GAJANAND SHARMAversusAADARSH SIKSHA PARISHAD SAMITI & ORS.

                          [2023] 1 S.C.R. 949                            949


                      GAJANAND SHARMA                                    A
                                  v.
        AADARSH SIKSHA PARISHAD SAMITI & ORS.
                 Civil Appeal Nos.. 100-101 of 2023
                        JANUARY 19, 2023                                 B
         [M. R. SHAH AND C. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.]
       Rajasthan Non-Governmental Educational Institutions Act,
1989 – s.18 – For termination from service, the approval of Director
of Education required or not – Appellant-employee was terminated
                                                                         C
after a departmental enquiry – Tribunal set aside the order of
termination by observing and holding that the prior approval of
the Director of Education as mandatory u/s. 18 of the Act, 1989
was not obtained – Single Judge confirmed the order passed by the
Tribunal – Division Bench of the High Court allowed the writ appeal
and has set aside the orders passed by the Tribunal as well as the       D
Single Judge and has upheld the order of termination – Division
Bench observed that in case of a termination after the disciplinary
enquiry/proceedings prior approval of the Director of Education is
not required – On appeal, held: On true interpretation of Section
18 of the Act, 1989, it is specifically observed and held that even in
                                                                         E
case of termination/removal of an employee of a recognized
institution after holding departmental enquiry/proceedings prior
approval of the Director of Education has to be obtained as per
first proviso to s.18 of the Act, 1989 – The impugned judgment and
order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court restoring the
order of termination which as such was without obtaining the prior       F
approval of the Director of Education is set aside – The order of
Tribunal setting aside the order of termination confirmed by the
Single Judge of the High Court is restored.
      Allowing the appeals, the Court
      HELD: 1. The decision of this Court in the case of Raj             G
Kumar was binding upon the High Court. Therefore, the Division
Bench of the High Court has seriously erred in not following the
decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar. [Para 5.1][957-
B]
                                                                         H
                                 949
950            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2023] 1 S.C.R.


A            2. Even on fair reading of Section 18 of the Act, 1989, this
      Court is of the opinion that in case of termination of an employee
      of a recognized institution prior approval of the Director of
      Education or an officer authorised by him in this behalf has to be
      obtained. In Section 18, there is no distinction between the
      termination, removal, or reduction in rank after the disciplinary
B
      proceedings/enquiry or even without disciplinary proceedings/
      enquiry. As per the settled position of law the provisions of the
      statute are to be read as they are. Nothing to be added and or
      taken away. The words used are “no employee of a recognized
      institution shall be removed without holding any enquiry and it
C     further provides that no final order in this regard shall be passed
      unless prior approval of the Director of Education has been
      obtained.” The first part of Section 18 is to be read along with
      first proviso. Under the circumstances, taking a contrary view
      that in case of dismissal/removal of an employee of a recognized
      institution which is after holding the departmental enquiry the
D
      prior approval of the Director of Education is not required is
      unsustainable and to that extent the judgment of the Larger
      Bench of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Central Academy
      Society is not a good law. [Para 5.5][959-B-E]
             3. Therefore, on true interpretation of Section 18 of the
E     Act, 1989, it is specifically observed and held that even in case
      of termination/removal of an employee of a recognized institution
      after holding departmental enquiry/proceedings prior approval
      of the Director of Education has to be obtained as per first proviso
      to Section 18 of the Act, 1989. [Para 5.6][959-E-F]
F           4. In view of the above and for the reasons stated
      hereinabove, the impugned judgment and order passed by the
      Division Bench of the High Court restoring the order of
      termination which as such was without obtaining the prior
      approval of the Director of Education deserves to be quashed
G     and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. The order
      of Tribunal setting aside the order of termination confirmed by
      the Single Judge is hereby restored. Consequently, the appellant
      shall have to be reinstated in service and considering the fact
      that the respondent(s) is/are un-aided institution and the order
      of termination was passed as far as back in the year 1998, this
H
GAJANAND SHARMA v. ADARSH SIKSHA PARISAD SAMITI                         951
                    & ORS.

Court directs that the appellant shall be entitled to 50% of the        A
back wages, however, he shall be entitled to all other benefits
notionally including the seniority etc., if any. [Para 6][959-F-H;
960-A]
      Raj Kumar vs. Director of Education and Ors. (2016) 6
      SCC 541 : [2016] 1 SCR 697 – relied on.                           B
      Central Academy Society vs. Rajasthan Non-Govt.
      Educational Institutional Tribunal (2010) 3 WLC 21 –
      held not good law.
      T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka (2002) 8
      SCC 481 : [2002] 3 Supp. SCR 587; Marwari Balika                  C
      Vidyalaya vs. Asha srivastava (2020) 14 SCC 449 :
      [2019] 2 SCR 722; Mangal Sain Jain vs. Principal
      Balvantray Mehta Vidya Bhawan & Ors. [W.P. (C) No.
      3415/2020 decided by the Delhi High Court] –
      referred to.                                                      D
      Mangal Sain Jain v. Principal Balvantray Mehta Vidya
      Bhawan & Ors. [W.P. (C) No. 3415/2020 decided by
      the Delhi High Court] – referred to.
                       Case Law Reference
                                                                        E
[2016] 1 SCR 697              relied on     Para 2.1, 5.1, 5.2, 5.4
[2002] 3 Supp. SCR 587        referred to   Para 2.1, 5.1, 5.4
[2019] 2 SCR 722              referred to   Para 5.4
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.100-
101 of 2023.                                                            F

      From the Judgment and Order dated 06.05.2022 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur in D.B. Special Appeal
Writ No.1077 of 2005 and D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.826 of 2011.
      Pradeep Aggarwal, Lal Pratap Singh, Umesh Pratap Singh, Arjun     G
Aggarwal, Bhaskar Aditya,Vishal Singh, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Advs. for the
Appellant.
     Nikhil Singhvi, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh, Bilal Ikram, Shikhar
Kishore, Advs. for the Respondents.
                                                                        H
952             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 1 S.C.R.


A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            M. R. SHAH, J.
             1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment
      and order dated 06.05.2022 passed by the High Court of Judicature for
      Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in D.B. Special Appeal Writ Nos. 1077/2005
B     (filed by the management) and 826/2011 (filed by the employee), by
      which the Division Bench of the High Court has allowed the appeal
      preferred by the respondent(s) herein – management and has quashed
      and set aside the judgement and order passed by the learned Single
      Judge and the order passed by the learned Tribunal quashing and setting
C     aside the order of termination dated 06.08.1998 and consequently upheld
      the same, the employee has preferred the present appeals.
            2. The facts leading to the present appeals in a nutshell are as
      under: -
             2.1 That the appellant herein – employee was serving with
D     respondent Nos. 1 and 2. A disciplinary enquiry was initiated against him
      under provisions of the Rajasthan Non-Governmental Educational
      Institutions Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Act, 1989). That
      thereafter on conclusion of the departmental enquiry services of the
      appellant came to be terminated which was the subject matter of challenge
E     before the learned Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the order of termination
      by observing and holding that the prior approval of the Director of
      Education as mandatory under Section 18 of the Act, 1989 was not
      obtained. The learned Single Judge confirmed the order passed by the
      learned Tribunal. By the impugned judgment and order and despite the
      fact that the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar Vs. Director
F     of Education and Ors., (2016) 6 SCC 541 dealt with the pari materia
      provisions of the Delhi School Education Act (hereinafter referred to as
      the DSE Act), taking the view that before termination of an employee,
      prior approval of the Director of Education is mandatory and required,
      the Division Bench of the High Court has not followed the decision of
G     this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) by erroneously observing
      that in the case of Raj Kumar (supra), this Court had not considered
      the earlier decision in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation Vs. State of
      Karnataka; (2002) 8 SCC 481. That thereafter, after following the
      decision of the Larger Bench of the High Court in the case of Central
      Academy Society Vs. Rajasthan Non-Govt. Educational
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GAJANAND SHARMA v. ADARSH SIKSHA PARISAD SAMITI                                  953
             & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

Institutional Tribunal; (2010) 3 WLC 21 reading down Section 18                  A
of the Act, 1989, observed that in case of a termination after the
disciplinary enquiry/proceedings prior approval of the Director of
Education is not required, the Division Bench of the High Court has
allowed the writ appeal and has set aside the orders passed by the learned
Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge and has upheld the order of
                                                                                 B
termination. That the impugned judgment and order passed by the High
Court is the subject matter of one of the present appeals. At this stage,
it is required to be noted that letters patent appeal (D.B. Special Writ
Appeal) No. 826/2011 was the subject matter of order dated 06.01.2011
passed by the learned Single Judge denying the case of the appellant for
equal pay for equal work. However, since the termination order came to           C
be upheld, thereafter, without further entering into the merits of the appeal,
the Division Bench of the High Court has dismissed the said appeal,
which is also the subject matter of one of the present appeals.
       3. Now so far as the impugned judgment and order passed by the
Division Bench of the High Court upholding the order of termination and          D
quashing and setting aside the orders passed by the learned Tribunal and
the learned Single Judge is concerned, it is vehemently submitted by the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant – employee that as
such the High Court has materially erred in not following the binding
decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra). It is submitted
that though not permissible, observing and holding that the decision of          E
this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra), the Division Bench of the
High Court has not followed the decision in the case of Raj Kumar
(supra) on the ground that in the case of Raj Kumar (supra), this Court
had not considered the decision in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation
(supra). It is submitted that the aforesaid is factually incorrect. It is        F
submitted that as such while passing the judgment and order in the case
of Raj Kumar (supra) this Court had taken into consideration at least in
more than 8-9 paragraphs the decision of this Court in the case of T.M.A.
Pai Foundation (supra) (paragraphs 13, 42, 43, 47, 50-52, 61 & 64). It
is submitted that therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court has
seriously erred in not following the binding decision of this Court in the       G
case of Raj Kumar (supra).
      3.1 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that as such in the case of Raj Kumar (supra)
while dealing with and considering the pari materia provisions of DSE
                                                                                 H
954            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 1 S.C.R.


A     Act, namely, Section 8 of the DSE Act, this Court has specifically observed
      and held that before terminating an employee even in case of a non-
      aided institution, the prior approval of the Director of Education is
      mandatory. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
      the appellant that while holding so this Court did consider the decision of
      this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). It is submitted
B
      that therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court has materially erred
      in taking the contrary view than the decision of this Court in the case of
      Raj Kumar (supra) and the Division Bench of the High Court has
      materially erred in relying upon the Larger Bench’s judgment/decision in
      the case of Central Academy Society (supra) and taking the view that
C     in case of termination followed by the disciplinary proceedings/enquiry,
      Section 18 requiring the prior approval of the Director of Education shall
      not be applicable.
             3.2 It is submitted that even in the case of Marwari Balika
      Vidyalaya Vs. Asha Srivastava; (2020) 14 SCC 449 after following
D     the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra), it is observed
      and held that before terminating/dismissing an employee, the prior approval
      of the Direction of Education is required/mandatory.
             3.3 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
      behalf of the appellant that the decision in the case of Raj Kumar (supra)
E     has been subsequently followed by the Delhi High Court in the case of
      Mangal Sain Jain Vs. Principal Balvantray Mehta Vidya Bhawan
      & Ors. [W.P. (C) No. 3415/2020] against which the Special Leave
      Petition filed by the management has been dismissed by this Court in the
      case of Principal Balvantray Mehta Vidya Bhawan Vs. Mangal Jain
      vide order dated 11.01.2021. Therefore, it is submitted that the Division
F     Bench of the High Court has materially erred in restoring the order of
      termination by observing that in a case of non- aided institution and in a
      case where the termination is after the disciplinary enquiry/proceedings,
      the prior approval of the Director of Education is not mandatory.
             3.4 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decision
G     of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra), it is prayed to allow the
      present appeals.
            4. Present appeals are vehemently opposed by the learned counsel
      appearing on behalf of the management - respondent(s).

H
GAJANAND SHARMA v. ADARSH SIKSHA PARISAD SAMITI                                  955
             & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

       4.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing           A
on behalf of the management that as such the decision of this Court in
the case of Raj Kumar (supra) and T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra)
shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand as in the aforesaid
decisions, it was a case of termination without holding any disciplinary
enquiry/departmental proceedings. In the case of Raj Kumar (supra)
                                                                                 B
this Court was considering Section 8 of the DSE Act. It is submitted that
in the present case as such the order of termination was passed after
following a departmental enquiry and after all the charges and the
misconduct held to be proved. It is submitted that therefore first part of
Section 18 of the Act, 1989 shall not be applicable.
       4.2 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the management has             C
heavily relied upon Larger Bench decision of Rajasthan High Court in
the case of Central Academy Society (supra). It is submitted that the
Larger Bench of the High Court has dealt with and/or considered the
very provision, namely, Section 18 of the Act, 1989 and has read down
the same after considering the decision in the case of T.M.A. Pai                D
Foundation (supra) and has observed and held that in case of termination
of an employee after departmental enquiry/proceedings, Section 18 of
the Act, 1989 shall not be applicable and the prior approval of the Director
of Education is not required.
       4.3 It is further submitted that even otherwise in the present case,      E
the order of termination is not required to be set aside on the ground that
the prior approval of the Director of Education was not obtained as the
disciplinary committee was consisted of District Education Officer. It is
submitted that the Committee, of which a nominee of the District
Education Officer was a member, held all the charges and the misconduct
alleged proved. It is submitted that the charges and the misconduct proved       F
against the appellant were very serious of abusing, misbehaving, and
threatening the school Principal, embezzlement of school funds and being
negligent in handling school property. It is submitted that therefore, when
in the disciplinary committee a nominee of the District Education Officer
was member, the order of termination without even the prior approval of          G
the Director of Education is not required to be set aside.
      4.4 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeals.
       5. At the outset, it is required to be noted that and it is an admitted
position that parties are governed by the Rajasthan Non-Governmental             H
956            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 1 S.C.R.


A     Educational Institutions Act, 1989. Section 18 provides that no employee
      of a recognized institution shall be removed, dismissed, or reduced in
      rank unless he has been given by the management a reasonable
      opportunity of being heard against the action proposed to be taken and
      that no final order in this regard shall be passed unless prior approval of
      the Director of Education or an officer authorized by him in this behalf
B
      has been obtained. The learned Tribunal set aside the order of termination
      on non-compliance of Section 18 of the Act, 1989 inasmuch as before
      terminating the services of the appellant – employee prior approval of
      the Director of Education was not obtained. The same came to be
      confirmed by the learned Single Judge, however, by the impugned
C     judgment and order taking a contrary view, the Division Bench of the
      High Court has allowed the appeal and has restored the order of
      termination.
             5.1 From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High
      Court, it appears that before the High Court the decision of this Court in
D     the case of Raj Kumar (supra) taking a contrary view and taking the
      view that before terminating the services of an employee of a recognized
      institution prior approval of the Director of Education is required was
      pressed into service. However, though impermissible the Division Bench
      of the High Court has not followed the said binding decision by observing
      that in the case of Raj Kumar (supra), this Court had not considered
E     the decision of this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra).
      Apart from the fact that the same is wholly impermissible for the High
      Court even the said observations are factually incorrect. If the decision
      in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) is seen in more than 8-9 paragraphs,
      this Court had referred to and as such dealt with the decision of this
F     Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra). Even the decision
      in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra) was explained and
      considered by this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra). Therefore,
      the Division Bench of the High Court is factually incorrect in observing
      that while deciding the decision in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) this
      Court had not considered the decision of this Court in the case of T.M.A.
G     Pai Foundation (supra). Before commenting upon the decision of this
      Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) the Division Bench of the High
      Court ought to have thoroughly read and/or considered the decision in
      the case of Raj Kumar (supra). Even after making the incorrect
      observations that in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) this Court had not
H     considered the decision of this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai
GAJANAND SHARMA v. ADARSH SIKSHA PARISAD SAMITI                                   957
             & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

Foundation (supra) the Division Bench of the High Court has considered            A
few decisions of judicial discipline which were not applicable at all. Judicial
discipline also requires that the judgment/decision of this Court should
be considered and read thoroughly. As observed hereinabove, the decision
of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) was binding upon the
High Court. Therefore, the Division Bench of the High Court has seriously
                                                                                  B
erred in not following the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar
(supra).
      5.2 Now so far as the decision of this Court in the case of Raj
Kumar (supra) is concerned, this Court was considering pari materia
provisions under the DSE Act. This Court was considering Section 8 of
the DSE Act, which reads as under:-                                               C

          “8. (2) Subject to any rule that may be made in this behalf, no
          employee of a recognised private school shall be dismissed,
          removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise
          terminated except with the prior approval of the Director.”
                                                                                  D
      5.3 Similar is the provision so far as Section 18 of the Act, 1989 is
concerned which reads as under: -
          “18. Removal, dismissal or reduction in rank of employees.-
          Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, no
          employee of a recognised institution shall be removed, dismissed
                                                                                  E
          or reduced in rank unless he has been given by the management
          a reasonable opportunity of being heard against the action
          proposed to be taken; Provided that no final order in this regard
          shall be passed unless prior approval of the Director of
          Education or an officer authorised by him in this behalf has
          been obtained.”                                                         F
       5.4 In the case of Raj Kumar (supra) while dealing with the pari
materia provision under the DSE Act and after considering the decision
of this Court in the case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation (supra), it is
specifically observed and held by this Court that in case of a recognized
institution, before terminating the services of an employee, prior approval       G
of the Director of Education is required. Therefore, a contrary view
taken by the Larger Bench of the High Court relied upon by the Division
Bench of the High Court is not a good law. It is required to be noted that
the decision of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) has been
considered by this Court in the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya (supra)
                                                                                  H
958            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2023] 1 S.C.R.


A     and also by the Delhi High Court in the case of Mangal Sain Jain
      (supra). In the case of Marwari Balika Vidyalaya (supra) this Court
      considered the decision in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) and object
      and purpose of Section 8 of DSE Act in paragraphs 13 and 14 as under:-
            “13. In Raj Kumar v. Director of Education [Raj Kumar v.
B           Director of Education, (2016) 6 SCC 541 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S)
            111] this Court held that Section 8(2) of the Delhi School Education
            Act, 1973 is a procedural safeguard in favour of employee to
            ensure that order of termination or dismissal is not passed without
            prior approval of Director of Education to avoid arbitrary or
C           unreasonable termination/dismissal of employee of even
            recognised private school. Moreover, this Court also considered
            the Objects and Reasons of the Delhi School Education Act, 1973
            and came to the conclusion that the termination of service of the
            driver of a private school without obtaining prior approval of
            Director of Education was bad in law. This Court observed : (SCC
D           p. 560, para 45)
               “45. We are unable to agree with the contention advanced by
               the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent
               school. Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is a procedural safeguard
               in favour of an employee to ensure that order of termination or
E              dismissal is not passed without the prior approval of the Director
               of Education. This is to avoid arbitrary or unreasonable
               termination or dismissal of an employee of a recognised private
               school.”
            14. This Court has laid down in Raj Kumar v. Director of
F           Education [Raj Kumar v. Director of Education, (2016) 6 SCC
            541 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 111] that the intent of the legislature
            while enacting the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (in short
            “the DSE Act”) was to provide security of tenure to the employees
            of the school and to regulate the terms and conditions of their
G           employment. While the functioning of both aided and unaided
            educational institutions must be free from unnecessary
            governmental interference, the same needs to the reconciled with
            the conditions of employment of the employees of these institutions
            and provision of adequate precautions to safeguard their interests.
            Section 8(2) of the DSE Act is one such precautionary safeguard
H
GAJANAND SHARMA v. ADARSH SIKSHA PARISAD SAMITI                                959
             & ORS. [M. R. SHAH, J.]

      which needs to be followed to ensure that employees of educational       A
      institutions do not suffer unfair treatment at the hands of the
      management.”
       5.5 Even on fair reading of Section 18 of the Act, 1989, we are of
the opinion that in case of termination of an employee of a recognized
institution prior approval of the Director of Education or an officer          B
authorised by him in this behalf has to be obtained. In Section 18, there
is no distinction between the termination, removal, or reduction in rank
after the disciplinary proceedings/enquiry or even without disciplinary
proceedings/enquiry. As per the settled position of law the provisions of
the statute are to be read as they are. Nothing to be added and or taken
away. The words used are “no employee of a recognized institution shall        C
be removed without holding any enquiry and it further provides that no
final order in this regard shall be passed unless prior approval of the
Director of Education has been obtained.” The first part of Section 18 is
to be read along with first proviso. Under the circumstances, taking a
contrary view that in case of dismissal/removal of an employee of a            D
recognized institution which is after holding the departmental enquiry
the prior approval of the Director of Education is not required is
unsustainable and to that extent the judgment of the Larger Bench of
the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Central Academy Society
(supra) is not a good law.
                                                                               E
       5.6 Therefore, on true interpretation of Section 18 of the Act,
1989, it is specifically observed and held that even in case of termination/
removal of an employee of a recognized institution after holding
departmental enquiry/proceedings prior approval of the Director of
Education has to be obtained as per first proviso to Section 18 of the
Act, 1989.                                                                     F

       6. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove,
the impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the
High Court restoring the order of termination which as such was without
obtaining the prior approval of the Director of Education deserves to be
quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. The            G
order of learned Tribunal setting aside the order of termination confirmed
by the learned Single Judge is hereby restored. Consequently, the
appellant shall have to be reinstated in service and considering the fact
that the respondent(s) is/are un-aided institution and the order of
termination was passed as far as back in the year 1998, we direct that         H
960              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2023] 1 S.C.R.


A     the appellant shall be entitled to 50% of the back wages, however, he
      shall be entitled to all other benefits notionally including the seniority
      etc., if any.
            6.1 Civil appeal No. 100/2023 arising out of the impugned judgment
      and order passed in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1077/2005 is hereby
B     allowed according to the aforesaid extent.
             6.2 Now so far as Civil Appeal No. 101/2023 arising out of the
      impugned judgment and order passed in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.
      826/2011 is concerned, the Division Bench of the High Court has not at
      all dealt with the said appeal on merits while upholding the order of
C     termination. Therefore, we set aside the order passed by the High Court
      in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 826/2011 and remand the matter to the
      High Court to decide the same afresh in accordance with law and on its
      own merits.
             Both the appeals are accordingly allowed to the aforesaid extent
D     and in terms of the above. In the facts and circumstances of the case
      there shall be no order as to costs.

      Ankit Gyan                                                 Appeals allowed.
      (Assisted by : Abhishek Pratap Singh, LCRA)

E




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