Supreme Court of India
FOREST RANGE OFFICER AND ORS.versusP.MOHAMMED ALI AND ORS.
- Citation
- 1993 INSC 179
- Decided
- 4 May 1993
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- K RAMASWAMY
Holding
Sandalwood oil is wood oil within the meaning of Section 2(f)(i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 and therefore a forest produce.
Summary
The State initiated criminal proceedings under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 against P. Mohammed Ali and others for manufacturing and possessing sandalwood oil. The accused contended that sandalwood oil is not "wood oil" as defined in Section 2(f)(i) of the Act and therefore the trial court lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court applied a purposive interpretation to the inclusive definition in the statute, holding that "wood oil" must be given its ordinary and technical meaning in the context of forest conservation. It concluded that sandalwood oil, derived from the heartwood and roots of sandalwood trees, falls within the meaning of "wood oil" and is consequently a forest produce. Accordingly, the trial court has jurisdiction to try the offence, the State's appeals were allowed and the accused's appeal was dismissed.
Issues considered
- Whether sandalwood oil qualifies as "wood oil" within the meaning of Section 2(f)(i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 and thus constitutes forest produce.
- Whether the trial court possessed jurisdiction to try the offence under the Act.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 482
- Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980
- Kerala Forest Act, 1961s. 2(f)(i), s. 2(k), s. 51(1), s. 52, s. 54
Subjects
forest producesandalwood oilwood oilstatutory interpretationpurposive interpretationKerala Forest Actjurisdictioncriminal procedure
Judgment
- FOREST RANGE OFFICER AND ORS.
v.
P.MOHAMMED ALI AND ORS.
A
MAY 4, 199~
B
[K. RAMASWAMY AND R.M. SABAi, JJ.]
The Kerala Forest Act, 1961:
S.2 (j)-Forest Produce-Wood oil-Sandalwood oil-Held, is wood oil
and a forest produce.
c
Ss. 52,54-Forest offence-Accused-Man.ufacturinglfound in possession
ofsandalwood oil-Trial-Held, trial court has jurisdiction to proceed with trial.
lntep!J!UUit:m of statute:
Doctrine of Purposive interpretation-Applied.
D
Words and Phrases:
"include", "wood oil"-S. 2 (f) of Kera/a forest Act-Interpretation of
The Kerala Forest Act, 1961 regulates preservation of forests and forest
produce. Section 2(t) (i) defines forest p,J'.oduce which includes wood oil.
E
The respondents in Crl. Appeals Nos. 420-422 of 1993 were found
manufacturing/in possession ofsandalwood oil. Proceedings under s. 52 (1) of
the Act were initiated against them. They fded applications under s. 482, Cr.
P.C. before the High Court challenging the j~risdic~on-of the trial court on
the premise that sandalwood oil was not wood oil as defined under s. 2(t) (i)
of the Act. F
) The High Co~~t allowed the case of the respondents and quashed the
-- complaint*. Subsequently in another case involving the same controversy, a
Dn<ision Bench of the High Court held' that sandalwood oil was a forest
produce within the meaning of s. 2(t) (i) of the Act. **The State and the
accused challenged the res~ective judgments in the appeals by special leave. G
It was contended on behalf of the accused that sandalwood oil is not a
forest produce inasmuch as there is a distintion between wood oil and
sandalwood oil--wood oil is a natural produce of forest directly derived as an
exudation from living trees in the forest whereas sandalwood oil is a bye-
product from sandalwood by industrial process utilising the heartwood and H
497
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 3 S.C.R.
A roots of sandalwood trees removed from the forest as a raw material.
The State contended that extraction ofsandalwood oil even by mechani-
cal process would nonetheless be a wood oil; and that since the word 'timber'
defined under s. 2 (k) of the Act includes 'sandalwood' being a forest produce,
the oil extracted therefrom would also be within the meaning of the word
B
'wood oil'.
On the question: whether sandalwood oil is a forest produce within the
meaning of s. 2(0 (i) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961. -
C Allowing the appeals of the.State and dismissing the other appeal, this
Court,
HELD: 1.1 Sandalwood oil is wood oil within the meaning ofs.2(0 (i) of
the Kerala Forest Act, 1961. Therefore, it is a forest produce. (507-G)
D
*Mohammed Ali v. Forest Range Officer: (1992) 2 KLT 502, overruled.
**Khushboo Enterprises v. Forest Range Officer. (1993) 1 KL T 91,
approved.
E Kangundilndustrial Works. Kuppam v. The Govt. ofA.P. (1987)2A.P.L.J.
458, disapJ>roved.
. 1.2 Sandalwood is forest produce. Even its roots are also included as
forest produce. They are also 'timber' within the meaning ofs. 2(k) of the Act.
F (504-D)
.
'
1.3 Forest produce as defined in s.2 (0 of the Act, whether found in or
brought from a forest or not is a forest produce which include, that is to say,
the enumerated items in clauses (i) and (ii). ''Wood oil" is one of the
enumerated items as are roots of sandalwood and rosewood. (502-E)
--
G
2.1 The word "wood oil" used in the Act will require purposive interpre-
tation drawing the context in which the words are Used and its meaning will
have to be discovered having regard to the intention and object which
legislature seeks to subserve. The purposive interpretation would aid conser-
H vation of sandal wood, a valuable forest wealth, prevent illicit felling and
transportation of them and makes the manufacturers of sandalwood oil
FOREST OFFICER v. MOHAMMED ALI 499
acco~ntable to the possession of sandalwood trees or chips or roots etc. (506- A
C-D)
Municipal Corporation ofGreater Bombay v./ndian Oil Corporation, AIR
1991 SC 686; State of Bombay & Ors. v. The Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Ors,
- (1960) 2 SCR 866 and Stale of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan, (1975] 2
sec, relied on. B
2.2 The Legislature does not intend to restrict the word 'wood oil' nor
are there any compelling circumstances in the Act to give restricted meaning
thatcllllyoil derived from Dipterocarpus trees would be wood oil. The literal
interpretation if given acceptance would lead to manifest frustration of the C
purpose of the Act. (506-D)
. Adi1yaMil/sv.Unionoflndia,[1988]4SCC315,andBabuManmohanDas
Shah & Ors. v. Bis/um Das, [1967) I SCR 836, referred to.
Raihi Khandsari Udyog and Ors v. State ofU.P. & Ors, (1985] 2SCC 485, D
inapplicable.
Craies on Statute law. Seventh Edition, referre~ to. Stedman's Medical
Dictionary (23rd Edition). Concise Chemical and Technical Dictionary (Fourth
edition); 'Scientific Treatises' (Vol. 6) by Ernest Guenther; 'Cyclopaedia of
E
India and of Eastern and Southern Asia' by Edward Balfour; 'Materia Medica
of India and their Therapeutics' by R.N. Khori, Pharma- cographia lndica by
William Dymock and 'Medical Plants of India and Pakistan' by J.F. Dastru,
referred to.
2.3 The expert opinion is only an opinion evidence on either side and F
does not aid in interpretation. (506-E)
3.1 Forest produce defined under s. 2(t) of the Act is an inclusive
definition. It is settled law that the word 'include' is generally used as a word
of extension. When used in an interpretation clause, it seeks to enlarge the G
meaning of the words or pharses occurring in the body of the statute. (504-D)
3.2 The word 'include' in the definition under s. 2(t) would show that it
did not intend to exclude what was ordinarily and in common parlance to be
spoken of wood oil. The expression being techinical and being part of an ff
-
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 3 S.C.R.
A inclusive definition has to be construed in its technical sense but in an
exhaustive manner, it cannot be restricted in such a manner so as to defeat the
principal object and purpose of the Act. (505-H, 506-A)
Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1990 SC 2269 and South Gujarat
Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Assn.&. Anr. v. State of Gujarat and Anr., (1977) 1
B SCR 878, referred to.
Fatesang Gimba Vasava & Ors v. State of Gujarat & Ors., AIR 1987
Gujarat 9, distinguished.
C 4. The process by which the oil is extracted is not decisive as oil may be
extracted by natural process ofexudation or it may be extracted by subjecting ---
to chemical or mechanical process. The purpose for whkh the oil is used is also
not decisive. (506-8)
5. The trial court has jurisdication to-proceed with the trial. It is for the
D trial court to find whether the offence as amputed to the accused has been
made out at the trial. (507-G)
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 420-22
of 1993.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 31.8.1992 of the Kerala High Court in
Crl. R.P. Nos. 665/91and666/91 and Crl. M.C. 832 of 1992.
AND
Criminal Appeal No. 423 of 1993.
F
From the Judgment and Order dated 15 .12.1992 of the Kerala High Court in
Crl. M.C. No. 1192 of 1992.
T.S. Krishna Murthy Iyer and M.T. George for the Petitioner in C.A. Nos.
420-22/93 and for the Respondents in C.A. No. 423/93.
G
G. Ramaswamy.John Joseph, P.S. Nayar, K.V. Sree Kumar, K. Raghunath
and T.G.N. Nair for the Appellant in C.A. No. 423/93 and for the Respondents in
C.A. Nos. 420-422/93.
H N.D. Garg for the Respondents.
FOREST OFFICER v. MOHAMMED ALI [K. RAMASWAMY,J.] 501
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
K. RAMASWAMY. J.: Special Leave granted.
Untramelled by questions of fact the learned Senior counsel on both sides
neatly presented question of law whether "sandlewood oil" is forest produce B
within the meaning of Section 2 (f) (I) of the Kerala Forest Act, 1961 for short 'the
Act'. When proceedings were laid under section 51 (1) of the Act against the
respondents.in Special Leave Petition (Cr!.) Nos. 27-29 of I 992, they questioned
the jurisdiction of the court in C.C. Nos. 145 and 148 of 1988. Eschewing
--- delineation ofintermediary proceedings went on from the start of prosecution, the
High Court in exercise of its power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal c
Procedure, 1973 for short 'the Code' by order dated August 31, 1992, reported in
Mohammed Ali v. Forest Range Officer, ( 1992) 2 KLT 502 quashed the complaint
holding that Sandal Wood Oil is not 'wood oil' as defined in s.2 (f) (i) of the Act.
So it is not a forest produce. Thus these appeals by Special leave. When same
question subsequently arose, other learned Single Judge doubting the correctness
of aforesaid judgment referred the matter to the division bench which by order D
dated December 15, 1992, reported in Khushboo Enterprises v. Forest Range
Officer, ( 1993) I KLT 91 held that Sandalwool Oil is a forest produce within the
meaning of S.2 (f) (I) of the Act. Thus the appeal in the other case.
The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 aims to prevent depleting forests, E
conservation thereof and protection of wild life in the country to maintain
ecological balance. The State Acts regulate preservation of forest and forest
produce to supplement the Central Act. The Act prescribes procedure for preser-
vation of the forest and regulates possession of the forest produce, falling of trees
in the forest area and removal from the forest or reserved forest area by transit
permits etc. When Sandalwood Oil either was found in transit or in possession of F
the manufacturers, it was seized in the respective cases and laid the complaints
under section 51 (I) for contravention thereof. As said earlier the jurisdictional
question was raised on the premise that Sandal Wood Oil is not a wood Qi! as
defined under section 2(f) (I) of the Act.
G
The question, therefore, emerges whether Sandalwood Oil is a wood oil.
S.2(t) defines forest produce thus:
"Section 2(t) 'forest produce' includes:-
(i) the following whetherf01uut in or brought from, a forest or not H
502 SUPREME COURT REFORTS (1993) 3 S.C.R.
A that is. to say-
timber, charcoal, wood-oil, gum, resin, natural varnish, bark,
lac, fibres and roots of sandalwood and rosewood; and
B (ii) the following when found in or broughtfrom aforest,
that is to say-
a) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits and all other parts
c
or produce not here-in-before m~ntioned, of trees.
b) plants not being trees including grass, creapers, reeds
and moss and all parts or produce of such plants;
-
c) silk cocoons, honey and wax; and
d) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including lime-
D stone, laterite), minerar oils and all products of mines or
quarries". '·
A reading thereof do indicate that the forest produce whether found in or
·.brought from a forest or not is a forest produce which include, that is to say, the
~numerated items in Clauses I and II "wood-oil" is one of the enumerate items as
E well as roots of sandalwood and rosewood. The contention of Sri G. Ramaswami,
the learned Senior counsel for the accused is that techinical Dictiontries, Botanical
Tax Books and expert opiqion would bring out a demonstrable distinction between
wood oil and sandalwood oil. The wood oil is a natural produce of the forest
directly derived as an exudation from living trees in the forest belonging to the
F family of the Dipterocarpucoae trees while sandal wood oil is a bye product from
sandalwood (Santalum Album) by industrial process. Wood oil is produced by
making a hole on the trunk of the living tree commonly known as "oil trees·· or
"wood oil trees". This family of trees are variously ~nown in different parts of
South India but they relate to Dipterocarpucoae family. Wood oil is gatbered by
heating the hole in the trunk to induce exudation of the olec-resin from the tree and
G commercially dealt with as wood oil which is a cheap substance in the commercial
world used solely for the purpose of painting planks Of wood or wooden vessels
floating in the sea. The physio-chemical properties of wood oil are distinct and
different from other oil. Sandal wood oil would be produced only at factory level
and that too by mechanised process utilising the heart wood and roots of sandal
wood trees removed from the forest as a raw material. Sandal wood oil is having
H very high commercial value and it is mainly used in manufacturing perfumery and
FOREST OFFICER''· MOHAMMED ALI [K. RAMASWAMY J.] 503
cosmetic items of different types and grades. The production of sandal wood oil is A
being carried out as industry, either by licence by the individuais or the state
government as its monopoly like Karnataka State, in a larger sca.Ie or as a small
scale business. It is further contended that the meaning of the word "wood oil"
defined in S. 2 (f) (I) must recive its colour from its context andconnotatio!l. When
the legislature used the word 'that is to say' the wood oil and other natural growth
B
referred to in the definition it would only mean natural bye-product directly drawn
from ttie trees. The Learned Single Judge had rightly construed the meaning of the
word 'wood-oil' and held that sandal wood-oil being the bye-product _derived
commercially manufacturing process is not wood oil. The division bench commit-
ted manifest error in its construction of the word 'wood-oil' to include sandal wood
oil. Sri Krishna Murthy Iyer, the learned Senior counsel for the respondents on the c
other haqd, refuted the contention arguing that inclusive definition of forest
produce must receive extended meaning. It must also be construed in the context
in which it is used and the purpose the Act seeks to serve and the family tQ which
sandal wool oil belongs being an essential oil would include wood oil. The
expression wood-oil being a technical and part of inclusive d~pnition has to be
construed in its technical sense and in an exhaustive manner. lt<:annot be restricted D
in a narrow circumference as was done by the learned Single Judge so as to defeat
the object and purpose of the Act. Extraction of sandal wood oil even by
mechanised process would nonetheless be a wood oil. He laid emphasis on the
word 'timber' defined in section 2(k) which include 'Sandal wood', being a forest
produce the oil extracted therefrom would also be within the meaning of the word
E
'wood-oil'. The restricted meaning canvassed by the counsel would defeat the
purpose of the Act and the literal interpretation giving narrow meaning to the word
'wood-oil' should be excluded.
Ex-facie the argument of Sri Ramaswami backed by material, though is
alluring, deeper probe denied its acceptance. Undoubtedly, the Karnataka Forest F
Act, 1963 incorporated in its definition of forest produce Sandalwood oil after the
word "wood oil" and the legislature in Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu, like the
Act, do not specifically incorporate Sandalwood oil in the definition of forest
pioduce. From this could it be concluded, ifit be otherwise interpretable, that wood
oil would not include Sandalwood oil as well. Undoubtedly Stedman's Medical
Dictionary (23rd Edition) defined at page 1576, wood oil as gurjan balsam and G
gurjan balsam defined at p. 156 to mean wood oil-oleo-resin from Dipterocarpus
alatus (family Dipterocarpuceae), - a tree of India and other regions of Southern
- Asia. Similar meaning was given in Concise Chemical and Technical Dictionary
edited by H. Bennett (Fourth Edition) at page 1217; Scientific Treatises on the
subject by Ernest Guenther in volume 6~ Edward Balfour in his 'Cryclopaedia of
8
India' and of Eastern and Southern Asia; R.N. Khori· in his 'Ma1eria MediCii of
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) 3 S.C.R.
A India and their Therapeutics' and 'Pharmacographia Indica' by Willim Dymock
defined wood oil in the same strain.All these technical literatures were concerned
in finding out physio-chemical properties contained in wood oil and.the source
from which they are drawn for use in industrial purposes. The literal interpretation
given therein if given acceptance would lead to manifest frustration of the purpose
B of the Act. In its interpretation we have to keep at the back of our mind the purpose
which the Act and the Parent Act (Forest Conservation Act) seek to subserve. J .F.
Dastru equally in his 'Medical Plants of India and Pakistan' tread into the same
path and given construction to wood oil in the context of its exudation obtained
from the trunk of the trees belonging to the family of Dipterocarpaceae as an oleo-
C resin or gurjan balsam. There would be no quarrel on that behalf. It must be noted
in this context that there are several types of essential oils in India, the important
being Sandalwood oil, agar-wood oil, deodar oil and pine oil, apart from oleo-resin
and wood oil derived from exudation from living trees in the forest area. These
essential oils are obtained from any of forest wood. Sandalwood as observed by
the High Court is forest produce. Even its roots thereof are also included as forest
D produce.They are also timber within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act. The
purpose of the Act is to conserve forest wealth which is very dear for preservation
to maintain ecology. Forest produce defined under section 2(f) is an inclusive
definition. It is settled law that the word 'include' is generally used as a word of
extension. When used in an interpretation clause, it seeks to enlarge the meaning
of the words or pharases occuring in the body of the Statute. Craies on Statute Law,
E Seventh Edition at p. 64 stated the construction to be adopted to the meanings of
the words and pharases that "The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of
Parliamem is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed
in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and
unambiguous. then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their
F ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best
declare the intention of the law giver",. At p. 214 it is stated that an interpretation
clause which extends the meaning of a word does not take away its ordinary
meaning. An interpretation clause of the inclusive definition is not meant to
prevent the word receiving its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that
word that would be properly applicable, but to enable the word as used in the Act,
G when there is nothing in the context or the subject matter to the contrary, to be
applied to some things to which it would not ordinarily be applicable ......... An
interpreation clause should be used for the purpose of interpreting word which are
ambiguous or equivocal, and not so as to disturb the meaning of such as are plain.
At p. 216 it is stated that another important rule with regard to the effect of an
interpretation clause is, that an interpretation clause is not to be taken as .
H substituting one set of words for another, or as strictly defining wliat the meaning
FOREST OFFICER v. MOHAMMED AU [K. RAMASWAMY,J.] 505
of the term must be under all circumstances, but rather as declaring what may be A
comprehended within the term where the circumstances require thar it should be
so construed.
This Court inBabuManmohan Das Shah & Ors. v. Bishun Das [I 967] 1 SCR
836 adopting the ordinary rule of construction stated that "the provisions of a B
statute must be construed in accordance with the language used therein unless
there are compelling reasons such as where the literal construction would reduce
the Act to absurdity or prevent manifest legislative purpose from being carried
out". The question therein was the interpretation of the phrase "materially altered
the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value" in the construc-
tion to a shop. In that context this court laid that cardinal principle of statutory C
construction referred to hereinbefore would apply. In State of Madhya Pradesh v.
M. V. Narasimh_q1J> [1975] 2 SCC 377 the definition bf 'public servant' in S.21
I.P.C. was amended and clause 12 thereof was brought on statute. The Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1947 created its own provisions as specific offences of criminal
misconduct which is different from the offence of bribery defined in the· Indian
D
. "' Penal Code. When similar definition was not given under the P.C. Act, 1947 the
contention was raised that the respondent cannot be prosecuted not being a public
servant under the P.C. Act. This court while holding that definition of public
servant was incorporated in P.C. Act by necessary implication of public servant
defined in CI. 12 ofS.21 I.P.C. and held that:P.C. Act is supplemental to I.P.C. and
that, therefore, both would deal with the same offence. Accordingly.the respon- E
dent was held to be public·servant coming within the definition of P.C. Act. This
court adopted the doctrine of purposive interpretation to prevent corruption, a
penal offence. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Indian Oil
Corporation, AIR 1991 SC 686-this Court adopted purposive construction in the
definition of the word 'building' for the purpose of levy of property tax under the
Bombay Municipal Corporation Act to include oil storage,.tanks to be "building" F
and held that the language of a statutory provision is not static vehicle of ideas ~d
concepts and as ideas and concepts change, as they are bound to do in any country
like-ours with the establishment of a democratic structure based on agalitarian
values, the meaning and content of the statutory provision undergo a change. The
law does not operate in a vaccum. It cannot be interpreted without taking into
account the social, economic and political setting in whiCh it is intended to operate. G
The Judge has to inject flesh and blood in the dry skeleton provided by the
legislature and invest it with a meaning which will harmonise the law with the
prevailing concepts and values and make it an effective instrument for delivering
}ustice.
The word include in the definition under section 2(f) would show that it did H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) 3 S.C.R.
A not intened to exclude what was ordinarily and in common parlance be spoken of
wood oil. The expression being technical and being part of an inclusive definition
has to be construed in its technical sense but in an exhaustive manner, it cannot be
restricted in such a manner so as to defeat the principle object and purpose of the
B
Act. The process by which the oil is extracted is not decisive as oil may be extracted
by natural process of exudation or it may be extracted by subjecting to chemical
or mechanical process and Sandalwood (SantalumAlbum) are cut into pieces. Its
-
heart wood and roots of Sandalwood trees removed from the forest are used as a
raw material at a factory level that too by mechanised process to extract sandal-
wood oil. The purpose for which the oil is used is not decisive. Therefore, the word
C wood oil used in the Act will require purpcisive interpretation drawing the context
in which the words are used and its meaning will have to be discovered having
regard to the intention and object which legislature seeks to subserve. The
restricted meaning sought to put up by the accused would frustrate the object and
the literal interpretation would defeat the meaning. The Legislature does not intend
to restrict the word wood oil nor we find any compelling circuinstanc-es in the Act
D to give restricted meaning that only oil derived from Dipterocarpus trees to be
wood oil as contended for the accused and found acceptance to the learned single
Judge. The purposive interpretation would aid conservation of sandle wood, a
,l;'l{IUable forest wealth, prevent illicit falling and transportation of them and makes
the.ma~ufacturers of sandlewood oil accountable to the possession of sandlewood
trees or chips or roots etc. Incorporation of sandlewood oil abundentecatela in
E Karnataka Act and absence thereof in sister Acts operating in South India does not
detract from giving its due meaning. The expert opinion is only an opinion
evidence on either side and does not aid us in interpretation. This court in Aditya
Mills v. Union of India, [ 1988] 4 sec 315 did not adopt the dictionary meaning
as it may be to some extent delussive guide to interpret entries in Central Excise
and Salt Act. In Kishan Lal v. State ofRajasthan, AIR 1990 SC 2269 to which one
F
of us, Sahai, J, was member, this court was to consider the word 'Sugar' whether
under Rajasthan Agricultrual Produce Marketing Act, 1961 an agricultural pro-
duce. It was contended that the Khandsari Sugar was not an agricultural produce.
Repelling that contention, this Court held that the word agricultural produce
include all produce whether agricultural, horticultural, animal husbandary or
G otherwise as specified in the schedule. The legislative power to add or include and
define a word even artificially, apart, the definition which is not exhaustive but
inclusive neither exclude any item produced in mills or factories no.r it confines its
width to produce from soil. If that be the construction then all items of animal
husbandry shall stand excluded. It further overlooks the expression "or otherwise
as specified in the Schedule". Accordingly it was held that Khandsari Sugar is an
H agricultural produce under that Act. In State of Bombay & Ors. v. The Hospital
Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. [1960] 2 SCR 866 this court adopted purposive approach
. . -
FOREST OFFICER v. MOHAMMED ALI (K. RAMASWAMY,J.) 507
in interpreting the word 'industry' ins. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, and held A
that the Legislature in defining the word 'industry' in s.2 (j) of the Act deliberately
used term of wide import in its first clause and referring to several other industries
in the second in an inclusive way obviously denoting extention. Tffe conventional ·
meaning attributed to trade or business was eschewed even in the absence of profit
motive. It was held that hospital was an industry. Therefore, the ratio, far from
helping the accused, is consistent with the view we have expressed above. In South B
Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association and Anr. v. State ofGujarat and
Anr., [ 1977] 1 SCR 878 the inclusive definition was construed in the context of the
explanation given to Entry 22. It was held, therefore, that the word 'pottery' does
not include tiles industry for the purpose ofMinimum Wages Act. The ratio therein
renders little assistance to the accused. lnRathi Khandsari Udyog and Ors. v. State
ofU.P. and Ors., [1985] 2 SCC485, this court held that the words not defined may
c
be construed in the popular sense in which it is being commonly used in
commercial parlance. The ratio is not apposite to the fact situation. Similarly the
construction placing reliance on the passage at p. 164 of Craies on Statute Law that
the word is to be construed in the sense in which it is being understood in trade,
business or transaction known to the trade is also inapplicable to the factual D
context. In Fa:esang Gimba Vasava and Ors. v. State of Gujarat and ors., AIR
1987 Gujarat 9 the division bench construed whether bamboo would include in its
ambit cut pieces in the context"and the purpose the Act sought to serve the tribals
in the forest area. Privilege was granted to the tribals to remove certain forest
produce from forest area for sale to supplement their livelihood. When toplas,
supdas and palas made out of bamboo chips were being taken out for sale, they E
were sought to be prosecuted. It was challenged by the tribals. In that context the
division bench held that though bamboo is a forest produce, the Bainboo chips of
the specified description do not fall within the definition of forest produce.
Accordingly it was interpreted, from the context and purposive approach of the
word 'forest produce'. Accordingly the ratio therein does not assist the accused.
F
The Andhra Pradesh High Court, relied for the accused, had not correct! y laid
the law in Kangundi Industrial works, Kuppam v. The Govt. of A.P. (1987) 2
A.P.L.J. 458 Accordingly we hold that Sandalwood oil is wood oil within the
meaning of s. 2 (f) (i) of the Act. Therefore, it is a forest produce. Necessary
conclusion is that the Trial Court has jurisdiction to proceed with the trial. It is for G
the Trial Court to find whetherthe offence as imputed to the accused has been made
out the trial. We need express no opinion at this stage. The appeals of the State are
allowed and the appeal of the accused is dismissed.
R.P. Appeals dismissed/allowed.
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