son-
D Rejection ofbonafide requirement of brothers on thi ground that they did not
have proprietary interest in the property-On appeal, held: Since it is
established that the plaintiff constitutes a joint family and held property for
benefit of entire family, the tenants are liable to be evicted as bonafide
requirement of the brothers of plaintiff is established

E Section 13(J}(g)-1nterpretation of-Held, it should be liberally
construed-Confining it to the landlord alone and not to his family will defeat
the object of the provision-The term ''lamily" must be construed so as to
include near relations of the head of the family.

Interpretation of statutes-A beneficial provision must be meaningfully
F construed so as to advance the object of the Act.

Words and phrases:

'Himself' and 'Family'-Meaning of in the context of Section 13(1){g)
of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.
G
Plaintiff-landlord filed a suit for eviction against respondent-tenant
on ground of default in payment of rent and bonafide need of the premises
for establishment of new business of his younger brothers and his son. The
landlord-appellant was karta of the Joint Hindu Family consisting of his
H brothers, sisters and mother. The lease deed with respect to the tenancy
580
DW ARKAPRASAD v. NIRANJAN 581
was executed by all the family members of the plaintiff and the property A
was let out for meeting the financial requirements of Joint Hindu Family.
During trial plaintiff had deposed that he and his brothers were members
of the joint family. Trial court decreed the suit on both grounds and lower
appellate Court rejected the ground regarding default in payment of rent
but maintained the decree on the ground of bonajide requirement. High
Court accepted need for establishment of the son but rejected the need of B
the brothers on the ground that requirement of brothers could not be
considered as they did not have any proprietary interest in the property
and thus partly affirmed the decree.

In appeal to this Court appellant contended that word 'himselr C
occurring in Section 13(l)(g) of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House
Rates (Control) Act, 1947 has to be liberally construed so as to include
the requirement of the family members of the plaintiff and the same cannot
be confined to the plaintiff alone.

Respondent-tenant contended that need of the brothers cannot be D
taken into consideration in view of the fact that property was owned by
the landlord exclusively.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I. Normally, rent legislations are meant for the benefit of E
the tenants but the rent statutes contain exceptions in favour of the
landlord which give him a right to evict the tenant, the most important
being to ensure that he gets payment of rent regularly and promptly and
that in case the tenanted premises is required by him for his personal need,
he is able to get its possession from the tenant. So the provision regarding
eviction of tenant to meet the personal requirement of the landlord with F
respect to the premises is a provision for the benefit of the lan.dlord.
(587-C-D]

2. In the present case, the plaintiff has pleaded right from the
beginning that he constitutes a joint family with his mother, brothers and G
sisters. It is also in evidence that the plaintiff holds the property for the
benefit of the entire family. Even when the plaintiff is sole owner of the
property, it is open to him to use the property for the benefit of his larger
family which includes his brothers and sisters. The respondent-tenant
cannot dispute the fact about the plaintifrs constituting a joint family
because it is specifically provided in the lease deed which is an admitted H
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A document. Moreover, the defendant had not led any evidence to contradict
or dispute this plea. 1587-E-Fl

3. The ground of eviction contained in sub-section (g) of Section 13(1)
of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
has to be liberally construed. Confining it to the landlord alone will defeat
B the very object of the provision. A beneficial provision must be
meaningfully construed so as to advance the object of the Act. The term
"family" must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include
near relations of the head of the family. 1586-H; 587-A; 589-E]

C Baldev Sahai Bangia v. R.C. Bhasin, AIR (1982) SC 109 and Joginder
Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, 12002] 5 SCC 397, relied on. ·-...b

Institute of Radio Technology and Ors. v. Pandurang Baburao, AIR (33)
1946 Bombay 212; Balbhadra Beharilal v. Premchand Lalchand and Ors.,
AIR (1953) Nagpur 144 (vol.40); Bidhubhusan Sen v. Commissioner, Patna
D Division and Anr., AIR (1955) Patna 496 and Kanhaiyalal v. Bapurao, (1989)
1 All India Rent Control Journal 16, approved.

4. In the present case landlord is the head of the family being the
eldest amongst the brothers. All the brothers and sisters including mother
of the landlord live with him as members of the Joint Hinllu Family. It is
E his obligation to settle his younger brothers in business as it is in his
obligation to settle his children in business. Therefore, he can legit.imately
seek eviction of a tenant by pleading that he needs demised premises to
settle his son and his younger brothers in business. The landlord is entitled
to decree for possession of the entire demised premises. 1590-D-E] -

F Kumbhar Pragji Bechar v. Parekh Harilal Jagjivan, AIR (1974) Gujarat
84, relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4731 of I999. --~

From the Judgment and Order dated I4.J.1998 of the Mumbai High
G Court in W.P. No. 5996 of 1997.
Ms. Lataa Krishnamurti and Ashok Kumar Singh, for the Appellant.

Makarand D. Adkar, S.D. Singh, Vijay Kumar, Anurag Kishore and
Vishwajit Singh, for the Respondents.
H
DWARKAPRASAD v. NIRANJAN (ARUN KUMAR, J.] 583
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
ARUN KUMAR, J. The appellant as owner landlord of Premises No.79,
Main Road, Nasik, instituted an eviction suit in the court of Civil Judge,
Senior Division, Nasik, for a decree of eviction against the respondents herein
regarding the suit premises comprising ground floor and first floor of house
bearing Municipal No.79, Main Road, Nasik. According to the averments in B
the plaint, a portion of the suit property was given on lease vide Lease Deed
dated 16. l 0.1971 to the defendants. The ground floor and first floor of the
property along with some open space formed part of the lease in favour of
defendants. The defendants had given an advance of Rs. 15,000 to the plaintiff.
The advance amount was to be adjusted out of the monthly lease charges to C
the extent of 50%. The monthly rent was fixed at Rs. 351. Thus, the defendants
were liable to pay only a sum of Rs. 175.50 each month and the remaining
half, that is, Rs. 175.50 per month was adjusted towards the advance of Rs.
15,000. The eviction suit was instituted mainly on two grounds, that is,
default in payment of rent and bonafide need of the plaintiff for use of the
demised premises by himself and members of his family. According to the D
averments in the plaint, the plaintiff constitutes a joint Hindu family comprising
his widowed mother, brothers and sisters. The plaintiff required
accommodation for the purpose of setting up new business in order to settle
his younger brothers. The plaintiff also required the suit premises for settling
his son in business. The plaintiff did not have any other premises in Nasik
which could be utilized for the said requirement of the plaintiff. It was averred E
that plaintiffs two younger brothers were not having any independent business.
They were only attending to the restaurant business carried on by the plaintiff.
According to the plaintiff so many members of the family in one business
were neither required nor it was profitable and advisable to have all the
family members in one business. The younger brothers were competent enough F
to set up their own independent business and for that purpose the suit premises
was most suitable.

The trial court decreed the suit on both the grounds pleaded by the
plaintiff vide its judgment and decree dated 28th January, 1994. The
respondent-tenant filed appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial G
court in the court of the District Judge, Nasik. The same was disposed of by
!Ind Extra Joint District Judge, Nasik, vide his judgment dated 30th August,
1997. The lower appellate court rejected the ground regarding default in
payment of rent but maintained the decree of eviction passed by the trial
court on the second ground, that is, personal bona fide need of the plaintiff- H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A landlord regarding the suit premises. The tenant filed a petition under Article
227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Bombay. By the
impugned judgment the High Court partly affirmed the eviction decree. The
personal bona fide need of the landlord qua the requirement of half portion
of demised premises for setting up business of his son was accepted while the
need for setting up of business by the brothers of the landlord in the other
B half portion was rejected on the ground that requirement of brothers could
not be considered specialty when they did not have any proprietary interest
in the property. This resulted in the landlord being granted eviction decree
only with respect to 50% of the demised premises. The premises was split
into two equal portions as per the decree of the High Court - one portion goes
C to the landlord by virtue of the eviction decree while the other portion remains
.........
with the tenant. The landlord has filed the present appeal against the judgment
of the High Court. ·

The learned counsel for the appellant confined her argument to the
ground of bona fide requirement of the landlord for the entire suit premises.
D The other ground regarding default in payment of rent is not required to be
considered. The case regarding bona fide requirement of members of family
of the appellant~landlord is based on requirement of his son and two younger
brothers. The relevant provision is contained in sub-section· (1 )(g) of section
13 of The Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947
E (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). The said Section is reproduced as under:

"Section 13 (I) (g):

that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord
for occupation by himself or by any persons for whose benefit tht:
premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public
F charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the
purposes of the trust;"

The key words which are required to be interpreted are :

"for occupation by himself'.
G
In this connection, we would like to refer to the lease deed dated 16th
October, 1971 which is the starting document with respect to the relationship
of the parties to the suit as landlord and. tenant. The lease deed has been
executed by alt the family members of the plaintiff. They am nine in all and
H include brothers and sisters of the plaintiff, the plaintiff being the eldest son
DWARKAPRASAD v. NJRAN.IAN [ARUN KUMAR. J.] 585

of late Gaurishankar Sharma. The mother of the plaintiff is also arrayed as A
a party to the lease deed along with rest of the family. Dwarkaprasad, the
eldest brother of the plaintiff in the suit has been arrayed at two places in his
individual capacity as also as head and karta of the joint family. Dwarkaprasad
Gaurishankar Sharma is described in the lease deed as an exclusive owner of
the suit property. He alone is recorded as the owner of the property in the
Government and Municipal records. However as per Para 3 of the lease deed B
at the insistance of the tenant all the brothers and sisters of the plaintiff, that
is, all the .heirs of deceased Gaurishankar Sharma father of the plaintiff, were
included as party No. I in the lease deed. Further, it is averred in the lease
deed that Dwarkaprasad Gaurishankar Sharma, his brothers and sisters are
members of joint Hindu family of which Dwarkaprasad Gaurishankar Sharma, C
that is, the plaintiff is the Karta. It is further stated in the lease deed that for
the needs of the joint Hindu family, that is, for marriages of two sisters of
the plaintiff, settling brothers in business and for some renovations in the
family property some money was taken as advance. A sum of Rs. 15,000 was
taken as advance from the tenant to meet such requirements of the family.
The lease deed is an admitted document. It follows from the lease deed that D
the plaintiff constituted a joint Hindu family with his mother and younger
brothers and sisters. They were joint in residence as well as in business. The
property was being let out for meeting the financial requirements of joint
Hindu family.

In the background of these facts what is to be seen is : Does the case
E
fall within the ambit of sub-section (g) of Section 13( I) of the Act to enable
the plaintiff/appellant to succeed in this case ? We have already quoted the
said provision. The question for consideration would be : Are the premises
in suit reasonably and bone fide required by the landlord for occupation by
himself? Really the question would be to interpret the word "himself', that F
is, what meaning is to be given to the word "himself' ? Is it to be confined
to the plaintiff alone or can it include the requirement of family members of
the plaintiff, that is, his son, brothers and sisters etc.?

According to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the word
"himself' has to be liberally construed so as to include the requirements of G
the family members of the plaintiff and the said word cannot be confined to
the plaintiff alone. While according to the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-tenant the need of brothers of the landlord cannot be taken into
consideration specially in view of the fact that the property is owned by the
landlord, that is Dwarkaprasad exclusively. Before the High Court, the counsel H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A appearing for the tenant conceded that the need of the son of the landlord
could be taken into consideration but not that of the brothers. This fact is
recorded in the impugned judgment. The High Court took the view that since
the plaintiff was the sole owner of the property he could not plead the
requirement of his brother as a ground of eviction, that is, no eviction decree
B could be passed for the requirement of the brothers of the plaintiff. It is
observed by the High Court that there was no warrant for taking into
consideration the need c:if the brothers of the landlord who have no interest
in the suit premises. Since it was stated in the plaint itself that the son of the
plaintiff would need half of the suit premises adjacent to the main road and
having frontage on the main road, the High Court accepting that the plaintiff
C could seek eviction regarding the need of his son, passed a decree for eviction
for the half portion of the tenanted portion of the property having frontage
on the main road. The eviction decree passed by the courts below was thus
modified. From the impugned judgment of the High Court, it is apparent that
so far as factual aspect of the bona fide need of the plaintiff qua his son and
his younger brothers is concerned, there was no dispute. The only contest
D was with respect to the need of the brothers. According to learned counsel
for the tenant their need could not be taken into consideration since they did
not have any right, title or interest in the suit property. This is purely a legal
question. Since there is no dispute regarding the factual aspect of bona fide
.need qua the brothers, we need not go into the evidence on this aspect in
E detail. A broad reference to the evidence on record in this behalf will suffice.
Plaintiff who appeared as P.W. I stated that he and his brothers are members
of a joint family. Plaintiff is the eldest brother and Karta of the joint family.
The plaintiff had four younger brothers. He also had four sons and there was·
need for premises for his son Jaiprakash for setting a separate business.
Jaiprakash's age at the time of deposition by the plaintiff was given as 27
F years. He further stated that there were about 11-12 male members in his
family. The present business was not sufficient to provide work to all the
family members. His Son Jaiprakash intended to set up a TV shop where
other electrical goods were also to be sold, besides doing repair work. His
brother Chanderbhan wanted to start a separate restaurant. The brothers were
G quite familiar with the restaurant business as this was the family business
started by their father which was continued by the eldest brother Dwarkaprasad.
He stated that he was ready to provide finances to Chanderbhan and Jaiprakash
for new starting businesses. The plaintiff also examined his son Jaiprakash as
P.W.2 and brother Manoharprasad as P.W.3. They supported the case of the
plaintiff.
H
.\_-
'

DWARKAPRASAD v. NIRANJAN [ARUN KUMAR, J.] 587
Learned counsel for the appellant also tried to build up a case that the A
suit property was a Joint Hindu Family property and therefore the requirements
of the brothers for their independent business could be pleaded and the suit
was liable to be decreed for that reason. This argument is contrary to the
specific averment in the lease deed to the effect that Dwarkaprasad is the sole
owner of the property. For the view that we intend to take regarding the
meaning of the word "himself' occurring in sub-section (g) of Section 13( 1) B
of the Act, it is not necessary for us to go into this question about the
ownership of the suit property any further. In our view, even as exclusive
owner of the suit property plaintiff Dwarkaprasad is entitled to seek eviction
decree against the tenant qua the requirement of his brothers who are joint
with him as one .family. C
This brings us to the legal question about the meaning tq be given to
the word "himself' used in sub-section (g) of Section 13(1) of the Act.
Normally, the rent legislations are meant for the benefit of the tenants but the
rent statutes contain exceptions in favour of the iandlord which give him a
right to evict the tenant, the most important being to ensure that he gets D
payment of rent regularly and promptly and that in case the tenanted premises
is required by him for his personal need, he is able to get its poss~.;sion from
the tenant. So the provision regarding eviction of tenant to meet the personal
requirement of the landlord with respect to the premises is a provision for the
benefit of the landlord. The question arises that should such a provision be E
construed strictly so as to confine it to the requirement of the landlord alone
or can it be extended to include the requirement of members of landlords'
family. In the present case, the plaintiff has pleaded right from the beginning
that he constitutes a joint family with his mother and brothers and sisters. It
is also in evidence that the plaintiff hoids the property for the benefit of the
entire family. Even when the plaintiff is sole owner of the property, it is open F
to him to use the property for the benefit of his larger family which includes
his brothers and sisters. The respondent-tenant cannot dispute the fact about
the plaintiffs constituting a joint family because it is specifically provided in
the lease deed which is an admitted document. Moreover, the defendant had
not led any evidence to contradict or dispute this plea. The way the case has G
been argued before the courts below also clearly suggests that the only
objection raised on behalf of the tenant was a legal objection that the need
of the brothers and sisters of the landlord cannot be considered under sub-
section (g). The fact that the pllnntiff constituted a joint family with his
brothers and sisters was never disputed,
H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A The ground of eviction contained in sub-section (g) of Section 13(1) of
the Act has to be liberally construed. Confining it to the landlord alone will
defeat the very object of the provision. At this stage, we may refer to some
of the judgments of this court as well as of various High Courts which almost
unanimously take the view that such a provision has to be liberally construed.

B In Institute ofRadio Technology and Ors. v. Pandurang Baburao, [AIR
(33) 1946 Bombay 212] the relevant words used in the Bombay Rent
Restriction Act, 1939 were: "own occupation". It was argued on behalf of the
tenant that this meant that the premises must be required by the landlord for
his occupation. Repelling the argument it was observed that the words "his
C own occupation" mean occupation of himself and all persons who are
dependant on him. The landlord had appeared as a witness in this case and
had stated that his family consisted of his son, his widowed sister, her two
daughters, two daughters of his daughter and his cousin. The Court was
satisfied that those persons were the plaintiffs dependants and therefore,
were entitled to live alongwith him. We have already made a reference to the
D evidence of plaintiff in the case in hand. The plaintiffs have stated that he
constitutes a joint Hindu family alongwith his mother, brothers and sister
besides his own wife and children. This evidence has gone unrebutted.
Therefore the word 'himself occurring in the Act which is subject matter of
the present case has to be read as himself and members of his family.

E In Balbhadra Behari/al v. Premchand Lalchand and Ors., AIR (1953)
Nagpur 144 (vol.40)] a Division Bench of the High Court was considering
the need of the widowed daughter and her cliildren as members of family of
landlords. It was observed:

"3. The main point canvassed before us was that the need of the
widowed daughter and her children must be deemed to be the need
of the landlord. In our opinion, the contention of the petitioner is
correct and must be upheld. No doubt, after marriage the daughter
passes out of the father's family and goes into that of the husband.
But the fact of marriage does not sever the blood relationship which
G exists between a father and his daughter. The existence of this
relationship does give rise to certain moral obligations. Where, in
pursuance of such moral obligations, a father affords support to his
daughter and her children, their needs become his needs."

In Bidhubhusan Sen v. Commissioner, Patna Division and Anr., AIR
H (1955) Patna 496 the Division Bench held that expression "his own occupation"
DWARKAPRASAD v. NIRANJAN [ARUN KUMAR, J.] 589
in Section l 1(3)(a) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control A
Act, 194 7 cannot be restricted only to the occupation of the landlord himself
but should be given wider and liberal meaning so as to include the occupation
of persons who are living with the landlord and are economically dependant
on him. In this case the requirement of the landlord for premises to settle his
sister's son in business who was living with him was upheld.
B
In Baldev Sahai Bangia v. R.C. Bhasin, AIR (1982) SC 1091 the
landlord had shifted permanently to Canada, he left behind his parents and
two sisters and a brother to continue to occupy the suit premises. The Delhi
Rent Control Act under which the case had arisen contains a provision under
sub-Section (d) nf Section 14( 1) to the effect that if a premises let for residence C
is not occupied by the tenant or any member of his family for a period of six
months immediately preceding the· date of filing of the eviction application,
the landlord is entitled to a decree of eviction. The question arose whether
in these facts could it be stated that neither the landlord nor any tr.ember of
his family was residing in the tenanted premises for the past six months. It
was held that the word "family" has to be given not a restricted but a wider D
meaning so as to include not only the head of the family but all members or
descendants from the common ancestor who are actually living with together
in the same house.

A beneficial provision must be meaningfully construed so as to advance
the object of the Act. The term "family" must always be liberally and broadly E
construed so as to include near relations of the head of the family. A Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in Kanhaiyalal v. Bapurao, (1989] 1 All
India Rent Control Journal 161] held that the term "family" must always be
liberally and broadly construed so as to include near relatives of the head of
the family. It would include not only the members of the landlord family but F
also those persons who are dependant on him and whose responsibility he
has accepted.

A latest decision of this Court in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal,
·reported in (2002] 5 sec 397 to which one of us (R.C. Lahoti, J.) was a party
takes the same view. In fact, this judgment contains a detailed resume of the G
entire case law on this point and holds that the expression for "his own use"
occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
Act, 1949 has to be liberally construed and should be given a wide and useful
meaning rather than a strict and narrow construction. The requirement of a
member of family of the landlord who is dependant on the landlord for H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A purposes of residence or for economic consideration can be considered as a
requirement of the landlord.

The learned counsel for the respondents was unable to dispute the
aforesaid legal position nor he challenged the findings of fact arrived at by
the courts below regarding the family of the landlord being a joint Hindu
B family and th~ requirement of the plaintiff-landlord to settle his son and
younger brothers in business in the demised premises. He cited Kumbhar
Pragji Bechar v. Parekh Harilal Jagjivan, reported in AIR (1974) Gujarat 84
in which it was held· that requirement of a member of a family who has
separated from the landlord is not the requirement of the landlord even though
C he is living V.'ith the landlord. This authority in fact supports the case of the
appellant in as much as it is observed that where a family unit consists of a
joint family wherein all members of the joint family reside together and do
business in the name of the joint family, requirement of all members of the
family shall be taken into consideration. The facts of the case in hand present
a picture which completely fits in these observations. The exception is created
D when a member of the family separates from the family. In such a case
requirement of such a.member cannot be considered as a requirement of the
landlord.

In the case in hand the landlord is the head of the family being the
eldest amongst the brothers. All the brothers and sisters inclqding mother of
E the landlord live with him as members of the joint Hindu family. It is his
obligation to settle his younger brothers in business as it is his obligation to
settle his children in business. Therefore, he can legitimately seek eviction of
a tenant by pleading that he needs demised premises to settle his son and his
younger brothers in business. This being the legal position, the conclusion is
p inevitable i.e. the plaintiff landlord must succeed and a decree for eviction is
liable to be passed in his favour for the entire demised premises. Accordingly
this appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court which has
granted only a decree for half portion of the suit premises is hereby modified.
The landlord is held entitled to decree for possession of the e:itire demised
premises. The decree for possession passed by the lower appellate court with
G respect to the entire suit premises is hereby restored. The respondents are
granted three month.: time to vacate the suit premises and hand over its
peaceful vacant possession to the plaintiff-laridlord. Parties are left to bear
their respective costs.

H K.K.T. Appeal allowed.

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