Holding

A statement constitutes a corrupt practice under Section 123(4) only if it is a false statement of fact, made believing it false, relating to the personal character or conduct of a candidate, and reasonably calculated to prejudice that candidate's election; only the false allegation of a Rs 20 lakh payment satisfied these criteria, rendering Gadakh's election void while the other statements and those of Sharad Pawar did not.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined an election petition challenging the Lok Sabha election of Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao from Ahmednagar on the ground that he had committed a corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The petition alleged that Gadakh and the then Chief Minister Sharad Pawar made false statements about the personal character of the petitioner, E.V. Alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil, including allegations of large payments to the Janata Dal and distribution of goods to voters. The Court held that for a statement to fall under Section 123(4) it must be a false statement of fact, made believing it false, relate to personal character, and be reasonably calculated to prejudice the election; only the allegation of a Rs 20 lakh payment to a Janata Dal candidate satisfied these criteria. Consequently, Gadakh's election was declared void, the High Court’s order naming Sharad Pawar under Section 99 was set aside, and the declaration that Vikhe Patil was duly elected under Section 101(b) was also set aside. The appeal was partially allowed, upholding the void election but rejecting the further relief.

Issues considered

The meaning and scope of "statement of fact" under Section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
Whether the alleged statements made by Gadakh and Sharad Pawar satisfy all the requirements of Section 123(4) – falsity, belief of falsity, relation to personal character, and prejudice to election prospects
The standard of proof applicable to allegations of corrupt practice – quasi‑criminal standard versus civil pre‑ponderance
Whether consent of the candidate is required when a third party makes the statement and how it may be proved
The applicability of Section 101(b) to declare the runner‑up elected after voiding the returned candidate’s election

Legislation cited

Representation of the People Act, 1951s. 101(b), s. 123(4), s. 123(6), s. 99

Subjects

Representation of the People ActSection 123(4)corrupt practicestatement of factelectoral lawquasi‑criminal standard of proofconsentSection 99Section 101(b)election petitionvoid electionpolitical speech

Judgment

GADAKH YASHWANTRAO KANKARRAO A
v.
E.V. ALIAS BALASAHEB VIKHE PATIL AND ORS.

NOVEMBER 19, 1993

[J.S. VERMA, N.P. SINGH AND N. VENKATACHALA, JJ.] B

Representation of the People Act, 1951-Sec: 123(4)-Conupt Prac·
tice-R.equirements of-Expression 'statement offact'-Meanin~nus of
proof

Appreciation of evidenct-Standard of proof of a quasi-criminal charge
c
-Proof required as in a criminal charge-Strictness of pleadings-Liberal
construction not the proper approach-Election to be contested on positive
vote-Purity of elections-Duty of Courts.. ·

Offending statement of fact which is falsely published by any other D
person-Consent of candidatt-Standard of proof

Statements relating to payment by candidate to a political party's fund--
Contribution prior to becoming a candidate whether amounts to corrupt
practice u/s 123 (4)-Held, No.
E
Allegation of payment to a candidate for shifting to another constituen-
cy-Statement of fact proved to be f alse-l'ub/ication in newspaper-Wltether
amounts to corrupt practice-Held, yes.

Statement of a proposal to distribute bicycles to participants in a rally--
Statement of likelihood of distribution of sarees, dhoties, liquor and cash in F
constituency-Expression of appreltension-Wltether constitutes corrupt prac-
tice-Held, No.

Hiring of workers for election campaign-Not an offending statement
of fact u/s 123 (4). G
Statement that a candidate was likely to give money for repair of
Cltawdies and renovation of temples-Not a disparaging act relating to per-
sonal character or conduct.

Statement made advising voters to accept whatever was offered by a H
731
732 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A candidate-Statement to cast vote uninfluenced by extraneous consideration--
Whether constitute conupt practice-Held, No.

General Statements made by Chief Minister projecting his plllty's can-
didate as upholder of morality and honesty-Exho1tation made to people to
vote for his pa1ty's candidate-Cannot constitute statements offact relating to
B character and conauct of opposite candidate-Not a conupt practice.

Section 123(6}-<:eiling on expenditure-Prescription on ceiling fixed
only in respect of expenditure by candidate-Expenditure incurred by party
outside the net of legal sanction-Lacuna in law-l'arliament to fill.

C Section 101 (b )-Election-Invalidation to election of returned can-
didate void for commission of corrupt practice-Candidate securing next
highest number of vote~Whether can be declared elected.

Section 116-A-Appeaf-Scope of.
D ELECTIONS-Election campaign-Trend of-Duty of political par-
ties-Election to be contested on positive vote-Shift in election campaign in
positive direction emphasised.

For the Lok Sabha seat from Ahemdnagar Parliamentary Con·
E stituency, the returned candidate, the appellant was declared elected
against his nearest rival, the election petitioner.

The election petitioner filed an election petition praying that the
election of the appellant be declared as void and the election petitioner be
declared to have been duly elected from that constituency. The validity of
F the election was challenged on the grounds that the appellant had com·
mitted the corrupt practice u/s 123(4) of the Representation of the People
Act; that the appellant had made certain false statements in his speeches
relating to the personal character and conduct of the election petitioner
attributing the use of corrupt methods by him, with a view to prejudice the
G prospects of his election which was published in the daily newspaper; that
in the public meetings, the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra had made
similar statements relating to the personal character of the election
petitioner, in the presence of and along with the appellant; that these
statements amounted to corrupt practice u/s 123(4) of the Act on 'lccount
of which the appellant's election was void and the then Chief Minister was
H liable to be named in accordance with Section 99 of the Act.
KANKARRAOv. B.V.PATIL 733

After the evidence was recorded and the appellant had also been A
examined, the High Court issued a notice u/s 99 to the then Chief Minister
of Maharashtra to show cause why he should not be so named. The then
Chief Minister challenged the issuance of this notice by a Special Leave
Petition, but the same was dismissed requiring him to raise his objections
in the first instance at the trial of the election petition in the High Court B
itself. He then raised his objections before the High Court but chose not
to adduce any evidence or to apply for recall of any witness already
examined for further cross-examination. However, he denied the commis-
sion of any such corrupt practice as did the appellant at the trial of the
election petition.
c
The High Court allowed the election petition and declared the elec-
tion of the returned candidate to be void making a further declaration that
the election petitioner was duly elected. The High Court also named the
then Chief Minister of Maharashtra for commission of the corrupt prac-
tice u/s 123(4) of the Act alongwith the returned candidate. It was held that D
the returned candidate and the Chief Minister did make supplementary
statements of each other stating that the petitioner was to spend Rs. 3
crores for his election, that the had paid Rs. SO lakhs to Janata Dal, Rs.
20 ~khs were paid to the Janata Dal Candidate for withdrawing from one
constituency and to contest from another constituency; that the petitions E
was to take out rally of 5000 cycles and distribute the cycles amongst the
participants, that the petitioner was to spend for repairs of Chawdies and
had spent Rs. 5,000 for repair of Chawdies. It was also stated that the
petitioner was to distribute sarees, dhoties, liquor amongst the workers
with a view to attract them and it was advised that the voters must accept F
them and vote for Congress. The High Court concluded that these state-
ments would touch upon the personal character and conduct of the
petitioner.

These appeals were filed u/s 116A of the Act, against the judgment
of the High Court. The returned candidate challenged declaration of his G
election to be void and the further declaration of the election petitioner to
have been duly elected. The respondent Nos. 5 & 6 had challenged merely
the further declaration of the petitioner to have been duly elected, in their
appeals. The notice filed appeal against naming him for commission of the
corrupt practice u/s 123(4) along with the returned candidate. H
734 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1993) SUPP. 3 s.c:R.

A The appellant, returned candidate atleged that he did not make any
of the statements attributed to him and at any rate none of those state-
ments amounted to the corrupt practice u/s 123 (4) of the Act. The noticee,
the then Chief Minister contended that the statements attributed to him,
which did not include the statement of payment of Rs. 50 lakhs to the
election fund of Janta Dal and the payment of Rs. 20 lakhs to the Janta
B
Dal candidate for shifting to another constituency, did not satisfy the
requirements of Section 123(4) and tlierefore, did not amount to the
corrupt pra_ctice thereunder; that apart from there being no ground to
declare the election of the returned candidate to be void, no ground had .
been made that the election petitioner to have been duly elected; that the
c making of these statements attributed to him or at least the disparaging
part thereof by him was not proved by any acceptable evidence and at any
rate all the requirements of section 123(4) were not proved to hold that
the -corrupt practice was committed by the returned candidate; that the
charge of commission of a corrupt prac~ice being of a quasi-criminal .
D nature, the standard of proof applicable was ofa.·cri~inal charge and not
merely that of preponderance of probabilities of a ciVil ease; and that the
statements which were made were only to caution the electorate against
possible misuse of money power. On the point relating to the manner of
appreciation of evidence in such a case, the appellant submitted that every
E statement reflecting on the personal character of a candidate does not
amount to a corrupt P.ractice since it does not prejudice the election in the
prevailing political climate; that the existing norms do not match the
earlier norms and, therefore, every reflection on a candidate's character
does not necessarily prejudice his election since the electorate is not
influenced by such a statement in the pravaling electoral scene since they
F are not taken seriously by the voters due to the falling ethical standards;
that political 11"aders have a duty to educate the electorate against possible
malpractices which are now not uncommon during the election and making ,
of such statements was desirable and that every allegation against a
candidate of his committing a corrupt practice was not moral turpitude
G adversely affecting the personal character of the candidate to constitute
the corrupt practice u/s 123(4) of the Act; that every statement was not a
'statement of fact' and, therefore, a statement made about ·future ap-
prehension or opinion of the maker, did not fall within the ambit of this
expression and that most of the statements attributed to the returned
H candidate and all the statements attributed to the then Chief Minister did
. KANKARRAOv. B.V.PATIL 735

not constitute 'Statement of fact' within the meaning of this expression in A
Section 123(4); and that all these statements were within the permissible
electoral practice, necessary for education of the electorate.

The respondent contended that the expression 'statement of fact' had
to be given a wider meaning to include even a statement relating to the
state of mind of the other person about his future conduct and, therefore, B
all the statements attributed to the appellants fell within the meaning of
this expression.

The notice submitted that to constitute corrupt practice uf!; 123(4),
the consent of the returned candidate to the making of these statements
by the then Chief Minister was also essential which had neither been
c
pleaded nor proved; that the fact of candidate's presence at the time when
these statements were alleged to have been made by him in the public
meeting was not sufficient to prove the consent of the returned candidate
requisite for constituting the corrupt practice u/s 123(4) and that the
statements attributed to the notice did not constitute corrupt practice u/s D
123(4) of the Act as the requirements of that provision were not satisfied.

Disposing of the matter, this Court

HELD : 1. The High Court's judgment declaring the election of the
appellant, the returned candidate to be void for commission of corrupt E
practice under Section 123(4) of the Representation of the People Act is
upheld and the further declaration made by the High Court that the
election petitioner was duly elected is set aside. The High Com ~'s order
naming the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra under Section 99 of the
Act for commission of the corrupt practice under 123(4) is also set aside. F
(794-F-G]
2. Allegations of corrupt practice are of a quasi-criminal nature and
the proof that would be required.in support of such allegations would be
as in a criminal charge and not mere preponderance of probabilities as in
a civil matter. (765-D] G
Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh & Ors., (1985] 1 SCC 91 and Megraj
Patodia v. R.K Bir/a & Ors., [1971] 2 SCR 118, relied on.

Samant N. Balakrishnu etc. v. George Fernadez & Ors. etc, [1969] 3
SCR 603; Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandh~ [1986] Supp. SCC 315; Lalit H
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R ..

A Kishore Chatwvedi v. Jagdish Prasad Thada & Ors., (1990] Supp SCC 248;
Dau/at Ram Chauhan v.Anand Slza1111a, [1984] 2 SCC 64 andM.J. Zakha1ia
Sait v. T. M. Mohammed & 01:1·., [1990) 3 SCC 396, referred to.

3.1 The plain meaning of Section 123.(4) indicates that it is not every
statement but only 'a statement of fact' to which the provision applies, that
B
the statement of fact should be false; that such statement should be made
believing it to be false or at least not true; that it should relate to the
personal character or conduct etc. of any candidate; and it should be
reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate's elec-
tion. tJnless all these requirements are satisfied, the state~ent does not
C constitute corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of Act howseever un·
desirable, morally or ethically, the making of that statenient may be
otherwise. [775-H, 776-A]

3.2 Every statement of fact in relation to the personal character or
D conduct of any candidate does not amount to a corrupt pr.actice under
Section 123(4) unless all the requirements of the provision are satisfied,
notwithstanding the fact that such a statement may be defamatory i•
character. The additional requirements to constitute a corrupt practice are
obviously to maintain the delicate balance between the freedom of speech
E of an individual and public interest of giving full information to the
electorate of the candidates. There is no presumption of falsity of such a
statement of fact for the purpose of Section 123(4) as it is under the law
of defamation; and apart from proving the statement of fact to be false, it
must also be shown· that the maker of the statement either believed it to
·F be false or did not believe it to be true. Irrespective of the quantum of I
evidence necessary to discharge the initial onus of leading evidence, the
burden of proving these requirements on the evidence adduced remains on
the person alleging commission of the corrupt practice. The object of
making this provision more stringent is to emphasise the significance of
freedom of speech in this sphere while prohibiting the making of such
G statements of fact relating to the personal character or conduct of any
candidate which are not merely false but which are also believed to be false
or not believed to be true by the maker. The grater latitude in election law
is meant to serve the public purpose if the statement found to be false is
made with the belief in its truth based on reasonable grounds and it is not
H intended to be a licence for making a scurrilous attack on the opponents
recklessly. [766-B·C·D·E]
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL 737

3.3 The primary requirements of Section 123(4) are that the state- A
ment should be a 'statement of fact' which is 'false' and which the maker
either 'believes to be false' or 'does not believe to be true'. The burden of
proving the satisfaction of all these requirements is no him who alleges
commission of the corrupt practice. The onus of leading evidence relating
to some requirements is however light in view of their nature. Once the B
initial onus is discharged, the onus shifts to the other side. For proving
the statement of fact to be false, the initial onus is discharged and the
burden shifts to the other side by assertion of its falsity on oath whereafter
it is for the other side to rebut the same. Similarly, the nature of belief of
the maker being primarily related to the state of mind of the maker, the
initial burden is discharged by an assertion on oath to that effect. If there C
be any circumstances relevant for proving and justifying the belief of the
maker, that also would be a matter of evidence. The maker of the statement
knows best that material on which his belief was formed and, therefore, it
is for him to prove the same. Whether the maker of the statement believed
it to be false or did not believe it to be true, is then ordinarily a matter of D
inference from the facts so proved. (766-F-G-H; 767-A-B]

3.4 For constituting the C()rrupt practice in Section 123(4), all the
requirements thereof must be satisfactorily proved. A statement o( fact for
the purpose of Section 123 (4) can be one which is capable of proof as 'false'
and which the maker either 'believed to be false' or 'did not believe to be E
true' at the time ofmaking,it. These further requirements of its falsity and
nature of belief of the maker at the time of making the statement of fact
are essential requirements without which the 'statement of fact' is not the
one contemplated by Section 123(4). A 'statement offact' can be· proved to
be 'false' only if it relates to an event which bas happened and not to a F
hypothetical future possibility. Similarly, the belief of the maker about its
falsity or the lack of belief in its truth relates to an existing fact and not
to a hypothetical future apprehension howsoever honestly one may believe
in its likelihood. Any statement made which is a conjecture of a likelihood
in future, would. not come within the ambit of the expression "statement of
fact" used in Section 123(4). This is also supported by the fact that G
another requirement of Section 123(4) is that the statement o( fact made
should be reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that
candidate's election. This further requirement cannot be satisfied by mere-
ly stating a likely apprehension for the future and if the even does not
happen, this requirement cannot be tested. It is a different matter if the H
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A statement amounts to an opinion relating to the personal character or
conduct of any candidate which is based on existing or past acts of the
candidate. (768-A-B-C-D-E]

Kumara Nand v. Brijmohan Lal Shamia, (1967) 2 SCR 127; Nepal
Chand Roy v. Netaji Chandra Das & Ors., (1971) 3 SCC 303; T.K. Gangi v.
B M. C. Anjaneya Reddy & Ors., 22 E.L.R 261; Gurnji Shrihari Baliram Jivatode
v. Vithalrao & Ors., (1969) 1 SCC 82; Ram Chand Bhatia v. Hardayal, [1986)
1 SCR 177; Inder Lal v. Lal Singh, (1962) Supp. 3 SCR 114 and Sheopat
Singh v. Ram Pratap, (1965) 1SCR175, relied on.

C 3.5 The meaning of the expression 'statement of fact' used in Section
123(4), must be such which is apposite in the context and even if the
meaning of the word "fact" be wider to include opinion about another
person and apprehensions about his future conduct, that is not sufficient
to so construe the expression "statement of fact" in this provision unless
it fits in the context. A pragmatic test is to examine whether the meaning
D given to the expression 'statement of fact' is capable of satisfying the other
requirements of the provisions. It is only that meaning of this expression
which is capable of satisfying the other requirements of the provision
which can be its true meaning in the context. (767-F-G-H]

E Salmond on juris.prudence, 12th Edition, p.69, referred to.

4. The consent of the candidate for the purposes of Section 123(4)
when the offending statement of fact which is false is published by any
other person may be proved by inference from the circumstances and not
necessarily by positive evidence to that effect since positive evidence of
F consent may not be available. (771-F]

B.R. Rao v. N.G. Ranga, (1970) 3 SCC 576; Narasingh Charan Mohan-
ty v. Surendra Mohanty, (1974) 2 SCR 39 and Samant N. Balakrishna etc. v.
George Fernandez & Ors. etc., (1969) 3 SCR 603, relied on.
G 5.1 The allegations made against the appellant was that he stated that
the election petitioner had an election budget of Rs. 3 crores. The 9uestion
in the present case related only to the corrupt practice specified in sub~.sec- .
tion (4) of Section 123 and not to the corrupt practice under sub-section (6) ...
thereof relating to the incurring or authorising of expenditure in contraven-
H tion of Section 77 of the Act. Therefore the only point was whether the
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL 739

statement that the election petitioner had an election budget of Rs. 3 crores A
was a false statement of fact. So far as the means of the candidates was
concerned, both appeared to be considerably affluent. The electorate must
have been well aware of their means and, therefore, this was a neutral
circumstance which by itself had no significance bearing on the other
statements attributed to the appellant. (776-D-E-G-H; 777-A]
B
5.2. The statement of the appellant alleging payment of Rs. 50 Lakhs
by the election petitioner to Janata Dal election fund did not necessarily
imply that this payment was for shifting its candidate to another con-
stituency particularly when no other details were given. This statement
had, therefore to be examined as the allegation of contribution to the C
election fund of a political party. There was no allegation that this payment
was alleged to have been made at any time after the election petitioner had
become a candidate at the election. It was doubt if the mere aJJegation of
contribution to a political party's election fund prior to becoming a can-
didate can amount to the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the Act.
(777-H; 778-A-B] D
5.3 The requirement of Section 123(4) that this statement about
payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by the election petitioners to the Janata Dal
candidate for withdrawing from a constituency and shifting to another
constituency was a statement of fact' which was 'false' was duly proved. E
The publication of these statements was by the appellant himself in a
public meeting and in the interview given for being published in the
Maharashtra Times, and therefore, the further requirement of its publi-
cation as required by Section 123(4) was also proved. This false statement
of fact was in relation to the personal character or conduct of the election
petitioner and it did not relate merely to his political character or conduct. F
The statement was reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of the
election petitioner's elections inasmuch as it conveyed that he had bribed
the Janata Dal candidate by payment of Rs. 20 Lakhs to withdraw his
candidature from this constituency for his benefit. (778-F-G-H; 779-A]

5.4 The election petitioner had denied the payment of Rs .. 20 lakhs G
and also asserted that the appellant while maldng the statement did not
believe it to true. Even though the burden on the pleadings to prove the
satisfaction of this requirement was on the election petitioner yet the initial
burden of leading evidence of that fact was discharged shifting the burden
of rebutting the same to the appellant. In his deposition the appellant did H
740 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A not believe in the truth of the information given to him about the payment
of Rs. 20 lakhs by the election petitioner to a candidate and the latter
withdrawing from the COJ!Stituency for that reason. In such a situation, the
appellant's admission in his cross examination that he did not believe the
allegation to be true had the effect of reinforcing the petitioner's assertion
to this effect instead of negativing it. It could not, therefore, be doubted
B that the appellant did not believe in the truth of this allegation made
against the petitioner when he said in his speech and interview that Rs. 20
lakhs had been paid by the petitioner to the Janata Dal candidate for
withdrawing from this constituency and shifting to another constituency.
All the requirements of Sectio~ 123(4) were satisfied and the false state-
C ment of fact made to this effect by the appellant in respect of the personal
character and conduct of the election petitioner amounted to the corrupt
practice under Section 123(4) of the Act. This along was sufficient for
declaring the election of appellant to be void.
[779-E-F-H; 782-A-B; 785-F-G]
D 5.5. The expression of a mere apprehension which did not come true
apart from not being a 'statement of fact', did not satisfy the other
requirements of Section 123(4). The statement of a proposal to take out a
rally of 5000 bicycles and then distribute the bicycle to the participants
related to the f~ture and was·at best merely the expression of an apprehen-
E sion. No one had even suggested that such a rally was taken out at any
time during the election campaign by the petitioner. It was an apprehen-

-
sion which did not materialise and, therefore, there was no reasonable
.likelihood of any impact thereof on the mind of the voters. Similar was the
stntement alleged to have been made of the likelihood of distribution of
sarees, dhoties, liquor and cash in the constituency. No one had said that
F such a distribution of any of these articles was made by the petitioner
during the election campaign. Such a statement, if made, was therefore
another apprehension which did not come true and, therefore, could not
affect the mind of the voters. [786-B-C-D]

G 5.6. Mere hiring of worker for election campaign is not an offending
statement of fact under Section 123(4). Unless the hiring of workers by
payment of money resulted in exceeding the permissible maximum limit of
election expenditure to constitute the corrupt practice under Section
123(6), this fact along would not constitute the corrupt practice under
H Section 123(4). [786-E-F-G]
KANKARRAOv. B.V.PATIL 741

S.7. Mere repair of Chawdies or renovation of temples is not a dis- A
paraging act relating to the personal character or conduct of anyone unless
the further requirements of section 123 (4) are proved including the require-
ment of its impact on the mind of the electorate that it was reasonably
calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate. [787-B-C]
B
6.1. The statements attributed to the then Chief Minister of
Maharashtra in the meetings et f acie did not amo•J~t to 'statements of fact'
relating to the personal character or conduct of the petitioners being only
the expression of his opinion based on apprehensions about the likely
future conduct of the petitioner or relating only to his political character .
which did not fall within ambit of Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. The C
statement of the Chief Minister that he had no objection to acceptance of
the articles if they were distributed did not fall within the net of Section
123(4). The statement was an exhortation to the electorate to support
morality and honesty to belittle and destroy the force of wealth and ego
opposed to it. This was merely an exhortation of the speaker to support D
morality and honesty against money power and ego. These general state-
ments made projecting his party's candidate as. ~e upholder of morality
and honesty against the forces guided by money power and ego amounted
to his opinion of the kind of representation made by the two candidates
irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of that opinion. The exhorta·
tion made to the people to vote for his party's candidate as the upholder E
of morality and honesty could not be treated as statements of fact relating
to the character and conduct of the election petitioner amounting to
vilification of his character or conduct. Thus, none of the statements of the
Chief Minister constituted the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the
R.P. Act. The stateuaents wherein he said that the petitioner chose to F
contest from the South constituency being a famine prone region wherein·
the people were poor for the purpose of purchasing their self respect and
that the petitioner had stated activities to win the election by efforts of
interested parties by playing their game of purchasing sel~ respect of the
poor people did not come within Section 123(4). In one statement, he said
that money alone could not be an important motivation in the election and ·a
there was need of ideology, policy, programme and morality. He then added
that it was wrong to give up morality and leave the party when one's wish
was not fulfilled and to join hands with other parties. This was in the
background of the petitioner leaving the Congress (I) Party when the party
ticket was not given to him and he contesting the election with the help of H
742 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

· A other parties. The suggestion was that abandoning the party and switching
of loyalty was not morally and ideologically correct. In the admitted
background of the petitioner, this comment was on his political morality
and character because of his leaving the Congress (I) Party on denial of
ticket to him to and contesting against the Congress (I) Party's candidate.
B This statement did not relate to the personal character or conduct of the
petitioner but merely to his political character and morality. This did not
fall within Section U3(4). [788·F·G; 789·D·G·H; 790·A·G]

Manohar Joshi v. Damodar Talyaba & Ors., (1991) 2 SCC 342,
referred to.
c
6.2. Some or the statements, made by the Chief Minister even thQugh
not amounting to corrupt practice under the enacted law, did not measure
upto the desired level or electioneering at the top echelon or political
D leadership to set trend for a healthly election campaign. His suggestion to
the voters to accept monies etc., if distributed by a candidate, without being
inftuenced thereby as a means or propagating socialism exhibited a bizarre
perception or socialism. It was shocking enough that appellant said so but
far worse to find the Chief Minister endorse that view. Intended as
sarcasm It depicted poor tasb!. Ir this be the level of election campaign at
E the top, It ls bound to degenerate as it descends to the lower levels. Some
portions or the speeches or the Chief Minister were indeed high precept
but the electorate would have benefited more by knowledge or the track
record or the preachers' practice or the same. There was no such attempt.
The degree or responsibility and the level or electioneering excepted or the
F top leadership was wanting in these speeches. Ir probity in public life is to
be maintained and purity or elections is not a myth or mere catch-phrase,
a higher level of electioneering is expected at least at the highest level of
political leadership. This shift in the election campaign has, therefore, to
be in the positive direction to enable the electorate to case its positive vote
G instead of the negative vote by rejecting those with greater demerits. This
duty is cast more heavily on the senior leaders of all the political parties
to ensure that the election campaign does not degenerate into a campaign
or vilification, which may tend to promote violence during elections and
lead to criminalisation of politics. The present trend of election campaign
must be reversed to make the democracy more meaningful by ensuring
H purity of elections. (792-C·D·E; 791-H; 792·A·B] .
. KANKARRAOv. B.V.PATIL 743

7.1 If purity of election is the essence of democracy and providing A
for inv~lidation of an election on the ground of commission of any corrupt
practice is the object of enacting these provisions, it cannot be accepted
that the election scene having degenerated over the years, appreciation of
evidence for determining the commission of a corrupt practice must be
made liberally because of the lower values in the arena of elections. If the
rule of law has to be preserved as the essence of the democracy of which
B
purity of elections ls a necessary concomitant, it ls the duty of the courts
to appreciate the evidence and construe the law ln a manner which would
subserve this higher purpose and not even imperceptibly facilitate accep·
tance, much less amnnance, of the falling electoral standards. For
democracy to survive, rule of law must prevail, and lt Is necessary that C
the best available men should be chosen as people's representatives for
proper governance of the country. This can be best achieved through men
of high moral and ethical values who win the el~tions on a positive vote
obtained on their own merit and not by the negative vote of process of
elimination based on comparative demerits of the candidates. It is also D
necessary that the. impact of money power which has eliminated from
electoral contest many men of undoubted availability and credibility for
want of requisite financial support should be able to re-enter the field to
make the people's choice meaningful. This can be achieved only if elections
are contested on a positive vote and the comparison is between the merits
and abilities of the contestants without the influence of power and pelf and E
not between their comparative demerits and the supports of money power.
Apart from the other adverse consequences, the growing influence or
money power has also the effect or promoting criminalisation of politics.
[761-F-G-H; 762-A-B-C]
F
7.2 The existing law does not measure upto the existing realities. The
ceiling on expenditure is faxed only in respect or the expenditure incurred
or authorised by the candidate himself but the expenditure incurred by the
party or anyone else in his election campaign is safely outside the net of
legal sanction. The spirit of the provision suffers violation through the
escape route. The prescription or ceiling on expenditure by a candidate is G
a mere eye-wash and no practical check on election expenses for which it
was enacted to attain a meaningful democracy. This lacuna in the law is,
however, for the parliament to fill lest the impression is reinforced that its
retention is deliberate for .the convenience of everyone. If this be not
feasible, it may be advisable to omit the provision to prevent the resort to H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R..

A indirect methods for its circumvention and subversion of the law, accept·
ing without any qualm the role of money power in the elections. This
provision has ceased to be even a fig leaf to hide the reality. [762-D-E-F]

7.3 Real education of the electorate contemplates informing them of
the past achievements and future plans of the political party on a positive
B note and its candidate's qualifications to serve that purpose compared
with those of the other political parties and their candidates and not a
projection of the comparative greater demerits of the opponents. The
functioning of democracy depends on the quality of the men chose of the
governance of the country. This is the need which the election campaign is
C meant to serve in an election based on party lines, the qualifications of the
candidates being material for this purpose. (762-H; 763-A·B]

7.4 Past experience had shown that even the illiterate section of the
electorate was educated enough to remain uninfluenced by power and pelf.
D This it had shown more than once, by rejecting the high and the mighty in
power when it felt that they had filed to discharge their true obligation.
Even if the said statements or any of them did not constitute the corrupt
practice u/s.123(4), it only meant that the existing law does not frown upon·
the same to visit it with any adverse consequence, but that does not mean
that it is a desirable practice during the election campaign. It is one thing
E to say that a statement does not constitute corrupt practice but entirely
different to suggest that it is a desirable electoral practice fo~ing a part
of the programme for education of the electorate which can oniy \ead to a
further degeneration of the wanting morality in the electoral scene, when
the felt need is for curbing any such tendency to ensure purity of election&.
r
F [763-F-G-H; 764-A·B·CJ
8. The mere fact that the election petitioner secured the next highest
number of votes after the returned candidate was not sufficient to declare ' '

him elected on the conclusion that the election of the returned candidate
was void for commission of a corrupt practice. To justify this relief, it mu!it
G heve been held that but for votes obtained by the returned candidate by the
corrupt practice committed u/s 123(4), the petitioner would have obtained
a majority of the valid votes. The High Court proceeded on an erroneous
assumption that the election of the. returned candidate being void the
petitioner who polled the next highest number of votes must be declared to
have been duly eiected. Relief granted under Section 101(b). of the R.P. Act
H was unwarranted on account of the absence of the requisite evidence to
KANKARRAOv. B.V.PATIL[VERMA,J.] 745

support the grant of this further declaration in the present case. A
[794-D; 793-E; 794-E]
Ko1111app11 Rudrappa Nadgouda v. Vishwanath Reddy & Anr., [1969)
2 SCR 90, relied on.

9. The scope of an appeal under Sedion 116A of the Representation B
of the People Act is an wide as in a civil appeal, and this court has to
exercise the same jurisdiction as is exercised in an appeal against the
original judgment of the High Court. [765-C]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2115 of
~ c
From the Judgment and Order dated 30-3-1993 of the Bombay High
Court in Election Petition No. 2 of 1991.,

WITH
D
CA Nos. 2116/93, 2444/93 and 1758/93.

V.N. Ganpule, Ram Jethmalani, Raja Bhosale, Ashok H. Desai, K.
Parasaran, V.R. Manohar, P.P. Rao, V.A. Bobde, Satish K. Agnihotri, Ms.
Punam Kumari, Ms. Lata Krishnamurthy, Ravinder Kumar, Ms. Nandini
Gore, Vasant Kotwal, S.B. Talekar, R.N., Karanjawala, P.K. M1Jiid.., E
Suruchi Agarwal, Ms. M. Karanjawala, Harsh Desai, Pallav Sisodia, K.K.
Lahir~ P.N. Banerjee, K.J. JohQ, G. Umapathy, P.R. Tiwari, A Raghunath,
Ms. Pragati Shukla, S. Ganesh, A~. Khanwilkar" Viswajit Singh, Prashant
Kumar, E. Iaher, V. Dhoni, V.B'. Mishra, S.B. Mhase, R.F. Nariman, Vijay
Kumar, San''lsh Paul, M.J. Paul and Mrs. V.D. Khanna for the appearing F
parties.

Intervenor in person in C.A. No. 2115/93.

The Judgment of Court was delivered by

VERMA, J. These appeals under Section 116A of the Representation G
of the People Act, 1951 {hereinafter referred to as "the R.P. Act") are
against the judgment dated 30th March, 1993 in Election Petition No. 2 of
1991 E. V. Alia Balasaheb Vikhe Patil v. Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankanao &
Ors., passed by A.A. Halbe, J. of the Bombay High Court at the Auran-
gabad Bench. By the impugned judgment, the election of Gadakh Yash- H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R. ·

A wantrao Kankarrao as a member of the Lok Sabha from 39 Ahmednagar
Parliamentary constituency held in June 1991 has been set aside for com-
mission of the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act; and
E.V. Alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil has been declared elected. Civil Appeal
No. 2115 of 1993 is by Gadakh Yashwantrao Kankarrao (Gadakh) against
B declaration of his election to be void and the further declaration of E.V.
alias Balasaheb Vikhe Patil (Vikhe Patil) to have been duly elected. Civil
Appeal No. 2116of1993 is byDeshmukh Bhagwan Rangnath (Respondent
No. 5 in th~ Election Petition) against declaration of Vikhe Patil to have
been duly elected. Similarly Civil Appeal No. 2444 of 1993 is by Najan
Rambhau Maruti (Respondent No. 6 in the Election Petition) against
C declaration of Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected. Civil Appeal No. 1758
of 1993 is by Sharad Chandra Govindrao Pawar (Sharad Pawar) to whom
a notice under Section 99 of the R.P. Act was issued, against naming him
for commission of the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P.
Act along with the returned candidate Gadakh.
D The material facts are now stated: Programme for election ,of a ·
member for election of a member of the Lok Sabha from 39 Ahmednagar
Parliamentary Constituency known locally as Ahmednagar South con-
stituency was as under :

E "l. Issuance of Nomination papers From 19th April, 91 to 26th
April, 1991.
2. Last Date of Acceptance of 26th April, 1991.
Nomination Papers.
3. Scrutiny and Publication of list of 27th April, 1991
F candidates •,.

4. Withdrawal and Publication of 29th April, 1991
final list of candidates.
5. Allotment of symbols 29th April, 1991 after 3.00 p.m.

G 6. Duration of Propoganda 30th April, to 21st May, 1991.
7. Date of polling 23rd May, 1991.
8. Counting of votes and declaration 27th May, 1991
of results."

H HoweVer, due to the assassination of Shri Rajiv Gandhi, former prime
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL [VERMA, J.] 747

Minister of India on 21st May, 1991, the remaining election programme A
was modified by fixing 12th June. 1991 as the date of polling in that
constituency and 16th June, 1991 for the counting of votes and declaration
of result. For the election from that constituency, the election petitioner
Vikhe Patil, the returned candidate Gadakh, respondent No. 1 and respon-
. dents 2 to 10 in the election petition, were candidates. The polling took
place on 12th June, 1991 and the result was declared on 16th June, 1991
B
wherein Gadakh was declared elected having secured 2,79,520 votes against
his nearest rival Vikhe Patil who secured 2,67, 883 votes.

Vikhe Patil then filed an election petition (E.P. No. 2 of 1991) at the
Aurangabad Bench of the Bombay High Court praying that the election of C
Gadakh be declared as void and the election petitioner Vikhe Patil be
declared to have been duly elected from that constituency. Challenge to
the validity of the election of Gadakh was made by Vikhe Patil on the
ground that Gadakh had committed the corrupt practice under sub-section
(4) of Section 123 of the R.P. Act. This ground was based on the allegation D
that Gadakh had made certain false statements in his speeches relating to .
the personal character and conduct of Vikhe Patil attributing the use of
corrupt methods by him, with a view to prejudice the prospects of Vikhe
Patil's election, in meetings held by him at Sonai on 30th April, 1991,
Ahmednagar on 2nd May, 1991, Newasa on 3rd May, 1991 and in an
interview given to a journalist on 10th May, 1991 which was published in E
the daily newspaper "Maharashtra Times" on 13th May, 1991. It was also
alleged by Vikhe Patil that in the public meeting held at Newasa on 3rd
May, 1991 and at Srigonda on 11th May, 1991, Sharad Pawar, the then
Chief Minister of Maharashtra had made similar statements relating to the
personal character of Vikhe Patil, in the presence of and along with p
Gadakh. It was alleged by Vikhe Patil that these statements relating to the
personal character of Vikhe Patil made by Gadakh and Sharad Pawar
amounted to corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act on
account of which Gadakh's election was void and Sharad Pawar was liable
to be named in accordance with Section 99 of the R.P. Act. After the
evidence was recorded at the trial and Gadakh had also been examined on G
commission on account of his illness, the High Court Issued a notice under
Section 99 of the R.P. Act to Sharad Pawar to show cause why he should
not'be so named.

Sharad Pawar challenged the issuance of this notice under Section H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A 99 of the R.P. Act to him by a special leave petition filed in this Court, but
the same was dismissed requiring sharad Pawar to raise his objections to
the notice in the first instance at the trial of the election petition in the
High court Itself. Sh~rad Pawar then raised his objections before the High
Court but chose not to adduce any evidence or to apply for recall of any
witness already examined for further cross-examination. Sharad Pawar
B denied the commission of any such corrupt practice as did Gadakh at the
trial of tht" election petition.

The High Court at the end of the trial allowed the election petition
and declared the election of Gadakh to be void making a further declara-
C tion that Vikhe Patil was duly elected. The High Court also named Sharad
Pawar for commission of the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the
Act along with the returned candidate Gadakh. The conclusions of the
High Court on the basis of which these reliefs have been granted are
summerised in paragraphs 223 and 224 of the impugned judgment, which
are as under : -
D
"From the discussion in the foregoing paragraphs, it has to be
concluded that the respondent No. 1 and Sharz.d Pawar did made
supplementary statements of each other. Those statements can be
enumerated as below : -
E (1) Petitioner was to spend Rs. 3 crores for his election;

(2) Petitioner had paid Rs. 50- Lakhs to Janata Dal;

(3) Petitioner had paid Rs. 20 Lakhs to Janata Dal candidate for
withdrawing from Nagar constituency and to contest from Beed
F
constituency.

(4) Petitioner was to take out rally of 5000 cycles and distribute
the cycles amongst the participants;

G (5) Petitioner was to spend for repairs of Chawdies and had sent
Rs. 5,000 for repair of Chawadi at Ganganagar, Tq. Newasa;

(6) Petitioner was to distribute sarees, dhoties, liquor amongst the
work~rs obviously with a view to attract them.

H (7) Voters must accept them and vote for congress.
KANKARRAOv. B.V. PATIL [VERMA,J.] 749
• These are the statements made by the respondent No. 1 and A
Sharad Pawar in various meetings. The foregoing discussion has
clearly indicated as to what was spoken by either of them at
different meetings. That portion would be again reconsidered at
the end but suffice it to say that they would certainly touch upon
the personal character and conduct of the petitioners."
B
It i~ these conclusions and relief~ granted- on by basis which are
challenged by the return~d candidate Gadakh and the notice Sharad
Pawar, while respondent No. 5 Deshmukh Bhagwan Rangnath and respon-
dent No. 6 Najan Rambhau Maruti have challenged merely the further
declaration of Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected, in their appeals. C

At this stage, a gist of the alleged false statements relating to the
personal character of Vikhe Patil attributed to Gadakh and Sharad Pawar
may be mentioned while the details thereof would be stated later at the
time of considering each of them separately. It has been alleged by Vikhe D
Patil that Gadakh attributed to him the resort of corrupt methods for
winning the election in his statements by stating the Vikhe Patil had a huge
election budget of Rs. 3 crores; that Vikhe Patil had paid Rs. 50 lakhs to
the election fund of Janata Dal; that Rs. 20 lakhs were by him to the Janata
Dal candidate B.G. Kolse Patil to shift to another constituency; that he was
to distribute 5000 bicycles to the particiI>ants in a bicycle rally to be taken E
out for him; that he had offered to the workers in the election campaign
Rs. 25,000 at the village level and Rs. 50,000 at the taluka level; that he was
to give money for repairs of Chawdies and temples in the constituency; and
he was to distribute sarees, dhoties, liquor and cash to the voters for
purchasing their votes. It was also alleged that Gadakh exhorted the voters p
in the constituency to accept these things from Vikhe r'atil but to vote for
Gadakh. Against Sharad Pawar, it was alleged that in the public meetings
he addressed at Newasa and Srigonda, he made similar statements in the
presence of Gadakh, except the statement attributed to Gadakh alone of
payment by Vikhe Patil to the Janata Dal election fund and the J anata Dal ·
candidate. It may be noticed at this stage that combined findings against G
Gadakh and Sharad· Pawar have been recorded by the High Court in
paragraphs 223 and 224 of the judgmt;nt in respect of all the alleged
statements including those relating to payments to the Janata Dal and the
J anata Dal candidate even though there is no pleading or proof of such
statements being made by Sharad Pawar. The application made by the H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A returned candidate Gadakh for recrimination alleging that the election of
Vikhe Patil would have been void if he had been the returned candidate,
, was also dismissed by the High Court. Civil Appeal No. 2445 of 1993 as
well as Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9210 of 1993 filed by Gadakh
against dismissal of his application for recrimination have already been
B dismissed by us as not pressed.
The operative order made by the High Court is as under : -

"(i) The Election Petition is allowed.

(ii) The election of the respondent No. 1 Gadakh Yashwantrao
c Kankarrao from 39 Ahmednagar Parliamentary constituency
is hereby declared as null and void as the respondent Gadakh
Yashwantrao Kankarrao is proved to have committed corrupt
practices under section 123(4) of the Representation of
People Act.
D
(iii) The notice against Sharadchandra Govindrao Pawar is made
absolute under Section 99 of the Representation of People
Act and Sharadchandra Govindrao Pawar is named as a
person who has been proved to be guilty of corrupt practices
under Section 123(4) of the Representation of People Act.
E The respondent No. 1 shall pay the costs of Rs. 30,000 to the
petitioner and likewise respondent No, 6 shall pay the costs
of Rs. 5,000 to the petitioner.

(iv) Registrar to take action under section 103 of the Repre-
F sentation of People Act and forward the copy of the notice
under section 99 of the Representation of People Act and the
judgment and order in this Election Petition to the Election
Commissioner and also to the Speaker or the Chairman of
the House of Parliament or the State Legislature, as may be
found necessary.
G
(v) The petitioner E.V. @ Balasaheb Vikhe Patil is declared as
a candidate duly elected from the above parliamentary con-
stituency.

H (v!) Petitioner be refunded his security deposit."
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL [VERMA. J.] 751

In these mat~ers, Shri Ashok Desai appeared for Gadakh; Shri K. A
Parasaran for Sharad Pawar; Shri V.N. Ghanpule for Deshmukh Bhagwan
Rangnath (respondent No.5 in the election petition); and Shri Ram Jeth-
malani for Najan, Rambhau Maruti (respondent No. 6 in the election
petition). In substance, the contention of Shri Ashok Desai was that
Gadakh did not make any of the statements attributed to him and at any
rate none of those statements amounts to the corrupt practice under
B
Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. Shri K. Parasaran contended that the
statements attributed to Sharad pawar, which do not include the statement
of payment of Rs. 50 lakhs to the election fund of Janata Dal and the
payment of Rs. 20 lakhs to the Janata Dal candidate B.G. Kolse Patil for
shifting to another constituency, do not satisfy the requirements of Section C
123(4) and, therefore, do not amount to the corrupt practice thereunder.
Shri Desai further contended that apart from there being no ground to
declare the election of Gadakh to be void, no ground had been made out
to declare Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected. Shri Ghanpule appearing
for Deshmukh Bhagwan Rangnath adopted the arguments of Shri Ashok o·
Desai to contend that Vikhe Patil could not be declared elected. Shri Ram
Jethmalani appearing for Najan Rambhau Maruti, Apart from challenging
the declaration of Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected, supported the
submissions of Shri Ashok Desai and Shri Parasaran to contend that a
corrupt practice under Section 123(4) was committed either by Gadakh or
Sharad Pawar E

The statements attributed to Gadakh and Sharad Pawar as constitut-
ing the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act are alleged
in the election petition to have been made in four meetings and one
interview to a journalist given by Gadakh. Before giving the 'particulars of p
these allegations, the particulars of these meetings and interview may be
given. It may be mentioned that Gadakh was the candidate of the Congress
(I) Party at the election and Sharad Pawar belonging to the same Party was
the Chief Minister of Maharashtra at that time. The first meeting was held
on 30th April, 1991 at Sonai at which Gadakh had addressed the Congress G
Party workers. The second meeting of the District Congress Committee
was addressed by Gadakh at Ahmednagar on 2nd May, 1991. The third
was a public meeting at Newasa on 3rd May, 1991 addressed by Gadakh
as well as Sharad Pawar. The fourth was also a public meeting at Srigonda
on 11th May, 1991 which was addressed by Sharad Pawar after he held
introduced and welcomed by Gadakh. The speeches by Gadakh and H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993} SUPP. 3 S.. C.h.

A Sharad Pawar at these meetings were also published in the newspaper.
Apart from these meetings, an iP· erview was given by Gadakh on 10th May,
1991 to a Journalist Girish Kulkarni and that interview was published in
the "Maharashtra Times'' 0f the 13th .May, 1991.

The averments in the election petition relating to the statements
B attributed to Gadakh and Pawar alleged to constitute the corrupt practice
under Section 123(4) are mixed up but the relevant portions in the election
petition are as under :

"On 30th April, 1991, the first respondent had addressed a
c meeting at village Soriai....... .

.......... Further he made a statement that the Petitioner had paid
20 lakhs of rupees for the candidate who was selected by J anata
Dal Party for the Ahmednagar constituency to contest the election
from Beed CC?nstituency. Respondent No. 1 further alleged that the
D
Petitioner was going to spend Rs. 3 crores for Petitioner's election.
Respondent No. 1 also alleged that Petitioner has declared rate
of Rs. 25,000 for defecting worker of village level and Rs. 50,000
for woi;ker of Tahsil............ The petitioner states that the state-
ments mady by the first respondent that petitioner paid Rs. 20
E lakhs to the candidate of Janata Dal to withdraw from Ahmed-
nagar Parliamentary constituency is false is known to first respon-
dent as false and such a statement is relating to personal character
and conduct of the petitioner the statement is false and also related
to the candidate. This Statement was made by the first respondent
F believing it to be false. The said statement was made to prejudice
prospects of the Petitioner in the election. The statement of first
respondent that the petitioner had paid Rs. 50 lakhs to the Janata
Dal Party is also false and this statement of the first respondent
that petitioner has declared rate of Rs. 25,000 per defection worker
of village level and 50,000 per worker of tahsil level is equally false.
G The first respondent know and believe that it was false statement.
The petitioner was indulging into an act of bribery for inducing
Janata Dal candidate to withdraw from election. This statement
relates to the personal character of petitioner ............................. .

H (para 9)
KANKARRAOv. B.V. PATIL [VERMA,J.] 753

............. The petitioner states that the first respondent made a A
statement in the meeting dated 2nd May 1991, that in order to take
the support of Janata Dal, the petitioner had paid Rs. 50 lakhs to
the election fund of (Janata Dal) .......... .

(para 10)
B
The Petitioner states that in the meeting addressed by the first
respondent in the office of the District Congress Committee,
Ahmednagar, on 2.5.1991, as stated in para No. 10. and further the
first respondent made a statement that a sum of Rs. 5000 had been
sent on behalf of Petitioner for constructing Chawdi at Ganganager C
area of Newasa tahsil. The respondent No. 1 further stated that
the Petitioner was going to have bicycle rally of 5000 strong, and ·
those bicycles would be given permanently to the participants in
the said rally........... The Petitioner states that no bicycle rally was
held. The Petitioner had not purchased any bicycle not handed
ovet any bicycle to anybody. The statemer.'I: made by the first D
respondent was false. The statement indicates that the Petitioner
was going to spend large sum of money to bribe voters, and even
distribute 5000 bicycles ... ,..... .

(Para 11)
E
The Petitioner states that an Election meeting was held at·
Newasa Bajartal on 3.5.1991, at 10.30 a.m. for the inauguration of
propoganda. The said meeting was addressed among others by the
first respondent and the. then Chief Minister of Maharashtra Shri
Sharad Pawar. In the said meeting, the first respondent repeated
that 5000 bicycles ............ distributed, money is also being sent for F
repairing of Chawdi. Temples and cash was being distributed on
behalf of the Petitioner. Shri Sharad Pawar made a reference to
this statement in the presence of the first Respondent and Shri
Sharad Pawar also made statement that Vikhe is under false
impression that the poor men from famine affected area of South G
Nagar District can be purchased. Poor persons do not go here or
there for money. Don't take test of self respect of those (poor
men). Institutions have been erected by taking advantage of party.
Voter can't be purchased by that money. Shri Pawar advised the
voters that if the wealth is being distributed take the wealth but
vote for Congress. Statement were repeated to the effect that the H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Petitioner was distributing bicycles and pairs of dhoties, and sarees,
among voters in the constituency........ .

The Petitioner states that these statements were false. The first
respondent and Shri Sharad Pawar were knowing that these state-
ments were false. Shri sharad Pawar Knew well that these state-
B ments reflected on the personal character of the Petitioner. The
petitioner was being painted by the first respondent and Shri
Sharad. Pawar, that the petitioner would do anything to get elected
by use of his money.

c (para 12)

The Petitioner states that the first respondent gave an interview
to Shri Girish Kulkarni representative of Maharashtra Times. The
said interview has been published in the Maharas~tra Times dated
D 13th May, 1991. ........... In the said interview it was put up to 1st
respondent that first respondent had been accusing the Petitioner
of indulging in corrupt practices, on what basis such accusations
were made. 1st respondent replied stating that according to· his
own information the Petitioner had paid· Rs. 50 lakhs to the
election fund of Janata Dal for getting its support and Rs. 20 lakhs
E to Shri B.G. Kolse Patil to make him not to contest the election
from 39, Ahmednagar parliamentary constituency but to contest
from Beed constituency. First respondent had further stated that
the Petitioner had collected Rs. 3 crores from various places to
fight out this election as it is a fight for political existence of Vikhe
F Patil. It was further stated that he would be distributing cycles,
liquor bottles, dhoties, sarees and cash amount among the workers
then only he will be elected and arrangements have been made. It
was further stated by Respondent No. 1 that the Petitioner had
been trying to win over the political workers by financial induce-
ments ........ The Petitioner states that the above statement is false.
G The Petitioner had not paid Rs. 50 lakhs or nor any amount to
Janata Dal Election Fund, nor paid Rs. 20 lakhs to Shri B.G. Koise
Patil. Petitioner had not distributed bicycles, liquor bottles,
dhoties, sarees, cash amounts among the voters. Petitioner had not
attempted to induce the workers of other party with financial
H. support. ~e first. respondent knew that the above statement was
KANKARRAOv. B.V. PATIL [VERMA,J.] 755

false. The first respondent believed it it be false .......... . A

(para 13)

The Petitioner states that the first respondent was also present
in the election meeting on 11th May 1991, at Srigonda at 8.30 p.m. B
in Ahmednagar constituency. The said meeting was addressed by
the then Chief Minister Shri Sharad Pawar ........... The Petitioner
states that the then Chief Minister Shri Sharad Pawar making the
reference to above fact relating to Petitioner, made the following
statements. "Who is contesting this election against us. On one side
there is Rajiv Gandhi and this his candidate trying to save the C
country. On the other side are the ranged people trying to secure
voters in the name of religion and some other candidates and on
the third side there is someone who went in adoption some where
because it was not possible for him to wait when the party told
him to wait for some time. And the third candidate who is con- D
testing the election with their support had left his party and came
here thinking that this is a soft (electorate). I am not worried about
the Bhartiya J anata Party candidate in this constituency because
he is going to loose. He too is aware of this. The question is
different while what to do about this adoptive candidate who was
raised by the Congress made a member of Parliament for five E
times, and office bearer of the Zilla Parishad. On one occasion
when he was asked to wait a little, he grew impatient and began
searching. He filled up (nomination) forms in Kipergaon and in
Nagar. He adopted a stand of interest parties while to rebell in
South constituency. But while performing that role he saw that he
could not get an opportunity in the nGrth. So the idea entered his F
mind that this South constituency being a famine prone region and
the people there being poor he could pocket them. So he started
activating in this path with a view to take over Maharashtra from
here and win the election by the efforts of interested parties by
playing game of purchasing your self respect. We must face it and G
defeat such activity. That is the task to be done in this election. At
some time or other you will have to tell (them) that money alone
cannot be in important motivation in this election. What is needed
is ideology, policy, programme and morality. It is wrong to give up
morality, when one is wish is not fulfilled to leave the party program
and colleagues when a favourable decision is not taken and to join H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A hand with other parties once the 'koom koom" (sacredred powder
indicating natrimony) is applied, its sanctity must be maintained.
But we did not know, that the koom koom was being applied in
the name of one person and the eyes were looking at somebody
else ........ Then the possibility cannot be ruled out that attention
will be drawn to all such question; like what benefit we. will get,
B which leaders are coming to South (constituency) will be village
chawdi be built, will the temple be renovated will the motorbike
be available for riding, will bicycles at least be available for ridding.
It is not in your and my interest to accept the same. It will not
behove our self respect, but it must be accepted. I say that the
reason for this (acceptance) is that whatever comes, will be coming
c out of the resources of society. If the process of distribution has
begun, it is very good in the interest of establishing socialism in
this away. Take the same for free and use it against them. If we
can do this sincerely, then I am sure that all these people shall
realize that the people of South (constituency), are poor but their
D attitude is different. .....

The Petitioner state that in the speech, Shri Pawar have not
·taken the name of petitioner, but have made references to the
petitioner stating his political career and naming the petitioner as
third candidate going in adoption. .....
E
The Petitioner states that the statement made by Shri Sharad
Pawar stated above were innuendo. The p,etitioner states that the
statement above quoted was false. The said statement was made
in the presence of first respondent. The first respondent never
F objected to these statements ......... The Petitioner stated the first
respondent and Shri Sharad Pawar believed this statements to be
false. The Petitioner states that the said false statements made by
Shri Sharad Pawar with the calculation to prejudice petitioner's
prospects of election........ .

G (para 16)

The Petitioner submits that the statements made by the first
respondent himself and statements made by Shri Sharad Pawar in
the presence of the first respondent amount to corrupt practice
H under section 123(4) of the Representation of People Act 1951.
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL [VERMA, J.] 757

These statements are even published in the widely circulated news A
papers which are produced at Exhibit A to K The statements
amounted to an allegation that the Petitioner was ready to buy the
voters by offering bribes, t · them. The Petitioner states that bribing
itself is a corrupt practice and it it is said against a candidate that
he practises the corrupt practice of buying the votes by means of B
bribery and clearly and unequivocally constitutes an attack on the
private character. The Petitioner states that the statements of the
first respondent and Shri Sharad Pawar as reported above were
totally false. He believed that the statements were false and the
statements were made calculated to prejudice the election
prospects of the Petitioner. C

(para 17)"

Recording of the evidence at the trial of the election petition was
concluded on 4th September 1992 when the statement of Gadakh was
recorded on commission. The High Court an order on 18th September, ·n
1992 directing Issuance of a notice to Sharad Power under Section 99 of
the R.P. Act pursuant to which the notice was actually issued on 3rd
October, 1992 together with the ennexures as directed in the order itself.
This noti:::e was served on Sharad Pawar on 12th October, 1992. As earlier
s~ ...cu, Sharad Pawar preferred a special leave petition in this Court against
E
issuance of the notice and that special leave petition was dismissed requir-
ing Sharad Pawar to raise all his objections to the notice in the first instance
.before the High Court leaving those questions questions open for con-
sideration after the final decision of the High Court, if necessary. In view
of the High Court's order naming Sharad Pawar under Section 99 of the
R.P. Act. the question now arises for side on the his pleas. In the notice F
issued to Sharad Pawar under Section 99, the statements attribution to him
in the meeting at Newasa on 3rd May, 1991 and at Srigonda on 11th May,
1991 were quoted. At this stage. It is necessary to quote only those portions
from the extracts given in the notice which have been i:elied on by Shri
P.P. Rao on behalf of vikhe Patil to support the allegation of corrupt
practice against sharad Pawar. The relevant portions are as under : G

At Newasa on 3rd May, 1991

"Filed the nomination in South instead of North. These people
guessed that it is a poor region. Scarcity area, suffers from water H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A problems. People are engaged on Employment Guarantee
Schemes. The people are having problems. always.· A good cir-
cumstance to win over easily. But they do know what is underneath.
A black granite of Sahyadri is there. Any hammering would be not
without danger. It would hurt the head ............................................. .
that Shri Balasaheb has taken a stand to test the self respect of
B the commonman. He should be warned in clear terms that you
have grown big because of Congress. Congress makes you known
to.every body. Your institutions have grown because of the support
coming from the congress Government at the State and the Centre.
Today you left Congress. Left Your family name. Parental name
c you have cast off and I warn that, you will realise your true place
and nature. Possessed with the illusion that you will be able to
purchase the poor man of the south with the help of the resources
at your disposal. You have come here every person of this part is
a man possessing self respect. He would rather remain without
food and be a peril but he would never sell his vote with anybody's
D
money. Balasaheb would come to realise after the election of 23rd
at the time of counting of votes scheduled on 26th. .. ................

They will distribute bicycles, distribute dhoties and sarees. He told
you to accept them. I do not have any objection..................... .
E
Balasaheb has become one of them. And in celebration of that
occasion, if the wealth is being distributed into this constituency,
there should be no hesitation in getting benefited. Complete the
renovations, if a bicycle is coming, let it be accepted. The symbol
should be always in our hands. We should not worry ourselves
F about everything. May be there should be generous attitude behind
the distribution of wealth in the shape of decentralii;ation. Let us
welcome it. Let them do at the place and so far diverting the votes
on the strength of money, let it be clear to whole of Maharashtra
that voters cannot be boqght. ..................... ..
G
Efforts are being made, to corrupt the people, attempts being
made to put on the pressure. There will be an attempt to distribu-
tion and notwithstanding anything done as above .......... .

And side by side, it this district, here is a fight between morality
H and honesty from one side and money resources and· a tendency
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL [VERMA, J.] 759-

guided by ego to the other side. I am sure that in this fight, the A
morality and honesty would triumph. Though to that side, we see
a mountain of wealth, but we also see that there is an infinite sea
of common poor public. They are backing Yashwantrao and
Shankarrao. With the help of this common man's support, the
voters of this constituency of the district have become able to B
belittle and destroy this mountain of wealth."

· At Srigonda on 11th May, 1991

"So the idea entered his mind that this South constituency being a
famine prone region and the people there being poor he could C
pocket them. So he started activities in these parts with a view to
take over Maharashtra from here and win the election by efforts
of interested parties by playing their game of purchasing your self
respect. ............ .
D
At some time or other you will have to tell (them) that money
alone cannot be an important motivation in this election. What is
needed is ideology, policy, programme and morality. It is wrong
to give up morality when one's wish is not fulfilled, to leave the
party, programme and colleagues, when favourable decision is not
taken and to join hands with other parties. Once the 'kumkum' E
(sacred red powder indicating matrimony' is applied its sanctity
must be maintained. But we did not know that the "kumkum" was
being applied in the name of one person and the eyes were looking
at some body else. .. .....
F
Then the possibility cannot be ruled out that attention will be
drawn to all such questions like "what benefit we will get which
leaders are coming to the south (constituency) will the village
Chawdi be built, will the temple be renovated, will motorbikes be
available for riding, will bicycles at least be available for riding?"
It is not your and my interest to accept the same. It will not behove G
ourself respect, but it must be accepted. I say that the reason for
this (acceptance) is that whatever comes will be coming out of the
resources of society. If the process of distribution of social wealth
has begun, it is very good in the interest of establishing socialism
in this way. Take the same for free and use it against them. ....... H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A A decision is to be taken whether one should act on principle or
disloyally whether one is to act according to morality or immorality
according to humanity or in the arrogance of money and power."

The submission of Shri Ashok Desai was that the making of these
statements or at least the disparaging thereof by Gadakh is not proved by
B
any acceptable evidence and at any rate all the requirements of Sec-
tion123( 4) are not proved to hold that the corrupt practice was committed
by Gadakh. Shri Parasaran contended that the statements attributed to
Sharad Pawar have not been duly proved and, therefore, the question of
any rebuttal by Sharad Pawar does not arise; and even if the alleged
C statements are proved to have been made by Sharad Pawar, all the require-
ments of Section 123(4) have not been made out to justify naming him
under Section 99 of the Act. Shri Ram Jethmalani supported the submis-
sions of Shri Ashok Desai and Shri Parasaran. It was submitted by these
learned counsel that the charge of commission of a corrupt practice being
D of a quasi-criminal nature, the standard of proof applicable is of a criminal (r
charge and not merely that of preponderance of probabilities of a civil case.
It was fu~ther submitted that the statements which were made by Gadakh
and Sharad Pawar were only to caution the electorate against possible
misuse of money power and to exhort them to succumb to any such
pressure or temptation. They submitted that this was done on account of
l
E the reasonable apprehension arising from the rumours afloat in the area of
the likelihood of such tactics being adopted by Vikhe Patil who was a
pefson of considerable financial means. They submitted that such exhorta-
\
tion with a view to educate the electorate cautioning them against possible
misuse of money and adoption of unfair tactics does not amount to the
F corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act.
BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL CLIMATE

Before adverting to the particular statements alleged to have been by
Gadakh and Sharad Pawar which are alleged to constitute the corrupt
G practice under Section 123(4), it would be appropriate to deal with one
submission made by Shri Ashok Desai and followed up by Shri Ram
J ethmalani with gree1ter vigour. relating to the manner of appreciation of
evidence in such a case. Shri Desai submitted that even though it may not
be quite: proper to make statements reflecting on the personal character of
H a candidate, yet every such statement does not amount to a corrupt practice
KANKARRAOv. B.V. PATIL [VERMA,J.) 761

since it does not prejudice the election in the prevailing political climate. A
Shri Desai submitted that the existing norms do not match the earlier
norms and, therefore, every reflection on a candidate's character does not
necessarily prejudice his election since the electorate is ~ot influenced by
such a statement in the prevailing electoral scene. Shri Ram Jethmalani
went further and submitted that political leaders have a duty to educate B
the electorate against possible malpractices whi'-, .il'e now not uncommon
during the .elections and making of such statements. is desirable. Shri Ram
J ethmalani also submitted that every allegation against a candidate of his
committing a corrupt practice is not moral turpitude adversely affecting
the personal character of the candidate to constitute the corrupt practice
under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. C

In the present case, the large question posed by Shri Ram J ethmalani
does not arise for consideration and, therefore, we need not express herein
any concluded opinion thereon. We may only observe that the proposition.
enunciated by Shri Ram Jethmalani is too wide for acceptance even in the D
existing political climate adverted to by the learned counsel unless the
, election law leads to that inevitable conclusion exposing a hiatus in the
legislative effort to achieve the avowed object of purity of elections. We
would also like to observe that the suggestion of a liberal construction of
the election law relating to corrupt practices by appreciation of evidence
in the manner suggested in the existing political climate wherein mud- E
slinging' is common place, does not commend to us as the proper approach
envisaged by the election law. If purity of election is the essence of
democracy and providing for invalidation of an election on the ground of
commission of any corrupt practice is the object of enacting these'
provisions, it cannot be accepted that the election scene having F
degenerated over the years, appreciation of evidence for determining the,
commission of a corrupt practice must be made liberally because of the
lower values in the arena of elections. If the rule of law has to be preserved
as the essence of the democracy of which purity of elections· is a ~cessary
concomitant, it is the duty of the courts to. appreciate the eviovnce and G
construe the law in a manner which would subserve this higher purpose
and not even imperceptibly facilitate acceptance, much less affirmance, of
the falling electoral standards. For democracy to survive, rule of law must
prevail, and it is necessary that the best available men should be chosen as
people's representatives for proper governance of the country. This can be
best achieved through men of high moral and ethical v~ues who win the H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A elections on a positive vote obtained on their own merit and not by the
negative vote of process of elimination based on comparative demerits of
the candidates. It is also necessary that the impact of money power which
has eliminated from electoral contest many men of undoubted ability and
credibility for want of requisite financial support should be able to re-enter
B the field to make, the people's choice meaningful. This can be achieved only
election are contested on a positive vote and the comparison of between
the merits and abilities of the contestants without the influence of power
and pelf and not between their comparative demerits and the support of
money power. Apart from the other adverse consequences, the growing
influence of money power has also the effect of promoting criminalisation
C of politics.

The increasing electoral malpractices, of which some like booth-
capturing have led even to amendment of the election law, make availability
of evidence difficult and this cannot be ignored while applying the standard
of proof of a quasi-criminal charge for the proof of a corrupt practice. The
D existing law does not measure upto the exiting realities. The ceiling on
expenditure is fixed only in respect of the expenditure incurred or
authorised by the candidate himself but the expenditure incurred by the
party or anyone else in his election campaign is safely outside the net of
legal sanction. The spirit of he provision suffers violation through the
E escape route. The prescription of ceiling on expenditure by a candidate is
a mere eye-wash and no practical check on election expenses for which it
was enacted to attain a meaningful democracy. This lacuna in the law is,
however, for the Parliament to fill lest the impression is reinforced that the
retention is deliberate for the convenience of everyone. It this be not
feasible, it may be advisable to omit the provision to prevent the resort to
F indirect methods for its circumvention and subversion of the law, accepting
without any qualm the role of money power in the elections. This provision
has ceased to be even a fig leaf to hide the reality.

We are constrained to make these observation on account of the
repeated reference made at the hearing to the growing maipractices during
G elections, even though it was made for the purpose of persuading us not
to attach any significance to statements relating to the personal character
of conduct of a candidate since they are not taken seriously by the voters
due to the falling ethical standard.

H Real education of the electorate co.atemplates informing them of the
KANKARRAOv. B.V.PATIL[VERMA,J.] 763

past achievements and future plans of the political party on a positive note A;
and its candidate's qualifications to serve that purpose compared with those
of the other political parties and their candidates and not a projectio.. of the
comparative greater demerits of the opponents. This is with a view to em-
phasise that the functioning of the democracy depends on the quality of the
men chosen for the governance of the country. This is the need which the
election campaign is meant to serve in an election based on party lines, the
B
qualifications of the candidates being material for this purpose.

The duty at the top echelons of leadership at the state and national
level of all political parties is to set the trend for giving the needed
information to the electorate by adopting desirable standards so that it C
percolates to the lower levels and provides a congenial atmosphere for a
free and fair poll. A contrary trend of speeches by the top leaders tends
to degenerate the election 1·:unpaign as it descends to the lower levels and
at times promotes even violence leading to criminalisation of politics. The
growth of this unhealthy trend is a cause for serious concern for the proper
functioning of "~ democracy and it is the duty of the top leaders of all D
poliucal parties to reverse this trend to enab~~ movement of the functioning
democracy in the proper direction.

The lament of Gadakh and Sharad Pawar of despair against the
financial might of Vikhe Patil was indeed f:ircical and sounds comical in E
view of their own considerable resources !nduding the power of the ruling
party and the active support of the Chief Minister of the State. We cannot
accept that the alleged offe1.~ing portions of the speeches of Gadakh and
Sharad Pawar were educative of the electorate even if thP.y do not con-
stitute the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. To
suggest that the electorate needs to be warned against the purchase of votes F
by anyone is to insult their intelligence. Past experience has shown that
even the illiterate section of the electorate is educated enough to remain
uninfluenced by power and pelf. This it has shown more than once by
rejecting the high and the mighty in power when it felt that they had failed
to discharge their true obligation.
G
We must also add that even if we come to the conclusion that these
statements or any of them do not constitute the corrupt practice under
Section 123(4), it only means that the existing law does not frown upon the
same to visit it with any adverse consequence, but that «' )1.;s not mean that
it is a desirable practice during the election campaign. It is one thing to H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A say that a statement does not constitute corrupt practice but entirely
different to suggest that it is a desirable electoral practice forming a part
of the programme of education of the electorate.

We emphasise this fact on account of the vehemence with which Shri
Ram fothmalani canvassed for acceptance the view that all these state-
B ments are within the permissible electoral practice, necessary for education
of the electorate. We are unable to subscribe to this view which can only
lead to a further degeneration of the waning morality in the electoral scene,
when the felt need is for curbing any such tendency to ensure purity of
elections.
c The question there~ore, is : Whether in the law as it exists, all or any
of the statements proved to h' ' been made by Gadakh or Sharad Pawar
constitute the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act?

CORRUPT PRACTICE UNDER SECTION 123(4) OF THE R.P. ACT
D
Several authorities were cited to emphasise the strictness of plead-
ings in election petitions and the pleadings nec~c;sary to raise a triable issue
of the corrupt practice under Section 123(4). It is not necessary to deal
with all the authorities cited since in the present case even assuming there ·
is no such defect in the election petition, many statements c.1.tributed to
E .Gadakh and all the statements attributed to Sharad Pawar do not constitute
the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. The cases on
which particular emphasis was laid by Shri Ashok Desai on behalf of
Gadakh are alone referred briefly. In Samant N. Balalaishna etc. v. George
Fernandez and Ors. etc., (1969] 3 SCR 603, it was held that the facts which
F constitute the corrupt practice must be stated and the facts must be
correlated to one of the heads of the corrupt practice; and that an election
petition without the material facts relating to a corrupt practice is no
election petition at all. InAzhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandh~ (1986] Supp SCC
315, it was held that a petition is liable to be summarily dismissed in case
of petitioner's failure to furnish any of the material facts and particulars
G which are essential for disclosing a cause of action relating to a charge of
corrupt practice. In Lalit Kishore Chaturvedi v. Jagdish Prasad Thada and
Others, [1990] Supp SCC 248, the pl ading in election petition was found
to be deficient but even on facts the corrupt practice alleged was found to
be not proved. Similarly, in Daulat Ram Chauhan v. Anand Shanna, (1984]
H 2 sec 64, the requirement of pleading of a eorrupt practice alleged was
KANKARRAOv. B.V.PATIL[VERMA,J.] 765

2 sec 64, the requirement of pleading of a corrupt practice alleged was A
emphasised.

In M.J. Zaklta1ia Sail v. T.M. Mohammed and Others, (1990] 3 SCC
396, it was held that when the corrupt practice alleged is based on a
innuendo in the false statement published, then the innuendo meaning must
be specifically pleaded and proved. Accordingly, the attempt made by Shri B
P.P. Rao at the hearing to suggest that the statement made the Vikhe patil
had an election budget of Rs. 3 crores meant that he had that much amount
of ill-gotten money, cannot be taken note of since such an innuendo is
neither pleaded nor proved.

The scope of an appeal under Section 116A of the Representation
c
of the People Act is as wide in a civil appeal. This court has to dispose of
the appeal by exercising the same jurisdiction as is exercised in an appeal
against the original judgment of the High Court. It is well settled that
allegations of corrupt practice are of a quasi-criminal nature and the proof
that would be required in support of such allegations would be . as in a D
criminal charge ~ not mere preponderance of probabilities as in a civil ·:
matter. (See Surinder Singh v. Hardial Singh and Others, (1985] 1 SCC 91.}

In Megraj Patadia v. R.K. Birla and Others, (1971] 2 SCR 11$", it was
held that many times corrupt practices may be not be established by direct
evidence and the same may have to be inferred from the proved facts arid E
circumstances, but the circ\lmStances proved must reasonably establish that
the alleged corrupt practice was committed by the returned candidate. It
was also emphasised that preponderance of probabilities is not sufficient
proof in such a matter. ·
F
The requirements of Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act may now be
considered. The provision is as under : -

"123. Corrupt practices. The following shall be deemed to be
corrupt .practices for the purposes of this Act : -
G
xxxx xxxx xxxx
(4) The publication by a candidate or his agent or by any other
person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, of
any statement of fact which is false, and which he either believes
to be false for does not believe to be true; in relation to the personal H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

'A character or conduct of any candidate, or in relation to the can-
didature, or withdrawal, of any candidate, being a statement
reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate's
election."

B It is clear that every statement of fact in relation to the personal
character or. conduct of any candidate does not amount to a corrupt
practice under Section 123(4) unless all the requirements of the provision
are satisfi~d, notwithstanding the fact that such a statement may be
defamatory in character. The additional requirements to constitute a cor-
rupt practice are obviously to maintain the delicate balance between the
C freedom of speech of an individual and public interest of giving full
information to the electorate of the candidates. There is no presumption
of falsity of such a statement of fact for the purpose of Section 123(4) as
it is under the law of defamation; and apart from proving the statement of
fact to be falses, it must also be shown that the maker of the statement
D either believed it to be false or did not believe it to be true. Irrespective
of the quantum of evidence necessary to discharge .the initial onus of
leading evidence, the burden of proving these requirements on the
evidence adduced remains on the person alleging commission of the cor-
rupt practice. The object of making this provision more stringent is to
emphasise the significance of freedom of speech in this sphere while
E prohibiting the making of such statements of fact relating to the p·ersonal
character or conduct of any candidate which are not merely false but which
are also believed to be false or not believed to be true by the maker. The
greater latitude in election law is meant to serve the public purpose if the
statement found to be false is made with the belief in its truth based on
F reasonable grounds and it is not intended to be a licence for making a
scurrilous attac~. on the opponents recklessly.

The primary requirements of Section 123(4) are that the statement
should be a 'statement of fact' which is 'false', and which the maker either
G 'believes to be false' or 'does not believe to be true'. If these requirements
are not satisfied, the further inquiry to ascertain the satisfaction of the
remaining requirements of Section 123(4) serves no useful purpose. No
doubt, the burden of proving the satisfaction of all these requirements is
on him who alleges commission of the corrupt practice. The onus of leading
evidence relating to some requirements is however light in view o( their
H nature; Once the initial onus is discharged, the onus shifts to th~ other side.
KANKARRAOv. B.V. PATIL[VERMA,J.) 767

For proving the statement of fact to be 'false' the initial onus is discharged A
and the burden shifts to the other side by assertion of its falsity on oath
whereafter it is for the other side to rebut the same. Similarly, the nature
of belief of the maker being primarily related to the state of mind of the
maker, the initial burden is discharged by an assertion on oath to that
effect. If there be any circumstances relevant for proving and justifying the B
belief of the maker, that also would be a matter of evidence. The maker of
the statement knows best the material on which his belief was formed and,
therefore, it is for him to prove the same. Whether the maker of the
statement believed it to be false or did not believe it to be true, is then
ordinarily a matter of inference from the facts so proved.
c
The meaning of the expression "statement of fact" was a point of con-
siderable debate at the Bar. The true meaning of this expression is of sig-
nificance because several statements attributed to Gadakh and Sharad
Pawar relate to apprehensions about Vikhe Patil's likely future conduct and
not to his acts done in the past or at the time of making the statements. It was D
contended by Shri Ashok Desai for Gadakh and Shri K. Parasaran fm;
Sharad Pawar that every statements is not a 'statement of fact' and , there-
fore, a statement made about future apprehension or opinion of the maker,
does not fall within the ambit of this expression. It was urged by them most
of the statements attributed to G'.l.dakh and all the statements attributed to
Sharad Pawar do not constitute 'statement of fact' within the meaning of this E
expression in Section 123(4). Shri P.P. Rao, on the other hand, conter<ied
that the expression "statement of fact" has to be given a wider meaning to
include even a statement relating to the state of mind of the other person
about his future conduct and, therefore, all the statements attributed to
Gadakh and Sharad Pawar fall within the meaning of this expression. F

There can be no dispute that the meaning of the expression "state-
ment of fact" used in section 123(4), must be such which is apposite in the
context and even if the meaning of the word "fact" be wider to include
opinion about another person and apprehensions about his future conduct,
that is not sufficient to so construe the expression "statement of fact" in this G
provision unless it fits in the context. A pragmatic test is to examine
whether the meaning given to the expression "statement of fact" is capable
of satisfying the other requirements of the provision. It is only that meaning
of this expression which is capable of satisfying the other requirements of
the provision which can be its true meaning in the context. H
768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A For constituting the corrupt practice in Section 123(4), all the re-
quirements thereof must be satisfactorily proved. A 'statement of fact' for
the purpose of Section 123(4) can be one which is capable of proof as
'false' and which the maker either 'believed to be false' or did not believe
to be true' at the time of making it. These further requirements of its fatsity
and nature of belief of the maker at the time of making the statement of
B fact are essential requirements without which the 'statement of fact' is not
the one contemplated by Section 123(4). It needs no elaboration to say that
a 'statement of fact' can be proved to be 'false' only if it relates to an event
which has happened and not to a hypothetical future possibility. Similarly,
the belief of the maker about its falsity or the lack of belief in its truth
C relates to an existing fact and not to a hypothetical future apprehension
howsoever honestly one may believe in its likelihood. It is clear that any
statement made which is a conjuncture of a likelihood in future, would not
come within the ambit of the expression "statement of fact" used in Section
123(4). This is also supported by the fact that another requirement of
Section .123(4) is that the statement of fact made should be 'reasonably
D calculated_to prejudice the prospects of that candidate's election. This_
further requirement cannot be satisfied by merely stating a likely apprehen-
sion for the future and if the event does not happen, this requirement
cannot be tested. It is a different matter if the statement amounts to an.
opinion relating to the personal character or conduct of any candidate
which is based on existing or past acts of the candidate. In other words, if
E the statement made is that a candidate is a 'murderer', that would imply
that he had committed a murder and that amounts to a 'statement of fact'
_ for the purpose of Section 123(4).

The view we have taken finds support from the meaning of 'fact' in
F the realm of jurisprudence. Relevant extracts from textbooks are as under:

"There is yet a third meaning of the expression "question or
matter of fact" in which it is contrasted with a question or matter
of opinion. A question offact is one capable of being answered by
way of demonstration - a question of opinion is one that cannot be
G so answered. The answer to it is a matter of speculation which cannot
be proved by any available evider(e to be right or wrong. The past
history of a company's business' is a matter of fact; but its prospects
of successful business in the future is a matter · 1pinion. ........... "

H (Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, at page 69)
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL [VERMA, J.) 769

"Secondly, fact and opinion are frequently contrasted. Whether A
a company has been prosperous in the past is a matter of fact,
whether it will fulfil the expectations aroused by its prospectus is
a matter of opinion ............ "

(A Textbook of Jurisprudence by George Whitecross Paton, 4th
Edition, at page 207) B
(emphasis supplied)

In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edition, the meaning of the expression
"false statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct" of C
a candidate at a parliamentary election is given as "of fact, as distinguished
from a false statement of opinion".

The meaning of the expression "statement of fact" in Section 123(4)
of the R.P. Act has to be understood in this manner.
D
In Kumara Nand v. Brijmohan Lal Sharma, (1%7) 2 SCR 127, it was
reiterated that the onus is on the election petitioner to prove commission
of the corrupt practice under Section 123(4), but the onus on him to prove
that the statement is false is very light and can he discharged by the
complaining candidate swearing to that effect; and once that is .done the E
burden shifts to the candidate making the false statement of fact to show
what his belief was, Wanchoo, J. (as he then was) speaking for the court,
stated thus :

".......... But though the onus •. on the election petitioner to show
all these things, the main things that the election petitioner has to F
prove are that such a publication was made of a statement of fact
and that that statement is false and is with respect to the personal
character or conduct of the election petitioner. The burden of
proving that the candidate publishing the statem~nt believed it to
be false or did not believe it to b.:, true though on the complaining
candidate is very light and would.be discharged by the complaining G
candidate swearing to that effect. Thereafter it would be for the
candidate publishing the statement to prove otherwise. The ques-
tion whether the statement was reasonably calculated to prejudice
the prospects of the election of the candidate against whom it was
made would generally be a matter of inference. So the main onus H
770 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A on an election petitioner under s. 123(4) is to show that a statement
of fact was published by a candidate or his agent or by any other
person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent and
also to show that that statement was false and related to his
personal character or conduct. Once that is proved and the. com-
plaining candidate has sworn as above indicated, the burden shifts
B to the candidate making the false statement offact to show what his
belief was. The fulther question as to prejudice to the prospects of
election is generally a matter of inference to be arrived at by the
tribunal on the facts and circumstances of each case."

c (at page 136)
(emphasis supplied)

This decision summarises the extent of onus on the election petitioner and
the manner in which it is discharged indicating that some of the require-
D ments of Section 123(4) are matters of inference. This is the gist of the law
on the point and is reiterated in the subsequent decisions of this Court;
Nepal Chandra Roy v. Netai Chandra Das and others, (1971] 3 SCC 303.

In T.K Gangi Reddy v. M.C. Anjaneya Reddy and others, 22 E.L.R.
261, the same position with regard to the manner in which the burden can
E be discharged by the· election petitioner was stated and it was indicated
that if on shifting of the burden to the respondent he fails to establish either
that the petitioner did in fact commit the alleged act or to give any other
circumstances which made him bona fide believe that he was so guilty, the
court is entitled to say that the burden of proving the necessary facts has
p been discharged by the petitioner.

In Guruji Shrihari Baliram livatode v. Vithalrao and others, (1969] 1
sec 82, while considering the meaning of the expression "personal char-
acter or conduct", it was indicated that the allegations must reflect on the
moral or mental qualities of the candidate relating to his pnsonal character
G or conduct and not merely to his political personality. In Ram Chand
v.
Bhatia Hardaya4 (1986j 1 SCR 177, the distinction between the personal
character or conduct of the candidate and his public or political character
and conduct was explained and it was indicated that a statement relating
to public or political character and conduct of the candidate is not a
H corrupt practice under section (123(4)."
KANKARRAOv. B.V. PATIL[VERMA,J.) 771

Both sides referred to Jnder Lal v. Lal Singh, (1962) Supp, 3 SCR A
114. In that case, the allegation made against the candidate was that he was
'purchaser of the opponents of the Congress by means of money'. This was
held to constitute the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) since the
statement was construed to mean that the candidate buys 'by his offering
bribes the votes of the opponents of the Congress'. It was held that bribery B
is itself a corrupt practice and if it is said against a candidate that he
practices the corrupt practice of buying the votes of the opponents of the
C'»lgress by means of bribery, that clearly and unequivocally affects his
private character. Shri P.P. Rao strenuously urged that this allegation was
construed as a 'statement of fact' for the purposes of Section 123(4) in
Jnder Lal, even though of a general nature. It is clear that the allegation C
related to the personal character of the candidate based on the fact, not
mere speculation about the future, of purchasing votes by bribery and it
was not simply a statement of the maker's opinion of the candidate .. It was
also made clear that having regard to the moral turpitude involved in the
offering of the bribe, the statement in question affected his private charac- D
ter as well and not merely the political character of the candidate. Thus
the emphasis was on the allegation relating to the personal character of
bribing the voters which cannot form part of the political character since
the act of bribery has a personal element.

In Sheopat Singh v. Ram Pratap, [1%5) l SCR 175, it was held that E
any criticism of a person's political or public activities and policies is
outside Section 123(4). It was further held that the word "calculated" means
designed : It denotes more than mere likelihood and imports a design to
affect voters.
F
The consent of the candidate for the purpC'ses of Section 123(4)
when the offendfug statement of fact which is false is published by any
other person may be proved by inference from the circumstances and not
necessarily by positive evidence to that effect since positive evidence of
consent may not be available. See B.R. Rao v. N.G. Ranga, (1970) 3 SCC
576, Narasingh Charan Mohanty v. Surendra Mohanty, (1974) 2 SCR 39, and G
Samant N. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernandez and Ors. etc., (1%9) 3 SCR
603.

The question, therefore, is : Whether the declaration of Gadakh's
election to be void is sustainable and so also the naming of Sharad Pawar H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R ..

A under Section 99 of the R.P. Act?
ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPT PRACTICE UNDER SECTION I23(4)
OF THE R.P. ACT

The gist of the several statements atributed to Gadakh and Sharad
B Pawar which are alleged to constitute the corrupt practice under Section
123(4) of the R.P. Act are now enumerated for the sake of convenience
before each of them is taken up for consideration. The requirements of
Section 123(4) have been already indicated. •

Re. : Gadakh Yashwantrao KankfJ1Tao
c
(1) He Sated that Vikhe Patil has an election budget of Rs . .3 crores.

This was stated by Gadakh in the meeting at Sonai on 30.th April,
1991 and in the interview given to Girish Kulkarni on 10th May, 1991 which
D was published in the Maharashtra Times of 13th May, 1991. .

(2) A sum of Rs. 50 liikhs was paid by Vikhe Patil to the Janata Dal
election fund for the support of that party.

This was stated by Gadakh in the mattings at Sonai on 30th April,
E 1991 and Ahmednagar on 2nd May, 1991 and in the interview given· to
Girish Kulkarni on 10th May, 1991 which was published in the Maharashtra
Time of 13th May, 1991.

(3) A sum of Rs. 20 lakhs was paid by Vikhe Patil to the Janata Dal
candidate B.G. Kolse Patil for shifting to another constituency.
F
This was said by Gadakh in the meeting at Sonai on 30th April, 1991
and the interview given to Girish Kulkarni on 10th May, 1991 which was
published in the Maharashtra Times of 13th May, 1991.

G (4) A rally of 5000 bicycles was to be taken out by Vikhe Patil and
the participants were to be given those bicycles.

This was stated by Gadakh in the meetings at Ahmednagar on ind
May, 1991 and Newasa on 3rd May, 1991 and in the interview given to
Girish Kulkarni on 10th May, 1991 published in the Maharashtra Times of
H 13th May, 199:.
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL [VERMA, J.) 773

(5) Vikhe Patil had offered payment of Rs. 25.000 to each worker at A
the village level and Rs. 50.000 at the talukci level.

This was said by Gadakh in the meeting at Sonai on 30th April,
1991.

(6) Money was being given by Vikhe Patil for repair of Chawdies and B
temples in the constituency.

This was said by Gadakh in the meetings at Ahmednagar on 2nd
May, 1991 and Newasa on 3rd May, 1991.

(7) Vikhe Patil was going to distribute sarees, dhoties, liquor and C
cash in the constituency.

This was said in the meeting at Newasa on 3rd May, 1991 and in the
interview given to Girish Kulkarni on 19th May, 1991 which was published
in the Maharashtra Times of 13th May, 1991.
D
(8) In his speech, Gadakh had advised the voters to accept these
articles from Vikhe Patil to vote for Gadakh only.

Re. : Sharad Pawar

The gist of the statements attributed to Sharad Pawar according to E
the notice given to him und~r Section 99 of the R.P. Act, is as follows :-

(A) At Newasa on 3rd May, 1991

(1) Vikhe Patil had filed the nomination from the S1Juth instead
of North constituency because the people of this constituency are F
poor having problems due to which Vikhe Patil thinks to win over
easily, but he does not know the inner strength of the poor peoples.

(2) Possessed with the illusion that Vikhe Patil will be able to
pmchase the poor people of the South with the help of the G
resources at his dispn<;al, but every person of this part is a man
p, ,;sessing self respecL who will remain without food and be in
peril but he .¥ould never sell his vote.

(3) They will distribute bicycle, distribute dhoties and sarees. He
(Gadakh) told you to accept them. I do not have any objection. H
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A (4) If the wealth being distributed in the constituency, ther6 should
. be no hesitation in getting benefited and the things given should
be accepted, but let it be clear to whole of Maharashtra that voters
cannot be bought.

(5) Efforts are being made to corrupt the people and put pressure
n on them and there will be an attempt to distribute.

(6) There is a fight between morality and honesty from one side
th~ money resources and the tend~ncy guided by ego on the other
·side but I am sure that in this fight the morality and honesty would
c triumph. With the help of common man's support, the voters of
the constituency have become able to belittle and destroy the
mountain of wealth.

(B) At Srigonda on 11th May, 1991

D (1) The idea entered his (Vikhe Patil) mind that the South con-
stituency being a famine prone region and the people there being
poor he could pocket them.

(2) We will have to tell them that money alone cannot be an
important motivation in this election. It is wrong to give up iµ.orality
E
when one's wish is not fulfilled, to leave the party, programme and
colleagues, when favourable decision if not taken and to join hands
with the other parties. Once the 'kumkum' is applied, its sanctity
must be maintained. But we did not know that the 'kumkum' was
being applied in the name of one person and the eyes were looking
F at somebody else.

(3) The possibility cannot be ruled out that questions may arise
whether chawdies will be built, temples renovated and motorbikes
or bicycles at least be made available for riding. It will not behove
our respect to accept the same but if the process of distribution
G has begun it is good for establishing socialism in this way and so
take the same and use it against them.

(4) A decision must be taken to choose between principle or
disloyalty, the morality or immorality, humanity or arrogance of
H money and power.
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL [VERMA, J.] 775

It may be noted that in respect of the statements attributed to A
Gadakh, the alleged offending portions being denied by him, it is also to
be considered whether the making of those statements has been proved.
On the other hand, Sharad Pawar has chosen not to adduce any evidence
or pray for recall of any witness for cross-examination and, therefore, the
statements attributed to him being pleaded and proved by the election B
petitioner, the only question is whether they constitute the corrupt practice
under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. It is also significant that all the
s~atements alleged to have been made by Gadakh as enumerated earlier
are not attributed to Sharad Pawar, Particularly those relating to Vikhe
Patil's election budget of three crore rupees, payment by him of Rs. 50
lakhs to the Janata Dal election fund and Rs. 20 lakhs to the Janata Dal C
' candidate B.G. Kolse Patil. On behalf of Sharad Pawar, it was also con-
tended by Shri Parasaran that to constitute the corrupt practice under
Section 123(4), the consent of the returned candidate Gadakh to the
making of these statements by Sharad Pawar was also essential which had
neither been pleaded nor proved. It was submitted that the fact of D
Gadakh's presence at the time when these statements are alleged to have:;
been made by Sharad Pawar in the public meetings is not sufficient to
prove the consent of the returned candidate requisite for constituting the
corrupt practice under Section 123(4).

To enable proper appreciation of the question whether all or any of E
the aforesaid statements attributed to Gadakh and Sharad Pawar constitute
the corrupt practice under Section 123(4), it is necessary at this stage to
briefly restate the requirements of this Section.

The essential requirements of the corrupt practice under Section p
123(4) are: (1) publication by the candidate or his election agent or by any
other person with the consent of the candidate or his election agent; (2)
of any 'statement of fact' which is 'false'; (3) which he either 'believes to
the false' or does not believe to be true ; (4) in relation to the personal
character or conduct' of any candidate or in relation to the candidature or
withdrawal of the candidate; and (5) being a statement 'reasonably calcu- G
lated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate's election. The plain
meaning of the Section indicates that it is not every statement but only 'a
statement of fact' to which the provision applies; that the statement of fact
should be false; that such statement should be made believing it to be false
or at least not true; that it should relate to the personal character or H
1
SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A conduct etc. of any candidate; and it should be reasonably calculated to
prejudice the prospects of that candidate's election. Unless all these re-
quirements' are satisfied, the statement does not constitute the corrupt
practice· under· Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act howsoever undesirable;
. morally or ethically, the making of that statement may be otherwise. This
B is too well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court, some of which
have been referred. Accordingly, it is this test which must be satisfied to
hold that the statements attributed to Gadakh or Sharad Pawar constitute
the corrupt practice.

R.: Gadakh
c
Vlkhe Patil's Election Budget of Rs. 3 Crores

One of the allegations made against Gadakh is that he stated that
Vikhe Patil had an election budget of Rs. 3 crores. The question in the
D presen( ~e relates only to the corrupt practice specified in sub-section
(4) of Section 123 and not to the r.orrupt practice under sub-Section (6)
thereof relating to the incurring o uthorising of expenditure in contraven-
tion of Section 77 of R.P. Act. This being so, the only question is whether
the statement that Vikhe Patil had an electi0n budget of Rs. 3 crores was
a false statement of fact the kind envisaged by sub- section (~of Section
E 1 since the allegation is not of incurring or authorising that expencliture but
only of availability of that amount. A feoble attempt was made by Shri P.P.
- Rao to argue that the innuendo in that statement was that Vikhe Patil had
rupees three crores of ill-gotten money which he could utilise for purchas-
ing the voters and other electoral malpractices. In the first place, there is
an
F not even a hint of such innuendo in the election petition or the evidence
adduced in a sport thereof. This further suggestion has therefore to be ·
ignored as indicated earlier. Faced with this difficulty, Sbri Rao modified
his argument to contend that even if this statement by i!;self did not
constitute the corrupt practice under Section 123(4), it was a televant fact
to indicate the means or capacity of Vikhe Patil to probablise the other
G statements alleging the possibility of adopting malpractices to win the
election. So far as the means of the candidates is concerned, it is sufficient -
to say that both Vikhe Patil and Gadakh appear to be considerably affluent
· _ .. being sugar barons of that area. The electorate must h!'ve been well aware
of the their means and, therefore, this is a neutral circumstance which by
H itself has no significant bearing no the other statements attributed to •
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL [VERMA, J.) 777

Gada~h. No further consideration of this statement attributed to Gadakh A
is necessary even assuming he had said so.

Payment by Vikhe Patil of Rs. 50 Lakhs to Janata Dal and Rs. 20 Lakhs to
E.G. Kolse Patil

Two statements attributed to Gadakh relate to the payment by Vikhe B
Patil of Rs. 50 lakhs to the Janata
.
Dall election fund and Rs. 20 lakhs to
the Jan,.ta Dal candidate B.G. Kolse Patil. Gadakh is alleged to have said
that Vikhe Patil had paid Rs. 50 lakhs to the Janata Dal election fund for
getting the support of that party and Rs. 20 lakhs to the Janata Dal
candidate for withdrawing his nomination from this constituency and shift- C
ing to another constituency. These statements are alleged to have been
made by Gadakh more than once. However, it is sufficient if such a
statement is proved to have been made even once and it satisfies all the
requirements of Section 123(4). The particulars of these statements have
been given earlier.
D
The statement alleging payment of Rs. 50 lakhs to the Janata Dal
election fund is alleged to have been made in the meeting at Sonai on 30th
April, 1991 and Ahmednagar on 2nd May, 1991 as well as in the interview
given by Gadakh on 10th May, 1991 to Girish Kulkarni (P.W. 11) which
was published in the Maharashtra Times of 13th May 1991. The statement E
by Gadakh of payment of Rs. 20 lakhs to the Janata Dal candidate B.G.
kolse Patil for withdrawing from this ci>nstituency and shifting to another
constituency is alleged to have been made in the meeting at Sonai on 30th
April, 1991 and in the interview given by him to Girish Kulkarni on 10th
May, 1991 which was published in the Maharashtra Time of 13th May,
1991. Form the evidence adduced, the making of both' these statements is F
11mply proved and we agree with the finding of the High Court to this effect
on this point. Shri Ashok Desai took us through the entire evidence on the
point and strenuously urged that these statements are not duly proved but
we are unable to accept this contention. From the evidence adduced we
have no doubt that these statement were_ made by Gadakh as alleged by. G
Vikhe Patil. Admitted contemporaneous news reports and the conduct of
Gadakh after knowing their contents further reassures us that these state-
ments were made by Gadakh. Accordingly, we are referring only to some
significant evidence on the point.

The statement of Gadakh alleging payment of Rs. 50 lakhs by Vikhe H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Patil to Janata Dal election fund does not necessarily imply that this
payment to Janata Dal was for shifting its candidate to another constituen-
cy particularly when no other details were given. There is not such clear
pleading in the election petition to that effect. This statement has, there-
fore to be exar_ .ied as the allegation of contribution to the election fund
B of a political party. There is no allegation that this payment was alleged to
have been made it any time after. Vikhe Patil had become a candidate at
the election.. In these circumstances, it is doubtful if the mere allegation
of contribution to a political party's election fund prior to becoming a
candidate can amount to the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the
R.P. Act.
c
The position, however, is different with regard to the allegation of
payment of Rs. 20 lakhs to the Janata Dal candidate B.G. Kolse Patil for
withdrawing from this constituency and ·shifting to another constituency.
Vtkhe Patil has denied on oath the making of any of these payments by
D him. Each of these statements is undoubtedly a 'statement of fact' which is
also proved to be false since there is no attempt made by Gadakh to prove
it to be true by rebuttal of the testimony of Vikhe Patil on this point.
Obviously Vtkhe Patil was not required to examined B.G. Kolse patil after
his own denial on oath. No attempt has been made by Gadakh to even
suggest that the allegation is true.
E
The question, therefore, is : Whether the statement of Gadakh
alleging payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to the J anata Dal candidate
B.G. Kolse Patil for this purpose, proved to be false, amounts to the
corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act?
F
As already held, the requirement of Section 123(4) that this state-
ment of Gadakh about payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to the J anata
Dal candidate B.G. Kolse Patil for this purpose was a 'statement of fact'
which was 'false' is duly proved. The publication of these statements was
G by Gadakh himself in a public meeting and in the interview given to Girish
Kulkarni for being published in the Maharashtra Times and, therefore, the
further requirement of its publication as required by Section 123(4) is also
proved. It cannot be doubted that th... false statement of fact was in relation
to the personal character or conduct of Vikhe Patil and it did not relate
merely to his political character or conduct so that this requirement of
H Section 123(4) is also satisfied. It must also be held that the statement was
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL [VERMA, J.) 779

reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of Vikhe Patil's elections A
inasmuch as it conveyed that Vikhe Patil had bribed B.G. Kolse Patil, the
Janata Dal candidate by payment of Rs. 20 lakhs to withdraw his candida-
ture from this constituency for his benefit. In fact the fulfilment of none of
these requirements of Section 123(4) was seriously disputed by Shri Ashok
Desai if the making of such a statement by Gadakh is found proved, as we B
have already held. The serious dispute by Shri Ashok Desai in this respect
was only to the fulfilment of the remaining requirement of Section 123(4)
that Gadakh had made this false statement of fact believing it to be false
or not believing it to be true. Shri Ashok Desai very strenuously and ably,
even through unsuccessfully, argued that a strong rumour to this effect was
then afloat which together with the circumstances in which B.G. Kolse C
Patil, the Janata Dal candidate withdrew from that constituency, lent
credence to the rumour creating a reasonable belief in the mind of Gadakh
that the same was true. Shri Ashok Desai submitted that in these cir-
cumstances, Gadakh had reasonable belief in the truth of the statement
attributed to him and, therefore, this requirement of Section 123(4) was D
not satisfied on account of which the corrupt practice under Section 123(4)
is not proved. We are unable to accept this contention.

Vikhe Patil had denied the payment of Rs. 20 lakhs to B.G. Kolse
Patil and also asserted that Gadakh while making the statement did not
believe it to be true. This is all that could be done by Vikhe Patil to prove E
the belief of Gadakh at the time of making the statement since that related
to 1.1\e state of mind of Gadakh which he knew : est. Even though the
burden on the pleadings to prove the satisfaction of this requirement was
throughout on Vikhe Patil, the election petitioner, yet the initial burden of
leading evidence of that fact on Vikhe Patil was clearly discharged in this F
manner shifting the burden rebutting the same to Gadakh. The evidence
of Gadakh has, therefore, to be now examined to see if the burden so
shifted to Gadakh had been discharged by his evidence. Tt is significant that
in the deposition of Gadakh, there are statements on this point which
provide the best indication of his belief about the truth or falsity of the
allegation made. In our opinion, the admission made by Gadakh in his G
deposition is decisive on the point.

In his deposition, Gadakh has spoken about his belief in the examina-
tion-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination and the relevant ex-
tracts of his deposition, as given in Vol. V of the paperbooks, are as under: H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A Examination-in-Chief

"............... On hearing the information, I was satisfied and got
sured that the information given to me by the workers must be
correct otherwise the J anata Dal· candidate would not have
withdrawn and gone to other constituency for election ............ "
B
(para 31)

Cross-Examination

"Q. When information was given to you by Congress workers
c which they had got from the workers of the petitioner that
Rs. 20 lacs were paid to Shri B.G. Kolse Patil by the petitioner
for withdrawing from South 'A'nagar constitUency and con-
testing election from Beed constituency, did you think that
his information was grave matter?
D
(This question was explained by commissioner to the ~tness
and he was reqUired to restrict his reply to the extent of what
was being asL~d)

Ans. Since Janata Dal had asked Shri B.G. Kolse Patil to contest
E election from Beed constit".lency, the information conveyed to
me was not a grave matter.

I did not believe the infonnation. given to me by the workers
that Shri B.G. Kolse Patil was going to withdraw from South
~· nagar constituency having accepted Rs. 20 lacs from the
F petitioner.............. "

(para 222)
·• ;mphasis ·supplied)

Re-examination
G
"Q. In paras. 21 and 31 of your Chief-exam. you have stated that
information given by eongress worker before starting of the
meeting at Sonai on 30.4.1991 that petitioner Balasaheb Vikhe
Patil paid Rs. 20 lacs to Shri B.G. Kolse Patil to withdraw
H from South 'A'nagar constituency and that statement was
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL [VERMA, J.) 781

believed by you, whereas in para 222 of your cross-exam. at
page no. 215 you have stated the you did not believe the
information given to you that Shri B.G. Kolse Patil going to
withdraw from South constituency A'nagar having accepted
Rs. 20 lacs from the petitioner. What exactly did you want to
say in this regard?
B
(Shri S.B. Mhase, Adv. for the petitioner objected asking this
question, on the ground that there is no ambiguity in both
these questions in the chief as well as cross-examination and
the purpose for asking this question is to wipe out the admis-
sion given by the witness under stress of cross-exam. and C
therefore, it should not be allowed. Moreover, this question
is not permissible in re-examination. This objection shall be
decided by the High Court) ·

Ans. It is true that I believed the say of the congress workers before
starting of the Sonai meeting that petitioner paid Rs. 20 lacs D
to Shri B.G. Kolshe Patil for withdrawing from South A'nagar
constifuency but then when I gave adm;ssion in cross-ex-
amination as stated above in the question I believed it more,
and it was to the effect that Janata Dal asked Shri B.G. Kblshe
Patil to withdraw from South A'nagar co11stituency and to E
contest election from heed constituency"

(para 258)

It is clear from the above extracts that Gadakh admitted unequivo-
cally in his cross-examination in para 222 of his deposition that he did not F
believe the information given to him by the workers that B.G. Kolse Patil
was going to withdraw from Sough Ahmednagar constituency having ac-
cepted Rs. 20 lakhs from the petitioner. In other words, he did not believe
in the truth of the information given to him about the payment of Rs. 20
lakhs by Vikhe Patil to B.G. Kolse Patil and the latter withdrawing from
this constituency for that reason. This admission about the kind of belief G
he had about the truth of this allegation made by Gadakh in his cross-ex-
amination is notwithstanding a different statement in the ·examination-in-
chief and an attempt to resile from that admission in the re-examinatiou.
His statement in re-examination after being pointed out clearly the admi5-
sion made in the cross-examination that he did not believe the allegation H
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A of payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to B.G. Kolse Patil to be true,
does not have the effect of either withdrawing that admission or showing
it to be made erroneously. In such a situation, Gadakh's admission in his
cross-examination that he did not believe the allegation to be true has the
effect of reinforcing Vikhe Patil's assertion to this effect instead of negativ-
B ing it.

Shri Ashok Desai advanced an ingenious argument to avoid the
logical adverse effect of this admission made by Gadakh in his cross-ex-
amination. We have no doubt that nothing better could have been done in
this situation. Shri Desai submitted that the belief about the allegation not
C being true stated by Gadakh in his cross-examination related to his belief
prior to 29th April, 1991 on which date B~G. Kolse Patil actually withdrew
his candidature from the South Ahmednagar constituency and not the
belief which he entertained later when he made the statement at Sonai on
30th ·April, 1991 and also subsequently. Shri Desai submitted that the
admission merely means that when he was given such an information by
D ·his workers, he did not believe in the likelihood of B.G. Kolse Patil
withdrawing from the South Ahmednagar constituency which could be only
prior to his actual withdrawal on 29th April, 1991. The obvious fallacy in
the argument is that the admission has to be read in the context of the
earlier question and the speeches made by him to this effect which were
E all subsequent to withdrawal of B.G. Kolse Patil from South Ahmednagar
constituency on 29th April, 1991. He was never questioned about his belief
on this aspect prior to the making of these statements or prior to the actual
withdrawal by B.G. Kolse Patil. It is also significant that the explanation
offered by Shri Desai in his arguments is not the explanation given by
F Gadakh even though he was re-examined pointedly with reference to this
admission. It is sufficient to say that the explanation offered by Shri Desai
cannot be accepted when even Gadakh does not say so and Gadakh's belief
at the time of making the statements subsequent to withdrawal of B.G.
Kolse Patil was the only fact in issue.

G The dispute relating to the statement attributed to Gadakh alleging
payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to B.G. Kolse Patil for withdrawing
from the South Ahmednagar constituency and shifting to another con-
stituency is in a limited area. Gadakh says that this was the rumour afloat
and his own workers had been repeatedly telling him so pointing out the
H workers of Vikhe Patil as the source of their information. It is significant
KANKARRAO v. B.V. PATIL [VERMA,J.] 783

that Gadakh has not examined any of his workers who according to him A
gave this information nor has he named any worker of Vikhe Patil as the
source of this information. No circumstance justifying belief in the truth of
the allegation has been relied on by Gadakh. There is also no dispute that
in the interview which he gave to Girish Kulkarni (P.W. 11), a specific
question to this effect was put to him. The news-item reporting Gadakh's
interview in the Maharashtra Times is Exh. 90 (at page 116 to 122 of Vol.
B
II). This news-item had appeared in the Maharashtra Times of 13th May,
1991 wherein Gadakh was reported to have said as under :

"........... According to my reliable information Shri Vikhe Patil had
paid Rs. 50 lakhs to the election fund of the party and Rs. 20 lakhs C
in order that Shri B. G. Kolse Patil should contest the election
from Beed instead of Nagar."

The so-called "reliable information" mentioned by Gadakh has not
been disclosed by specifying the name of anyone supposed to have given D
the information or by examining him. It is also of significance that Gadakh
alleges having sent a letter dated 16th May, 1991 under certificate of
posting to the Maharashtra Times Office disputing correctness of the
news-item (Exh.90). The receipt of that letter by the addressee is denied
and the likelihood of its despatch by Gadakh is extremely doubtful since it
was not sent by registered post and a certificate of posting being easy to E
obtain is not reliable. Expense being immaterial in that election for both
sides, It is extremely unlikely that Gadakh would send such a letter under
certificate of posting and not by registered post. In view of the narrow
controversy on this point, the criticisms levelled against the testimony of
Girish Kulkarni is of no practical significance and his version about the
F
interview to the e.xtent it was reported in the news-item (Exh.90) must be
accepted as duly proved. The only significant question on this point is
whether Gadakh did not believe this allegation to be true when he made
it so that this further requirement to constitute the corrupt practice under
Section 123(4) is made out.
G
Gadakh's version that he send the letter dated 16th May, 1991
(Exh.Q) under certificate of posting is unbelievable. A certificate of
posting is easy to procure and does not inspire confidence. Moreover, the
circumstances belie his version. With his considerable means and past
experience of elections, he would have sent such a letter by registered post H
784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A to ensure its delivery and create cogent evidence of its despatch. Moreover,
he would not merely send such a letter but have his denial published in
newspapers because of its signfficancc during elections. We have no doubt
that Gadakh's conduct belies his belated de,nial at the trial.

There is, however, another aspect of such a stand taken by Gadakh.
B Some features are rendered ~eyond doubt on this point. Gadakh must take
the consequence of the contents of the letter which he claims to have sent
on 16th May, 1991, even though we have rejected his claim of sending such
a letter. This letter appears to have been brought into existence later when
Gadakh was faced with the consequence of his interview. Admittedly,
C Gadakh had known prior to 16th May, 1991 the contents of the news-item
(Exh. 90) published in the Maharashtra Times attributing to him the
statement alleging payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to B.G. Kolse
Patil but he did not choose to contradict the same by a denial through the
Press or in any other authentic manner. Silence of Gadakh at that time
D reinforces authenticity and the correctness of the news-item (Exh. 90).
Another significant feature is that the contents of the letter dated 16th May,
1991 indicate at least his doubt in the correctness of the allegation against
Vikhe Patil When he said-"it would not be proper on my part to subscribe .
to those unless I had evidence to that effect. " This suppeits. the conclusion
that Gadakh did not believe in the truth of that allegation. Absence of a
E. clear denial by Gadakh even therein much less through the Press at that
time, in these circumstances, reassures us about the correct reporting of
the interview published in the news-item (Exh.90) in Maharashtra Times
of 13th May, 1991 in addition to its proof by other evidence supported by
conduct of Gadakh himself. The making of the statement of fact alleging
F payment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to. B.G. Kolse Patil, its falsity and
the want of belief in its truth by Gadakh are proved beyond any doubt.

Shri Desai also submit~ed that there were strong reasons for Gadakh
to believe in the truth of this allegation. These factors according to Shri
Desai are; (1) Vikhe Patil was an important Congressman who was the
G likely party candidate earlier having won the Congress (I) Party ticket five
times since 1971 from the adjacent Kopergaon (North Ahmednagar con-
stituency); (2) Vikhe Patil was an extremely influential and affluent person; (
\;..
(3) Vikhe Patil had filed his nominations from both, that is, North and
South Ahmednagar constituencies; (4) Smt. Mrinal Gore, President of the
H State Janata Dal had said. on 28th April, 1991 that their party would npt
KANKARRAO v. B.V- PATIL [VERMA, J.] 785

support Vikhe Patil and B.G. Kolse Patil had already filed his nominations A
from both, that is, South Ahmednagar and Beed constituencies; and (5)
On 29th April, 1991, B.G. Kolse Patil withdrew his candidature from South
Ahmednagar constituency while Vikhe Patil withdrew from Kopergaon
(North Ahmednagar Constituency) and Janata Dal declared its support for
Vikhe Patil. Shri Desai submitted that these were strong circumstances for B
Gadakh to reasonably believe in the truth of the rumour that B.G. Kolse
Patil had withdrawn from this constituency (South Ahmednagar) on pay-
ment of Rs. 20 lakhs by Vikhe Patil to B.G. Kolse Patil. In our opinion,
these factors are not necessarily consistent with the truth of the allegation
of payment of money by Vikhe Patil to B.G. Kolse Patil inasmuch as they
are equally consistent with B.G. Kolse Patil preferring to contest from the C
other constituency on a full assessment of his prospects in the election from
of the South Ahmednagar constituenq against Vikhe Patil who even
according to Gadakh was a very strong and influential candidate. The mere
fact that Smt. Mrinal Gore had spoken against the likelihood of withdrawal
of B.G. Kolse Patil from South Ahmednagar is not by itself significant since D
action of politicians contrary to their earlier declaration in such matters is -.~

not uncommon. Moreover, in view of the direct evidence in the form of
admission by Gadakh of the kin!f of belief he entertained at the time of
making the statement, these circumstances are in-consequential when
Gadakh himself does not say so. The direct evidence of Gadakh himself
about the kind of belief he entertained at that time is decisive of the matter E
and conclusive against him .on this point.

It cannot, therefore, be doubted that Gadakh did not believe in the
truth of this allegation made against Vikhe Patil when he said in his speech
and interview that Rs. 20 lakhs had been paid by Vikhe Patil to the Janata
Dal candidate B.G. Kolse Patil for withdrawing from this constituency and F
shifting to another constitue11cy. It follows that all the requirements of
Sectiu;1 123(4) are satisfied and the false statement of lctc;. made to this
effect by Gadakh in respect of the personal character and conduct of Vtlche
Patil amounts to the corrupt practice under Section 12:.:tf4) of the R.P. Act.
This alone is sufficient for dec 1aring the election of Gadakh to be void. The G
High Court's conclusion to this effect is, therefore, sustainable only for this
reason alone.

Remaining Allegations

We shall now take up for consideration the remaining statements H
786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A which do not require any elaborate discussion since the very first close look
at them reveals that they cannot constitute the corrupt practice under
Section 123(4). In respect of the statements of this category, we also do
not consider it necessary to examine the remaining arguments advanced
from both sides since no further consideration of the same appears neces-
B sary.

The statement of a proposal to take out a rally of 5000 bicycles and
then distrib.ute the bicycles to the participants obviously related to the
future and was at best merely the expression of an apprehension. No one
has even suggested that such a rally was taken out at any time during the
C election campaign by Vikhe Patil. That means that it was at best an
apprehension which did not materialise and, therefore, there was no
reasonable likelihood of any imi.-..tct thereof on the mind of the voters.
Similar is the statement alleged to have been made of the likelihood of
distribution of sarees, dhoties, liquor and cash in the constituency. No one
has said that such a distribution of any of these articles was made by Vikhe
D Patil during the election campaign. Such a statement, if made, was there-
fore another apprehension which did not come true and, therefore, could
not affect the mind of the voters. This being so, the expression of a mere
apprehension which did not come true apart from not being a 'statement
of fact', does not satisfy the other requirements of section 123(4).

E The vague statement of offer by Vikhe Patil of payment to the
workers at the rate of Rs. 25,000 at the village level and Rs. 50,000 at the
taluka level being unrelated to the maximum permissible limit of election
expense is not material for the purposes of Section 123(4) of R.P. Act. The
only allegation in the statement is of hiring the workers to work for Vikhe
F Patil in the election campaign by payment of money and the mere hiring
of workers for election campaign is not an offending statement of fact
..
under Section 123(4). Any further consideration of this aspect may have
been necessary only if the corrupt practice alleged was that under sub-sec-
tion (6) and not merely under sub-section (4) of Section 123 of the R.P.
G Act. Unless the hiring of workers by payment of money resulted in exceed-
ing the permissible maximum limit of election expenditure to constitute the
corrupt practice under Section 123(6), this fact alone would not constitute
the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) since the mere hiring of workers
during election campaign is not a corrupt practice.

H Another statement attributed to Gadakh is that Vikhe Patil was likely
KANKARRAOv. B.V. PATIL[VERMA,J.] 787

to give money for the repair of Chawdies and renovation of temples. This A
too is a vague general statement without the details which could not be
taken seriously by any one. No attempt has been made in the evidence by
either side to prove the truth of falsity of this statement. Assuming such a
statement was made which was also false, there is no evidence to prove the
impact of such a vague statement. Mere repair of chawdies or renovation
B
of temples is not a disparaging act relating to the personal character or
conduct of anyone unless the further requirements of Section 123(4) are
proved including the requirement of its impact on the mind of the elec-
torate that it was reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that
candidate. We do not find any satisfactory evidence for this purpose and,
therefore, no serious notice need be taken of such a statement even it it c
was made by Gadakh.

Another statement attributed to Gadakh is that he advised the voters
to accept whatever was offered by Vikhe Patil but to vote for Gadakh.
Merely saying that if some benefit was offered by a candidate, it should be D
accepted by the voters without being influenced thereby in the choice of ·
the candidate, cannot be a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice
the prospects of that candidate since the suggestion in the statement is to
cast the vote uninfluenced by any extraneous consideration. This statement
also, even if made by Gadakh, does not constitute the corrupt practice
under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. It is difficult to appreciate how the E
High Court overlooked this clear position in law and reached the con-
clusion that each of these statements constitutes the corrupt practice under
Section 123(4).

Re. : Sharad Pawar F
In respect of the statements, attributed to Sharad Pawar which have
led to naming him under Section 99 of the R.P. Act by the High Court, the
submission of Shri K. Parasaran, learned counsel for Sharad Pawar, is
twofold. He contended that the notice under Section 99 is invalid as there
was no occasion for issuance of that notice on the material present. His G
other submission was that assuming the alleged statements to have been
made by Sharad Pawar, none of them constitutes the corrupt practice
under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act as the requirements of that provision
are not satisfied. Shri Parasaran contended that none of those statements
is a 'statement of fact' as required by Section 123(4) being merely the H
788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A expression of certain apprehensions amounting at best to opinion and
exhorting the electorate to beware of such attempts, if any, by Vikhe Patil
to win over the electorate. According to Shri Parasaran, the thrust of the
speeches of Sharad Pawar at Newasa and Srigonda was that the electorate
should uphold the cause of morality instead of voting for Vikhe Patil who
B had exhibited lack of political morality by abandoning the .Congress (I)
Party when the party ticket was not given to him after he had the benefit
of representing the party in the Lok Sabha for five terms. Shri Parasaran
contended that the rumours being afloat of the likelihood of such tactics
to be adopted by Vikhe Patil to win the election, Sharad Pawar merely
warned the electorate to be not misled by the same. It was also contended
C by Shri Parasaran that Sharad Pawar did not even mention the payment of
any money by Vikhe Patil to the Janata Dal election fund or to the Janata
Dal candidate B.G. Kolse Patil which are the allegations made against
Gadakh, in spite of shifting of the Janata Dal candidate B.G. Kolse Patil
to another constituency after a categorical statement to the contrary was
D made till the last minute by the Janata Dal Leader Sml. Mrinal Gore and
rumours being afloat to that effect. Shri Parasaran in all fairness did not
dispute that Sharad Pawar was given the requisite opportunity to lead
evidence and to cross-examine the witnesses examined in support of the
election petition, but added that this was unnecessary since the statements
made by Sharad Pawar ex facie do not constitute corrupt practice under
E Section 123(4). Shri Parasaran also contended that the requisite consent of
the returned candidate Gadakh was not pleaded regarding Sharad Pawar's
~tatement at Newasa and it had also not been proved regarding Sharad
Pawar's statements made both at Newasa and Srigonda. This is an addi-
tional submission to contend that the requirements of Section 123(4) are
F not satisfied.

In our opinion, the statements attributed to Sharad Pawar in the
meetings held at Newasa and Srigonda ex fade do not amount to 'state-
ments of fact' relating to the personal character or conduct of Vikhe Patil
being only the expression of his opinion based on apprehensions about the
G likely future conduct of Vikhe Patil or relating only to Vikhe Patil's political
character which do not fall Within the ambit of Section 123(4) of the R.P.
Act. For this reason, the remaining submissions of Shri Parasaran do not
require consideration. We shall now deal with the statements attributed to
Sharad Pawar specified in the notice under Section 99, which alone require
H consideration. These have been extracted and enumerated earlier.
KANKARRAOv. B.V. PATIL [VERMA,J.] 789

The statements made in the meeting at Newasa were these : In the A
first statement made by Sharad Pawar, he said that Vikhe Patil had filed
h:s nomination from the South constituency instead of.the North because
it was a poor region and a scarcity area thinking that it was a good
circumstance to win easily. It is difficult to appreciate how this statement
can relate to the personal character or conduct of Vikhe Patil envisaged B
by Section 123(4). The second statement ~as that Vikhe Patil suffered from
the illusiqn that the poor people of South could be purchased with his
resources but those people were men possessed of self respect who could
not be purchased with anybody's money. The indi~ation was that any such
illusion or impression of Vikhe Patil was incorrect and was meant for Vikhe ·
Patil and not the voters. This statement also is not of the kind envisaged C
by Section 123(4). This statement also is, therefore, of no significance in
the present context. The third statement refers to the speech Of Gadakh
wherein he said : "Tuey will distribute bicycles, distribute dhoties and
sarees"; and then adds : "I do not have any objection". The statement of
Sharad Pawar therein was that he had no objt!ction to acceptance of the D
articles if they were distributed. For the reason given while dealing with
Gadakh's statement to this effect, Sharad Pawar's statement that he had
no obje.;tion to acceptance of the same, does aot fall within the net of
Section 123(4). The fourth statement again refers to the likelihood in
future of distribution of articles and wealth and proceeds to add : "Let them
do to it at the place and so far diverting the votes on the strength of money, E
let it be clear to whole of Maharashtra that voters cannot be bought." The
emphasis in this statement is on the fact that voters cannot be bought even
if such a distribution was made by any candidate and not that any such
distribution was being made by the candidate Vikhe Patil. This too doe~
not fall within Section 123(4). The fifth statement also is a general state- F
ment to the same effect of the likelihood of corrupting the people and
putting prelsure on the;n with the further caution to guard against any such
attempt. The sixth and the last statement made at Newasa is an exhortation
to the electorate to support morality and honesty to belittie and destroy
the force of wealth and ego opposed to it. This was merely an exhortation
of the speaker to support morality and honesty against money power and G
ego. These general statements made by Sharad Pawar at Newasa projecting
his party's candidate as the upholder of morality and honesty against the
forces guided by money power and ego amounted to his opinion of the
kind of representation made by the two candidates irrespective of the
H
790 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A correctness or otherwise of that opinion. The exhortation made to the
people to vote for his party's candidate as the upholder of morality and
honesty cannot be treated as statements of fact relating to the character
and conduct of Vikhe Patil amounting to vilification of his character or
conduct. Thus, none of the statements of Sharad Pawar at Newasa con-
B stitutes the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act.

In the meeting at Srigonda, Sharad Pawar is alleged to have made
four statements to . which objection is taken by Vikhe Patil. The fir.st
statement is similar to the first and second statements made at Newasa
wherejn he said that Vikhe Patil chose to contest from the South Con-
C stituency being a famine prone region wherein the people were poor for
the purpose of purchasing their self respect. He then added that Vikhe
Patil had .started activities to win the ele1,;t; .n by efforts of interested parties
by playin~ their game of purchasing self respect of the poor pe 1e. For
the re.asons alrear 1 given, this statement does not come within Section
D 123(4). In the ~econd statement, Sharad Pawar said that money alone
cannot be an 1- .Jrtant motivation in the election and there was need of
ideology, policy, programme and morality. He then added that it is wrong
to give up morality and leave the party when one's wish is not fulfilled and
to join hand~ with other parties. He added that once the "kumkum" is
applied its sanctity must be maintained and there should not be any flirting
E with a person 0ther than he to whom the "kumkum" is applied. This was
in the background of Vikhe Patil leaving the Cor ....,.ess (I) Party when the
party ticket was not given to him and he contesting the election with th".
help of other parties. The suggestio1 was that abandoning the party and
switching of loyalty was not morally a." rt ideologically correct. In the
F admitted background of Vikhe Patil, this comment was on his political
morality and character because of his leaving the Congress (I) Party on
denial of ticket to him and contesting against the Congress (I) Party's
candidate. This statement did not relate to the personal character or
conduct of Vikhe Patil but merely to his political character and morality.
G This does not fall within Section 123(4). The third statement is a repetition
of the apprehensions for the future of the likelihood of distribution of the
benefits in the constituency coupled with the exhortation that if such a thing
has begun or is to happen in future, the same may be accepted without
being influenced thereby in the choice of the candidate. For the reasons
already given, this too does not come within Section 123(4). The fourth and
H the last statement at Srigonda made by Sharad Pawar was again an
KANKARRAOv. B.V. PATIL (VERMA,J.] 791

exhortation to act on principle, morality and humanity shunning disloyalty A
and arrogance of money and power. This is indeed high idealism better
practiced than preached. This cannot obviously come within Section
123(4).

These being the only statements attributed to Sharad Pawar, we have
no doubt that none of them constitutes the corrupt practice under Section B
123(4) of the R.P. Act and, therefore, accepting that these statements were
made by Sharad Pawar since there is no attempt by Sharad Pawar to
dispute any of them, it must be he that none of them is a 'statement of fact'
relating to the personal character and conduct of Vikhe Patil of the kind
envisaged by Section 123(4). The question of examining whether the c
remaining requirements of Section 123(4) including the consent of Gadakh
and the reasonable likelihood of its impact on the mind of the electorate
are satisfied, does not arise for consideration.

In the present case, it is unnecessary to deal with the arguments from D
both sides pertaining to the decision in Manohar Joshi v. Damodar Tatyaba'
and Others, (1991) 2 SCC 342, since without going into the arguments
relating to the defects in the notice under Section 99 of the R.P. Act issued
to Sharad Pawar, we have reached the conclusion that the statements
attributed to him of which he was given the notice, do not constitute the
corrupt practice under Section 123(4). E

We may, however, observe that the conclusion that these statements
do not constitute the corrupt practice under Section 123(4) should not be
construed as our opinion that the making of such statements during the
election campaign is desirable or that they are necessary for edu~ation of F
the electorate. This caution is necessary in view of the attempt made by
Shri Ram J athmalani to widen the scope by contending that the same a
justified electoral practice for education of the electorate. In our view, the
electorate by now is we educated about the justified means desirable during
the election campaign and it looks forward to knowing the positive G
programmes of the candidates together with their comparative merits
instead of being left to compare their demerits and choose from amongst
them the one with the lease demerits. The shift in the election campaign
has, therefore, to be in a positive direction to enable the electorate to cast
its positive vote instead of the negative vote by rejecting those with greater
demerits. This duty is cast more heavily on the senior leaders of all the H
792 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A political parties to ensure that the election campaign does not degenerate
into a campaign of vilification, which may tend to promote violence during
elections and lead to criminalisation of politics. These are hard realities of
the present trend of election campaign and this trend must be reversed to
make the democracy more meaningful by ensuring purity of elections which
can be achieved only by a shift in the trend towards the right direction.
B
Judging by these standards, we are constrained to observe that some
of the statements made by Sharad Pawar, the Chief Minister of
Maharashtra, even though not amounting to corrupt practice under the
enacted law, do not measure upto the desired level of electioneering at the
C top echelon of political leadership· to set the trend for a healthy election
campaign. His suggestion to the voters to accept monies etc., if distributed
by a candidate, without ·being influenced thereby as a m~ans of propagating
socialism exhibits a bazarre perception of socialism. It is shocking enough
that Gadakh said so but far worse to find the Chief Minister endorse that
D view. Intended as sarcasm it depicts poor taste. If this be the level of
election campaign at the top, it is bound to degenerate as it descends to
the 19wer levels. Some portions of the speeches of Sharad Pawar were
indeed high precept but the electorate would have benefited more by
knowledge of the track record of the preachers' practice of the same. There
E was no such attempt. The degree of responsibility and the level of elec-
tioneering expected of the top leadership was wanting in these speeches.
If probity in public life is to be maintained and purity of elections is not a
myth or mere catch-phrase, a higher level of electioneering is expected at
least at the highest level of political leadership.

F It is with this note of caution we say that all the statements attributed
to Sharad Pawar and many attributed to Gadakh do not constitute the
alleged corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act. Accordingly,
the notice issued under Section 99 to Sharad Pawar shoulu have been
discharged by the High Court instead of Sharad Pawar being named for
G commission of any such corrupt practice.
FURTHER RELIEF UNDER SECTION JOJ(b) OF THE RP. ACT

The further relief granted by the High Court of declaring Vikhe Patil
to have been duly elected after declaring the election of Gadakh to be void
H is clearly unsustainable. This further relief declaring Vikhe Patil to have
KANKARRA01': B.V. PATIL[VERMA, J.] 793

been duly elected has been granted under Section 101 of the R.P. Act A
which reads as under: -

"101. Grounds for which a candidate other than the returned
candidate may be declared to have been elected, If any person who
has lodged a petition has, in addition to calling in question the
election of the re-turned candidate, claimed a declaration that he B
himself or any other candidate has been duly elected and the High
Court is of opinion : -

(a) that in fact the petitioner or such other candidate received
a majority of the valid votes; or C

(b) that but for the votes obtained by the returne4 candidate
by corrupt practices the petitioner or such other candidate would
have obtained a majority of the valid votes, the High Court shall
after declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void
declare the petitioner or such other candidate, ?s the case may be, D
to have been duly elected."

Obviously it is clause (b) of Section 101 under which the further relief in
the present case can be justified. To justify this further relief, it must be
held that but for the votes obtained by Gadakh by the corrupt practice E
committed under Section 1 "3(4) of the R.P. Act, Vikhe Patil would have
obtained a majority of tht.. ..rid votes. The High Court has taken the view
that the election of Gadakh being void Vikhe Patil who polled the next
highest number of votes must be declared to have been duly elected. Thei;e
is no discernible cogent reason in the High Court's jul.fgment to support
this conclusion. F
In Konappa Rudrappa Nadoouda v. Vishwanath Reddy & Anr., (1969]
2 SCr 10. the Constitution Bench pointed out the cases falling under
Section 101 (b) in which this further declaration can be m<ide. It was held
therein as under : -
G
"........... We are again unable to see any logic in the assumption
that votes cast in favour of a person who is regarded by the
Returning Officer as validly nominated, but who is in truth dis-
qualified, could still be treated as valid votes, for the purpose of
determining whether a fresh election should be .held. When there H
794 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1993) SUPP. 3 S.C.R..

A are only two contesting candidates, and one of them is under a
statutory disqualification, votes cast in favour of the disqualified
candidate may be regarded as thrown away, irrespective of whether
the voters who voted for him were aware of the disqualification .
.· This is not to say that where there are more than two candidates in
the field for a single seat, and one alone is disqualified, on proof of
B disqualification all the votes cast in his favour will be discarded and
the candidate securing the next highest number of votes will be
declared elected. In such a case, question of notice to the voters may
assume significance, for the voters may not, if aware of the dis-
qualification have voted for the disqualified candidate." ·
c
(?ages 95-96)
(emphasis supplied)

The law applicable being as above, the mere fact that Vikhe Patil
secured the next highest number of votes after Gadakh is not sufficient to
D declare him elected on the conclusion that Gadakh's electio~ is void for
commission of a corrupt· practice. The High Court proceeded on an
erroneous assumption to grant this further relief under Section lOl(b) of
the R.P. Act declaring Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected. Shri P.P. Rao,
with his usual fairness, in our view rightly, did not seriously support the
E grant of this further relief declaring Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected,
bn account of the absence of the requisite evidence to support the grant
of this further declaration in the present case. No further consideration of
this point is, therefore, necessary.

CONCLUSION
F
The result is that the High Court's judgment declaring the election
of Gadakh to be void for commission of the corrupt practice under Section
123(4) of the R.P. Act is upheld on the ground indicated by us; the further
declaration made by the High Court that Vikhe Patil is duly elected is set
G aside; and the High Court's order naming Sharad Pawar under Section 99
of the R.P. Act for commission of the corrupt practice under Section
123(4) is also set aside.

Consequently, we direct as under : -

H (1) Civil Appeal No. 2115 of 1993 filed by Gadakh Yashwantrao
KANKARRAOv. B.V. PATIL [VERMA,J.) 795

Kankarrao is allowed only in part. The appeal relating lo declaration of ;A
election of Gadakh to be void is dismissed for the reason given by us. ,
However, the remaining part against grant of the further relief declaring·
Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected, is allowed. This appeal partly
succeeds to this extent only. Vikhe Patil would get Rs. 20,000 as cost from
Gadakh. Other parties to bear their own costs.
B
(2) Civil Appeal No. 1758 of 1993 filed by Sharad Chandra
Govindrao Pawar is allowed and the order naming him for commission of
tf.e corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the R.P. Act made by the High
Court is set aside. No costs.

(3) Civil Appeal No. 2116 of 1993 by Deshmukh Bhagwan Rangnath C
only against declaration of Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected is allowed
and that further declaration is set aside. No costs.

(4) Civil Appeal No. 2444 of 1993 by Najan Rambahu Maruti similar-
ly against declaration of Vikhe Patil to have been duly elected is allowed D
and th~t further declaration is set aside. No costs.

R.A. Matters disposed of.