Holding

The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act’s limitation applies only to suits and not to consumer‑forum complaints; the complaint must be decided under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, which permits condonation of delay under Section 24‑A.

Summary

ELCM Exports Ltd., an export house, filed a complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission seeking damages for a delayed shipment that was held in a US customs bonded warehouse, causing the foreign buyer to reject the consignment. The Commission dismissed the complaint as barred by the one‑year limitation in Article III, Clause 6 of the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925. The appeal raised two questions: (1) whether the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act’s limitation applies to a complaint filed before a consumer forum, and (2) whether the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, allows condonation of delay under Section 24‑A. The Supreme Court held that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act applies only to "suits" as defined under CPC Section 9, and a consumer‑forum complaint is not a suit; therefore its limitation provision is inapplicable. Consequently, the complaint must be governed by the Consumer Protection Act, whose Section 24‑A(2) permits the forum to entertain a delayed complaint if sufficient cause is shown. The Court set aside the National Commission’s order and remitted the matter for fresh consideration under the Consumer Protection Act.

Issues considered

The applicability of the limitation provision of the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925 to a complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.
Whether Section 24‑A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 allows condonation of delay in filing a consumer complaint.

Legislation cited

Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925s. Schedule Article III, Clause 6
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Section 9
Consumer Protection Act, 1986s. 24-A

Subjects

Consumer Protection ActLimitation periodCarriage of Goods by Sea ActComplaint vs suitSection 24-ANational Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission

Judgment

[2009] 11 S.C.R. 275

E.l.C.M. EXPORTS LIMITED A
v.
SOUTH INDIAN CORPN. (AGENCIES) LTD. & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No.4290 of 2003)
JULY 21, 2009
B
[MAR~NDEY KATJU AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]
''.

CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 1986:

s. 24-A - Complaint - Period of /imitation - Goods C
exported - Shipment delayed and foreign buyer refusing to
accept consignment - Complaint before National
Commission - Dismissed as barred -by limitation, applying
Article Ill, Clause 6 of the Schedule to Indian Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act - Held: The provision of Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act will be applicable in a case where a suit is filed -- D
The word "suit" has a technical meaning which denotes
proceedings instituted uls 9 CPC - A complaint before
Consumer Forum is not a suit and, therefore, Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act is not applicable to the facts of the case
and the Consumer Protection Act will only apply- Sub.s.(2)-E
of s.24-A of the 1986 Act clearly mentions that,a complaint
can be entiifained under the Ac't even after the prescribed
period of two years if the complainant satisfies the Forum/
Commission that he. had sufficient cause for not filing the
complaint within the prescribed period - Accordingly, order F
of National Commission is set aside and the matter is
remitted to it for deciding the complaint afresh in accordance
with law by applying s.24-A of the 1986 Act and not the 1925
Act- Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925 - Schedule
- Article Ill, Clause 6 - Limitation. G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4290 of 2003.

275 H
276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 11 S.C.R.
-
A From the Judgment & Order dated 6.02.02003 of the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New
Delhi in Original Petition No. 285 of 1997.

Kailash Vasdev, Vipin Gogia (for Jaspreet Gogia) for the
Appellants.
8
E.C. Agrawala for the Respondents.

The following order of the Court was delivered by

ORDER
c
1. This Appeal has been filed against the impugned order
of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,
New Delhi (for short 'National Commission') dated 06th
February, 2003 passed in Original Petition No. 285 of 1997.
D
2. The facts of the case are:

The Appellant is an export house. It had booked certain
goods through respondent No.1 for carriage through respondent
No.2 to New York, U.S.A. According to the appellant, the goods
E were expected to reach in the second week or early third week
of February, 1995. It is alleged that the goods were never
delivered to the consignee in New York, although the goods had
allegedly reached New York. According to the appellant, the
goods were kept in the Custom's Bonded Ware House in New
F York which demanded US Dollars 5000 as demurrage.

3. Since the shipment was delayed and consequently the
foreign buyer refused to accept the consignment, the appellant
filed a complaint before the National Commission seeking a
G direction to the respondents to pay a sum of Rs.39,81,351/-
along with interest thereon @ 24% per annum from the date of
filing of the petition till realization due to the negligence on the
part of ttie respondents.

4.The National Commission, by its impugned order, has
H
E.l.C.M. EXPORTS LIMITED v. SOUTH INDIAN 277
CORPN. (AGENCIES) LTD. & ANR.
1
.dismissed the complaint filed by the appellant as barred by A
'lir:nitation, applying Article Ill Clause 6 of the Indian Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 1925 in which limitation of one year has
been provided for filing a complaint.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties. B
6. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that
the National Commission has erred in dismissing the complaint
.>. as barred by limitation, applying the Indian Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act, 1925 in which limitation of one year has been
provided. He further contended that this Act does not apply at C
all to the facts of the present case and instead Section 24-A
of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 will apply.

7. Article Ill, clause 6 of the Schedule of the Indian
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1925 provides: D

• ".... In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged
from all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit
is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or
the date when the goods should have been delivered. This
period may, however, be extended if the parties so agree E
after the cause of action has arisen.

Provided that a suit may be brought after the expiry of the
period of one year referred to in this sub-paragraph within
a further period of not more than three months as allowed F
by the court."

8. On a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is clear
that the aforesaid provision will be applicable in the cases
where a suit is filed. In the present case, the appellant did G
not file any suit but filed a complaint before the Consumer
For.um.

9. The word "suit" has a technical meaning which denotes
proceedings instituted under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure
Code, 1908. All legal proceedings in the country are not suits. H
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [2009) 11 S.C.R.

A There are petitions/complaints/applications before various
Tribunals or authorities but they are not suits as per Section 9
of the CPC. In our opinion, a complaint before Consumer Forum
is not a suit, and hence, the Indian Car~iage of Goods by Sea
Act, 1925 is not applicable to the facts of the present case and
B the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 will C>.JllY be applicable.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that
assuming that the Consumer Protection Act will be applicable
to the facts of the case, even then the complaint is barred by
limitation.
c
11. Section 24-A of the Consumer Protection Act reads as
under:

"Section 24-A - Limitation period - (1) The_ District Forum,
D the State Commission or the National Commission· shall
not admit a complaint unless it is filed within two years from
the date on which the cause of action has arisen.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-:section (1,),
a complaint may be entertained after the period specified
E in sub-section (1 ), if the complainant satisfies the District
Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission,
as the case may be, that he had sufficient cause for not
filing the complaint within such period:

F Provided that no such complaint shall be entertained unless
the National Commission, the State Commission or the
District forum, as the case may be, records its reasons for
condoning such delay."

12. Sub-section (2) of Section 24-A, quoted above, clearly
G mentions that a complaint can be entertained by the District
forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as
the case may be, even after the prescribed period of two years
if the complainant satisfies that he had sufficient cause for not
filing the complaint within such period.
H
E.l.C.M. EXPORTS LIMITED v. SOUTH INDIAN 279
l CORPN. (AGENCIES) LTD. & ANR.
13. Accordingly, we accept this appeal, set aside the A
impugned order of the National Commission and remand the
matter to the National Commission to decide the complaint
afresh in accordance with law by applying Section 24-A of the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and not the Indian Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 1925. If the National Commission comes B
to the conclusion that the complaint had been filed beyond the
prescribed period of two years, the National,Commission, after
hearing both the parties, may condone the delay if it is satisfied
that the delay was because of sufficient cause and if it does
so it shall decide the case on merits. c
14. We make it clear that this shall not be taken as an
expression of opinion as if we are inclined to condone the delay.
The National Commission shall be.at liberty to decide this issue
on its own merits in accordance with law without being
influenced by any of the observations made in this order. D

15. No order as to costs.

R.P. Appeal allowed.
[2009) 11 S.C.R. 280

-y
A VANNA CLAIRE KAURA THROUGH CONSTITUTED
ATTORNEY MRS. INDEERA BAWA
v.
GAURI ANIL INDULKAR & ORS.
(Arbitration Petition No. 14 of 2008)
B JULY 22, 2009
[DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
).

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 "."' ss. 11 (5) rlw 11
c (9) and 11 (12) - International commercial arbitration
agreement - Dispute between the parties - Petition for
appointment of arbitrator for adjudicating and deciding the
disputes - Held: Dispute has arisen between the parties and
it needs to be adjudicated and decided by an arbitrator -
D Arbitrator appointed - Parties directed to appear before the
arbitrator.
1<
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Arbitration Petition No.
14 of 2008.
E Under Section 11 (5) with Section 11 (9) and Section
11 ( 12) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Dinkar Singh, lrshad Ahmad for the
Petitioners. ,.,.
)r

F P.H. Parekh, Sumit Goel, ,,Shubhranshu Padhi, Vishal
Prasad (for Parekh & Co.) for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G DALVEER BHANDARI, J. 1. This application has been
filed by the applicant under section 11 (5) read wit~ section
11 (9) and section 11 (12) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, )or-

1996 for appointment of an arbitrator for adjudicating and
deciding the disputes which have ai-isen between the applicant
H 280
VANNA CLAIRE KAURA THR. CONSTITUTED ATTORNEY 281
v. GAURI ANIL INDULKAR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
~
•
~
~
and the respondents in respect of the implementation and A

...f working of agreements entered into between the applicant and
the respondent no.3 on the one hand and respondent nos.1 and
2 on the other hand on 29.1.2005 and the supplementary
agreement between the same parties on 2.2.2005.
B
2. The applicant is a citizen of the United States of
America and is a person of Indian origin .
..-. 3. Respondent no.3, Dr. Vined Kaura is the husband of the
applicant, Vanna Claire Kaura.
c
4. Respondent no.2, Anil lndulkar was doing business in
Pharmaceuticals in USA and respondent no.1, Gauri Anil
lndulkar is his wife. Respondent no.2 came in contact with the
applicant and he represented to the applicant and respondent
no.3 that there was a good prospect of business for water and D
' - ~
amusement park in India and that if the applicant and
respondent no.3 invested in India, the applicant and respondent
no.3 would get good returns on their investments. Consequently,
the applicant and respondent no.3 remitted $6,40,000 (US
Dollars) to respondent nos.1 and 2. A memorandum of E
understanding dated 7.6.2000 was entered into between the
rtrf
applicant and respondent no.3 on the one hand and respondent
nos.1 and 2 on the other. On the basis of the capital so provided
....... by the applicant and respondent no.3, respondent nos.1 and 2
"" formed a company called, M/s Splash Mountain Water Park Pvt.
F
ltd. with its registered office at Pune, Maharashtra. According
to the applicant, it was agreed that 1,67,000 equity shares of
Rs.100/- each in the said company shall be allotted as fully paid-
up shares to the applicant and respondent no.3 by way of 40%
equity shares to be allotted to the applicant as per the earlier
-< understanding. It was also agreed that respondent nos.2 and G
> _.,. 3 ·shall hold the remaining 2,50,400 equity shares of Rs.100/-
each representing their 60% shares holdings in the company.

5. According to the applicant, it was agreed by an
agreement dated 29.1.2005 that respondent no.1 who owned H

I
"-
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 11 S.C.R.
'
',.._
,.
-y
A 25 acres of land in Pune should transfer 10 acres out of the
said land along the eastern boarder thereof to the applicant in
~
lieu of the 40% contribution made by the applicant towards the
initial capital. There is a clause of arbitration in the said
agreement. In the supplementary agreement entered on
B 2.2.2005 a small modification was made that inasmuch as
respondent no.1 undertook to transfer and convey the entire 25
acres of land owned by her to the applicant instead of the earlier
agreed extent of 10 acres of land. Accordingly, respondent no.1 A
did not transfer the land, as agreed. It is alleged that respondent
c nos.1 and 2 called a Board meeting of the company hurriedly
to ensure that the applicant and respondent no.3 could not know
about the meeting and there was no possibility of their
participation in the said meeting. In the said meeting,
respondent nos.1 and 2 maneuvered to get a resolution passed
to wind up the Water Park business of the company and
D
transferred the said business to another company owned by the ·--,..:
close relatives of respondent nos.1 and 2. The land on which
the business of the company was being run was also handed
over to the said company owned by the close relatives of
respondent nos.1 and 2.
E
6. In these circumstances, the applicant had sent a legal ~
I

notice on 14.3.2006 to respondent nos.1 and 2 appointing one
Vilol Khaladkar as an arbitrator and also called upon .,.
respondent nos.1 and 2 to appoint their arbitrator. Since y

F responderltl)os.1 and 2 did not take any steps to appoint their
arbitrator, the applicant ti.led an arbitration petition in the High
Court of Bombay under section 11 of the Act. The respondents
submitted that the said arbitration petition filed by the applicant
in the High Court of Bombay was not maintainable for the
G reason that the agreement dated 29.1.2005 and the
supplementary agreement dated 2.2.2005 are in the nature of
)..
international corritnercial arbitration agreement as defined
'\Jnder the Act and, therefore, an application for appointment of
·. an arbitrator under section 11 (5) read with section 11 (9) and
H section 11 (12) of the Act would only lie before the Chief Justice
VANNA CLAIRE KAURA THR. CONSTITUTED ATTORNEY 283
;. v. GAURI ANIL INDULKAR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]
-r of India. A

7. Accordingly, the applicant withdrew the application filed
~
at the Bombay High Court. The applicant submits that the
following disputes have arisen between applicant and
respondent nos.1 and 2 and the same are required to be
B
referred to an Arbitrator and the Arbitrator is to be appointed
for the purpose of adjudicating and deciding the following
I - disputes:-
-""
...... "(a) Transfer & conveyance of 25 acres of land, as
mentioned in agreement dated 29.1.2005 and c
dated 2.2.2005, standing in the name\of Guari
lndulkar to the claimant Ms. Vanna Claire Kaura and
~ her husband Dr. Vined Kaura.

(b) Being shareholders of 1,67,000 number of equity
,_ shares of Rs.100/- each of Splash Water Mountain
D
~ Park Pvt.Ltd. in the name of Vanna Clair Kaura and
~ same number of equity shares of Rs.100/- each in
the name of Dr. Vined Kaura in terms of agreement,
dated 29.1.2005, action of Gauri lndulkar and Anil
E
lndulkar to hand over the leased land to Lessor was
illegal and consequently due to illegal closure of
business of Splash Water Park Mountain Pvt. Ltd.
~ they are liable to compensate Vanna Clair Kaura
.,., for loss of business and loss of profits
approximately to the tune of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees F
twenty lacs/ per month from September 2005, the
---+
date of Resolution passed in the absence of Vanna
Clair Kaura and Dr. Vinod Kaura and without giving
them sufficient time to respond and thereby illegally
closing the business of Splash Water Park G
Mountain Pvt.Ltd.·
--1., .----- (c) A sum of Rs.7,00,000/- per month to be paid ta
Vanna Clair Kaura by Gauri lndulkar and Anil
lndulkar in terms of compensation as stipulated in H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.
.:.
-y-
A clause 5 of supplementary agreement dated '

2.2.2005 from the date of repayment of loans and
payment of lease rent; ....
(d) A sum of Rs.10,00,000/- towards reimbursement of
expenditure incurred on travel and board, lodging
B
etc., by the Vanna Clair Kaura;

(e) Vanna Clair Kaura to be compensated by way of
payment of damages by Gauri lndulkar and Anil ~

lndulkar due to non-performance of their respective ·~
c parts as stipulated in the agreements dated
29.1.2005 and 2.2.2005;

(f) Present, pendent lite and future interest@ 24% on
the amounts found due and payable to Vanna Clair
Kaura."
D
8. The applicant prays that an independent arbitrator be j:..
appointed for adjudicating and deciding the disputes having
arisen between the parties out of the agreement dated
29.1.2005 and the supplementary agreement dated 2.2.2005
E entered into for and between the parties.

9. In pursuance to the notice issued by this court, reply on
affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondent nos.1 and 2. In
the reply affidavit, a number of preliminary objections have been )#-
....
F taken. Respondent no.1 submitted that the application filed by
the applicant is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed
because there is no live dispute pending between the parties.
It is also submitted by respondent no.1 that the applicant has
suppressed facts from this court and has been indulging in
G forum shopping and the present application is liable to be
dismissed on this ground alone.
r-.
10. It is further mentioned in the reply that the applicant has
abandoned the arbitration clause. It is further mentioned that
the MOU dated 7.6.2000 and subsequent agreement dated
H 29.1.2005 and the supplementary agreement dated 2.2.2005
VANNA CLAIRE KAURA THR. CONSTITUTED ATIORNEY 285
v. GAURI ANIL INDULKAR [DALVEER BHANDARI, J.]

were entered into by respondent nos.1 and 2 due to coercion, A
threat and harassment on the part of the applicant and
.. respondent no.3 .

11. The company by the name, Splash Mountain Water
Park Pvt. Ltd. came into existence on or about 3.7.1997. By
B
Board Resolution dated 24.6.2005, wherein the applicant
herself was present, the applicant proposed the closure of the
_.. Water Park business of the company since the same was
suffering losses. She further stated that she and respondent
no.3 would not invest any further funds to keep the business
going. As such, by way of board resolution dated 24.6.2005, c
the proposal of the applicant was discussed and thereafter i,t
was unanimously resolved that the activity of the Water Park
should be closed as of 30th Junef 2Q05.

12. In the reply, respondent no.1 has mentioned that the D
applicant is indulging in forum shopping and has filed multi..
~
pronged litigation before various forums including the Bombay
High Court, Civil Judge, Pune, Principal Bench of Company
Law Board and this court as well as the_ criminal proceedings
before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class. E
13. It is also mentioned that the applicant has invoked
arbitration by notice dated 14.3.2006 and the present
~
application is not _based on the said invocation and the'
·)I
applicant subsequently entered into arbitration on second time
on the same cause of action and as such the present F
application is barred. It is also submitted that the applicant
having invoked arbitration by notice dated 14.3.2006 and
thereafter !3bandoning the same cannot seek arbitration for the
second time for the same cause of action. Respondent no.1
also submitted that the present application is a clear abuse of G
the process of law and is liable to be dismissed.
,-+ ... .....,

14. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
carefully perused the MOU dated 7.6.2000 and agreement
~
H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 11 S.C.R.

A dated 29.1.2005 and the supplementary agreement dated
2.2.2005.

15. In my c9nsidered view, the dispute has arisen between
the parties and it needs to be adjudicated and decided by an
Arbitrator. Consequently, I request Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.N.
8
Variava, a former Judge of this court to accept this Arbitration
and, adjudicate and decide the dispute which has arisen
betWeen the parties. The learned Arbitrator would be free to
decide about his fee.

C 16. This arbitration petition is accordingly disposed of with
the direction to the parties to appear before Hon'ble Mr. Justice
S.N. Variava, a former Judge of this court at 11 a.m. on 27th
July, 2009 at Mumbai.'

17. The Registry is directed to immediately communicate
D this order to the I.earned arbitrator to enable him to decide the
;ii. \
arbitration matter as expeditiously as practicable.

18. Consequently, this. arbitration petition is allowed and
disposed of. In the peculia~ facts and circumstances of this
E case, I direct the parties to bear
I
their own costs.

K.K.T. _ Arbitration Petition disposed of:
[2009] 11 S.C.R. 287

SIME DARBY ENGINEERING SON. BHD. A
v.
ENGINEERS INDIA LTD.
(Arbitration Petition No. 3 of 2009)
JULY 22, 2009
B
[ASHOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]

_.., ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996:

ss.2(1)(d), (f), 10(2) and 11 - International Commercial c
Arbitr3tion - Appointment of arbitral tribunal - Number of
arbitrators - Dispute regarding - Held: In the instant case, the
relevant arbitration clause of agreement is silent about1: the
number of arbitrator - Therefore, s.10(2) squarely applies·-
In view of the arbitration clause read with s. 10(2)1 clear that
D
'arbitral tribunal in the instant case would be consisting of a
..., sole arbitrator - Policy decision that for contracts costing over
a particular amount B committee of arbitrators would be
composed of, cannot change the contractual clause -
Besides, the policy decision coming into force after the
contract between the parties had been entered into, the said E
policy decision cannot override the contract - UNCITRAL .
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration - Articles .
2(b) and 10(2)-Administrative Law-Policy decision vis-a7 vis,
~ contractual clause.
~ 'F
s. 10(2) - Number of arbitrators - Held: Parties' autonomy
in the arbitration agreement must be given due importance
in construing intention of parties - Parties have freedom to
change the number of arbitrators even after the contract has
been entered, and by mutual consent parties may amend the G
contract - Interpretation of commercial arbitration agreements.
-t. ·---1
Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice of International
Commercial Arbitration, IV Edition, 2004, page 185 and Mustil
287 H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A and Boyd on Commercial Arbitration, 2nd Edition, page 174,
referred ·to.

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Arbitration Petition No.
3 of 2009.

B Petition Under Section 11 Sub section (5) r/w Sub section
(12) of The Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

Oipankar Gupta, Anil Bhatnagar, Amit Dhingra, Aman ~
Leekha and Dua Associates for the Petitioners.
c Mukul Rohtagi, Syed Naqvi, Namrata ,Kapoor Sharma,
Diksha Rai Ninad Laud, Nikhil Rohtagi and Surya Kant for the
Respondents.

The following Order of the Court was delivered
D
ORDER
;i
1. This petition has been filed under Section 11 of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (hereinafter referred "the
said Act") by the petitioner praying for appointment of the
E arbitral tribunal to adjudicate the claims and disputes between
the petitioner and the respondent.

2. The petitioner is a company incorporated and existing
under the laws of Malaysia and is engaged in the business of :iv

F fabrication of all types of offshore and onshore structures and t>'-
complexes. The respondent on the other hand is the company
incorporated under the (Indian) Companies Act, 1956 and is
inter alia engaged in the business of providing engineering and
related technical services for petroleum refineries and other
G industrial projects.
3. The necessary facts of the case are that Oil and Natural
Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) invited a tender vide
~ .. ?--

notification dated November 17, 2003 for carrying work of
Survey, Design, Engineering, Procurement, Fabrication,
H
SIME DARBY ENGINEERING SON. BHD. v. 289
ENGINEERS INDIA LTD.
~
Anticorrosion and Weight coating, Laying of submarine pipeline, A
Installation of SPM, Load out, Tie-down/Sea-fastening and
various other jobs in respect of Mumbai High South Field
offshore site.

4. In connection with the said tender issued by ONGC, B
respondent and petitioner entered into a Business Agreement
on 22/01/2004 by which it was agreed that the respondent shall
-{.
quote as a bidder against the said Tender with the petitioner
as a sub~contractor for identified scope of work. The tender was
awarded by ONGC to the respondent by notice dated 10/03/
2004 for the said fabrication and installation of D-1 Well-Cum-
c
Water Injection Platform at Mumbai High South field Off-shore
site on a turnkey basis for a sum of US $ 62,3000,000/- and
thereafter an agreement between the respondent and ONGC
was entered into. Then, the respondent entered into a
subcontract with the petitioner which was signed on 29th of D
.i.,- October 2004 and for Fabrication, Load Out and Transportation
of Jacket, Piles, Conductors and Deck for D-1 Well-Cum-Water
Injection Platform Project of ONGC 13t Bombay High South field
off-shore site for a lump sum subcontract price of US $
20, 162,460/-. In terms of the said subcontract the petitioner E
carried out its scope of work in terms of its contractual
obligations. As it did not receive the full payment from the

-
-~
respondent disputes and differences between them cropped up.
These disputes between the parties remained unresolved
despite some joint negotiations between them. F

5. The petitioner by jts Advocate's notice on 19/02/2008
invoked the arbitration Clause and referred. all disputes and
differences between them and respondent to arbitration
including its claim of US $ 14,244,$12.02 and claim for loss G
ans:i damage on account of financing charges and foreign
~1 exchange and such other damages. In the said letter the
petitioner also suggested the names of a few arbitrators. The
respondent by its letter dated 26/02/2008 did not accept the
stand of the petitioner and stated that petitioner's stand to
H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] t1 S.C.R.
_,_,,___
A proceed with arbitration is premature and the respondent
requested the petitioner to withdraw the Notice Invoking
Arbitration and come out with a viable proposal to create a joint
settlement mechanism to settle the dispute amicably.

,6. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner tried to
B
show before this Court that several meetings were held
between the parties for settling the dispute amicably but the
said efforts ultimately did not succeed. However before this ..,..__
Court the learned counsel for the respondent fairly accepted the
position but disputes between the parties virtually cannot be
c resolved amicably anymore and the matter should be resolved
through arbitration.

7~ Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he
does not dispute that there are arbitrable disputes between the
D parties. Nor does he dispute.that the petitioner has invoked the
arbitration clause between the parties. The only point on which ?I.
the case is argued is that in this case. the arbitration panel must
consist of three arbitrators, one is to be nominated by each
party and the third arbitrator is to be chosen by the nominated
E arbitrators. Learned counsel for the petitioner on the other t:iand
did not accept -the said_ stand of the learned counsel for the -
respondent and submitted_ that in· terms of the agreem~nt in this·
case dispute can be decided by th~ sole: arbitrator. Matter was
actually heard before this Court on the ~for~said coptrovetSY. );.--

F
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
admittedly the arbitration clauses in the contract which govern
the rights of the parties in the matter of arbitration are as follows:

"12.1 This Subcontract shall be governed by and construed
G in accordance with the Laws of India. The Courts at Delhi·
shall have sole jurisdiction.

12.2 The Parties shall endeavour to resolve any dispute
or difference amicably through joint negotiation and when
-necessary by reference to the Chief Executive of Ell and
H
,.
I

..___ SIME DARBY ENGINEERING SON. BHD. v. 291
ENGINEERS INDIA LTD.
-or
SSE. If any dispute or difference, which cannot be mutually A
resolved by the parties, the same shall be referred to
<"
arbitration in accordance with the provisions contained in
Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which is
generally in accordance with UNCITRAL rules.
B
12.3.The arbitrator(s) shall give reasoned award in respect
of each dispute or difference referred to him. The award
~
as aforesaid shall be final, conclusive and binding on all
the Parties of this Subcontract in accordance ~ith the Law.·

12.4. The venue of the arbitration shall be at New Delhi, c
India."

9. By relying on para 12.2, learned counsel submitted that
the said clause does not indicate about the number of arbitrators
to be appointed while reciting that the matter be referred to D
y arbitration in accordance with the provisions contained in the
Indian Arbitration and Conciliation, 1996, which is generally in
accordance with the UNCITRAL rules .

.10. Learned counsel also referred to and relied on Section
1O of the said Act which deals with the composition of Arbitral E
Tribunals under Chapter Ill of the said Act. Section 10 (1) and
\. 10 (2) are as under:-
-:-- -.,.( --"10. Number of arbi(rators. - (1) The parties are free to
determine the number of arbitrators, provided that such F
number shall not be an even number.

(2) Failing the dete~mination referred.to in sub-section (1),
the arbitral tribunal shall consist ofa s-0le arbitrator."

11. Relying on Clause 12.2 and Section 10, learned G
-,...--f · counsel.submits that it is clear that arbitration in this case shall
be held by a sole or a single arbitrator. He particularly
emphasised Clause 12.2 of the agreement and Section 10(2)
of the Act which says that failing the determination referred to
in sub-section 1, the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of a sole H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R. .,..

A arbitrator. -- ~'I

12. Learned counsel submits that in the instant case .....
Clause 12.2 does not indicate the number of arbitrators and in
that event Sub-section (2) of Section 10 would apply.
B 13. Learned counsel further submits that the matter should ~
not be referred to three arbitrators as that would prolong
arbitration proceedings as three arbitrators would have to adjust
r-
their timings. Apart from that the same would result in
considerable escalation of cost.
c
14: Learned counsel has referred to a judgment of this
Court in support ofhis contention that it has been judicially
recognized that reference of a dispute to a pariel of three
arbitrafors escalates the cost and more so it is very time
D consuming.
->.t
15. .Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand
submits that reference of the matter to a panel of three
arbitrators is not ruled out if the arbitration clause is properly
construed alongwith Section 10 of the said Act.
E
•}
16. Learned counsel admitted that Clause 12.2 is silent - i,'-
about the number of arbitrators but Clause 12.3 refers to an j
expression 'arbitrator(s)'. By relying on the said expression in
Clause 12.3 learned counsel submits that the arbitration clause )<· -· J-

F thus postulates the appointment of more than one arbitrator. As
there cannot be two arbitrators which is an even number; the
minimum number of arbitrators other than one would be three.

17. Learned counsel also submitted that while clause 12 .2
stipulates that the arbitration between the parties would· be
G
governed u~der the said Act it also says in clause 12.2 that it
shall generally be in accordance with UNCITRAL rules. . t...,..,

18. Learned counsel also submitted that they have a policy
that in matters involving high stakes above Rupees ten crores,
H it should be referred to a Committee on panel of arbitrators. In
SIME DARBY ENGINEERING SON. BHD. v. 293

- -..,,,.
ENGINEERS INDIA LTD.
support of this submission, learned counsel referred to a A
Standard Contract Clauses which have been disclosed in the
counter affidavit filed by the respondent and reliance was
placed o'n the following clause:-

"The Arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the
B
Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. For
Contracts costing upto Rs.10 Crores, a Sole Arbitrator
should be appointed. For Contracts costing over Rs.10
-< Crores, a Committee of Arbitrators should be appointed
composed of one Arbitrator to be nominated by the
Contractor, one to be nominated by the Owner and the third
c
Arbitrator, who will act as a Chairman but not as umpire,
to be chosen jointly by the two nominees. The decision of
majority of Arbitrators shall be final and binding on both
parties."
D
19. Learned counsel also relied on a passage from
.'r
Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice of International
Commercial Arbitration, Fourth Edn., 2004, page 185, which
is as under:-
E
"In modern practice, despite the advantages of a sole
arbitrator, particularly in arbitrations involving heavy stakes,

... ...
preference is for appointment of three arbitrators, albeit
not without rationale. Particularly, in the area of
"international commercial arbitration" involving complex
problems peculiar to special types of disputes, eg,
F
engineering, construction, maritime and international
trading disputes, a sole arbitrator, many a time may not
be suitable for resolution of such disputes. In such
situations, the common practice is to appoint a tribual
comprising of three arbitrators. Even though it may involve G
more expense and delay than a sole arbitrator arbitration,
it is still preferred as it is more effective.· 'An arbitral
tribunal of three arbitrators is likely to prove more
satisfactory to the parties, and the ultimate award is more
likely to be accepted to them." H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R.

A 20. The learned counsel argued if the aforesaid stipulations ~-
in clauses 12.2 and 12.3 of the agreement and Sections 10(1)
and 10(2) are read harmoniously with UNCITRAL model rules,
the appointment of- a panel of three arbitrators in this case
cannot be ruled out.
B
21. These being the rival contentions-of the parties, I am
.unable to accept the contentions put-forth by learned counsel
for the. respondent for the reasons discussed hereinbelow.

22. If one looks at the Clause 12.2 of the agreement it
C should be clear if the disputes and differences are not resolved ·
mutually, the same shall be referred to arbitration in accordance
with the provisions of the said Act. Clause 12.3 stipulates the
requirement on the part of the arbitrator(s) to give reasons.

0 23. The Arbitration Tribunal as defined under Section 2(d)
-of the Act means "a sole- arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators".

-24. Section 10(2) of the Act is very relevant in order _to
resolve the controversy in this case in as much as Section 10(2)
makes it very clear where the number of arbitrator is not
E determined, the arl:>itral tribunaLshall consistofa:sole arbitrator-.
In this connection if UNCITRAL rules are referred the position
will remain the same. UNCITRAL model law on International
Commercial Arbitration also accepts the same -definition of
Arbitration Tribunal in Article 2(b). Article 10 of ~hose rules is
F almost identical with Section 10 of the said Act Article 2(b) and
Article 10 of those rules are extracted hereinbelow:-

"Article 2. Definition and rules of interpretation - For the
purposes of this Law:

(a) xxx xxx

(b) "arbitral tribunal" means a sole arbitrator or a panel ).-___,,
of arbitrators."

H "Article 10. Number of arbitrators - ( 1) The parties are free
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009L 11 S.C.R.

A in consultation with colleagues in an endeavour to arrive at an ,.,,,.-
agreed or majority determination of the matters in dispute." '
,)
(Page 184)

30. Similar opinion has been expressed in Russell on
B Arbitration 23rd Edition. At page 129, paragraph 4-035 with
reference to arbitration it has been said "Where no choice is
made, the law implied a reference to a tribunal consisting of a
sole arbitrator." In fact Section 15(3) of the (English) Arbitration
Act, 1996 provides for the same. 'r- ,Y

c 31. Mustil and Boyd on Commercial Arbitration, 2nd
Edition also contains the same statement of law. At page 174
of the said book it has been provided that "an arbitration
agreement calls for a reference to a single arbitrator, either if
it contains an express stipulation to that effect, or if it is silent
D as to the mode of arbitration."
'
32. In the instant case, the arbitration clause 12.2 is silent
,
as to the number of arbitrator. The said clause re?d with
Section 10(2) of the Act makes it very clear that arbitral tribunal
E in the instant case would be consisting of a sole arbitrator.

33. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred
to its policy decision which has been quoted hereinabove.
Such policy decision cannot change the contra\;fual clause. In
any event the contract between the parties was entered into in ~
F 2004. The said policy decision came into effect in 2005.
Therefore, the said policy decision cannot in any way override
contract between the parties.

34. The parties autonomy in the arbitration agreement must
G be given due importance in construing the intention of the
parties. In so far as reference to the expression 'arbitrator(s)'
in clause 12.3 is concerned, the same does not in any way )o--r
affect the intention of the parties in clause 12.2.

35. It is noted in this connection that parties have freedom
H
SIME DAR6Y !;NGINEERING SON. SHP. v. 297
ENGINEERS INDIA LTD.

to change the number of arbitrator even after the contract has A
been entered and by mutual consent the parties may amend
the contract. If that takes place, in such cm eventuality cla1,1se
12.3 provides that the arbitrator or arbitrators have to give.
reasoned award in respect of each dispute and differencH
referred. Here also the expression which has been used is 'him' . B
which also points to a sole arbitrator.

36. It is clec;1rly provided in the said Act that an arbitrCll
tribunal can, if necessary, take the help of experts in terms of
Section 27 of· the said Act. If the sole arbitrator requires the · C
assistance of an expert it can always take such assistance.
. ;:
37. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned counsel for the respondent '
has fairly submitted that if his argument is not accepted by the .
Court then his client has no objection to the appointment of
Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.P . Wadhwa, a former Judge of this D
Court, to be the sole arbitrator in this case. The name of Justice
Wadhwa also finds place in the li:;t of names suggested by the
petitioner. Therefore, appointment of Justice Wadhwa is fairly
by consensus.
E
38. Since I am unable to accept the argument of learned
counsel for the respondent, I accordingly appoint Justice D.P, ·
Wadhwa, a former Judge of this Court, the sole arbitrator in
this case.

39. The Hon'ble arbitrator is requested to decide the F
dispute as early as possible and preferably within a period of
six months from the date of entering upon the reference. The
terms of arbitration proceeding are left to be decided by
learned arbitrator.
G
40. The petition is allowed accordingly. No order as to
costs.

R.P. Petition allowed.

H