ESHA BHATTACHARJEEversusMANAGING COMMITTEE OF RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY AND OTHERS

                         [2013] 9 S.C.R. 782


A                    ESHA BHATTACHARJEE
                                 V.
     MANAGING COMMITTEE OF RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR
                   ACADEMY AND OTHERS
            (Civil Appeal No. 8183-8184 of 2013)
B
                      SEPTEMBER 13, 2013.
            [ANIL R. DAVE AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.)

        DelayIL aches:
c
        Appeal against interim order filed belatedly - Prayer to
  condone 2449 days delay - Allowed by Division Bench of
  High Court - Principles as regards condonation of delay
  culled out - Additional guidelines laid down - Held: Rules of
D limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties --
  They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory
  tactics but seek their remedy promptly -- Every legal remedy
  must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time --
  Order passed by Division Bench of High Court condoning the
E delay is set aside - Appeal.

        Education/Educational Institutions:

       Managing committee of school - Non-compliance of
  court's order - Inordinate delay in filing appeal - Held: The
F persons who are nominated or inducted as members or
  chosen as Secretaries of the managing committees of
  schools are required to behave with responsibility and not to
  adopt a casual approach -- A statutory committee cannot
  remain totally indifferent to an order passed by court.
G       The appellant, an Assistant Teacher in language
    group (Bengali), filed a writ petition seeking approval of
    her appointment and for certain other reliefs. The single
    Judge of the High Court, on 25.2.2004, issued a direction

H                               782
  ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF             783
        RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY

that during the pendency of the application, the services      A
of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher in Bengali should
not be disturbed. As the said order was not complied
with, the appellant filed a contempt application. An
undertaking was given before the single Judge and
accordingly the contempt petition was disposed of.             B
However, as the appellant was not allowed to join her
duty, she preferred another contempt petition.
Consequent upon the High Court's direction, she was
allowed to join, but was neither permitted to sign the daily
attendance register, nor allotted any work nor was she         c
paid the salary. She filed yet another contempt petition
and on 24.12.2010 the single Judge directed for personal
presence of the Secretary and teacher-in-charge of the
school. The Managing Committee and the Secretary of
the school then preferred an appeal along with an
                                                               0
application for condonation of delay, challenging the
interim order dated 25.2.2004; and the Division Bench of
the High Court condoned the delay and also passed an
interim order of stay.
    In the instant appeals, the question for consideration     E
before the Court was: whether the Division Bench of the
High Court was justified in entertaining the application for
condoning of 2449 days delay in filing the appeal against
the interim order dated 25.2.2004; passed by the single
Judge in the writ petition.                                    F

    Allowing the appeals, the Court

    HELD: 1.1. As regards condonation of delay, from the
enunciation of law in the judgments of this Court, the
principles that can broadly be culled out are:                 G

     (i)   There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
           oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing
           with an application for condonation of delay,
           for the courts are not supposed to legalise         H
    784      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 9 S.C.R.

A                 injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

          (ii)    The term "sufficient cause" should be
                  understood in its proper spirit, philosophy and
                  purpose regard being had to the fact that the
                  term is basically elastic and is to be applied in
B
                  proper perspective to the obtaining fact-
                  situation.

          (iii)   Substantial justice being paramount and
                  pivotal the technical considerations should
c                 not be given undue and uncalled for
                  emphasis.

          (iv)    No presumption can be attached to deliberate
                  causation of delay but, gross negligence on
D                 the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken
                  note of.

          (v)     Lack of bona tides imputable to a party
                  seeking condonation of delay is a significant
                  and relevant fact.
E
          (vi)    It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
                  proof should not affect public justice and
                  cause public mischief because the courts are
                  required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
F                 eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

          (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to
                encapsule the conception of reasonableness
                and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered
                free play.
G
          (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay
                 and a delay of short duration or few days, for
                 to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
                 whereas to the latter it may not be attracted.
H                That apart, the first one warrants strict
  ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF              785
        RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY

            approach whereas the second calls for a              A
            liberal delineation.

     (ix)   The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
            relating to its inaction or negligence are
            relevant factors to be taken into consideration.     B
            It is so, as the fundamental principle is that the
            courts are required to weigh the scale of
            balance of justice in respect of both parties
            and the said principle cannot be given a total
            go by in the name of liberal approach.
                                                                 c
     (x)    If the explanation offered is concocted or the
            grounds urged in the application are fanciful,
            the courts should be vigilant not to expose the
            other side unnecessarily to face such a
            litigation.                                          D
     (xi)   It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away
            with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation
            by taking recourse to the technicalities of law
            of limitation.                                       E
     (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
           scrutinized and the approach should be based
           on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is
           founded on objective reasoning and not on
           individual perception.                                F

     (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity
            representing a collective cause should be
            given some acceptable latitude. [para 15] [797-
            D-H; 798-A-H; 799-A-C]                               G
    Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v.
Mst. Katiji and Others 1987 (2) SCR 387           =
                                                 1987 (2)
SCC 107, G. Ramegowda, Major and Others v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Bangalore 1988 (3) SCR 198 = 1988 (2)
 SCC 142; O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) and             H
    786         SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A Others (1984) 4 SCC 66, State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and
  Others 2005 (3) SCR 108 = 2005 (3) SCC 752, the Court,
  after referring to New India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Shanti
  Misra 1976 (2) SCR 266 = 1975 (2) SCC 840, N. State of
  Haryana v. Chandra Mani 1996 (1) SCR 1060 = 1996 (3)
B SCC 132 and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K. V.
  Ayisumma 1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 848 = 1996 (10) SCC 634,
  Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat
  Industrial Development Corporation and Another 2010
  (2) SCR 1172 = 2010 (5) SCC 459, Improvement Trust,
c Ludhiana ·v. Ujagar Singh and Others 2010 (7) SCR 376
   = 2010 (6) SCC 786; Ba/want Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh
  and Others 2010 (8) SCR 597 = 2010 (8) SCC 685 Union
  of India v. Ram Charan 1964 SCR 467 =AIR 1964 SC 215,
  P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kera/a 1997 (4) Suppl.
D SCR 204 =1997 (7) SCC 556; and Katari Suryanarayana v.
  Koppisetti Subba Rao 2009 (5) SCR 672 = 2009 (11) SCC
  183; Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of
  Brihan Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157, Vedabai v. Shantaram
  Baburao Patil 2001 (3) SCR 1053 = 2001(9) SCC 106; B.
E Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy 2012 (12) SCC 693 -
  referred to.

         1.2. Taking note of the present day scenario the
    following guidEtlines may also be added:

F         (a)    An Clipplication for condonation of delay should
                 be drafted with careful concern and not in a
                 half hazard manner harbouring the notion that
                 the courts are required to condone delay on
                 the bedrock of the principle that adjudication
                 of a lis on merits is seminal to justice
G
                 dispensation system.

          (b)    An application for condonation of delay should
                 not be dealt with in a routine manner on the
                 base of individual philosophy which is
H                basically subjective.
  ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF                787
        RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY

     {c)    Though no precise formula can be laid down            A
            regard being had to the concept of judicial
            discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving
            consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
            system should be made as that is the ultimate
            institutional motto.                                  B

      (d)   The increasing tendency to perceive delay as
            a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical
            propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant
            manner requires to be curbed, of course,
            within legal parameters. [para 16] [799-C-H]          C

      1.3. In the instant case, the Division Bench of the
High Court has misdirected itself by not considering
certain facts, namely, (a) that the notice of the writ petition
was served on the earlier managing committee; (b) that            D
the earlier committee had appeared in the writ court and
was aware of the proceedings and the order; {c) that the
District Inspector of Schools had communicated to the
managing committee to comply with the order of the
single Judge; {d) that the earlier managing committee had         E
undertaken before the single Judge to comply with the
order; {e) that the new managing committee had taken
over charge from the earlier managing committee; (f) that
nothing has been indicated in the affidavit that under what
circumstances the new managing committee, despite                 F
taking over charge, was not aware of the pending
litigation or for that matter the communication from the
District Inspector of Schools; (g) that the writ court was
still in seisin of the matter and no final verdict had come
and, therefore, it would not be a case where there will be        G
failure of justice if the appeal against the interim order is
not entertained on the ground of limitation inasmuch as
the final order was subject to assail in appeal; (h) that the
managing committee had exhibited gross negligence
and, in any way, recklessness; (i) that the conduct and           H
attitude of the members of the committee before the writ
    788      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 9 S.C.R.

A court deserved to be decried since they should not have
  taken recourse to maladroit effort in complying with the
  order of the court; and (j) that it was obvious that the
  managing committee was really taking resort to dilatory
  tactics by not seeking necessitous legal remedy in quite
B promptitude. [para 21) [802-G-H; 803-A-E]

       1.4. Plea of lack of knowledge, in the instant case, really
  lacks bona fide. The Division Bench of the High Court has
  failed to keep itself alive to the concept of exercise ofjudicial
  discretion that is governed by rules of reason and justice.
C Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the
  parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to
  dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. Every legal
  remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of
  time. [para 22) [804-A, D-E]
D
       Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy 1998 (1) Suppl.
              =
    SCR 403 AIR 1998 SC 3222- relied on.

       1.5. The persons who are nominated or inducted as
E members or chosen as Secretaries of the managing
  committees of schools are required to behave with
  responsibility and not to adopt a casual approach. It is a
  public responsibility and anyone who is desirous of
  taking such responsibility has to devote time and act with
  due care and requisite caution. A statutory committee
F cannot remain totally indifferent to an order passed by the
  court. [para 22) [803-E-G]

      1.6. The order passed by the Division Bench of the High
  Court condoning the delay is set aside. The writ petition
G shall be disposed of expeditiously. [para 23) [804-F]
                         Case Law Reference:
          1987 (2) SCR 387            referred to       para 6
          1988 (3) SCR 198            referred to       para 7
H
  ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF                 789
        RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY
    (1984) 4 SCC 66              referred to      para 8          A
    2005 (3) SCR 108             referred to      para 9
    1976 (2) SCR 266             referred to      para 9
    1998 (1) Suppl. SCR 403      relied on        para 9          B
    1996 (1) SCR 1060            referred to      para 9
    1996 (3) Suppl. SCR 848 referred to
                                                  para 9
    2010 (2) SCR 1172            referred to      para 10         c
    2010 (7) SCR 376             referred to      para 11
    2010 (8) SCR 597             referred to      para 12
    1964 SCR467                  referred to      para 12         D
    1997 (4) Suppl. SCR 204 referred to           para 12
    2009 (5) SCR 672             referred to      para 12
    c2012) 5 sec 157             referred to      para 13
                                                                  E
    2001 (3) SCR 1053            referred to      para 13
    2012 (12) sec 693            referred to      para 14

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
8183-8184 of 2013.                                                F

    From the Judgment & Order dated 21.02.2011 of the High
Court at Calcutta in CAN No. 365 of 2011 with ASTA 10 of
2011 in AST 13 of 2011.

    Kuna! Chatterji, Maitrayee Banerjee for the Appellant         G

   Anip Sachthey, Sarad Kumar Singhania for the
Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                  H
    790      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A       DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. Leave granted in both the special
    leave petitions.

       2. The singular question that we intend to address in these
  appeals, by special leave, is whether the Division Bench of the
B High Court of Calcutta is justified in entertaining theJ:;AN No.
  365 of 2011 for condoning the delay of 2449 days in A.S.T.A.
  No. 10 of 2011 preferred against the interim order dated
  25.2.2004 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No.
  6124(W) of 2004. It is also worthy to note that the Division
  Bench in A.S.T.A No. 10 of 2011 in A.S.T. No. 13 of 2011 had
C directed stay of further proceedings in connection with A.S.T.
  No. 346 of 2004. Needless to say, the said order is
  consequential as whole thing would depend upon the issue
  pertaining to condonation of delay.

D         3. Sans unnecessary details, the facts which are essential
    to be stated for the purpose of disposal of the present appeals
    are that the appellant, an Assistant Teacher in language group
    (Bengali), invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
    226 of the Constitution by preferring a writ petition seeking
E   approval of her appointment and for certain other reliefs. The
    learned single Judge on 25.2.2004 taking note of the
    submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner therein and ·
    further noticing the fact that in spite of notice none had
    appeared on behalf of the concerned respondents, issued a
F   direction that during the pendency of the application the
    services of the petitioner as Assistant Teacher in Bengali in
    Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (HS) at Abhoynagar in the
    district of Howrah shall not be disturbed until further orders. As
    the said order was not complied with, the appellant filed the
G   contempt application being C.P.A.N. No. 1016 of 2004. Be it
    noted, learned counsel for the petitioner communicated the
    order to the school authorities but the said communication was
    not paid heed to. On 24.1.2006 the District Inspector of Schools
    (SE), Howrah, directed the said school authorities to comply
H   with the direction issued by the learned single Judge. Despite
  ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF                  791
 RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
the said direction the order was not complied with. It may be        A
mentioned here that an undertaking was given before the
learned single Judge and on that basis C.P.A.N. No. 1016 of
2004 was disposed of. As the factual matrix would further unfurl
a new managing committee was constituted in place of the
erstwhile managing committee of the school on 21.11.2009 and         B
the appellant was not allowed to join her duty. Being
constrained, she preferred another contempt petition No.
C.P.A.N. No. 1506 of 2010 wherein the learned single Judge
vide order dated 13.5.2010 referred to his earlier order and
directed that the District Inspector of Schools (SE) would ensure    c
due compliance of the order. That apart, a direction was issued
that the concerned police authority should see to it that the
Secretary and the teacher-in-charge of the concerned school
implement the order in allowing the petitioner to join her duties.
After the said order came to be passed, the appellant herein         D
joined her duties as Assistant Teacher with effect from
14.6.2010. Though the appellant was allowed to join, yet she
was neither permitted to sign the daily attendance register, nor
allotted any work nor paid her salary. Being impelled, she filed
an application for contempt, C.P.A.N. No. 1506 of 2010, and
on 24.12.2010 the learned single Judge directed for personal
                                                                     E
presence of the Secretary and teacher-in-charge of the school.
At this juncture, the Managing Committee and the Secretary of
the school preferred an appeal along with an application for
condonation of delay. The said application was seriously
resisted by the appellant by filing an affidavit and, eventually,    F
by the impugned order the Division Bench condoned the delay.
Be it noted, the Division Bench has also passed an interim
order of stay. The said orders are the subject-matter of assail
in these appeals by special leave.
                                                                     G
     4. We have heard Mr. Kunal Chatterjee, learned counsel
for the appellant, Mr. Anip Sachthey, learned counsel for
respondent No. 1 and Mr. Sarad Kumar Singhania, learned
counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 to 5.
                                                                     H
    792     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013) 9 S.C.R.

A        5. Before we delve into the factual scenario and the
    defensibility of the order condoning delay, it is seemly to state
    the obligation of the court while dealing with an application for
    condonation of delay and the approach to be adopted while
    considering the grounds for condonation of such colossal delay.
B
          6. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another
    v. Mst. Katiji and Others1 , a two-Judge Bench observed that
    the legislature has conferred power to condone delay by
    enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order
    to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by
C   disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient
    cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to
    enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which
    subserves the ends of justice, for that is the life-purpose for the
    existence of the institution of courts. The learned Judges
D   emphasized on adoption of a liberal approach while dealing
    with the applications for condonation of delay as ordinarily a
    litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and
    refusal to condone delay can result in an meritorious matter
    being thrown out at the very threshold and the cause of justice
E   being defeated. It was stressed that there should not be a
    pedantic approach but the doctrine that is to be kept in mind
    is that the matter has to be dealt with in a rational
    commonsense pragmatic manner and cause of substantial
    justice deserves to be preferred over the technical
F   considerations. It was also ruled that there is no presumption
    that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable
    negligence and that the courts are not supposed to legalise
    injustice on technical grounds as it is the duty of the court to
    remove injustice. In the said case the Division Bench observed
G   that the State which represents the collective cause of the
    community does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status and the
    courts are required to be informed with the spirit and philosophy
    of the provision in the course of interpretation of the expression
    "sufficient cause"z.
H 1. (1987) 2 sec 101.
  ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF                793
 RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

    7. In G. Ramegowda, Major and others v. Special Land          A
Acquisition Officer, Bangalore 2 , Venkatachaliah, J. (as his
Lordship then was), speaking for the Court, has opined thus:-

      "The contours of the area of discretion of the courts in the
      matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set 8
      out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See :
      Ram/al, Motila/ and Ch hotelal v. Rewa Coalfield Ltd. 3 ;
      Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari4 ; Concord of
      India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Nirmala Devi5; Lala Mata Din
      v. A. Narayanan 6; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji C
      etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the
      party from all mistakes of its counsel. If there is
      negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or Jack of bona
      fide on the part of the party or its counsel there is no
      reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a
      time-barred appeal. Each case will have to be considered D
      on the particularities of its own special facts. However, the
      expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 must receive a
      liberal construction so as to advance ·substantial justice
      and generally delays in preferring appeals are required
      to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross E
      negligence or deliberate inaction or Jack of bona fides is
      imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay."

    8. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh (dead) and Others7 ,
the court was dealing with a fact-situation where the interim     F
order passed by the court of first instance was an interpolated
order and it was not ascertainable as to when the order was
made. The said order was under appeal before the District

2.   (1988) 2 sec 142.                                            G
3.   (1962) 2 SCR 762.
4.   (1969) 1 SCR 1006.
5.   (1979) 3 SCR 694.
6.   (1970) 2 SCR 90.
1.   (1984) 4 sec 66.                                             H
    794      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A Judge who declined to condone the delay and the said view
  was concurred with by the High Court. The Court, taking stock
  of the facts, came to hold that if such an interpolated order is
  allowed to stand, there would be failure of justice and,
  accordingly, set aside the orders impugned therein observing
B that the appeal before the District Judge deserved to be heard
  on merits.

          9. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO and Others 8 , the
  Court, after referring to New India Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Shanti
C Misra 9 , N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy1°, State of
  Haryana v. Chandra Mani1 1 and Special Tehsildar, Land
  Acquisition v. K. V. Ayisumma12 , came to hold that adoption
  of strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public
  justice and it may result in public mischief.

D       10. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority
  in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat
  Industrial Development Corporation and another13 , where a
  two-Judge Bench of this Court has observed that .the law of
  limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not
E prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of
  the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics
  and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal
  remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature.
  To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period
F within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the
  legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the
  power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not
  availing the remedy within the stipulated time. Thereafter, the
  learned Judges proceeded to state that this Court has justifiably
G 8. (2005) 3 sec 752.
  9. (1975) 2 sec 840.
    10. AIR 1998 SC 3222.
    11. (1996) 3 sec 132.
    12. (1996) 10 sec 634.
H 13. c201oi 5 sec 459.
  ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF                  795
 RAGHUNATHPUR NAFARACADEMY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

advocated adoption of liberal approach in condoning the delay        A
of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is
inordinate.

     11. In Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and
Others14 , it has been held that while considering an application
for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed       8
to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have
been made out or not. It has been further stated therein that each
case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances
in which the party acts and behaves.
                                                                     c
     12. A reference to the principle stated in Ba/want Singh
(dead) v. Jagdish Singh and Others15 would be quite fruitful.
In the said case the Court referred to the pronouncements in
Union of India v. Ram Charan 16 , P.K. Ramachandran v. State
of Kerala 17 and Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba            o
Rao18 and stated thus:-

     "25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause"
     has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall
     within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct
     of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal      E
     construction normally is to introduce the concept of
     "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general
     connotation.

     26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has          F
     definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party
     to arise. These principles should be adhered to and
     applied appropriately depending on the facts and
     circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has
                                                                     G
14. c201oi 6 sec 786.
15. c2010i 8 sec 685.
16. AIR 1964 SC 215.
11. (1997) 1 sec 556.
18. (2009) 11 sec 183.                                               H
    796       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013) 9 S.C.R ..


A         accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of
          the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient
          cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take
          away that right on the mere asking of the applicant,
          particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence,
B         default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to
          both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be
          achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in
          implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally
          unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has
          accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."
c
       13. Recently in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal
  Corporation of Brihan Mumbat1 9 , the learned Judges referred
  to the pronouncement in Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao
  PatiP0 wherein it has been opined that a distinction must be
D made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case
  where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case
  the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant
  factor, in the latter case no such consideration arises.
  Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench ruled thus: -
E
       "23. What needs to be emphasized is that even though a
       liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be
       adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the
       Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can
       neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful
F
       litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the
       judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed
       at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.

          24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get
G         in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend
          on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that
          there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant

    19. c2012) 5 sec 157.
H 20. c2001) 9 sec 100.
  ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF                    797
 RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

     and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona             A
     tides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand,
     the explanation given by the applicant is found to be
     concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his
     cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion
     not to condone the delay."                                       B

     Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for
condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold
that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and,
accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had        C
condoned the delay of more than seven years.

     14. In B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy2 1 , the Court
referring to earlier decisions reversed the decision of the
learned single Judge who had condoned delay of 1236 days
as the explanation given in the application for condonation of        D
delay was absolutely fanciful.

    15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can
broadly be culled out are:

      (i)     There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-          E
              oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with
              an application for condonation of delay, for the
              courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are
              obliged to remove injustice.
                                                                      F
      (ii)    The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood
              in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard
              being had to the fact that these terms are basically
              elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective
              to the obtaining fact-situation.                        G

      (iii)   Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
              technical considerations should not be given undue
              and uncalled for emphasis.

21. c2012) 12 sec 693.                                                H
    798         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A         (iv)    No presumption can be attached to deliberate
                  causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part
                  of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

          (v)     Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
                  condonation of delay is a significant and relevant
B
                  fact.

          (vi)    It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof
                  should not affect public justice and cause public
                  mischief because the courts are required to be
c                 vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no
                  real failure of justice.

          (vii)   The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule
                  the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be
D                 allowed a totally unfettered free play.

          (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and
                 a delay of short duration or few days, for to the
                 former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to
                 the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first
E                one warrants strict approach whereas the second
                 calls for a liberal delineation.

          (ix)    The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party
                  relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant
F                 factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the
                  fundamental principle is that the courts are required
                  to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect
                  of both parties and the said principle cannot be
                  given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
G         (x)     If the explanation offered is concocted or the
                  grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the
                  courts should be vigilant not to expose the other
                  side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

H         (xi)    It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with
  ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF   799
 RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

              fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking     A
              recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

      (xii)   The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully
              scrutinized and the approach should be based on
              the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded
                                                                      B
              on objective reasoning and not on individual
              perception.

      (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing
             a collective cause should be given some
             acceptable latitude.                                     c
    16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more
guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: -

     (a)      An application for condonation of delay should be
              drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard   D
              manner harbouring the notion that the courts are
              required to condone delay on the bedrock of the
              principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is
              seminal to justice dispensation system.
                                                                      E
     (b)      An application for condonation of delay should not
              be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of
              individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

     (c)      Though no precise formula can be laid down
                                                                      F
              regard being had to the concept of judicial
              discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving
              consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory
              system should be made as that is the ultimate
              institutional motto.
                                                                      G
     (d)      The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-
              serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity
              can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires
              to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.
                                                                      H
    800      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2013] 9 S.C.R.


A      17. Presently to the assertions made in the application for
  condonation of delay and the asseverations in oppugnation of
  the same. It may be stated here that the Division Bench while
  dealing with the application for condonation of delay has also
  adverted to the legal tenability of the interim order in a matter
B of appointment and approval of a teacher, and condoned the
  delay. It does not require Solomon's wisdom to perceive that
  the delay was colossal. In the application for condonation of
  delay the appellant before the High Court had stated about the
  circumstances in which the order came to be passed by the
C learned single Judge, the order in the earlier contempt petition
  and the second petition for contempt, the extinction of right of
  the respondent employee to continue in the post and thereafter
  proceeded to state the grounds for condonation of delay. We
  think it apposite to reproduce the grounds: -

D         "14. That from the record it appears that the order
          impugned was communicated to the then managing
          committee including the head master in question and the
          said fact is totally unknown to the newly elected managing
          committee as they have been elected on 20.9.2009 and
E         they have been handed over charge on 21.11.09 and to
          the teacher in charge who has been handed over charge
          on 1.3.10. It is pertinent to mention in this context that after
          having received the notice and the contempt application
          the applicants entrusted the Ld. Advocate for taking
F         appropriate steps and they have been advised to defend
          the case .but due to miscommunication the applicant herein
          again handed over the brief from Mr. Banik, Ld. Advocate
          to Mr. Baidya, Ld. Advocate. After having received the said
          papers and after perusing all the records he opined to
G         prefer an appeal before the appeal court or to prefer an
          application for vacating the interim order and ultimately the
          same was filed on 07.06.2010 after several pursuance in
          spite of taking the application for vacating the interim order
          the court below day to day is proceeding with the contempt
H         application.
  ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF                   801
 RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
     15. Having got no other alternative applicant have been         A
     advised to prefer an appeal without certified copy and the
     leave has been prayed for and the same was allowed.
            The photocopy of the receipt for application of Xerox
     certified copy is annexed herewith and marked with letter
     W.                                                              B
     16. That the delay occasioned in presenting the said
     mandamus appeal has taken place due to the aforesaid
     reasons which was beyond the control of the applicants
     and was completely unintentional."
                                                                     c
     18. Thereafter, the applicant therein stated about the duty
of the court while dealing with the application for condonation
of delay and in that context, proceeded to state as follows: -
    "Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof may lead
    to grave miscarriage of public justice apart from resulting      D
    in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the
    process of filing the appeal, the appellants/applicants do
    not stand to benefit from the delay of about 2449 days
    occasioned in preferring the said Mandamus Appeal, nor
    it is a fact that the writ petitioners/ respondents will be      E
    immense/prejudiced if such non-deliberate delay is not
    condoned. There has not been deliberate delay as would
    be evidenced from the foregoing paragraphs. Refusing to
    condone such non-deliberate delay may result in
    meritorious matters like the instant case, being thrown out      F
    at the very threshold and the cause of justice being
    defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the
    highest that can happen in the instant case is that a cause
    would be decided on merits after hearing the parties."
     19. The said grounds were opposed by the contesting             G
respondent therein by stating, inter alia, that the school
authorities were very much aware of the order dated 25.2.2004
as the same was communicated to them by her counsel as well
as by the District Inspector of school. That apart, an undertaking
was given before the learned single Judge by the managing            H
    802      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 9 S.C.R.


A committee. Quite apart from above, in any case, the new
  managing committee that had come into being iri 2009 was
  aware of the order but it chose not to assail the order till there
  was a direction for personal appearance of the Secretary and
  the teacher-in-charge. It was further put forth that the grounds
B urged did not justify condonation of such enormous delay and
  the plea of prejudice was not at all tenable.
        20. On a perusal of the .grounds urged in the affidavit and
  the stand put forth by the respondents herein for condonation
  of delay are that they were not aware of the order passed by
C the learned single Judge till they received the notice of the
  contempt application and thereafter because of
  miscommunication between the counsel and the parties no
  steps could be taken and, eventually, an application for vacation
  of stay was filed and thereafter, the appeal was preferred. That
D apart, it has been urged that if delay is not condoned there will
  be great miscarriage of public justice resulting in public mischief
  and cause of justice would be defeated if the meritorious matter
  like the present one is thrown at the threshold. The Division
  Bench of the High Court took note of the averments made in
E paragraph 14 of the application and thereafter, noted the
  submission of learned counsel for the parties, referred to the
  decision in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited
  (supra) and came to hold as follows: -
          "Now upon a close look at the prayer made for
F         condonation of delay we find that although the delay is
          substantial, the same has been sought to be explained in
          a manner even if it may not be full proof but is quite
          convincing."
       21. Barring the aforesaid, most of the discussion pertains
G to the merits of the case. We are of the convinced opinion that
  the High Court has misdirected itself by not considering certain
  facts, namely, (a) that the notice of the writ petition was served
  on the earlier managing committee; (b) that the earlier
  committee had appeared in the writ court and was aware of
H the proceedings and the order; (c) that the District Inspector of
   ESHA BHATTACHARJEE v. MANAGING COMMIT. OF 803
  RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY [DIPAK MISRA, J.]

schools had communicated to the managing committee to                    A
comply with the order of the learned single Judge; (d) that the
earlier managing committee had undertaken before the learned
single Judge to comply with the order; (e) that the new
managing committee had taken over charge from the earlier
managing committee; (f) that nothing has been indicated in the           B
affidavit that under what circumstances the new managing
committee, despite taking over charge, was not aware of the
pending litigation or for that matter the communication from the
District Inspector; (g) that the writ court was still in seisin of the
matter and no final verdict had come and hence, it would not             c
be a case where there will be failure of justice if t~e appeal
against the interim order is not entertained on the ground of
limitation inasmuch as the final order was subject to assail in
appeal; (h) that the managing committee had exhibited gross
negligence and, in any way, recklessness; (i) that the conduct
                                                                         0
and attitude of the members of the committee before the writ
court deserved to be decried since they should not have taken
recourse to maladroit effort in complying with the order of the
court; and U) and that it was obvious that the managing
committee was really taking resort to dilatory tactics by not
seeking necessitous legal remedy in quite promptitude.                   E
     22. At this juncture, we are obliged to state that the persons
who are nominated or inducted as members or chosen as
Secretaries of the managing committees of schools are
required to behave with responsibility and not to adopt a casual         F
approach. It is a public responsibility and anyone who is
desirous of taking such responsibility has to devote time and
act with due care and requisite caution. Becoming a member
of the committee should not become a local status syndrome.
A statutory committee cannot remain totally indifferent to an            G
order passed by the court and sleep like "Kumbhakarna". The
persons chosen to act on behalf of the Managing Committee
cannot take recourse to fancy and rise like a phoenix and move
the court. Neither leisure nor pleasure has any room while one
moves an application seeking condonation of delay of almost
                                                                         H
    804       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2013] 9 S.C.R.

A seven years on the ground of lack of knowledge or failure of
  justice. Plea of lack of knowledge in the present case really
  lacks bona fide. The Division Bench of the High Court has failed
  to keep itself alive to the concept of exercise of judicial
  discretion that is governed by rules of reason and justice. It
B should have kept itself alive to the following passage from N.
  Balakrishnan (supra): -
           "The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy
           for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is
           precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the
C          efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating
           newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the
           courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy.
           Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to
           unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law
D          of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined
           in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for
           the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules
           of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the
           parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort
E          to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea
           is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a
           legislatively fixed period of time."
           We have painfully re-stated the same.
       23. Ex consequenti, the appeals are allowed and the order
F passed by the Division Bench condoning delay is set aside.
  As a result of such extinction the appeal before the Division
  Bench of the High Court shall also stand dismissed. The
  learned single Judge is requested to dispose of Writ Petition
  No. 6124(W) of 2003 as expeditiously as possible, preferably,
G within a period of six months as the lis involved is not likely to
  consume much time. In the facts and circumstances of the
  case, there shall be no order as to costs.
    R.P.                                               Appeals allowed.
H