E. PARASHURAMAN (D) BY LRS.versusV. DORAISWAMY (D) BY LRS.

                   E. PARASHURAMAN (D) BY LRS.                               A
                               v.
                    V. DORAISWAMY (D) BY LRS.

                         NOVEMBER 18, 2005

                 [B.P. SINGH AND ARUN KUMAR, JJ.]                            B


     Rent Control and Eviction:

     Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961: Sections 2J(a) and (h).               c
       Eviction petition-Jura/ relationship of landlord and tenant-Existence
o/-Bonafide personal need-Property of which rented premises formed a
part was owned by the Corporation which had leased out the building in
favour of one 'DH' for a period often years-In a civil suit decree was passed
favour of 'DH'- 'DH' assigned the decree in favour of 'D ', predecessor-in- D
 interest of the landlord-Sale deed was executed by the Court on behalf of the
judgment debtor and in favour of 'D '- 'D' filed a suit for eviction of the
 tenant under S. 21(a) and (h)-In terms a/Will executed by him, his daughter,
 the landlord was brought on record as his LRs-Tria/ court held Jura/ ·
 relationship existed between landlord and tenants and allowed the eviction E
petition-High Court afjirme~ the decision-Correctness of-Held: The
 question ofbonafide personal need is a pure question offact-The landlord
 under the Karnataka Rent Control Act need not be the owner of the premises-
 The question which arises is not whether 'D' was the owner of the premises,
but whether he was the 'landlord' who could sustain an eviction proceeding
under the Act-Since a "landlord" under the Rent Act can maintain a suit for F
eviction even without being the owner ofthe premises, jural relationship existed
between the landlord and the tenant-Hence, eviction petition rightly allowed

      The property in question of which the rented premises formed a part
was owned by the Corporation which had leased out the building to one        G
'DH' for a period of 10 years. In a civil suit decree had been passed in
favour of 'DH' directing the vendors to execute the reconveyJnce deed in
favour of 'DH' and to deliver all documents in their possession. 'DH'
assigned the decree in favour of 'D', the predecessor-in-interest of the

                                   329                                       H
     330                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

. A respondents. Sale deed was executed by the Court on behalf of the
     judgment debtor and in favour of 'D'.

           'D' filed a suit for eviction of the appellants under Section 21(a) and
     (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961. During the pendency of the
     eviction suit 'D' died. In terms of the Will executed by him, his daughter,
 B   the respondent, was brought on record as his legal representative.

           The trial court held that jural relationship of landlord and tenant
     was established between the parties and that the eviction petition was
     maintainable. The trial court allowed the eviction petition on the ground
 C   of bona.fide personal need of the respondent-landlord. The High Court
     dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellants holding that once
     the relationship of landlord and tenant was admitted, it continued to exist
     until it was put to an end in a manner known to law. The High Court also
     held that the mere claim of the Corporation claiming to be the owner,
     could not affect the rights and obligations of the parties as landlord and
 D   tenants. Hence the appeal.

           On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that the need of the
     respondent was fully met as she had come in possession of other portions
     of the building which were earlier occupied by two other tenants.

 E         Dismissing the appeal, the Court

           HELD: 1; The question as to the existence of bona.fide personal need
     is a pure question of fact and there is no reason to interfere with the finding
     of the High Court on this issue. (337-C)
 F
         2.1. The landlord under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 need
  nfilt be the owner of the premises. Secondly, the mere dismissal of the suit
  did not, as a consequence, confer title on the Corporation in respect of
  the property in question. In fact a subsequent suit filed by the Corporation
  for a declaration that the sale deed executed in favour of 'D' was null and
G void was also dismissed. In these circumstances whatever may be the
  dispute between the Corporation and the respondent, the appellants
  certainly cannot take advantage thereof, once having admitted that they
  were inducted as tenants by 'D', the predecessor-in-interest of the
  respondent. In the suit filed by the Corporation a prayer was made for a
H direction to the respondent as well as to the appellants to handover vacant
            E. PARASHURAMAN(D)BYLRS. v. V. DORAISWAMY(D)BYLRS.            331
possession of the premises to the Corporation. The appellants derive their       A
                                                                                     . .1
right to continue in possession of the premises only through t~e respondent.
                                                       [337-F, G, H; 338-A]

      2.2. There was no extinguishment of title of the respondent, even
though there may be some dispute about it with the Corporation. It is well
settled that entries in the revenue record may, at times, raise a                B
presumption, but do not conclusively confer title. [338-B)

      D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagdish, [1987) 4 SCC 424, held inapplicable.

      3. The exception to the rule of estoppel embodied under Section 116
of the Evidence Act, 1872 arises if it is shown that since the d.ate of the      C
tenancy the title of the landlord came to an end, or that he was evicted by
a paramount title holder, or that even though there was no actual eviction
or dispossession from the property, under a threat of eviction, the tenant
had attorned to the paramount title holder and a new jural relationship
of landlord and tenant had come into existence between them. Such a              D
situation has not arisen in the instant case. In this case there is no finding
that the title of the landlord has come to an end. The Corporation has
not established its title in any proceeding in accordance with law. In these
circumstances, the exemption to the rule of estoppel embodied in Section
116 of the Evidence Act cannot be pleaded by the appellants. [338-D, E)
                                                                                 E
     D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagdish, (1987) 4 SCC 424 and A. V.G.P.
Chettiar and Sons v. T. Pa/anisamy Gounder, (2002) 5 SCC 337, held
inapplicable.

      4. In the instant case the relationship between the parties was not        F
created by the Government or Corporation and hence the appellants
cannot derive any benefit and claim exemption under Section 2(7) of the
Act. (339-E)

      Bharat Coal Mines Ltd. v. Kannappa, (1988) 3 Kar. L.J. (DB), referred
to.

      5. The High Court rightly took the view that the question which
arises in ttie instant proceeding is not whether 'D' was the owner of the
premises, but whether he was the "landlord" who could sustain an eviction
proceeding under the Act Since a "landlord" under the Rent Act can
                                                                                 H
    332                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   maintain a suit for eviction even without being the owner of the premises, ·
    the submission based on Section 152 of the Indian Succession Act, 1959
    must be rejected. In any event, there is no finding that the testator had
    got tile to the premises in question at the time of his death. (340-A, BJ

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3502of2004.
B
         From the Judgment and Order dated 15. 7.2003 of the Karnataka High
    Court in H.R.R.P. No. 210 of 2000.

                                        WITH
c         C.A. No. 3503 of 2004.

          R.S. Hegde, Ms. S. Pandey, Chandra Prakash, P.P. Singh and Ms. Kiran
    Suri for the Appellant.

D       Basava Prabhu S. Patil, A.S. Bhasme, B. Subrahmanya Prasad and S.K.
    Dubey for the Respondent.              ·

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          B.P. SINGH, J. These two appeals by special leave are directed again~t
E the common judgment and order of the High Court of Kamataka at Bangalore
    dated July 15, 2003 in H.R.R.P. Nos. 209 and 210 of2000. By its aforesaid
    judgment and order, the High Court dismissed the revision petitions preferred
    by the appellants/tenants and upheld the order of the 15th Addi. Small Causes
    Judge, Bangalore dated January 27, 2000 in H.R.C. Nos.10700-10701 of
     199 I thereby affirming the order of eviction on the ground of bona fide need
F   of the respondent/landlord.

          It is necessary to recapitulate the facts of the case. According to the
    appellants, the property in question, of which the rented premises fonn part,
    was owne<;I by the Bangalore Mahanagar Palike, (hereinafter referred to as
    the 'Corporation') which had leased out the building to one Mr. Dhanpal for
G   a period of ten years. In O.S. No. 436 of 1964 on the file of the Munsifs
    Court, Civil Station, Bangalore, a decree had been passed in favour of Shri
    Dhanapal directing the vendors to execute the re-conveyance deed in favour
    of Shri Dhanapal and to deliver all the documents in their possession. It also
    appears from the deed of sale executed on 9th June, 1967 by the Munsif,
H   Civil Station Bangalore, on behalf of the aforesaid vendors Smt. Lakshamma
      E. PARASHURAMAN (D) BY LRS. v. V. DORAi SWAMY (D) BY LRS. [B.P. SINGH, J.]   333

and others, that Shri Dhanapal had assigned the decree in favour of Shri                     A
Doraiswamy. The sale deed which was executed by the Court on behalf of
the judgment debtor and in favour of Doraiswamy narrates the following:-

        "Now this indenture of sale witnesseth that in pursuance of the Decree
        in OS No. 436 of 1965 and Ex. No. 425 of 1966 on the file of the
        Munsif, Civil Station, Bangalore, the Vendors l and 2 by the Munsiff,            B
        Civil Station, Bangalore, doth hereby grant and sell and transfer,
        convey and assign unto the use of the said purchaser, free from
        encumbrance of the schedule property to have and to hold the same
        with absolute liberty to own, occupy, use, transfer, deal with and to
        dispose of the said schedule property in any manner whatsoever the                   C
        said purchaser desires."

      On a reading of the sale deed executed by the Court, it appears that the
vendors therein claimed absolute ownership of the land and structures and
building thereon, and the same was conveyed to the assignee, namely-
Doraiswamy, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent.                               D
      The said Mr. V. Doraiswamy filed a suit for the eviction of the appellant
in Civil Appeal No.3503 of 2004 under Section 21(1) (a) and (h) of the
Kamataka Rent Control Act which was allowed only under Section 21 (1) (a)
and the tenant was given one month time to pay the arrears of rent. The order
was made on February 22, 1983.                                                               E
       Pursuant to Doraiswamy purchasing the property in question in execution
proceeding, the Corporation initially entered the name of Mr. V. Doraiswamy
along with Mr. Dhanapal in its record, but later realizing its mistake deleted
his name by order dated June 16, 1986. This was challenged by Doraiswamy                     F
who filed a suit being O.S. No.10815 of 1986 for a declaration and for
cancellation of the order deleting his name. The suit filed on October l 0,
1986 was ultimately dismissed on January 31, 1989 holding that the Civil
Court had no jurisdiction in view of the fact that the plaintiff was not the
owner of the property which was really a public premises. Against the dismissal
of his suit Doraiswamy preferred Regular First Appeal No.305 of 1989 before              G
the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. The said Regular First Appeal was              1




dismissed for non- prosecution on February 27, 2001 and, thereafter, a petition
for restoration was also dismissed for non-prosecution on January 10, 2002.


      While the aforesaid Regular First Appeal was pending in the High                   H
    334                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   Court, Doraiswamy claiming to be the landlord, filed applications for eviction
    of the appellants herein under various provisions of the Karnataka Rent Control
    Act including Section 21 (l) (h) thereof. The said applications were numbered
    as H.R.C. Nos. I 0700- 10070 I of 199 l. During the pendency of the said suit
    Doraiswamy died. In terms of the Will executed by him, his daughter, the
B   respondent herein, was brought on record as his legal representative.

           It is important at this stage to refer to the proceedings initiated by the
    appellants during the pendency of the eviction proceeding. It appears that the
    tenants preferred H.R.R.P Nos.1295-1296 of 1995 before the High Court
    contending that the eviction petitions were not maintainable as there was no
C   jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The said revision
    petition was disposed of by the High Court directing the trial court to consider
    the question as a preliminary issue. The trial court, thereafter, considered the
    question as a preliminary issue and held that jural relationship of landlord
    and tenant was established between the parties.

D         Aggrieved by the said order H.R.R.P. Nos:390-391 of 1998 were filed
    before the High Court a~d the High Court by its order dated September 8,
     1998 affirmed the finding of the trial court with regard to the existence of
    jural relationship between the parties. In those revision petitions the High
    Court also noticed that once the relationship of landlord and tenant was
E   admitted, it continued to exist until it was put to an end in a manner known
    to law. The mere claim of the Corporation claiming to be the owner, could
    not affect the rights and obligations of the parties as landlord and tenants.
    Thus, the High Court affirmed in revision that landlord-tenant relationship
    existed and, therefore, the application for eviction was maintainable under
    the Kamataka Rent Control Act.
F
           It appears that during the pendency of the proceeding before the trial
    court an application under Section 29(4) of the Act was filed by the landlord
    stating that he was willing to personally receive the rent from the tenant. The
    trial court directed that the rent be given to the landlord directly. This order
    of November 30, 1998 was challenged by the tenants in H.R.R.P. Nos.14-15
G   of 1999 which were also dismissed by order dated March 3, 1999.

         The trial ceurt ultimately allowed the applications for eviction on the
    ground enumerated in Section 21 ( 1) (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act,
    1961, by its order dated January 27, 2000. The appellants herein preferred
H   H.R.R.P. Nos.209-210 of 2000 impugning the eviction order passed by the
      E. PARASHURAMAN (D) BY LRS. v. V. DORAISWAMY (D) BY LRS. [B.P. SINGH, J.)   33 5

trial court.                                                                             A
       Even at the stage of admission the appellants sought to urge before the
High Court that the eviction petition was not maintainable in view of absence
of landlord-tenant relationship. The High Court noticing the earlier orders
passed by the High Court in H.R.R.P.Nos.390-391 of 1998 dated September
8, 1998 and the order dated March 3, 1999 in H.R.R.P. Nos.14-15 of 1999                  B
held that these orders conclusively decided that jural relationship of landlord
and tenant existed between the parties with respect to the petition premises,
and it stood conclusively established that the tenants are the tenants under the
respondent/landlord and consequently a petition for eviction under the Act
was maintainable. It was not open to the appellants to challenge the decisions           C
of the trial court aforesaid which were affirmed by the High Court in revision,
and which operated as res-judicata against the tenants. They could not be
permitted in law to re-agitate the same issue on one or the other pretext.
Having so recorded its finding, the High Court directed the matter to be
placed for admission on the other questions involved in the two revision
petitions. Ultimately, the matter came to be heard by the High Court, and by             D
its impugned common judgment and order the revision petitions were
dismissed.

      One another aspect of the matter may be noticed at this stage. The
Bangalore Mahanagara Palike claiming to be the owner of the premises in
question had filed a suit being O.S. No. 15139·of2000 against the respondent             E
(defendant No. I in the suit) and the appellants herein, who were defendants
2 and 3 in the suit. In the said suit the Corporation prayed for a declaration
to the effect that the sale deed executed on 9th June, 1967 on behalf of Smt.
Lakshmamma and others in favour of predecessor-in-interest of defendant
No. I was null and void and unenforceable and that the same may be cancelled             p
with direction to the defendants to handover the vacant possession of the suit
property to the Corporation. A further declaration was sought that the schedule
property belonged absolutely to the Corporation. Other reliefs such as
permanent injunction etc. were also prayed for.

     The suit was tried by the XXVIIIth Additional City Civil Judge,                     G
Bangalore. However, the Corporation filed a memo admitting that it ought to
have sought the relief under Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974. In view of the admission of the
Corporation aforesaid, the Court held that the suit was not maintainable and
accordingly the application filed by the respondent herein under Order 7                 H
    336                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A   Rule 11 read with Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure was allowed and
    the plaint was rejected. A copy of the order of the Court dated March I, 2004
    was handed over to us when the appeal was being heard.

          It thus appears that the sale deed executed by the Court on behalf of
    the judgment-debtor in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent
B   has not so far been set aside or cancelled. The sale deed purports to confer
    on the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent absolute title to the property
    in question.

          Even before us it was strenuously urged that there is no relationship of
C landlord and tenant between the parties and, therefore, an application for
     eviction under the Karnataka Rent Control Act was not maintainable. We
    have earlier noticed that this submission was urged by the appellants at'
    earlier stages in the proceeding. When the issue was tried as a preliminary
     issue and the trial court found that the jural relationship did exit, a revision   t
     was preferred before the High Court which was dismissed. The, material on
D    record also discloses that the same plea was taken in opposition to the
    application filed by the la::idlord under Section 29(4) of the Act and the same
    was again rejected. A revision against the said order was also dismissed by
    the High Court. It is also admitted by the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3503
    of 2004 that earlier a suit for eviction had been filed by the landlord under
E    Section 2l(l)(a) and (h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act which was partially
    decreed and the tenant was directed to pay the arrears of rent by order dated
    February 22, 1983. The High Court in its earlier order dated September 6,
    2000 has also referred to these facts and held that these orders having attained
    finality it was not open to the appellants to reopen the issue and to reagitate
    the same question over again. Apart from the finding of the High Court, the
F   undisputed position is that the appellants were inducted as tenants by
    Doraiswamy. Doraiswamy claimed to be the absolute owner of the property
    pursuant to the sale deed executed by the Court in his favour in execution
    proceeding. It is, therefore, apparent that the appellants were inducted as
    tenants by Doraiswamy, their landlord. The question as to whether Doraiswamy
    was the absolute owner of the property is not relevant in considering the
G   question whether there existed the jural relationship of landlord and tenant
    between the parties. The appellants had been paying rent to Doraiswamy.
    These facts lead to the inescapable conclusion that relationship of landlord
    and tenant existed, and the several orders passed by the trial court and the
    High Court in this regard cannot be faulted. On facts, therefore, we find that
H   the appellants cannot deny the· fact that they were inducted as tenants by
          E. PARASHURAMAN (D) BY LRS. v. V. DORAISWAMY (D) BY LRS. [B.P. SINGH, J.]   33 7
    Doraiswamy, the father of the respondent and her predecessor-in-interest.                A
           It was then urged before the High Court that the need of the respondent
    was fully met as she had come in possession of other portions of the building
    which were earlier occupied by two other tenants. In any event, it was argued,
    the right to sue did not enure to the benefit of the respondent since the
    requirement pleaded by Doraiswamy, her late father, was not for the benefit              B
    of the present respondent. The High Court has elaborately considered this
    submission and negatived it. We have been taken through the judgment of
    the High Court and we find no reason to take a different view. The question
    as to the existence of bona fide personal need is a pure question of fact and,
    we find no reason to interfere with the finding of the High Court on this                C
    issue.

           It was submitted before us that in the facts and circumstances of this
    case the tenants were justified in challenging the claim of the respondent to
     be the landlord. It was argued that the tenancy, if any, was created at an
    earlier stage and thereafter certain developments took place which justified D
     the appellants' challenge to the right of the landlord to seek their eviction. In
     this context it was submitted that after the court sale, though the name of
     Doraiswamy was added in the record maintained by the Corporation, his
    name was subsequently deleted. Doraiswamy, thereafter, filed a suit for
    declaration and also a decree for cancellation of the order deleting his name. E
    The suit was dismissed on the ground of want _of jurisdiction and the appeal
    preferred against the said judgment and order was also dismissed. Therefore,
     it was submitted, that the order of the Civil Court dismissing the suit filed by
    Doraiswamy attained finality. On the basis of these facts it was contended
    that Doraiswamy ceased to be the owner of the property and consequently
    could ·not exercise the rights conferred upon a landlord by the statute. The F
    submission must be rejected-firstly, for the reason that the landlord under
    the Karnataka Rent Control Act need not be the owner of the premises.
    Secondly, the mere dismissal of the suit did not, as a consequence, confer
    title on the Corporation in respect of the property in question. In fact we have
    noticed that a subsequent suit filed by the Corporation for a declaration that G
    the sale deed executed in favour of Doraiswamy was null and void was also
    dismissed. In these circumstances whatever may be the dispute between the
    Corporation and the respondent, the appellants certainly cannoJ take advantage
    thereof, once having admitted that they were inducted as tenants by


-   Doraiswamy, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent. It is also interesting
    to note that in the suit filed by the Corporation a prayer was made for a                H
    338                       SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A direction to the respondent as well as to the appellants herein to handover
    vacant possession of the premises to the Corporation. The appellants derive
    their right to continue in . possession of the premises only through the
    respondent. The judgment relied upon by the appellants in D. Satyanarayana
    v. P. Jagdish, [1987] 4 SCC 424 is clearly distinguishable on the facts of the
B   case. In our view there was no extinguishment of title of the respondent, even
    though there may be some dispute about it with the Corporation .. It is well
    settled that entries in the revenue record may, at times, raise a presumption,
    but do not conclusively confer title.

           We ·have carefully examined the decisions of this Court in D.
C   Satyanarayana v. P. Jagdish (supra) and A. V.G.P. Chettiar and Sons and
    Ors. v. T. Palanisamy Gounder, [2002] 5 SCC 337 and we are of the view
    that the principles laid down therein are not applicable to the facts of this
    case. The exception to the rule of estoppel embodied under Section 116 of
    the Evidence Act arises if it is shown that since the date of the tenancy the
D title of the landlord came to an end, or that he was evicted by a paramount
    title holder, or that even though there was no actual eviction or dispossession
    from the property, under a threat of eviction, the tenant had attomed to the
    paramount title holder and a new jural relationship of landlord and tenant had       r
  · come into existence between them. Such a situation has not arisen in the
    instant case. In this case ·there is no finding that the title of the landlord has
E come to an end. The Corporation has not established its title in any proceeding
    in accordance with law. In these circumstances the exception to the rule of
    estoppel embodied in Section 116 of the Evidence Act cannot be pleaded by
   ·the appellarifs.

          'it was then submitted before us that in view of the provisions of Section
F    2(7)of the Kamataka Rent Control Act, 1961 the proceeding under Section
    21' ther~~{ was not. maintainable at the instance of the respondent. This
    arg'unient again, assumes the existence of title in the Corporation and proceeds
    ~n the basis that the premises belong to the Corporation. Such a submission
    was not even advanced before the High Court. Learned counsel submitted
G   that In ah application under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
    the appellant in Civil Appeal No.3503 ·of 2004 had raised an objection to the
    juriS4iction of the Court. We have perused the aforesaid applicat!on and we
    fi~d that there. is no mention of Section 2(7) of the Act nor is there any plea
    raised in the said appilcation to the effect that the court had no jurisdiction
    since the premises belonged to the Corporation. The only objection· raised
H
      E. PARASHURAMAN (D) BY LRS. v. V. DORAISW AMY (D) BY LRS. [B.P. SINGH, J.]   339
therein was that there did not exist jural relationship of landlord and tenant           A
between the parties. The objection however, was sought to be raised before
us for the first time. In the proceeding giving rise to these appeals the
Corporation was not even a party and, therefore, the disputed question as to
whether the title holder was the Corporation or the respondent could not have
been gone into, and no finding could be recorded against the Corporation.
 We do not, therefore, wish to go into this question for the first time in these         B
appeals particularly in the absence of the Corporation. Moreover, as we have
noticed earlier, the suit filed by the Corporation for declaration of its title was
dismissed. The sale deed executed in favour of the landlord by the court in
the execution proceeding has not yet been declared by any court to be null
and void. Counsel for the respondent was, therefore, justified in submitting             C
that the question now sought to be urged, namely, whether title vests in the
Corporation or not, would necessitate a finding on a jurisdictional fact, which
must be pleaded and proved by the party raising the objection. The submission,
therefore, based on lack of jurisdiction of the court in view of the provisions
of Section 2(7) of the Act cannot, in the facts of this case, be entertained for
the first time by this Court, and we accordingly reject the same.                        D

      We may, however, notice the submission UJ4ged on behalf of the
respondent that the provision of Section 2(7) of the A.ct will not apply because
the provision was enacted to except the provision of the Act from governing
government premises and legal relationships created by governments and                   E
other authorities and bodies mentioned in the sub-section. In the instant case
the relationship between the parties was not created by the government or
corporation and hence the appellants cannot derive any benefit and claim
exemption under Section 2(7) of the Act. In this connection reference was
made to the decision of the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in
Bharat Coal Mines Ltd and Anr v. Kannappa and Anr., (1988) 3 Kar. L.J.                   F
327 (DB). Since we have not entertained this submission, it is not necessary
for us to express any opinion in this regard.

      Lastly it was faintly submitted that the respondent has come on record
as a legal representative of Doraiswamy under a Will, but she had no right               G
to continue with the proceeding after the death of her father on the ground
of ademption. It was submitted that the Will executed by late Doraiswamy
did not confer the right of ownership of the premises on the respondent as
Doraiswamy himself was not the absolute owner of the premises. Since he
was not the owner of the premises, he could not bequeath that right in favour
of the respondent. This submission has been considered by the High Court                 H
    340                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A and rejected. In our view the High Court rightly took the view that the
    question which arises in the instant proceeding is not whether Doraiswamy
    was the owner of the premises, but whether he was the "landlord" who could
    sustain an eviction proceeding under the Act. Since a "landlord" under the
    rent Act can maintain a suit for eviction even without being the owner of the
    premises, the submission based on Section 152 of the Indian Succession Act,
B   1959 must be rejected. In any event, there is no finding that the testator, had
    got title to the premises in question at the time of his death.

          We, therefore, find no merit in these appeals, and they are accordingly
    dismissed. No costs.

c V.S.S.                                                       Appeal dismissed.