Holding

The petitioner is entitled only to the 1008 MT originally awarded and the additional 1008 MT ordered on 6 September 1999; the later order increasing the entitlement to 6800 MT is set aside.

Summary

Eastern Coalfields Ltd. purchased 1.26 acres of land from Dugal Kumar and, under its policy, offered 1008 metric tons (MT) of coal, which the petitioner accepted and was released. After a ten‑year delay, the petitioner filed a writ petition seeking an additional 1008 MT of coal; the Calcutta High Court, on the basis of the company's counsel’s statement that a “usual order” could be passed, directed the company to allot the balance 1008 MT. The High Court later, without any application, altered the order to 6800 MT, which the company challenged. The Supreme Court examined the High Court’s territorial jurisdiction, the maintainability of the appeal, the effect of delay and laches, and the validity of the second order. It held that the High Court had jurisdiction, the appeal was maintainable, delay did not bar relief, and the order increasing the quantity to 6800 MT was invalid. Consequently, the petitioner is entitled only to the original 1008 MT plus the additional 1008 MT ordered on 6 September 1999.

Issues considered

The Calcutta High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
The appeal is maintainable despite the challenge being to the review order rather than the main order.
Whether the petitioner’s delay of ten years and alleged laches preclude relief under Article 226.
The validity of the High Court’s order dated 13 September 1999 increasing the coal quantity without an application.
The extent of the petitioner’s entitlement to coal under the company’s land‑acquisition policy.

Legislation cited

Companies Act, 1956s. 617

Subjects

Article 226territorial jurisdictiondelay and lacheswrit petitioncoal allocationland acquisitionreview petitionspecial leave petitionequitable estoppel

Judgment

[2008] 11 S.C.R. 369

)r
EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. A
v.
DUGAL KUMAR
(Civil Appeal NO. 245 of 2004)
JULY 28, 2008
B
... __,, [C.K. THAKKER AND LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA,
JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 226 and 32 - Coal
company offered employment or coal to persons in lieu of c
land acquired or purchased by it- Award of 1008 MTs coal to
petitioner against land purchased by Company - Writ peti-
tion filed after a decade seeking directions to the Company to
release balance quantity of 1008 MTs coal-Allowed by High
Court by order dated 06. 09. 1999 - Subsequently, on mere
D
mentioning of the matter by counsel, by order dated
13. 09. 1999, High Court enhanced balance quantity of coal to
6008 MTs - Appeal thereagainst dismissed - SLP dismissed
as withdrawn - Review Petition also dismissed by High Court
- On appeal, held: Petitioner entitled to 1008 MTs coal
awarded to him initially as a/so balance quantity of 1008 MTs E
coal awarded to him by order dated 06.09.1999 - Order was
passed on basis of statement by counsel for Company that
usual order may be passed - Thus, objection regarding de-
lay in filing writ petition as also territorial jurisdiction of High
Court cannot be upheld - However, High Court not justified in F
.... passing order datedI
13. 09. 1999 on mere mentioning of mat-
ter without any application for modification/clarification of or-
der dated 06. 09. 99 - Hence, that part of the order set aside.
Appellant-Company formulated a Scheme whereby
G
it offered employment to a person whose one acre of land
was acquired, purchased or used by the Company. Sub-
sequently, the policy was changed and 800 Metric Tons
(MTs) of coal was offered in lieu of employment of a fam-
269 H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.

A ily member. In 1996, the policy was again modified and
the entitlement was increased to 1600 MTs. Appellant-
Company purchased the land of the respondent measur-
ing 1.26 acres and executed a registered' sale deed at
Dhanbad. As per the policy, the Company offered 1008
B MTs of coal to the respondent. The respondent accepted
the same and the coal was released. After a period of ten
years, the respondent filed a writ petition before the
Calcutta High Court seeking directions to the Company
to release additional quantity of 1008 MTs coal to the re-
c spondent. The writ petition was placed for 'first' hearing
on 6.09.1999, and in view of the statement of the counsel
for the Company that 'usual order' be passed in the mat-
ter, the petition was disposed of.. The Single Judge of High
Court directed the Company to allot "balance quantity of
1008 MTs" of coal to the writ-petitioner. Thereafter, on
0
13.09.1999, the respondent mentioned the matter without
filing any application and the High Court enhanced the
balance quantity of coal to 6800.MTs. The Company filed
appeal challenging the order of the Single Judge of High
Court. The Division Bench of the High .Court dismissed
E the appeal. Aggrieved, appellant filed SLP which was sub-
sequently withdrawn as the Company wanted to file 'Re-
view Petition' in the High Court. Thereafter, the appellant
filed Review Petition. The Division Benc.h of the H.igh
Court dismissed the same. Hence the present appeaJ.
F
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 With regard to the technical objection
raised by the Company as to territorial jurisdiction of the
High Court of Calcutta it would not be appropriate to set
G aside the order passed in favour of the writ petitioner on
that ground. It is clear from the record that the writ peti-
tion came up for admission hearing on September 6, 1999
and the counsel for the appellant-Company was. present.
Not only that he did not raise any objection as to territo-
H rial jurisdiction of the Court, he expressly made a state-
EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DUGAL 371
., KUMAR

ment before the Court to pass "usual order". Accordingly, A
an order was passed directing the Company to allot "bal-
a nee quantity of 1008 MTs" of coal to the writ petitioner.

.
Therefore, it cannot be said that the High Court of Calcutta
had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.
[Para 13] [380-C-F] B
....-
1.2 The submission that the appeal is not maintain-
able since the Company had challenged the orqer passed
in Review Petition dated January 28, 2002 and not the
main order dated February 17, 2000 dismissing intra-Court
appeal. cannot be accepted. It was submitted that when c
Review Petition was dismissed, the order passed by the
Division Bench in intra-Court appeal got merged in the
order of Review Petition. But even otherwise, when the
order passed in the Review Petition is challenged, itwould .
not be proper to dismiss this appeal particularly when D
~
leave was granted in SLP after hearing the parties. [Para
14] [380-F, 381-A]
1.3 It is well-settled that under Article 226 of the Con-
stitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appropri-
ate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the E
grounds to refuse relief by a writ Court is that the peti-
tioner is guilty of delay and laches. It is imperative, where
the petitioner invokes extra-ordinary remedy under Article
226 of the Constitution that he should come to the Court
at the earliest reason~bly possible opportunity. Inordinate F
delay in making the motion for a writ is indeed an ad-
equate ground for refusing to exercise discretion in favour
of the applicant. [Para 15] (381 B-D]
Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi 1969 (2) SCR 824;
G
Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of/ndia 1970 (1) SCR 697, Ex-
press Publications v. Union of India 2004 (11) SCC 526;
Ramchandra Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra 1974 (1) SCC
317 - relied on.
R. v. Essex Country Council 1993 COD 344; R. v. Dairy H
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 1~ S.C.R.

A Produce Quota Tribunal 1990 (2) AC 738 Lindsay Petroleum
Co. v. Prosper Armstrong 1874 (5) PC 221 - referred to.
1.4 The Single Judge should not have entertained a
writ petition in 1999 and directed the Company to release
balance quantity of 1008 MTs of coal to the writ petitioner.
B The order was passed in view of the statement of the coun-
sel appearing for the Company that the Court could pass
'j..-<
"usual order" and accordingly the order was passed. It
was also stated by the writ petitioner in the counter-affi-
davit that similar orders were passed in several matters.
c Therefore, it would be appropriate if the benefit is ex-
tended to the writ petitioner of the order passed by the
Single Judge to the extent of "balance quantity of 1008
MTs of coal", which was based on the 'statement' by the
counsel for the Company. [Para 21] [383 D-F]
D 1.5 After the writ petition was disposed of on Sep-
tember 6, 1999 wherein balance quantity of 1008 MTs of
coal was directed to be allotted to the writ petitioner, the
Single Judge was not justified in passing an order on
September 13, 1999 on mentioning of the matter without
E there being any application for modification/clarification
of the order dated September 6, 1999 and directing the
Company to allot to the writ petitioner balance quantity
of 6800 MTs of steak coal Grade-D quality.[Paras 22 and
25] [383 G-H 385 C]
F 1.6 In the light of the order dated 13.9.99, the Division
)Ii.,
Bench ought to have interfered with the direction of the
Single Judge in the order dated September 13, 1999 and
intra-Court appeal ought to have been allowed. When the
intra-Court appeal was dismissed, the appellant ap-
G proached this Court by filing Special Leave Petition. It was
dismissed as withdrawn as the Company wanted to move
the Division Bench in Review Petition. On the facts and in
the circumstances of the case, the Division Bench ought
r
to have considered the said aspect and passed an appro-
H priate order in accordance with law. [Para 24] [384 E-G]
EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DUGAL 373
KUMAR

1.7 From the totality of circumstances, the respon- A
dent-writ petitioner was entitled to the price (consider-
ation) for the land sold by him by registered sale deed to
the Company which has already been paid to him. He was
also entitled to 1008 MTs of coal which was given to him
as per the Policy. He was further entitled to 1008 MTs B.
which has been ordered to be given to him towards "bal-
ance quantity" on the basis of statement made by the
Counsel for the Company and in terms of 'usual order'
dated September 6, 1999 passed by the Single Judge. The
writ petitioner will not be entitled to anything more. If the C
said quantity of coal has already been allotted, the Com-
pany has discharged its liability and nothing more is re-
quired to be done. But if it has not released the said quan-
tity, the writ petitioner would be entitled to coal to the above
extent. [Paras 25 and 26] [384 H, 385 A-8] [385 D-E]
D
Case Law Reference
1993 COD 344 Referred to. 16
1990 (2) AC 738 Referred to. 17
1874 (5) PC 221 Referred to. E
18
1969 (2) SCR 824 Relied on. 19
1970 (1) SCR 697 Relied on. 19
2004 (11) sec 526 Relied on. 20 F
~ 1974 (1) sec 317 Relied on. 20
CIVILAPPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 245
of 2004
From the final Judgment and Order dated 28.1.2002 of G
the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta in G.A. 3319 of 2000 in
APOT No. 94 of 2000

Ajit Kumar Sinha and Shivalok for the Appellant.

R.K. Gupta and A.N. Bardiyar for the Respondent. H
374. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R

A. The Judgment of the Court was delivered, by
C.K. THAKKER, J~ 1. This appear is filed by the Eastern
Coalfields Ltd. -('Company' for short) against an order passed
by the Division Bench of the High Cburt of Calcutta on January
28, 2002 dismissing Review Petition filed by the appellant herein .
.B , l'

2. The facts of the case are that.the appellant is '.Gov~rn- -y_---...
ment Company' under Section 617 of the CompaniesAct,.1956.
A scheme was formulated by the Company to offer employment
to:a person who ·is a land loser..for 1 acre of lan_dwhich has
C been acquired, p_urchased. or used by the. Company. Subse'."
quently, the policy was ct_ianged a_nd it was also provided that
those who do not intend to get employment may be offered 800
Metric Tons_ (MTs) of.coal in lieu o_f employment of a fam.ily mem-
ber whose one acre of land .has been acquired, purchased or
used by the Company,. The policy was again modified in 1996
0
and entitlement was increased to 1600 MTs.
3. It is the case of the Company that it purchased land of ~
the respondent admeasuring 1.26 acres and registered sale
deed No. 2006, dated February 17, 1989 was executed at
E_ Dhanbad. In the light of the policy then in vogue, the respondent
was offered 1008 MTs of coal on the basis of 800 MTs per acre
since the sale was for 1.26 acres of land. The respondent ac-
cepted the said decision on February 23, 1989 and a written
communication was addressed to the General Manager stat-
F. ing therein that the land owner was not interested in getting
employment and he would be thankful if 1008 MTs of coal would
be given to him. The Authorities accepted the request and the
appellant Company vide a letter dated May 22, 1989, passed
an order to release 1008 MTs of steam Coal, Grade-D. It was
G stated that the coal would be released on fulfilling the terms and
conditions mentioned in the said communication. According to
the Company, everything was over and nothing further was re-
quired to be done in the matter. The respondent-writ-petitioner
was paid consideration for land which was sold by registered
sale deed. Over and above compensation, as per the policy in
H
EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DUGAL 375
KUMAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

force, they offered 1008 MTs of coal which was accepted by A
the respondent and quantity was also released. It was accepted
by the respondent without any protest. objection or reservation
and the matter ended there.
4. After considerable delay of about a decade, a petition
..-.- -'! came. to be filed being Writ Petition No. 770 of 1999 contend- B
ing therein that writ petitioner (respondent herein) was entitled
to additional quantity of 1008 MTs of coal and an appropriate
direction be issued to the Company to release the goods. The
writ petition was placed for 'first' hearing on September 6, 1999,
and on the same day, it was disposed of by.the Court observ- C
ing inter alia that "no affidavit in opposition has been filed", and
the learned counsel for the Company submitted that 'usual or-
der' be passed in the matter. Accordingly, the Company was
directed to allot "balance quantity of 1008 MTs" of coal to the
writ-petitioner. D
5. The said order read as under;
"Mr. D.P: Majumdar, Adv. with Mr. G. Patra, Adv. appears
and submits.
Mr. A.K. Mitra, Adv. with Md. lairsh, Adv. appears and E
submits.
The Court: No affidavit-in-opposition has been filed. The
Learned Lawyer for the respondent submits that usual
order may be passed in this matter. Accordingly, I passed F
the following order:-
The respondents are directed to allot balance quantity
of 1008 M .T. to the petitioner in terms of the release
order dated 25.5.1989 from Nayandanga Coliery,
Mugma Area. G

The writ petition is disposed of.
All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of
this order on the usual undertaking."
H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 11 S.C.R.
-.(.

A 6. It is stated by the appellant-Company that after the or-
der dated September 6, 1999, on September 13, 1999, again
the matter was mentioned by the writ-petitioner without filing
any application and the High Court modified its earlier order
dated September 6, 1999 and the balance quantity which was
B mentioned in the earlier order of September 6, 1999 as 1008
MTs was· enhanced to 6800 MTs. Again, the matter was men- -.:~·

tioned on September 15, 1999 and the order was corrected.
· 7.The Company, being aggrieved by the order passed by
the learned Single Judge, preferred an appeal being APOT No.
c 94 of2004 challenging the orders passed by the learned single
._
Judge. The Division Bench of the High Court, however, dis- r
·missed the appeal on February 17, 2000 observing that when
the order was .passed by the learned single Judge on Septem-
ber 6, 1999, the counsel for the Company appeared and no
D reply was filed by the Company. In the circumstances, the Com-
pany had "to blame itself'. The matter was thereafter taken up )>·
by the learned single Judge and even at that stage, no reply
was filed. According to the Court, therefore, there was no rea-
son to interfere with the order of the single Judge and the ap-
E peal was dismissed.
8. The Company challenged the order passed by the Divi-
sion Bench of the High Court by filing Special Leave Petition
No. 8238 of 2000. When the matter came up for admission
hearing, it was withdrawn on May 12. 2000. The said order
F mentioned that the learned counsel for the Company stated that
the Company would file 'Review Petition' in t~e High Court The >---
special leave petition was accordingly 'dismissed as with-
drawn'. Thereafter Review Petition was filed by the Company
in the High Court and as stated above, the Review Petition was
G also dismissed by the Court observing that there was "no ap-
parent error to review the order". The said order is challenged
in the present appeal.
9. Initially when the matter was placed for admission hear-
ing, notice was issued on August 12, 2002. It appears that the
H
EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DUGAL 377
KUMAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
~
Special Leave Petition was dismissed on February 12, 2003, A
but the said order was recalled by the Court on September 12,
2003. On January 12, 2004, leave was granted, printing was
dispensed with and the appeal was ordered to be heard on
SLP paper books. Parties were granted liberty to file additional
documents. Original record was requisitioned. Interim stay B
......... :;( against the order passed by the High Court was also granted .
On March 7, 2008, a Bench of this Court presided over by
Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India directed final hearing of the
matter during summer vacation and accordingly the matter was
placed before us for final disposal on May 27, 2008. c
10. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

11. The learned counsel for the appellant-Company con-
tended that tne orders passed by the High Court are liable to
be set aside. It was submitted that admittedly, the transaction
D
J. of sale took place in Dhanbad. Both the parties -the appellant
\ as well as respondent - were residing at Dhanbad The entire
"" cause of action thus arose within the territorial jurisdiction in the
State of Bihar (now within Jharkhand area). The High Court of
Calcutta, therefore, had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain,
deal with and decide the writ petition. On that ground alone, the E
orders passed by the High Court of Calcutta are liable to be set
aside. It was also submitted that admittedly sale deed was ex-
ecuted in February, 1989 by the respondent. The Company paid
the amount of consideration and offered 1008 MTs coal under
the policy then in force over and above the amount of consider- F
·~ ation of property. The writ- petitioner accepted the offer, release
order was issued and the goods had been delivered to him
which the writ petitioner accepted without any protest or objec-
tion. It was after' about 10 years that a writ petition was filed
which was entertained and orders were passed by the High G
Court. According to the appellant, there was gross delay and
laches on the part of the writ petitioner in approaching the Court
)'
and on that ground also, no order could have been passed grant-
ing relief in favour of the writ petitioner. Moreover, there was no
right-duty relationship between the writ petitioner and the Com- H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 11 S.C.R.

~
·A pany. The right of the writ petitioner was limited to consider-
ation in lieu of land sold to the Company. The said amount had
already been paid to the writ petitioner. It was only on the basis
of the policy' that coal was offered to the writ-petitioner. Even if it
is assumed that the writ petitioner had right to get coal as per
B the policy adopted by the Company, the quantity to which the
respondent was entitled was given to· him. Thereafter there was )( --;;,...

no cause for making grievance against the Company. It is only
on the basis of 1996 Policy that additional quantity was de- .
rnanded by the writ-petitioner by filing writ petition in 1999 to
c which there was no entitlement on the part of the writ petitioner.
Even on that ground, therefore, the petition was liable to be dis-
missed. The counsel also argued that when the writ petitioner
was paid consideration for land as also coal under the policy in
force and when it was accepted without any protest, the writ
petitioner was estopped under the doctrine of equitable estop-
D
pel to challenge the said decision. By his conduct, writ peti-
tioner made it abundantly ·clear that he was satisfied as to the )- :-
quantity which was offered to him and after acceptance thereof,
it was notopen to challenge the said decision. It was also urged
that the learned single Judge was not right in observing that the
E writ-petitioner was entitled to relief as prayed in the writ petition
on the ground that no counter affidavit was filed by the Com-
pany. The record reflects that writ petition was filed by the writ
petitioner on February 18, 1999. It was placed for 'first' hearing
on September 6, 1999 and on the same day, the matter was
F disposed of. It was, therefore, not proper for the Court to ob-
serve that since no affidavit was filed by the Company, the prayer )>..-

of the petitioner should be granted. A grievance was also made
that even after the decision on September 6, 1999, without there
being any application, the order was modified on mentioning
G ·the matter and the quantity was enhanced from additional 1008
to
MTs 6800 MTs which was clearly illegal and without jurisdic-
tion: In Letter Patents Appeal also, the fact of non~filing of affi-
-(
davit by the Company weighed with the Division Bench, but as
already stated, the matter was taken up and disposed of on
H one and the same day at the 'first' hearing by the learned single
EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DUGAL 379
KUMAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

Judge and there was no default on the part of the Company. It A
was submitted by the counsel that when the grievance was made
against the order passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court in the Special Leave Petition, this Court had observed
that the counsel for the Company wanted to file Review Petition
-f and SLP was, therefore, dismissed as withdrawn. But even B
..,..._ )( thereafter the Division Bench dismissed the Review Petition
which necessitated the Company to approach this Court again.
It was, therefore, submitted that the orders passed by the High
Court may be set aside by allowing the appeal and holding that
the writ petitioner was not entitled to additional quantity of coal c
and the High Court should not have ordered the Company to
supply coal.
12. The learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner
supported the orders passed by the High Court. It was submit-
ted that the learned single Judge was wholly right in observing D
~
that no affidavit was filed by the Company. Moreover, the learned
counsel for the Company appeared in the Court and made a
statement that 'usual order' be passed. Accordingly, the order
was passed and thereafter it was not open to the Company to
raise an objection against such order. An objection as to terri- E
torial jurisdiction of the Court also looses its significance in the
light of the statement made by the counsel appearing for the
Company. In the affidavit-in-reply, it was stated by the writ peti-
tioner that several similarly situated persons were granted the
benefit and additional quantity of coal was given to them. Cop- F
ies of the orders in favour of all those persons were placed on
record in the counter-affidavit. It was further stated that the policy
was modified in 1996 and additional quantity of coal was given
to land losers. Such benefit was also granted to other persons.
Refusal to grant similar benefit to the writ petitioner was viola-
G
tive of Article 14 of the Constitution. The counsel submitted that
in the circumstances, the Division Bench was right in not enter-
r taining intra-court appeal on the ground that if counter was not
filed by the Company, the Company had to thank itself. Again, it
is not true to say that liberty was granted by this Court to file
H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
~

A Review Petition. Special Leave Petition was dismissed as with-
drawn but this Court did not grant liberty to file Review Petition.
Hence, the Review Petition itself was not maintainable. The
counsel also contended that even in the present proce_edings,
the prayer is only to set aside an order pass~d in Review on
B January 28, 2002. The'main order passed in intra-court appeal t-
)(----
(dismissing the appeal) has not been challenged. It was, there-
fore, submitted that on all these grounds~no interference is called
for and the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
13;. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, in ~

c our opinion, the appeal deserves to be partly allowed. So far as
the technical objection raised by the Company with regard to
territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Calcutta is concerned,
in our opinion, it would not be appropriate to set aside the or-
der passed in favour·of the writ petitioner on that ground. It is
D . clear from the record that the writ petition came up for admis-
sion hearing on September 6, 1999 and the counsel for the ..,.,
appellant-Company was present. Not only that he did not raise ·:-
any objection as to territorial jurisdiction of the Court, he ex-
pressly made a statement before the Court to pass "usual or-
E der''. Accordingly, an order was passed directing the Company
to allot "balance quantity of 1008 MTs" of coal to the writ peti-
tioner. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the
learned counsel for the appellant-Company that the High Court
of Calcutta had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ
F petition.
)..._
14. But we are also unable to uphold the contention of the
writ petitioner that the appeal is not maintainable since the
Company had challenged the order passed in Review Petition
dated January 28, 2002 and not the main order dated February
;G 17, 2000 dismissing intra-Court appeal. It was submitted by
the learned counsel for the appellant that when Review Petition
was dismissed, the order passed by the Division Bench in in- --(
tra-Court appeal got merged in the order of Review Petition.
But even otherwise, when the order passed in the Review Peti-
H tion is challenged, it would not be proper to dismiss this appeal
1!

EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DUGAi 381
KUMAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

particularly when leave was granted in SLP after hearing the A
parties. We, therefore, reject the objection raised by the writ
petitioner.
15. As to delay and !aches on the part of the writ petitioner,
there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the
+ j
appellant-Company. It is well-settled that under Article 226 of B
the Constitution, the power of a High Court to issue an appro-
priate writ, order or direction is discretionary. One of the grounds
to refuse relief by a writ Court is that the petitioner is guilty of
delay and !aches. It is imperative, where the petitioner invokes
• r extra-ordinary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, that
he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible
c
opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ is
indeed an adequate ground for refusing to exercise discretion
in favour of the applicant.
D
~ 16. Under the English law, an application for leave for judi-
cial review should be made "promptly". If it is made tardily, it
may be rejected. The fact that there is breach of public law duty
does not necessarily make it irrelevant to consider delay or
la ch es on the part of the applicant. Even if leave is granted, the
question can be considered at the time of final hearing whether E
relief should be granted in favour of such applicant or not. ( Vide
R. v Essex Country Council, 1993 COD 344).
17. In R. v Dairy Produce Quota Tribun;:il, (1990) 2 AC
738, 749: (1990) 2All ER 434: (1990) 2 WLR 1302, the House F
~
of Lords stated;
"The public interest in good administration requires that
public authorities and third parties should not'be kept in
suspense as to the legal validity of a decision the authority
has reached in purported exercise of decision making G
powers for any longer period than is absolutely necessary
""')-
in fairness to the persons affected by the decision".
18. The underlying object of refusing to issue a writ has
been succinctly explained by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay
H
L
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 ?.C.R.

A Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong, ( 18 74) 5 PC 221 : 22
WR492 thus;
"Now the doctrine of !aches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be
practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the
8 party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be
regarded as equivalent to a. waiver of it, or where by his
conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving
that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which
it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy
c were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
la.pse of time and delay are most material. But in every
case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would
be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course
not amounting to a bar by any statute or limitations, the
D validity of that defence must be tried upon principles
substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always
important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and
the nature of the acts done during the interval, which
might affect either party and cause a balance of Justice
E or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far
as it relates to the remedy."
(emphasis supplied)
19. This Court has accepted the above principles of En-
F glish law. In Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 2
SCR 824 and Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1
SCR 697, this Court ruled that even in cases of violation or in-
fringement of Fundamental Rights, a writ Court may take into
account delay and laches on the part of the petitioner in ap-
G proachjng the Court. And if there is gross or unexplained delay,
the Court may refu,se to grant relief in favour of such petitioner.
20. It is not necessary for us to refer to several decisions
on this point wherein a similar view has been taken by this Court.
Suffice it to say that in Express Publications v. Union of India,
H (2004) 11 SCC 526, this Court ~eferring to Tilokchand
EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DUGAL 383
KUMAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.]
~
Motichand, Rabindranath Bose and Ramchandra Deodhar v. A
State of Maharashtra, ( 1974) 1 SCC 317, explained the prin-
ciple thus;
"No hard and fast principle can be laid down that under no
circumstances delay would be a relevant consideration in
judging constitutional validity of a provision. It has to be B
... 'f
-:- remembered that the constitutional remedy under Article
32 is discretionary. In one case, this Court may decline
discretionary relief if person aggrieved has slept over for
long number of years. In another case, depending upon
the nature of violation, court may ignore delay and c
pronounce upon the invalidity of a provision. It will depend
from case to case."
(emphasis supplied)
21. Prima facie, we are satisfied that the learned single D
Judge should not have entertained a writ petition in 1999 and in
directing the Company to release balance quantity of 1008 MTs
of coal to the writ petitioner. But as observed earlier, the order
was passed in view of the statement of learned counsel ap-
pearing for the Company that the Court could pass "usual or- E
der" and accordingly the order was passed. It was also stated
by the writ petitioner in the counter-affidavit that similar orders
were passed in several matters. It would, therefore, be appro-
priate if we extend the benefit to the writ petitioner of the order
passed by the learned single Judge to the extent of "balance F
quantity of 1008 MTs of coal", which was _based on the 'state-
ment' by the counsel for the Company.
22. In our view, however, the learned counsel for the ap-
pellant-Company is right that after the writ petition was disposed
of on September 6, 1999 wherein balance quantity of 1008 MTs G
of coal was directed to be allotted to the writ petitioner, the
learned single Judge was not justified in passing an order on
r September 13, 1999 on mentioning of the matter without there
being any application for modification/clarification of the order
dated September 6, 1999. H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 11 S.C.R.
I

'

A 23. On September 13, 1999, the following order was ~
passed by the learned single. Judge;
"Mr. D.P. Majumdar, Adv. Mentions and submits.
Mr. A.K. Mitra, Adv. Appears and submits.
B The Court: The last but third paragraph of the order dated
6.9.99 is corrected in the manner as follows:-
¥ ••
The respondents are directed to allot balance quantity_
of 6800 M.T. of Steam Coke, Grade-D quality of Coal
c t6 the petitioner in terms of the release order dated
25.5.1989 from Nayandanga Colliery, Mugma Area
in terms of Annexure 'C'.
The supply is to be effected within a period of eight weeks
from the date of communication of this order.
D
This order is incorporating into the earlier order dated
6.'9.99.
.. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of
this order."
E
24. We are also of the view that in the light of the above.
order, the Division Bench ought to haye interfered with the di- .
rection of the learned single Judge in the order dated Septem-
ber 13, 1999 and intra-Court. appeal ought to have been al-
lowed. When the intra-Court appeal was dismissed, the appel-
F lant approached this Court by filing Special Leave Petition. It
was dismissed as withdrawn as the Company wanted to move
the Division Bench in Review Petition. To us, on the facts and in ~-

the circumstances of the case, the Division Bench ought to have
considered the aforesaid aspect and passed an appropriate
G order in accordance with law.

25. From the totality of circumstances, we are of the con-
sidered view that the respondent-writ petitioner was entitled to
the price (consideration) for the land sold by him by registered -r
sale deed to the Company which has already been paid to him. !
H
EASTERN COALFIELDS LTD. v. DUGAL 385
KUMAR [C.K. THAKKER, J.]

He was also entitled to 1008 MTs of coal which was given to A
him as per the Policy. He was further entitled to 1008 MTs which
has been ordered to be given to him towards "balance quan-
tity" on the basis of statement made by the Counsel for the Com-
pany and in terms of 'usual order' dated September 6, 1999
passed by the learned single Judge. We are, however, con- B
vinced that the learned single Judge was not justified in grant-
ing prayer on mentioning the matter on September 13, 1999
without any application for modification of earlier order and di-
rection to the Company to allot to the writ petitioner balance
quantity of 6800 MTs of steak coal Grade-D quality. To that ex- c
tent, therefore, the appeal filed by the Company deserves to be
allowed.
26. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed
and the writ petitioner is held entitled to 1008 MTs as initially
awarded to him as also 1008 MTs of coal towards "balance D
quantity" as per the order dated September 6, 1999. The writ
petitioner will not be entitled to anything more. If the said quan-
tity of coal has already been allotted, the Company has dis-
charged its liability and nothing more is required to be done.
But if it has not released the said quantity, the writ petitioner E
would be entitled to coal to the above extent. On the facts and in
the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.
N.J. Appeal partly allowed.