G. JAYALALversusUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

                        [2013] 3 S.C.R. 868

A                          G. JAYALAL
                                v.
                 UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
                 (Civil Appeal No. 4665 of 2013)
                          MAY 29, 2013
B
         [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND DIPAK MISRA, JJ.]

        Service Law:

c       Selection - Panel not indicating preference - Effect of -
  Post of Director General, All India Radio - Committee
  recommending a panel of three persons with name of
  appellant at SI. No. 1 - When asked, Selection Committee,
  _subsequently, shortlisted the candidates and made
0 recommendation in order of preference - Name of fourth
  respondent shown at sl. No. 1 - Held: The panel sent earlier
  does not specifically state that the recommendations were in
  order of merit or in order of preference as determined by the
  Board - On the contrary, it is suggestive of the fact that the
E Board has placed the names in the same order as sent by
  the department for consideration - The subsequent
  recommendation was made in order of preference by
  deliberation - Even after three members were substituted, it ·
  would not have made any difference as majority of the earlier
  Members were there and they had given preference in favour
F of fourth respondent - Therefore, there is no flaw in the three
  Members participating in the short-listing of the names and
  giving preference - There is no element of legal malice.

      Selection - Recommendation in order of preference -
G The term 'preference' - Connotation of.

        Advertisements were issued to fill up the posts of
    Director General in All India Radio and Doordarshan on
    20.10.2010 and 20.12.2010 respectively. The Committee
H                              868
   G. JAYALAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS             869


constituted to make the recommen~ations for A
appointment to the said two posts forwarded three names
for the post of Director General, Doordarshan and names
of two persons, viz. the appellant and the fourth
respondent, for the post of Director General, All India
Radio. On receipt of the recommendations, a letter dated B
21.3.2011 was circulated by the Officer on Special Duty
in Prasar Bharati to all the Members of the Selection
Committee stating therein that since the names
recommended were not put in any particular order of
preference, the same be put in the order of preference. c
Thereafter, the majority of the members of the Selection
Committee placed the fourth respondent in order of
preference at No. 1 for the post of Director General, All
India Radio. The recommendations were sent to
Government of India as per letter dated 21.3.2011.        0
     The appellant preferred an O.A. before the Tribunal
seeking quashment of the recommendations dated
21.3.2011 and also sought for issuance of a direction to
the respondents to act as per the recommendations dated
15.3.2011 contending that therein he was placed at No. 1 E
in order of preference for appointment to the post of
Director General, All India Radio. The Tribual as well as
the High Court did not accept the case of the appellant.

    Dismissing the appeal, the Court                          F
     HELD: 1.1. Conceptual preference, fundamentally,
would mean that all aspects, namely, merit, suitability,
fitness, etc. being equal, preference is given regard being
had to some other higher qualifications or experience, G
etc. [para 12] [878-G]
    Secretary, A.P. Public Service Commission v. Y. V. V.R.
Srinivasu/u and Others 2003 (3) SCR 742            = 2003
(5) sec 341 - referred to
                                                              H
    870    SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A      1.2. In the case at hand, it is not disputed that both
  the candidates were eligible. If the minutes of the meeting
  are minutely studied, it is perceptible that three
  departmental candidates were interviewed for the post of
  Director General, All India Radio. The names of the
B appellant and the fourth respondent were placed at serial
  Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. When the Committee gave its
  recommendations, it also placed them in the same
  seriatim. The language used in paragraph 4 of the
  minutes states that taking into account the consideration
c of overall merit and experience and with due regard to the
  assessment of suitability, the Board decided to forward
  the recommendations to the Government of India. But it
  does not specifically state that the recommendations
  were in order of merit or in order of preference as
0 determined by the Board. On the contrary, it is suggestive
  of the fact that the Board has placed the names in the
  same order as sent by the department for consideration.
  [para 13] [879-D-G]

       1.3. It cannot be said that any wrongful act has been
E done to inflict any legal injury on the appellant. It is
  difficult to hold that any act has been done to disregard
  or defeat his legal rights. What has been stated by the
  OSD is basically requiring the Board to short-list the
  names in order of preference. The Members of the Board
F could have reiterated that they had earlier recommended
  the names in accordance with preference. They did not
  say that the recommendations already made were in
  order of preference but gave the preference initially by
  circulation and when it was set aside by the tribunal,
G thereafter, by deliberation. Thus, there is no element of
  legal malice. [para 16] [881-A-C]

       State of A.P. and Others v. Goverdhanlal Pitti 2003
  (2) SCR 908 = 2003 (4) SCC 739; West Bengal State
H Electricity Board v. Dilip Kumar Ray 2006 (9) Suppl.
   G. JAYALAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS            871


         =
SCR 554 2007 (14) SCC 568 and Kalabharati Advertising       A
v. Hemar'lt Vimalnath Narichania and· Other 2010 (10)
SCR 971 = 2010 (9) SCC 43·, - referred to

     1.4. There is no dispute from any quarter that three
Members had to be substituted because some had
                                                             8
retired and the tenure of some had expired. There is no
cavil that three Members, who have been appointed, have
been validly appointed. By efflux of time, some of the
Members of the Board were substituted and different
Members were inducted. The tribunal thought it
appropriate to remit the matter to the Board to reconsider C
the matter after due deliberation. Keeping in view the
minutes of the meeting, it is manifest that the Board has
gone through the whole deliberations by the
recommending authority and expressed the view. Thus,
it was not necessary to hold a further interview to find out D
the preference as the minutes were absolutely clear that
no preference was given. Therefore, there is no flaw in
the three Members participating in the short-listing of the
names and giving preference. That apart, the majority of
the earlier Members were there and they had given E
preference in favour of the fourth respondent and,
therefore, factually, it would not have made any
difference. [para 17 and 19) [881-E; 882-E-H; 883-A-B]
                    Case Law Reference:
                                                            F
   1987 (1) SCR 1054          held inapplicable para 9
   2003 (3) SCR 742           referred to        p~ra 12

   2003 (2) SCR 908           referred to        para 14
                                                            G
   2006 (9) Suppl. SCR 554 referred to           para 15
   2010 (10) SCR 971          referred to        para 15
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4665 of 2013.                                               H
    872      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A        From the Judgment and Order dated 17.02.2012 of the
    High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Civil Writ Petition No. 61
    of 2012.

          M.N. Krishnamani, Sanjai Kumar Pathak for the Appellant.
B       Paras Kuhad, ASG, Vikas Singh, Swati Vijaywargiya, Jitin
    Chaturvedi, Rekha Pandey, D.S. Mahra, Rajeev Sharma, Sahil
    Bhaiaik, Uddyam Mukherjee, Sanket, Deepika Kalia, M.C.
    Dhingra, Rajesh Srivastava for the Respondents.

c         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       DIPAK MISRA, J. 1. In this appeal, the pregnability of the
  order dated 17.2.2012 pc:assed by the High Court of Delhi in
  WP. (C) No. 61 of 2012 affirming the order dated 30.11.2011
D passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench,
  New Delhi (for short "the Tribunal") in O.A. No. 1290 of 2011 is
  called in question.
        2. The facts, as have been exposited, are that
  advertisements were issued to fill up the posts of Director
E General in All India Radio and Doordarshan on 20.10.2010 and
  20.12.2010 respectively. A Committee headed by the
  Chairperson, Prasar Bharati Board, was constituted to make
  the recommendations for appointment to the aforesaid two
  posts. Names of nine persons including that of the appellant
F and the fourth respondent herein were recommended to be
  interviewed by the Selection Committee. The recommendations
  of the Selection Committee were forwarded to the Government
  of India vide letter dated 16.3.2011 by the Member (Personnel),
  Prasar Bharati. The Committee forwarded three names for the
G post of Director General, Doordarshan and names of two
  persons, that of the appellant and the fourth respondent, for the
  post of Director General, All India Radio. On receipt of the
  recommendations, a letter dated 21.3.2011 was circulated by
  the Officer on Special Duty in Prasar Bharati to all the Members
H of the Selection Committee. It was mentioned in the letter that
     G. JAYALAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS                  873
                  [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
 in the special meeting held on 15.3.2011, the Selection Board,      A
 after interviewing the candidates and taking into account all the
 relevant factors, had decided to recommend a panel of
 candidates for the two posts but as the names recommended
 were not put in any particular order of preference by the
 Selection Board, the Government had desired that the names          B
 in the panel be put in the order of preference. After receipt of
 the letter, it was decided by the Board to short-list the
 candidates in order of preference by way of circulation.
 Thereafter, each Member of the Selection Committee gave his
 recommendation by way of separate endorsement. Eight                c
 Members of the Selection Committee, that constituted of nine
 Members, placed the fourth respondent at serial No. 1 and the
 appellant at serial No. 2 in order of preference for the post of
 Director General, All India Radio. Five out of nine Members of
 the Committee placed Shri Tripurari Sharan at serial No. 1, Shri    D .
 Ram Subhag Singh at serial No. 2, and Shri L.D. Mandloi at
 serial No. 3 in the said order of preference for the post of
 Director General, Doordarshan. It is evident from the record
 that the majority of the members of the Selection Committee
 placed the fourth respo.ndent in order of preference at No. 1
 for the post of Director General, All India Radio and Shri
                                                                     E
 Tripurari Sharan for the post of Director General, Doordarshan.
 Be it noted, the name of the appellant was also recommended
 for the post of Director General, Doordarshan. The aforesaid
 recommendations of the Selection Committee indicating
 preference were sent to the Government of India as per letter       F
 dated 21.3.2011 by the Joint Secretary (B), Ministry of
 Information and Broadcasting.

       3. At that stage, the appellant preferred O.A. No. 1290 of
  2011 before the tribunal seeking quashment of the                  G
  recommendations dated 21.3.2011 and also sought for
  issuance of a direction to the respondents to act as per the
  recommendations dated 15.3.2011. Such a prayer was made
  as the stand of the appellant was that he was placed at No. 1
· in order of preference for appointment to the post of Director     H
    874      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A General, All India Radio. The tribunal did not accept the
  contentions raised by the appellant pertaining to placing of
  names in order of preference. The plea of mala fide pertaining
  to the act of any authority in the Government in changing the
  decision of the Selection Committee was also not accepted.
B However, the tribunal opined that the order of preference that
  has been decided on 21.3.2011 could not have been so
  decided by circulation and a meeting of Prasar Bharati Board
  (Selection Committee) was required to be held for the said
  purpose and the decision was required to be taken after due
c deliberations and consultations amongst the Members of the
  Board. Being of this view, the tribunal directed the respondents
  to convene a meeting of the Board to determine the order of
  merit of the candidates. It was further observed by the tribunal
  that if the outcome of the meeting would result in the
  endorsement of the earlier view, nothing more was required to
0
  be done. In pursuance of the order passed by the tribunal, a
  meeting of the Board was convened and the decision that was
  taken by circulation was reiterated.

          4. Being dissatisfied with the s·aid confirmation, the
E appellant approached the High Court as the tribunal had
    foreclosed the issue by stating that if there would be
    confirmation or endorsement of the earlier view, nothing more
    was required to be done. Be it noted, by the time the tribunal
    decided the Original Application, the tenure of three Members
F _ had come to an end either by virtue of retirement or expiry of
    the term. It was urged before the High Court that since three
    new Members of the Board had not interviewed the candidates,
    they were not in a position to take an informed view with respect
    to the merits of the candidates. The High Court declined to
G enter into the said arena by holding that if the appellant is
    aggrieved by the decision taken in the meeting of the Board
    convened pursuant to the direction of the tribunal, it was open
    to file an application before the tribunal. The High Court
    adverted to the singular issue whether the Selection Committee,
H in its meeting held on 15.3.2011, had placed the appellant
    G. JAYALAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS                 875
                  [DIPAK M~SRA, J.]

herein, in order of preference, for the post of Director General, A
All India Radio, or not. After perusing the minutes of the meeting,
the High Court opined that the recommendations could not be
interpreted to mean that the person whose name was shown
at No. 1 ranked first in order of merit. The allegation that
someone in the Government was instrumental in influencing the B
Members of the Selection Committee to change the
recommendation as decided in the meeting on 15.3.2011 to
deprive the appellant of a legitimate claim was not accepted.
The High Court proceeded to deal with the allegation of mala
fide and opined that as no particulars were given about any        c
Governmental authority showing any favour to any particular
candidate, the said allegations were not acceptable. Th·e plea
of legal malice to the effect that the Government directed Prasar
Bharati Board to act in a particular manner was repelled by the
High Court as the same was not based on any material. Being
                                                                    0
of this view, the High Court dismissed the writ petition.

      5. We have heard Mr. M.N. Krishnamani, learned senior
counsel for the appellant, Mr. Paras Kuhad, learned Additional
Solicitor General, Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel for
the fifth respondent, Mr. M.C. Dhingra, learned counsel for the    E
fourth respondent, Mr. Rajeev Sharma and Mr. Rajesh
Srivastava, learned counsel for the respondents.

     6. Mr. Krishnamani, learned senior counsel appearing for
the appellant, has basically raised three contentions, namely, F
(i} on a perusal of the recommendations of the Selection
Committee, it is clearly demonstrable that it had sent the names
in order of preference, regard being had to the seniority, merit
and suitability, but the same was changed by the Board which
had no authority to do so; (ii} after the tribunal had quashed the G
decision taken by way of circulation, the matter was directed
to be reconsidered by proper deliberation but three Members
of the Selection Committee who had not interviewed the
candidates had been replaced and hence, the decision of the
Board is vitiated; and (iii} the Government has indirectly H
    876      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A influenced the decision by a proposal and the same
  tantamounts to legal malice which makes the selection
  vulnerable in law.

       7. Mr. Paras Kuhad, learned Additional Solicitor General,
B has submitted that the recommendations did not indicate any
  preference based on merit and, therefore, the presumption in
  that regard is absolutely erroneous. It is urged by him that the
  Officer on Special Duty had clarified the position before the
  tribunal that as per his understanding, there was no preference
C and there was no interference by the Government requiring the
  Committee to do any act in any particular manner and hence,
  there is nothing to suggest any legal malice. He has produced
  the proceedings of selection before this Court.

      8. Mr. Dhingra, learned counsel appearing for the fourth
D respondent, has submitted that the order passed by the High
  Court is absolutely impregnable and defensible and does not
  warrant any interference by this Court.

        9. Mr. Vikas Singh, learned senior counsel appearing for
E the fifth respondent, the Director General, Doordarshan,
  submitted that there was no recommendation by preference
  and further non-availability of the three Members due to their
  retirement or expiry of tenure and constitution of the Board by
  inducting three new Members would not vitiate the selection.
  For the aforesaid purpose, he has placed reliance on Section
F 4(2) of the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India)
  Act, 1990 (for short "the Act") and commended us to the
  decision in B.K. Srinivasan and Others v. State of Kamataka
    and Others1•

G        10. To appreciate the aforesaid submissions, we shall refer
    to the minutes of the meeting dated 15.3.2011. The relevant
    part of the minutes reads as under: -
        "2. The Board interviewed the following officers (who
H 1. (1987) 1 sec 658.
G. JAYALAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS                 877
             [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
responded to the intimation in respect of the interview} for   A
the post of Director General, All India Radio: -

  i.       Shri G. Jayalal

  ii.      Shri L.D. Mandloi
                                                               B
  iii.     Shri Ashok Jailkhani

3. The Board interviewed the following officers (who
responded to the intimation in respect of the interview} for
the post of Director General, Doordarshan: -
                                                               c
 EXTERNAL CANDIDATES
  (i}      Shri Sunil Kumar Singh
  (ii}     Shri Ram Subhag Singh
                                                               D
  (iii}    Shri Anil Kumar Aggarwal
  (iv}     Shri Manoj Kumar Panda
  (v}      Shri Jagmohan Singh Raju
  (vi}     Shri Tripurari Sharan                               E

 DEPARTMENTAL CANDIDATES
 (i}      Shri G. Jayalal
 (ii}     Shri L.D. Mandloi                                    F

 (iii}    Shri Ashok Jaifkhani
4. Taking into account the considerations of overall merit
 and experience and with due regard to an assessment of
 suitability, the Board decided to forward recommendations G
 to the Government of India, as given below: -
 For the post of Director General, Doordarshan

   1.      Sh. L.D. Mandloi
                                                               H
    878         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 3 S.C.R.


A          2.     Sh. Tripurari Sharan

           3.     Sh. Ramsubhag Singh

          For the post of Director General, All India Radio

B          1.     Sh. G. Jayalal

           2.     Sh. L.D. Mandloi"

          11. It has been contended that it was a recommen~ation
    in order of preference. On a perusal of the file, it is perceptible
C   that after the recommendations were sent, the OSD circulated
    a letter stating that the Board had not sent the names in order
    of merit or preference and, therefore, it was necessary that the
    names should be short-listed in order of preference. It is also
    evident from the record that each of the Members of the
D   Selection Committee gave his recommendation separately on
    the proposed decision circulated by the OSD. No Member of
    the Selection Committee, while giving his recommendation,
    stated that in the meeting held on 15.3.2011, the Board had
    recommended the names in order of merit. It is also noticeable
E   that one of the Members, namely, Dr. George Verghese, who
    had recommended the appellant to be placed at No. 1, had
    also not mentioned that the names had already been placed
    in order of preference of merit. We have only referred to the
    same to indicate that the Members of the Board had
F   understood the minutes in that perspective.

       12. At this juncture, we think it appropriate to advert to when
  preference is given on the basis of merit and suitability.
  Conceptual preference, fundamentally, would mean that all
G aspects, namely, merit, suitability, fitness, etc. being equal,
  preference is given regard being had to some other higher
  qualifications or experience, etc. In this regard, we may refer
  with profit to the dictum in Secretary, A. P. Public SeNice
  Commission v. Y. V. V.R. Srinivasu/u and Others2 wherein a

H   2.   (2003) s sec 341.
    G. JAYALAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS                  879
                    [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
two-Judge Bench stated about the preference. Though the              A
principle was laid down in the context of a particular rule, yet
we reproduce the same with profit: -

    "Whenever, a selection is to be made on the basis of merit
    performance involving competition, and possession of any         B
    additional qualification or factor is also envisaged to
    accord preference, it cannot be for the purpose of putting
    them as a whole lot ahead of others, dehors their intrinsic
    worth or proven inter se merit and suitability, duly assessed
    by the competent authority. Preference, in the context of all    C
    such competitive scheme of selection would only mean that
    other things being qualitatively and quantitatively equal,
    those with the additional qualification have to be preferred."

     13. In the case at hand, it is not disputed that both the
candidates were eligible. If the minutes of the meeting which D
we have reproduced hereinbefore are minutely studied, it is
perceptible that three departmental candidates were
interviewed for the post of Director General, All India Radio. The
names of the appellant and the fourth respondent were placed
at serial Nos. 1 and 2 respectively. When the Committee E
recommended, it also placed them in the same seriatirn. The
language used in paragraph 4 of the minutes states that taking
into account the consideration of overall merit and experience
and with due regard to the assessn:ient of suitability, the Board
decided to forward the recommendations to the Government of F
India. But it does not specifically state that the recommendations
were in order of merit or in order of preference as determined
by the Board. On the contrary, it is suggestive of the fact that
the Board has placed the names in the same order as sent by
the department for consideration. Thus, the submission of Mr. G
Krishnamani that the names were sent in order of merit or
preference does not merit acceptance.

     14. The next limb of argument is thcit there was interference
by the Government to take the decision in a particular manner.
The said aspect is linked with legal malice and hence, it is         H
     880       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 3 S.C.R.

A necessary to deal with both the aspects in a singular
  compartment. The High Court has referred to the facts in detail
  after referring to the affidavit filed by the Officer on Special Duty.
  In the letter circulated on 21.3.2011 by the Officer on Special
  Duty, he had only suggested that the Board was required to
B short-list the candidates in order of preference. The decision
  in entirety was left to the Board. No suggestion was given. Mr.
  Krishnamani has very fairly stated that the appellant does not
  intend to allege any kind of personal mala fide but legal malice
  as the suggestion had been given for short-listing the
c candidates which was absolutely unnecessary. In essence, the
  submission of the learned senior counsel is that the action of
  the authorities is not bonafide in law. In this context, we may
  refer with profit to the decision in State of A.P. and Others v.
  Goverdhanlal Pitti3 wherein this Court has ruled thus: -
D          " "Legal malice" or "malice in law'' means "something done
           without lawful excuse". In other words, "it is an act done
           wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable
           cause, and not necessarily an act done from ill feeling and
           spite. It is a deliberate act in disregard of the rights of
E          others". (See Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 3rd
           Edn., London Butterworths, 1989.)"
                 )()()(                  )()()(             )()()(


           "Where malice is attributed to the State, it can never be a
F          case of personal ill-will or spite on the part of the State. If
           at all it is malice in legal sense, it can be described as an
           act which is taken with an oblique or indirect object."

      15. Similar view has been expressed in West Bengal State
G Electricity Board v. Di/ip Kumar Ray4 and Kalabharati
    Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania and Others5.

    3.   (2003) 4 sec 739.
    4.   (2007) 14 sec 568.
H 5. (2010) g sec 437.
    G. JAYALAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS                   881
                  [DIPAK MISRA, J.]
      16. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles of law,     A
it cannot be said that any wrongful act has been done to inflict
any legal injury on the appellant. It is difficult to hold that any
act has been done to disregard or defeat his legal rights. What
has been stated by the OSD is basically requiring the Board
to short-list the names in order of preference. The Members of        B
the Board could have reiterated that they had earlier
recommended the names in accordance with preference. They,
we are inclined to think correctly, did not say that the
recommendations already made were in order of preference
but gave the preference initially by circulation and when it was      c
set aside by the tribunal, thereafter, by deliberation. Thus, the
submission pertaining to legal malice, being sans substratum,
stands repelled.

     17. The last plank of argument of the learned senior
counsel is that the inclusion of three new Members who had            D
not interviewed the candidates would vitiate the decision of the
Board. The High Court has not dealt with it and opined that if
the said decision was required to be assailed, it was open to
the appellant to knock at the doors of the tribunal. There is no
dispute from any quarter that three Members had to be                 E
substituted because some had retired and the tenure of some
had expired. Section 4 of the Act deals with appointment of
Chairman and other Members. Sub-sections (1) and (2) of
Section 4 read thus: -
                                                                      F
     "4. Appointment of Chairman and other Members. -
     (1) The Chairman and the other Members, except the ex
     officio Members, the nominated Member and the elected
     Members shall be appointed by the President of India on
     the recommendation of a committee consisting of-                 G

     (a) the Chairman of the Council of States, who shall be the
     Chairman of the Committee;

     (b) the Chairman of the Press Council of India established       H
    882       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [201~13 S.C.R.

A         under section 4 of the Press Council Act, 1978 (37 of
          1978); and

          (c) one nominee of the President of India.

          (2) No appointment of Member shall be invalidated merely
8         by reason of any vacancy in, or any defect in the
          constitution of, the committee appointed under sub-section
          (1 )."

       18. Regulation 5 of the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting
C Corporation of India) Director General (Akashvani) and Director
  General (Doordarshan) (Recruitment) Regulations, 2001 reads
  as follows: -

          "5. Appointing Authority : The appointment to the post
          specified in column 1 of the Schedule shall be made by
D
          the Corporation, after consultation with the Recruitment
          Board established under sub-section (1) of Section 10 of
          the Act."

          19. There is no cavil that three Members, who have been
E   appointed, have been validly appointed. Though Mr. Vikas
    Singh, learned senior counsel, has drawn inspiration from the
    concept of principle of "Ganga" clause as enshrined in B.K.
    Srinivasan (supra), yet the same need not be adverted to as
    neither the appointment of the Member of the Board nor their
F   holding the office as Member is called in question. The issue
    is slightly different. By efflux of time, some of the Members of
    the Board were substituted and different Members were
    inducted. The tribunal thought it appropriate to remit the matter
    to the Board to reconsider the matter after due deliberation.
G   Keeping in view the minutes of the meeting, it is manifest that
    the Board has gone through the whole deliberations by the
    recommending authority, as we find from the records, and
    expressed the view. Thus, it was not necessary to hold a further
    interview to find out the preference as the minutes were
H   absolutely clear as day that no preference was given. Therefore,
    G. JAYALAL v. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS                  883
                 [DIPAK MISRA, J.)
we do n.ot find any flaw in the three Members participating in      A
the short-listing of the names and giving preference. That apart,
the majority of the earlier Members were there and they had
given preference in favour of the fourth respondent and,
therefore, factually, it would not have made any difference. Thus
analysed, we perceive no merit in this contention.                  8

     20. In view of the aforesaid premised reasons, the appeal
is devoid of any substance and, accordingly, stands dismissed
without any order as to costs.

R.P.                                        Appeal dismissed.       c