Holding

The award of the Labour Court is set aside because the workers failed to plead and prove fraud or undue influence, resulting in a finding of no evidence, and the writ court correctly exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to quash the award.

Summary

The case involved 90 non‑management workers (NMRs) of the Rengali Hydro Electric Project who claimed that they were forced to sign applications for a Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS) through fraud and undue influence, and consequently were denied reinstatement. The Labour Court held that the VSS was thrust upon them and ordered their reinstatement with back‑wages, a decision later affirmed by the High Court. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether the workers had sufficiently pleaded and proved fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether the High Court erred in its jurisdictional assessment. The Court found the pleadings vague, the evidence lacking, and concluded that the award was based on a finding of no evidence, rendering it infirm. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the award, dismissed the workers' application, and ordered the employer to return the amounts received with interest. The judgment also clarified the limited scope of writs of certiorari and the non‑applicability of CPC Order VI Rule 4 to proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, though its principles of pleading remain relevant.

Issues considered

The adequacy of pleadings and evidence to establish fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Whether the Labour Court's award was infirm due to a finding of no evidence and thus liable to be interfered with by a writ of certiorari.
The applicability of Order VI Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure to proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act.
The scope and jurisdiction of a writ of certiorari in correcting tribunal errors.
The entitlement of the workers to reinstatement and back‑wages under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order VI Rule 4
Indian Contract Act, 1872s. 16, s. 17, s. 18, s. 19
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947s. 11, s. 17B, s. 33, s. 33A

Subjects

Industrial disputeVoluntary Separation SchemeFraudUndue influenceMisrepresentationSection 33Section 33AWrit of certiorariJurisdictional errorCPC Order VI Rule 4EvidenceReinstatementBack wages

Judgment

[2019] 12 S.C.R. 293 293

GENERAL MANAGER, ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO A
ELECTRIC PROJECT, ORISSA AND OTHERS
v.
SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 8071 of 2010) B
SEPTEMBER 12, 2019
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND K. M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947:
s. 33A r/w. s. 33 – Application – By NMR workers/employees C
of appellant – Alleging that they were prevented from discharging
their duties, by fraudulently and by applying undue influence getting
their signatures on papers of a ‘Voluntary Separation Scheme’, (VSS)
– Labour Court directed their reinstatement holding that the VSS
was thrust upon them – Writ petition before High Court was dismissed
D
on the ground that there was no jurisdictional error in passing the
award – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: There are no sufficient
pleading with regard to fraud and undue influence – The workmen
had failed to plead and prove and it being a case of no evidence,
the Award passed by the Labour Court became infirm and was liable
to be interfered with – The employer has produced ample E
documentary evidence to show that the workers voluntarily opted
for the VSS – Thus no case was made out before the Labour Court
for invoking s. 33A r/w. s. 33.
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908:
Order VI r. 4 – Rules of pleadings – Applicability of – To the F
proceedings u/s. 33A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Held: The
proceedings u/s. 33A not being a civil suit, provisions of CPC would
not apply – However, the salutary principles engrained therein
would apply.
Writ: G

Writ of Certiorari – Nature and scope of – Held: Jurisdiction
to issue writ of certiorari is supervisory and not appellate – It is
intended to correct jurisdictional excesses – An erroneous decision

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294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A in respect of a matter which falls within the authority of the Tribunal
would not entitle a writ applicant for a writ of Certiorari – It can be
issued when a jurisdictional error is clearly established – An error
of law which becomes vulnerable to judicial scrutiny by way of
Certiorari must be one which is apparent on the face of the record.
B Words and Phrases:
‘Fraud’, ‘Misrepresentation’ and ‘Undue influence’ –
Meaning of.
‘Fraud’ and ‘Misrepresentation’ – Distinction between –
Discussed.
C
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD : 1.1 An erroneous decision in respect of a matter
which falls within the authority of the Tribunal would not entitle a
writ applicant for a writ of Certiorari. However, if the decision
D relates to anything collateral to the merit, an erroneous decision
upon which, would affect its jurisdiction, a writ of Certiorari would
lie. [Para 21] [308-E]
1.2 The jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is supervisory
and not appellate. The Court considering a writ application of
Certiorari will not don the cap of an Appellate Court. It will not
E
reappreciate evidence. The Writ of Certiorari is intended to
correct jurisdictional excesses. A writ of prohibition would issue
when a Tribunal or authority has not yet concluded its proceedings.
Once a decision is rendered by a body amenable to Certiorari
jurisdiction, Certiorari could be issued when a jurisdictional error
F is clearly established. [Para 29] [315-B-C]
1.3 The jurisdictional error may be from failure to observe
the limits of its jurisdiction. It may arise from the procedure
adopted by the body after validly assuming jurisdiction. It may
act in violation of principles of natural justice. The body whose
G decision which comes under attack may decide a collateral fact
which is also a jurisdictional fact and assume jurisdiction. Such a
finding of fact is not immune from being interfered with by a Writ
of Certiorari. As far as the finding of fact which is one within the
jurisdiction of the court, it is ordinarily a matter ‘off bounds’ for
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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 295
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU

the writ court. This is for the reason that a body which has A
jurisdiction to decide the matter has the jurisdiction to decide it
correctly or wrongly. It would become a mere error and that too
an error of fact. However, gross it may amount to, it does not
amount to an error of law. An error of law which becomes
vulnerable to judicial scrutiny by way of Certiorari must also
B
be one which is apparent on the face of the record. [Para 29]
[315-D-F]
1.4 As to what constitutes an error apparent on the face of
the record, is a matter to be decided by the court on the facts of
each case. A finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence
would be perverse and in fact would constitute an error of law C
enabling the writ court to interfere. If the overwhelming weight
of the evidence does not support the finding, it would render the
decision amendable to Certiorari jurisdiction. This would be the
same as a finding which is wholly unwarranted by the evidence.
[Para 29] [315-F-H] D
1.5 In the case of Writ of Certiorari, no doubt, the Court
also bears in mind that it is not axiomatic, or that upon a finding
of illegality, a court is bound to interfere. The court may still
exercise its discretion and decline jurisdiction unless there is
manifest injustice. The appellants have made out a case of manifest E
injustice if the Award is allowed to stand. Large sums were spent
by a Public Sector Corporation in seeking to trim its work force.
The workers voluntarily accepting the terms of the Scheme,
receiving the benefits thereunder, got separated. Implementing
the Award would mean reinstatement of the workers and that too
with 70 per cent back-wages, when there was absolutely no F
warrant for the same. [Para 85] [341-E-G]
Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan and another AIR
1964 SC 477 : [1964] SCR 64 – followed.
M/s. Perry and Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal, Judge of the Second G
Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta and others AIR 1970 SC
1334 : [1969] SCR 976 ; T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa
AIR 1954 SC 440 : [1955] SCR 250 ; Hari Vishnu
Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque & Ors. AIR 1955 SC 233 :

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296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A [1955] SCR 1104 ; Dharangadhara Chemical Wor k s
Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra and others AIR 1957 SC
264 : [1957] SCR 152 ; Mukand Ltd. v. Mukand Staff
& Officers’ Association (2004) 10 SCC 460 : [2004] 2
SCR 951 – relied on.
B “Commentary on the Constitution of India 9th Edition”
by Durga Das Basu – referred to.
2.1 It was during the pendency of the proceeding before
the Labour Court on the reference regarding the availability of
certain benefits to the workers that the applicants alleged denial
C of employment. They alleged that in essence, they were duped
into submitting applications as if they were intended to secure
the benefit of the VSS whereas they put their signatures on the
blank papers not comprehending such use. [Para 32] [317-B-C]
2.2 As per Order VI Rule 4 CPC, in a civil suit, if the plaintiff
D alleges fraud, misrepresentation or undue influence, he is obliged
to give particulars. An allegation of fraud is a matter of a grave
nature. So is the allegation of undue influence and
misrepresentation. The intention underlying Order VI Rule 4 is
that the opposite party is to be put on sufficient notice as to the
case which he is called upon to meet. The law loathes, parties to
E the lis being taken by surprise resulting in the violation of the
basic principle of justice that a party should be able to effectively
meet the case set up against him. [Para 39] [318-F-G]
2.3 A perusal of the definition of the word “fraud”, as defined
in Section 17 of the Contract Act, would reveal that the concept
F of fraud is very wide. It includes any suggestion, as a fact, of that
which is not true, by a person who does or does not believe it to
be true. It may be contrasted with Section 18(1) of the Contract
Act which, inter alia, defines “misrepresentation”. It provides
that it is misrepresentation if a positive assertion is made by a
G person of that which is not true in a manner which is not warranted
by the information which he has. This is despite the fact that he
may believe it to be true. In other words, in fraud, the person
who makes an untruthful suggestion, does not himself believe it
to be true. He knows it to be not true, yet he makes a suggestion

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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 297
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU

of the fact as if it were true. In misrepresentation, on the other A
hand, the person making misrepresentation believes it to be true.
But the law declares it to be misrepresentation on the basis of
information which he had and what he believed to be true was not
true. Therefore, the representation made by him becomes a
misrepresentation as it is a statement which is found to be untrue.
B
Fraud is committed if a person actively conceals a fact, who either
knows about the fact or believes in the existence of the fact. The
concealment must be active. It is here that mere silence has been
explained in the Exception which would affect the decision of a
person who enters into a contract to be not fraud unless the
circumstances are such that it becomes his duty to speak. His C
silence itself may amount to speech. A person may make a promise
without having any intention to perform it. It is fraud. The law
further declares that any other act fitted to deceive, is fraud. So
also, any act or omission, which the law declares to be fraudulent,
amounts to fraud. Running as a golden trend however and as a
D
requirement of law through the various limbs of Section 17 of the
Contract Act, is the element of deceit. A person who stands
accused of fraud be it in a civil or criminal action, must entertain
an intention to commit deception. Deception can embrace various
forms and it is a matter to be judged on the facts of each case. It
is, apparently, on account of these serious circumstances that E
fraud has on a legal relationship or a purported legal relationship
that the particulars and details of fraud is required if pleaded in a
civil suit or a proceeding to which the CPC applies. [Para 44]
[321-A-G]
2.4 An application under Section 33A of the Act is not a F
civil suit. The provisions of Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC, as such,
is not applicable to proceedings under the Act. While the
provisions of the CPC may not apply, the salutary principles
embodied would apply. This is for the reason that the purpose of
pleading, be it in a civil suit or other proceeding, is to allow the
opposite party to meet the case of his opponent to ready the G
evidence to be adduced and marshal the law in support of its
case. In the present case, there is no sufficient pleading in regard
to fraud. The allegation as to undue influence is totally without

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298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A any basis in the pleading. The VSS, if availed of by an employee
voluntarily, amounts to a contract. [Paras 46, 50 and 51] [322-G;
323-A-B; 324-F-G]
Management of Hindustan Steel Limited v. Workmen and
others AIR 1973 SC 878 : [1973] 3 SCR 303 ; Bharat
B Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel AIR 1976 SC
98 : [1976] 2 SCR 280 ; Bank of India and others v.
O.P. Swarnakar and others (2003) 2 SCC 721 : [2002]
5 Suppl. SCR 438 – relied on.
3.1 The applicants, were members of the writ petitioners’
C union in O.J.C. No. 2420 of 1989, who became entitled under the
judgment of the High Court which was affirmed by this Court as
regards the direction for regularization provided they had served
continuously for a period of five years as on 28.10.1992, i.e., the
date of the judgment of the High Court. The judgment of the
High Court in O.J.C. No. 2420 of 1989 held that those members
D of the writ petitioners’ union who served continuously for a period
of five years till 28.10.1992 (date of judgment) were entitled to
regularization as the High Court had directed regularization. They
had indeed acquired a legal right. This was undoubtedly subject
to the lis pending in this Court. A period of five years continuous
E service prior to 28.10.1992 would mean those employees who
were members of the writ petitioners’ union before the High
Court in O.J.C. No. 2420 of 1989, would be employees who were
appointed on or before 27.10.1987. In fact, going by the
deposition of applicants, it would appear that AW1 claimed to be
working since 1988. This means AW1 apparently was not one
F who was covered by the direction for regularization by the High
Court as he was working from 03.06.1988, as he would complete
five years only by 02.06.1993. [Paras 63 and 65] [333-F-G;
334-A-C]
3.2 So far as AW2 to AW4, going by the dates given, if they
G had worked continuously from the dates, they would be covered
by the order of the High Court for regularization. The direction
in their favour had not become final. Thus, if the VSS was floated
and it was found sufficiently attractive, it would not be unnatural
for them or unfair to them to take advantage of the same. In this
H regard, the appellants have projected that out of the 281 NMRs
G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 299
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU

and Contingent Khalasis who opted for the Scheme, the A
Corporation accepted the applications for 271 workers. It is only
the 90 applicants, it is pointed out, who have made a somersault
and sought to resile from the applications which were made by
them. [Paras 65 and 66] [334-C-F]
3.3 The application under section 33A of the Act was filed B
after several months from the date of receiving the ex gratia
payment. It is also the case of the appellants that there was a
letter from the President of the Workers’ Union of 15.04.2000,
which was before the circulation of the Scheme, requesting for
enhancing the amount for VRS for the NMR workers. There are
Minutes of the discussion held on 20.05.2000 between the C
Management and the representatives of the Union. The Minutes
indicate that the issue relating to the VSS, which was taken up
for discussion, was – “(1) Enhanced amount of VSS for the NMR
employees”. It may be true that the Notification dated 27.04.2000
was published in English. So were the further Notifications dated D
17.06.2000 and 28.01.2000. There is no dispute that the applicants
have been favoured with an amount of Rs.1,25,000/- which is the
amount which is contemplated under the Scheme besides other
amounts. These amounts have been paid by cheques into the
accounts of the applicants. The applications which have been
produced appear to be witnessed by two witnesses. This is as E
per the terms of the Notification which contemplates that the
application must be signed by two witnesses. So also, in regard
to the payments which are effected, the authorization appears to
be supported by the signatures of two witnesses. [Paras 67, 68
and 69] [334-G-H; 335-A] F
3.4 None of the applicants have a case that the signatures
in the applications have not been appended by them. It may be
true that one applicant out of the 90 has written a letter purporting
to withdraw. It is noteworthy that other 89 applicants had not
made any application seeking to withdraw. In the application filed G
by one worker (First Applicant), he would state that he was
threatened and coerced and, being afraid, he was made to sign
the application for VSS against his wish. He never intended to
take the VSS and he was told that he would be forced to dire

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300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A striats. No doubt, his application is dated 01.06.2000, which is
the very next date of the making of his application. It may be
remembered that AW1 was not a person who was entitled even
to the benefit of the order passed by the High Court as he had
not completed five years as on the date of the judgment. There
can be no similarity between a case of threat or coercion on the
B
one hand and fraud. [Para 71] [335-E-H; 336-A]
3.5 The manner in which fraud was perpetuated, the exact
nature of the fraud and person or persons by whom the fraud was
perpetuated, are found missing in the pleadings. In the present
case, the pleading does not match up to the requirements of the
C case. The state of the evidence, which is adduced, makes matters
even worse. the protest letter dated 01.06.2000 sent by the first
applicant completely demolishes the case as pleaded in the
application. Apart from the first applicant, none of the 89 other
applicants have registered their protest about the VSS. Though
D there is mention about a letter sent to the Conciliation Officer, it
is not brought on record. [Paras 72, 76 and 77] [336-B; 338-A-C]
3.6 The appellants have produced a wealth of documentary
evidence before the Labour Court. The Exhibits included the
applications which were signed by the applicants and two
E witnesses; the VSS Scheme itself; the document evidencing the
authorisation of payments of the amounts under the VSS Scheme;
the Charter of Demand before the Management for discussion-
Exhibit ‘F’. The Minutes of the Discussion of the meeting which
was held on 20.05.2000. [Para 78] [338-C-D]

F 3.7 The applicants have failed to plead and prove, and on
the yardstick of it being a case of no evidence, the Award became
infirm and was liable to be interfered with. The findings rendered
by the Labour Court that it was not the choice of the applicants
and was thrust upon the complainants amounting to refusal of
employment, is completely insupportable both in law and on facts.
G The finding that there was no demand from the side of the
complainants for the introduction of the VSS is completely
irrelevant, as, as an employer, it was certainly open to devise
such policy which was in the best interest of the Corporation.

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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 301
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU

Validity of the Scheme did not depend upon the Scheme having A
its origin in a demand by the workmen. The finding that there
was no proposal for the Scheme or recommendation for reducing
the staff strength was wholly irrelevant. It is the factum of the
Scheme being propounded, in fact and implemented elsewhere
as well, which should have been considered by the Labour Court.
B
[Para 81] [338-H; 339-A-C]
3.8 Therefore, from the facts of the case, the only finding
possible is that the Union to which the applicants belonged, wanted
the VSS amount to be enhanced. This aspect has not been
considered at all by the Labour Court. It is true that the document
was marked as Exhibit ‘G’ with objection. In the cross-examination C
of the witness, through whom Exhibit ‘G’ was marked, there is
no suggestion that such a discussion did not take place or the
discussion did not relate to the enhanced payment under the VSS.
But it is true that OPW1 admits that in Exhibit ‘G’, the two Office
Bearers have not signed though their names are appearing. D
However, there is no cross-examination about discussion taking
place prior to implementation. Therefore, this would, at any rate,
show that the applicants, who were members of the Union, were
fully aware of the VSS. There is no case for them that they were
misled or defrauded by their own Union Leaders. A perusal of
the Award would show that there is no discussion about these E
documents at all. Thus, this is a case where documentary evidence
adduced is by appellants is ignored by the Labour Court. Thus,
no case was made out before the Labour Court for invoking
Section 33A read with Section 33 of the Act. [Paras 83 and 85]
[340-E-G; 341-A] F
State of Orissa and others v. Balaram Sahu and others
(2003) 1 SCC 250 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 525 – relied
on.
4. During the pendency of the Writ Petition filed by the
appellants in the High Court, 28 applicants deposited the amount G
which they have received from the appellants so that application
under Section 17B of the Act could be pursued. This amount
must be directed to be returned with interest at the rate of 8 per
cent per annum from the date of deposit till the date of payment
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302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A to the concerned workmen who had made the deposit. [Paras 86
and 87] [341-G-H; 342-A]
Case Law Reference
(2005) 3 SCC 193 relied on Para 18
B [1955] SCR 250 relied on Para 21
[1955] SCR 1104 relied on Para 22
[1957] SCR 152 relied on Para 23
[1964] SCR 64 followed Para 24
C [1969] SCR 976 relied on Para 25
[2004] 2 SCR 951 relied on Para 26
[1973] 3 SCR 303 relied on Para 47
[1976] 2 SCR 280 relied on Para 48
D [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 438 relied on Para 51
[2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 525 relied on Para 61
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8071
of 2010.
E From the Judgment and Order dated 14.05.2008 of the High Court
of Orissa at Cuttack in W.P. (C) No. 3710 of 2002.
Shibashish Misra, S. Debabrata Reddy, Advs. for the Appellant.
Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv., Ramendra Mohan Patnaik, Arnav D.,
Ketan Shah, Advs. for the Respondents.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
K. M. JOSEPH, J.
1. This appeal by special leave is directed against judgment of the
High Court of Orissa dismissing the Writ Application filed under Articles
G 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by the appellant. What was
called in question before the High Court was the Award passed by the
Labour Court, Bhubaneswar.
2. By the impugned order, the High Court had dismissed the Writ
Application and confirmed the Award. The award was passed on an
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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 303
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

application filed under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 A
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, for short) by 90 workers of the
appellant, the respondents herein who shall be referred as the applicants.
3. On 28.10.1992, the High Court, in Writ Petition O.J.C. No.
2420 of 1989, held that the NMR workers in the Rengali Hydro Electric
Project (RHEP) who had worked continuously for a period of five years B
on the date of the judgment, were entitled for regularization. They were
found entitled to same pay as regular employees. The appellants
challenged the same by a Special Leave Petition which was converted
to Civil Appeal Nos.7342-7343 of 1993.
4. In short, the case of the applicants (who were NMR workers C
in the Rengali Unit) before the Labour Court was that a reference had
been made to the Labour Court dated 02.07.1999 for adjudicating disputes
between the appellants-Management and its workmen. Issues were
essentially whether NMR workers were entitled to payment of Hydro
Allowance at revised rates. The further issue was, whether NMR
workers of the Rengali Unit of the Orissa Hydro Power Corporation, D
who were being paid medical allowance, were entitled for such allowance
at revised rates.
5. The further case of the applicants, who were NMR workers in
the Application under Section 33A of the Act, was that they had signed
certain papers on the basis that it was necessary for their being E
regularized but as it turned out, it was used as if they were Applications
for claiming the benefit of a Voluntary Separation Scheme (hereinafter
referred to as ‘VSS’ for short). They were prevented from discharging
their duties. They came to know about the deception practiced. This led
to the application under Section 33A of the Act. F
6. The Labour Court found that the VSS was thrust upon the
applicants and there was no publicity and allowed the application and
directed reinstatement with 70 per cent back-wages which was directed
to be adjusted towards payments made to the applicants.
7. The High Court noticed that an industrial dispute was pending, G
as noticed by us earlier. It took note of the fact that the Labour Court
has proceeded to find that the VSS had not been published widely for
the information of the NMR workers, and therefore, it would not be
accepted that the NMR workers signed the applications knowing its
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304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A contents and consequences. It was found inter alia further that the
Award was passed on appreciating the oral and documentary evidence
produced before the Labour Court. Noticing what was invoked before
the High Court was Certiorari jurisdiction and that a writ can be issued
only in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction and finding that there was
no jurisdictional error or any error apparent on the face of it, the writ
B
petition was accordingly dismissed.
8. We have heard Mr. Shibashish Misra, learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellants and Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned senior
counsel appearing for the applicants.
C THE CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
9. The appellants would submit that on 16.11.1999), the
Government of Orissa, Department of Energy, approved the proposal of
the appellant-Corporation to float the VSS after concurrence from the
Finance Department in respect of NMRs/Contingent Khalasis. On
D 15.04.2000, the President of the Employee Union wrote to the Chairman
to fix a date to discuss about certain issues. One of the issues was about
enhancement of the VRS for NMR employees. On 27.04.2000, the
appellant-Corporation informed the Senior General Manager that the
VSS shall be enforced from 01.05.2000 to 31.05.2000 in Rengali Unit. A
Notification, along with the Scheme, was to be circulated amongst the
E workers. It is the appellants case that 260 NMRs/Contingent Khalasis
requested for separation out of 357. The Corporation accepted the
application of 254 NMRs/Contingent Khalasis. On 25.05.2000, a
discussion took place between the Management and the Union. The
decisions were taken regarding regularisation of maximum number of
F 43 workmen and also about the number of workmen to be considered
under the VSS. The first applicant applied on 31.05.2000 under the
Scheme. The application of the applicant was accepted on 08.06.2000.
It is appellants case that applicant’s letter dated 01.06.2000 was never
received by the appellants. On 13.06.2000, in fact, first applicant sought
payment of gratuity under the Scheme. On 17.06.2000, the Corporation
G notified extension of the VSS for six days from 14.06.2000 to 24.06.2000.
During that phase, 23 NMRs/Contingent Khalasis sought VSS benefits
and the applications of 21 were accepted.
10. On 18.12.2000, an additional affidavit was filed by the appellant
in this Court in Civil Appeal No. 7343 of 1993, bringing out the decision
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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 305
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

to introduce the VSS and that as on 01.05.2000, inter alia, 260 persons A
had applied for the Scheme out of which applications of 255 were
accepted and they had taken the benefits under the Scheme. On
10.01.2001, there was a round of discussion and it was decided that
there would be no more regularisation of NMRs at the Rengali Unit and
VSS will be applied once again ending with 28.02.2001. On 28.01.2001,
B
the VSS was made available for one month from 30.01.2001 to
01.03.2001. Under this phase also 3 NMRs/Contingent Khalasis sought
the benefit of the VSS. The workmen, who applied for VSS, were paid
Rs.1,25,000/- towards ex gratia, Rs.5,500/- towards lumpsum differential
on account of hydro and medical allowances and other amounts towards
terminal benefits life gratuity, un-availed wages, etc.. A total sum of C
Rs.4,03,41,675/- was disbursed under the VSS. It was thereafter that on
29.05.2001, the application was filed by the 90 workers under Section
33A of the Act.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants would submit that it is a
clear case where the Labour Court has failed to appreciate that the D
applicants before it, 90 in number, had made applications with full
knowledge of the VSS. Employees, who were working in the NMR
establishment, who had put in five years of continuous service or more
in the Corporation and had three years left before attaining a particular
age as on 01.01.1999, were entitled under the Scheme.
E
12. He has placed reliance on the applications actually filed by
the applicants. He has referred to the contents of the applications. He
had pointed out that the VSS contemplated payment of ex gratia lumpsum
of Rs.1.25 lakhs besides other amounts.
13. The purpose of the Scheme was considering the fact that the F
employees of the NMR establishment could only be considered for
permanent employment in accordance with the Scheme which was
introduced during May, 1998, and since these employees had no right to
employment without availability of work and considering that some of
them had put in number of years of service, the VSS was introduced for
seeking separation with commensurate monetary benefits. The further G
objective was to rationalize manpower of the Corporation in the light of
the skilled manpower required and increased productivity. Still further,
the Scheme was intended to reduce redundant manpower and achieve
optimum manpower utilization.
H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A 14. The Scheme was applicable to employees who had joined
before the date of ban imposed on recruitment. This submission, appellants
made, on the basis of documents which were brought on record after
the arguments had commenced. The date of ban was 12.04.1993. It
was further pointed out with reference to Exhibit ‘H’ which is produced
before the Labour Court that applications contemplated witnesses. The
B
witnesses were to be regular or work-charged employees in RHEP.
Their names were to be disclosed. Clause (08) of Exhibit ‘H’ dated
24.04.2000, read as follows and was relied upon:
“08.The willing employees will be required to open a SB Account
in any Nationalised Bank in the locality because the payment
C toward ex-gratia and lump sum amount will be made by way of
A/c Payee Cheque. To facilitate opening of Bank Account, a sum
of Rs.500/- may be paid to the concerned employee on request
by way of advance which will be adjusted against his final dues.”
15. He further submitted that on the basis of the applications filed
D by all the applicants along with several others, who had also applied, the
appellant had applied the yardstick of eligibility. The workers entitled
were given the benefit under the VSS. The amount due came to be
credited into their bank accounts. Therefore, it is not open to the applicants
to resile from their position as established by their applications and set
E up a case as if they have been defrauded into making such applications.
The applicants were aware of the contents and the consequences. The
Labour Court has acted illegally in arriving at the conclusions and passing
the Award, noticed by us. He also relied on (2003) 5 SCC 163; (2004) 2
SCC 193; (2006) 9 SCC 177; (2004) 9 SCC 36; (2003) 2 SCC 721;
(2016) 9 SCC 375; (2006) 3 SCC 708; (2015) 4 SCC 482; (2003) 1 SCC
F 250; AIR 1964 SC 477.
16. Having received the benefits under the VSS, it was not open
to the workers to reprobate. The Labour Court has clearly overlooked
the overwhelming evidence in the form of the applications duly made by
the applicants claiming benefit of the VSS, the factum of payment to the
G applicants in terms of the applications into the bank accounts. He would
also further point out that the payments can be vouch saved for by the
fact that the procedure has been sanctified by there being two witnesses
to the said procedure as well.

H
G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 307
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

17. Per contra, Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel, would A
point out that this Court may appreciate that what is involved are findings
of fact rendered by the Labour Court. The High Court, under its
supervisory jurisdiction, has chosen not to interfere with such findings of
fact and they should not be disturbed by this Court in exercise of power
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Next, he would point out
B
that the applicants, who were only NMR workers, could not be attributed
with the knowledge of the contents of the Scheme. All the matters have
been appreciated by the Labour Court. He further pointed out that the
following application made by one of the applicants (the First Applicant).
It reads as follows:
“To, C
The Director (HRD),
Corporate Office,
Bhubaneswar
Through the Manager,
Maintenance Division RHEP, Rengali. D
Sub: Regarding withdrawal of my VSS Application.
Sir
The humble applicant Sri Giridhari Sahoo has been working as
NMR Welder in Maintenance Division since 3.6.1988 on 31.5.2000 E
upon the threat and coercion of the Management, Maintenance,
being afraid I was made to sign the VSS against my wish. I never
intended to take VSS. I was told that unless I sign the VSS
application I will lose (sic) everything and will be forced to dire
striates.
F
Therefore, I humbly request that my application dated 31.5.2000
may be returned to me for which I will remain ever obliged.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
Giridhari Sahoo
G
1.6.2000
xxx xxx xxx xxx”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. He further contended that workers have also, immediately
after the event, moved the Conciliation Officer. This is sufficient to show
H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A that they were initially not cognizant of the consequences and, at any
rate, at the earliest, they have sought to resile. He also relied on the
judgment of this Court in Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar
Mills Limited v. S. Viswanathan1.
19. Per contra, the learned counsel for the appellants, would
B point out that there was, at any rate, only one application in the nature of
the application which we have just referred to, namely, that is to say,
only one worker has brought on record an application stating about threat
and coercion of the appellants-Management and that the workmen never
intended to take the VSS. No doubt, the case of appellants is that the
letter of first applicant dated 01.06.2000, was not received. The evidence
C has been given by only four workers. The applications have been given
by 90 applicants. Therefore, it was not open to the applicants to lay store
by the application referred to above.
THE SCOPE OF CERTIORARI JURISDICTION

D 20. Since, applicants contend that the findings of fact by the Labour
Court are virtually unassailable in the Certiorari jurisdiction and the
argument has been found appealing and accepted by the High Court, it
is necessary to deal with the same.
21. An erroneous decision in respect of a matter which falls within
E the authority of the Tribunal would not entitle a writ applicant for a writ
of certiorari. However, if the decision relates to anything collateral to
the merit, an erroneous decision upon which, would affect its jurisdiction,
a writ of certiorari would lie. See Parry & Co. Ltd. vs. Commercial
Employees Association AIR 1952 SC 179. The scope of writ of certiorari
came in for an elaborate consideration by this Court in T.C. Basappa v.
F T. Nagappa2. Therein, this Court, inter alia, held as follows:
“7. … The second essential feature of a writ of certiorari is that
the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-
judicial tribunals or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory
capacity. In granting a writ of certiorari the superior court does
G not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not review
or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the
inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demolishes the order which
it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but
1
(2005) 3 SCC 193
2
H AIR 1954 SC 440
G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 309
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

does not substitute its own views for those of the inferior tribunal. A
The offending order or proceeding so to say is put out of the way
as one which should not be used to the detriment of any person [
Vide Per Lord Cairns in Walshall’s Overseers v. London and
North Western Railway Co., (1879) 4 AC 30, 39.].
xxx xxx xxx B
9. Certiorari may lie and is generally granted when a court has
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction
may arise from the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding
or from the absence of some preliminary proceeding or the court
itself may not be legally constituted or suffer from certain disability C
by reason of extraneous circumstances [Vide Halsbury, 2nd Edn.,
Vol. IX, p. 880]. When the jurisdiction of the court depends upon
the existence of some collateral fact, it is well settled that the
court cannot by a wrong decision of the fact give it jurisdiction
which it would not otherwise possess [ Vide Banbury v. Fuller, 9
Exch. 111; R v. Income Tax Special Purposes Commissioners, D
21 QBD 313].
10. A tribunal may be competent to enter upon an enquiry but in
making the enquiry it may act in flagrant disregard of the rules of
procedure or where no particular procedure is prescribed, it may
violate the principles of natural justice. A writ of certiorari may be E
available in such cases. An error in the decision or determination
itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a
manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e.g. when
it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of
law. …” F
(Emphasis supplied)
22. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque & Ors.3, this Court
held:
“21. … On these authorities, the following propositions
G
may be taken as established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for
correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or
Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to
exercise it. (2) Certiorari will also be issued when the court or

3
AIR 1955 SC 233 H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction,
as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to
be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The court
issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and
not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the court
will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior court or
B
tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a
court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction
to decide wrong as well as right, and when the legislature does
not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it
would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior court were
C to rehear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own findings
in certiorari. These propositions are well-settled and are not in
dispute.
xxx xxx xxx
23. It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of
D certiorari could be issued to correct an error of law. But it is
essential that it should be something more than a mere error; it
must be one which must be manifest on the face of the record. …
The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the
record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an
E element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must
be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
23. The question arose in Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd.
v. State of Saurashtra and others4. The question was whether the finding
F by the Tribunal under the Act about the party respondents being workmen
was liable to be interfered with. After dealing with various tests relating
to determining the issue, this Court also made the following observations:
“19. … It is equally well settled that the decision of the
Trinbunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine
G is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution unless at the least it is shown to be fully unsupported
by evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
4
H AIR 1957 SC 264
G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 311
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

24. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. A
Radhakrishnan and another5, has spoken about the scope of Writ of
Certiorari in the following terms:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High
Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been
frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in B
that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued
for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts
or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a
result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be
issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the court C
or tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a
question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party
affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing
with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There
is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari D
is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled
to act as an appellate court. This limitation necessarily means that
findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result
of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned
in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the
face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of E
fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of
fact recorded by the tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if
it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had
erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or
had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has F
influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is
based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law
which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this
category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a
finding of fact recorded by the tribunal cannot be challenged in
proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant G
and material evidence adduced before the tribunal was insufficient
or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or
sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to

5
AIR 1964 SC 477 H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a
writ court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred
on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari
can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad
Ishaque [AIR 1955 SC 233] , Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr.
B
of Hills Division and Appeals [AIR 1958 SC 398] and
Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh [AIR 1960 SC 1168]).”
(Emphasis supplied)
25. We may more importantly also advert to the view expressed
C by this Court in a matter which again arose under the Act in M/s. Perry
and Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal, Judge of the Second Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta
and others6. It was a case related to the scope of the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal in the matter of retrenchment under Section 25F. This is what
the Court held inter alia:

D “11. The grounds on which interference by the High Court
is available in such writ petitions have by now been well
established. In Basappa v. Nagappa [(1955) SCR 250] it was
observed that a writ of certiorari is generally granted when a
court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. It is available
in those cases where a tribunal, though competent to enter upon
E an enquiry, acts in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or
violates the principles of natural justice where no particular
procedure is prescribed. But a mere wrong decision cannot be
corrected by a writ of certiorari as that would be using it as the
cloak of an appeal in disguise but a manifest error apparent on the
F face of the proceedings based on a clear ignorance or disregard
of the provisions of law or absence of or excess of jurisdiction,
when shown, can be so corrected. In Dharangadhara Chemical
Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra [(1957) SCR 152] this Court
once again observed that where the Tribunal having jurisdiction to
decide a question comes to a finding of fact, such a finding is not
G open to question under Article 226 unless it could be shown to be
wholly unwarranted by the evidence. Likewise, in State of Andhra
Pradesh v. S. Sree Ram Rao [AIR 1963 S.C. 1723] this Court
observed that where the Tribunal has disabled itself from reaching

6
H AIR 1970 SC 1334
G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 313
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence A
and the merits of the case or where its conclusion on the very
face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable
person can ever have arrived at that conclusion interference under
Article 226 would be justified. …”
(Emphasis supplied) B
26. We may advert to the decision of this Court in Mukand Ltd. v.
Mukand Staff & Officers’ Association7. We may only advert to the
following paragraphs:
“47. In support of his contention that this Court while
exercising its power under Article 136 of the Constitution of India C
in an appeal from the judgment of the High Court rendered in
exercise of its powers under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India will exercise the same power which the High
Court could exercise and will not interfere with the finding of
facts recorded by a Tribunal, learned counsel cited the judgment D
in the case of Parry & Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal [AIR 1970 SC 1334
: (1969) 2 SCR 976] . In the said case, this Court held as under:
(AIR p. 1341, para 13)
“13. Since this is an appeal arising from a writ petition for
certiorari we also would not interfere with the conclusions E
arrived at by the Tribunal except on grounds on which the
High Court could have done.”
48. In the case of Fuel Injection Ltd. v. Kamger Sabha
[(1978) 1 SCC 156 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 33] this Court observed as
under: (SCC p. 157, para 3) F
“But the present appeals are from a judgment of the
High Court under Article 226 and so the jurisdiction of this
Court in entertaining an appeal by special leave under Article
136 must ordinarily be confined to what the High Court could
or would have done under Article 226.”
G
49. In our view, the material that was placed before the
Tribunal was not considered or discussed and that there was, as
such, no adjudication by the Tribunal. The whole award of the

7
(2004) 10 SCC 460 H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A Tribunal, in our view, is liable to be set aside on the ground of non-
application of mind by the Tribunal to the material on record. In
the first place, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain and
decide a dispute which covered within its fold “persons who are
not workmen”. That the material on record before the Tribunal as
regards the comparable concerns was admittedly “sketchy” and
B
incomplete as observed by the learned Single Judge of the High
Court and that the award based on such material could not have
been sustained.”
(Emphasis supplied)
C 27. In Durga Das Basu “Commentary on the Constitution of India”
th
9 Edition, in regard to the concept of no evidence, we find the following
discussion:
“No evidence’ does not mean only a total dearth of
evidence. It extends to any case where the evience taken as
D a whole is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding, or
where, in other words, no tribunal could reasonably reach that
conclusion on that evidence. This “no evidence” principle clearly
has something in common with the principle that perverse or
unreasonable action is aunauthorised and ultra vires. An order
made without “any evidence” to support it is in truth, made
E without order made without “any evidence is worthless, it is
equal to having “no evidence” jurisdiction.”
(Emphasis supplied)
28. In fact, in the decision relied upon by the applicants, viz., S.
F Viswanathan (supra), it is, inter alia, held as follows:
“12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as
the case may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes,
but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on
legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under
Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution can go into
G
the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal.
But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the
writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a
finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of

H
G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 315
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of A
factual disputes and finding given thereon.…”
(Emphasis supplied)
29. On the conspectus of the decisions and material, we would
hold as follows:
B
The jurisdiction to issue writ of certiorari is supervisory
and not appellate. The Court considering a writ application of
Certiorari will not don the cap of an Appellate Court. It will not
reappreciate evidence. The Writ of Certiorari is intended to
correct jurisdictional excesses. A writ of prohibition would issue
when a Tribunal or authority has not yet concluded its proceedings. C
Once a decision is rendered by a body amenable to Certiorari
jurisdiction, certiorari could be issued when a jurisdictional error
is clearly established. The jurisdictional error may be from failure
to observe the limits of its jurisdiction. It may arise from the
procedure adopted by the body after validly assuming jurisdiction. D
It may act in violation of principles of natural justice. The body
whose decision which comes under attack may decide a collateral
fact which is also a jurisdictional fact and assume jurisdiction.
Such a finding of fact is not immune from being interfered with by
a Writ of Certiorari. As far as the finding of fact which is one
within the jurisdiction of the court, it is ordinarily a matter ‘off E
bounds’ for the writ court. This is for the reason that a body
which has jurisdiction to decide the matter has the jurisdiction to
decide it correctly or wrongly. It would become a mere error and
that too an error of fact. However, gross it may amount to, it
does not amount to an error of law. An error of law which becomes F
vulnerable to judicial scrutiny by way of Certiorari must also be
one which is apparent on the face of the record. As held by this
Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath (supra), as to what constitutes an
error apparent on the face of the record, is a matter to be decided
by the court on the facts of each case. A finding of fact which is
not supported by any evidence would be perverse and in fact G
would constitute an error of law enabling the writ court to interfere.
It is also to be noticed that if the overwhelming weight of the
evidence does not support the finding, it would render the decision
amenable to certiorari jurisdiction. This would be the same as a
finding which is wholly unwarranted by the evidence which is H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A what this Court has laid down [See M/s. Perry and Co. Ltd
(supra)].
THE APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 33A OF THE ACT
30. The applicants were NMR workers. They moved the
application before the Labour Court alleging violation of Section 33(1)
B of the Act. Section 33 (1) of the Act, reads as follows:
“33(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before
a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before 2 an
arbitrator or] a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in
respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall—
C
(a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to
the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the
conditions of service applicable to them immediately before
the commencement of such proceeding; or

D (b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge
or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workmen
concerned in such dispute, save with the express permission in
writing of the authority before which the proceeding is
pending.”
31. Section 33A of the Act, reads as follows:
E
“33A. Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions
of service, etc., changed during pendency of proceeding.- Where
an employer contravenes the provisions of section 33 during the
pendency of proceedings before a conciliation officer, Board, an
arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal any
F
employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint
in writing, in the prescribed manner,-
(a) to such conciliation officer or Board, and the conciliation
officer or Board shall take such complaint into account in
mediating in, and promoting the settlement of, such industrial
G dispute; and
(b) to such arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal
and on receipt of such complaint, the arbitrator, Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall

H
G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 317
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred A
to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of
this Act and shall submit his or its award to the appropriate
Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply
accordingly.”
32. We have noticed that there was a proceeding before the Labour B
Court on the reference regarding the availability of certain benefits to
the NMR workers. It is during the pendency of the same that the
applicants alleged denial of employment. They alleged that in essence,
they were duped into submitting applications as if they were intended to
secure the benefit of the VSS whereas they put their signatures on the
blank papers not comprehending such use. C

33. In this case, the case of the appellants is that Section 33 of the
Act is not attracted as this is a case where the applicants voluntarily
applied for getting benefit of the VSS. They were given the benefits.
Section 33 of the Act has no application.
D
34. Learned senior counsel for the applicants, very fairly, submitted
that if it is found that the applications were made by the applicants
voluntarily and they had claimed the benefits of the VSS, then, Section
33, as such, may not apply. Therefore, the core issue to be decided is,
whether applications were indeed filed by the applicants cognizant of its
contents and aware of its consequences. E

THE PLEADING IN THE APPLICATION AND THE LAW
35. It is, inter alia, pleaded as follows:
“6. That the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa in OJC No.1527/91
have passed an order to regularize all NMR workers those who F
have completed 5 years of service or otherwise payment equal
pay for equal work as their counter part in regular establishments
are getting in the Rengali Hydro Power Project.”
36. There is reference to the matters, which were pending, which
we have, inter alia, referred to. We must notice the further pleading in G
the application filed by the applicants under Section 33A of the Act:
9. To defraud the workmen for regularization of their
services, appropriate authorities have obtained their signatures
enmass on certain papers under the pretext of regularization of
H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A workmen and by showing undue influence of regularization of the
service of the workmen that since the projects were temporary
and they were to be regularized in the Corporation in regular cadre,
the old job will come to an end and new job in Corporation would
stand afresh for which the workmen without understanding the
implication of application on plain faith with authority have signed
B
such applications. A fraud was practiced on the workmen and
such change amounted to change service without leave of Tribunal,
as such illegal. Change having been not voluntary, being actuated
with fraud, action of the Management is in violation of Section 33
of the Act and is in nullity. Opposite parties refused employment
C which amounts to retrenchment. This action is in clear violation
of Section 33 of the Act.
(Emphasis supplied)
37. Counter affidavit was filed. There is denial by the appellants
of the above contentions.
D
38. Order VI Rule 4 of The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’, for short), reads as follows:
“In all cases in which the party pleading relies on any
misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, willful default, or undue
E influence, and in all other cases in which particulars may be
necessary beyond such as are exemplified in the forms aforesaid,
particulars (with dates and items if necessary) shall be stated in
the pleading.”
39. Therefore, in a civil suit, if the plaintiff alleges fraud,
F misrepresentation or undue influence, he is obliged to give particulars.
An allegation of fraud is a matter of a grave nature. So is the allegation
of undue influence and misrepresentation. The intention underlying Order
VI Rule 4 of the CPC is that the opposite party is to be put on sufficient
notice as to the case which he is called upon to meet. The law loathes,
parties to the lis being taken by surprise resulting in the violation of the
G basic principle of justice that a party should be able to effectively meet
the case set up against him. What is fraud? Is it the same as
misrepresentation?
40. In The Indian Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as
‘the Contract Act’, for short), definition of “fraud”, is as follows:
H
G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 319
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

“17. ‘Fraud’ defined.—‘Fraud’ means and includes any of the A
following acts committed by a party to a contract, or with his
connivance, or by his agent, with intent to deceive another party
thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract:—
(1) the suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one
who does not believe it to be true; B
(2) the active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge
or belief of the fact;
(3) a promise made without any intention of performing it;
(4) any other act fitted to deceive; C
(5) any such act or omission as the law specially declares to
be fraudulent. Explanation.—Mere silence as to facts
likely to affect the willingness of a person to enter into a
contract is not fraud, unless the circumstances of the case
are such that, regard being had to them, it is the duty of the D
person keeping silence to speak2, or unless his silence, is, in
itself, equivalent to speech.
Explanation.-Mere silence as to facts likely to affect
the willingness of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud,
unless the circumstances of the case are such that, regard
E
being had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silence
to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself, equivalent to speech.”
41. “Misrepresentation” is separately defined in Section 18 of the
Contract Act, as follows:
“18.”Misrepresentation” defined.— “Misrepresentation” means F
and includes—
(1) the positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the
information of the person making it, of that which is not
true, though he believes it to be true;
(2) any breach of duty which, without an intent to deceive, gains G
an advantage of the person committing it, or any one
claiming under him, by misleading another to his prejudice,
or to the prejudice of any one claiming under him;

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320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A (3) causing, however innocently, a party to an agreement, to
make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is
the subject of the agreement.”
42. Section 19 of the Contract Act declares that when consent to
an agreement is caused by coercion, fraud or misrepresentation, the
B agreement is voidable at the option of the person whose consent was so
caused. The exception in Section 19, reads as follows:
“Exception —If such consent was caused by misrepresentation
or by silence, fraudulent within the meaning of section 17, the
contract, nevertheless, is not voidable, if the party whose consent
C was so caused had the means of discovering the truth with
ordinary diligence.”
43. “Undue influence” is separately defined under Section 16 of
the Contract Act, which reads as follows:
“16. ‘Undue influence’ defined.—(1) A contract is said to be
D induced by ‘undue influence’ where the relations subsisting
between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a position
to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an
unfair advantage over the other.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
E foregoing principle, a person is deemed to be in a position to
dominate the will of another—
(a) where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other,
or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other; or
(b) where he makes a contract with a person whose mental
F
capacity is temporarily or permanently affected by reason
of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress.
(3) Where a person who is in a position to dominate the will of
another, enters into a contract with him, and the transaction
appears, on the face of it or on the evidence adduced, to be
G unconscionable, the burden of proving that such contract was not
induced by undue influence shall be upon the person in a position
to dominate the will of the other.

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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 321
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

Nothing in the sub-section shall affect the provisions of A
section 111 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872).”
44. A perusal of the definition of the word “fraud”, as defined in
Section 17 of the Contract Act, would reveal that the concept of fraud is
very wide. It includes any suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true,
by a person who does or does not believe it to be true. It may be contrasted B
with Section 18(1) of the Contract Act which, inter alia, defines
“misrepresentation”. It provides that it is misrepresentation if a positive
assertion is made by a person of that which is not true in a manner
which is not warranted by the information which he has. This is despite
the fact that he may believe it to be true. In other words, in fraud, the
person who makes an untruthful suggestion, does not himself believe it C
to be true. He knows it to be not true, yet he makes a suggestion of the
fact as if it were true. In misrepresentation, on the other hand, the person
making misrepresentation believes it to be true. But the law declares it
to be misrepresentation on the basis of information which he had and
what he believed to be true was not true. Therefore, the representation D
made by him becomes a misrepresentation as it is a statement which is
found to be untrue. Fraud is committed if a person actively conceals a
fact, who either knows about the fact or believes in the existence of the
fact. The concealment must be active. It is here that mere silence has
been explained in the Exception which would affect the decision of a
person who enters into a contract to be not fraud unless the circumstances E
are such that it becomes his duty to speak. His silence itself may amount
to speech. A person may make a promise without having any intention to
perform it. It is fraud. The law further declares that any other act fitted
to deceive, is fraud. So also, any act or omission, which the law declares
to be fraudulent, amounts to fraud. Running as a golden trend however F
and as a requirement of law through the various limbs of Section 17 of
the Contract Act, is the element of deceit. A person who stands accused
of fraud be it in a civil or criminal action, must entertain an intention to
commit deception. Deception can embrace various forms and it is a
matter to be judged on the facts of each case. It is, apparently, on account
of these serious circumstances that fraud has on a legal relationship or a G
purported legal relationship that the particulars and details of fraud is
required if pleaded in a civil suit or a proceeding to which the CPC
applies.

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322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A 45. We are here not concerned with a civil suit. The application in
question has been filed under Section 33A of the Act. Section 11 (1) to
(3) of the Act, read as follows:
“11. Procedure and powers of conciliation officers, Boards, Courts
and Tribunals.-(1) Subject to any rules that may be made in this
B behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or
other authority concerned may think fit.
(2) A conciliation officer or a member of a Board, 4 or Court or
the presiding officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
C Tribunal may for the purpose of inquiry into any existing or
apprehended industrial dispute, after giving reasonable notice, enter
the premises occupied by any establishment to which the dispute
relates.
(3) Every Board, Court, Labour Court, Tribunal and National
D Tribunal] shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil
Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908 ), when
trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:-
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining
him on oath;
E (b) compelling the production of documents and material
objects;
(c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses;
(d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed;
and every inquiry or investigation by a Board,
F
Court, 2 Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], shall
be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning
of sections 193 and 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860).”
(Emphasis supplied)
G
46. An application under Section 33A of the Act is not a civil suit.
The provisions of Order VI Rule 4 of the CPC, as such, is not applicable
to proceedings under the Act. Does it mean that the law as to pleadings
is not to apply at all to proceedings under the Act or will it be more
correct to say that the law as to pleadings will apply but without its full
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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 323
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

vigor. We would think the latter would be the correct position in law. A
While the provisions of the CPC may not apply the salutary principles
embodied would apply. This is for the reason that the purpose of pleading,
be it in a civil suit or other proceeding, is to allow the opposite party to
meet the case of his opponent to ready the evidence to be adduced and
marshal the law in support of its case.
B
47. In Management of Hindustan Steel Limited v. Workmen and
others8, the case arose under Section 25-FFF of the Act thereof and the
notice issued under the provision was impugned as being conditional.
This is what this Court found in regard to the contention about the
vagueness of the plea:
C
“13. In our view, Shri Setalvad was fully justified in
submitting that the management had been taken by surprise and
that the Tribunal was in error in holding the general ground in the
written statement to cover the specific plea of infirmity of the
notice because of its being conditional. The plea of the statutory
defect in the notice should, in our opinion, have been reasonably D
specific and precise so as to enable the appellant to meet it. The
general plea could not serve the object of putting the appellant on
guard about the precise case to be met at the trial and tell the
management the precise nature of the plea with respect to the
defect in the notice, to enable them to meet it. …” E
48. In Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel9, again a
case arose under Section 33 of the Act and is, therefore, close to the
facts of the case before us. Respondent/ employee complained of
victimization and invoked Section 33 of the Act. This Court, apart from
holding that the Tribunal granting or withholding permission under Section F
33 of the Act does not sit as a Court of Appeal, administered the following
words of caution in regard to pleading:
“9. A word of caution is necessary. Victimisation is a serious
charge by an employee against an employer, and, therefore, it
must be properly and adequately pleaded giving all particulars G
upon which the charge is based to enable the employer to fully
meet them. The charge must not be vague or indefinite being as it
is an amalgam of facts as well as inferences and attitudes. The
8
AIR 1973 SC 878
9
AIR 1976 SC 98 H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A fact that there is a union espousing the cause of the employees in
legitimate trade union activity and an employee is a member or
active office-bearer thereof, is, per se, no crucial instance.
Collective bargaining being the order of the day in a democratic
social welfare State, legitimate trade union activity which must
shun all kinds of physical threats, coercion or violence, must march
B
with a spirit of tolerance, understanding and grace in dealings on
the part of the employer. Such activity can flow in healthy channel
only on mutual cooperation between employer and employee and
cannot be considered as irksome by the management in the best
interest of the concern. Dialogues with representatives of a union
C help striking a delicate balance in adjustment and settlement of
various contentious claims and issues.
10. The onus of establishing a plea of victimisation will be
upon the person pleading it. Since a charge of victimisation is a
serious matter reflecting, to a degree, upon the subjective attitude
D of the employer evidenced by acts and conduct, these have to be
established by safe and sure evidence. Mere allegations, vague
suggestions and insinuations are not enough. All particulars of the
charge brought out, if believed, must be weighed by the Tribunal
and a conclusion should be reached on a totality of the evidence
produced.”
E
49. In regard to a case based on acquiescence, the High Court of
Madras has also spoken of the need for specific plea [See (1991), Labour
and Industrial Cases, Page 40].
50. Applying the principles of law to the facts of our case, we
F would think that there is no sufficient pleading in regard to fraud. The
allegation as to undue influence is totally without any basis in the pleading.
51. The VSS, if availed of by an employee voluntarily, amounts to
a contract. This Court, in Bank of India and others v. O.P. Swarnakar
and others10, was dealing with the case of voluntary retirement scheme
G floated by the bank. A question arose as to whether the scheme was an
offer or an invitation to treat. After elaborate consideration of the scheme,
the Court took the view that having regard to the facts, in particular, the
fact that the bank reserved its right to accept or reject the application,
the scheme was an invitation to treat. The application made by the
10
(2003) 2 SCC 721
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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 325
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

employee amounted to an offer and a contract emerged only if the A
application was accepted by the bank. It was only when the offer of the
employee was accepted, it became an enforceable contract, it was held.
This aspect assumes significance in the light of the fact that the concept
of fraud, undue influence and misrepresentation as defined in the Contract
Act, would be apposite in the context of the Scheme giving rise to an
B
enforceable contract.
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE LABOUR COURT
52. Now, the time is ripe to look at the material which has been
produced before the Labour Court by the parties. On the side of the
applicants, 90 in number, 4 witnesses were examined. The first witness C
is Giridhari Sahu-the First Applicant. He states, inter alia, as follows:
He is one of the applicants. There are 89 other applications
with him praying for the same relief. He was working in the
Maintenance Division. Others were working in other Divisions.
He was working since 03.06.1988. He was refused employment D
since 13.06.2000. Reference is made to the order passed in O.J.C.
No. 2420 of 1989 which we have referred to. Appellants did not
comply with the directions of the High Court. It was stated that
the Civil Appeal is pending in this Court. A regulation was made
regulating the regularization of the NMRs who had completed
five years of service. After formation of the Corporation, the E
appellants introduced the Scheme. AW1 and other applicants were
given to understand that their services will be regularized and
signatures taken in the VSS form. There was no decision in the
meeting regarding the VSS in the Union. Signatures of the witness
and other applicants were taken by the appellants forcibly giving F
an impression that their services will be regularized. They protested.
The reference, which we have adverted to, is pending. The
conditions of service had been changed. In the cross-examination,
AW1 would state that he has not been issued with any appointment
letter by the time he joined in service. 327 persons, including AW1,
were working during his tenure. He denied that he, along with G
other applicants, signed in the Scheme. He stated it that it is not a
fact that he had given the application in the Scheme out of his
own without any compulsion or force. So also the other applicants.

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326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A AW2 is one Chirtamani Patra. He joined from 04.05.1987
and till 13.06.2000, he worked continuously. The appellants gave
them the impression that their services will be regularized and, at
first instance, their signature was taken on a blank paper and
subsequently in a form. Subsequently, he could know that the form
was meant for VSS. Prior to taking signatures in the VSS form,
B
no intimation or no notice was given regarding the VSS. He had
drawn attention to the authorities regarding taking of his signatures
in the VSS application form. The signatures were obtained at the
Divisional level. In the cross-examination, he, inter alia, stated
that more than 300 persons were engaged as NMR at that time.
C He had no knowledge about the VSS prior to his refusal of
employment. He denied that the VSS was sufficiently published
and he submitted his application for VSS. He also stated that it
was not a fact that signatures of the applicants were not taken
forcibly or fraudulently. He admits to have received Rs.5,500/-
towards hydro allowance and medical allowance as ex gratia.
D
AW3 is one Kurtartha Sahu. He joined on 02.04.1984.
He would state that with the instigation by the higher authorities,
their signatures on the VSS form were taken forcibly. In the similar
way, signatures of all the applicants were taken. VSS was not
published in the notice board or circulated among the workers
E prior to taking their signatures. The VSS was not published in any
local newspaper. In the cross-examination, he, inter alia, states
that it is not a fact that he, along with other applicants, signed in
the VSS form knowing the consequences. He further stands by
his case in the chief.
F AW4 joined on 06.03.1984. He was refused employment
on 14.06.2000 along with others. Their signature was taken in an
application and three to four blank papers. They were given to
understand that their services will be regularized. Subsequently,
they came to know about the application that the application they
G signed was a VSS form. He says in cross-examination that to his
knowledge, the VSS was not published on the notice board. He
further says he does not know if any settlement was made with
any Union or not by the management. The Executive Engineer
and HRD and others compelled him and others to sign. He has

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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 327
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

not intimated the concerned Chief Engineer. The application, in A
which his signature was taken, was dated 31.05.2000. About 15
days thereafter, he got the amount in bank draft. About 3-4 days
after 31.05.2000, he raised objection and protested against the
VSS. After protest, they received the money from the
management.
B
(Emphasis supplied)
EVIDENCE FOR THE APPELLANTS
ORAL EVIDENCE
53. OPW1, the Management Witness No.1, would state as follows: C
Out of the 336 NMRs, 256 NMRs accepted the VSS. The
Management has neither terminated nor retrenched the workers.
The applicants voluntarily separated themselves by accepting the
VSS. Exhibit ‘A’ is produced as the Notification dated 27.04.2000
constituting the Recommending Committee. Exhibit ‘B Series’ D
were marked as the applications. Exhibit ‘C Series’ are the
acceptances of the applications. Exhibit ‘D’ is the Order
authorizing AGM, HRD Shri A.K. Mitra to accept the application.
Exhibit ‘E Series’ are the payment sheets showing the payment
of their legal dues and ex gratia in account payee cheque. Exhibit
‘C Series’ are marked with objection. It is stated in Indrawati, E
the Management implemented the VSS and 690 persons were
given VSS in December, 1999. Exhibit ‘A/I’ is the Notification
extending the VSS till 24.06.2000. Exhibit ‘A/II’ is the Notification
extending the VSS till 01.03.2001. Discussion was made with
Rengali Power Projects Workers Union before implementing the F
VSS on 10.04.2000 AND 14/15.04.2000. The President had given
the agenda for discussion vide Exhibit ‘F’ including VRS for NMR
employees. Finally, discussion was held on 20.05.2000 as per
Exhibit ‘G’ (marked with objection). The Union was aware of the
implementation of the VSS prior to the implementation. The
witnesses have signed in Exhibit ‘E Series’. Exhibit ‘H’ is the G
guideline issued by the Corporate Office. The suggestion that
signatures of the applicants have been taken forcibly, has been
denied. An amount of Rs.5,500/- paid to the applicants as ex gratia
towards the enhanced medical allowance and hydro allowance.
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328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A In the cross-examination, the witness would state, inter alia,
as follows:
The Executive Engineer is the appointing authority so far
as NMR workers were concerned. The VSS was introduced in
all the units of the Corporation in the State. The Scheme was not
B notified in the Gazette by the Government or by the Corporation.
There was no request from the side of the applicants to implement
the VSS or VRS nor there was any proposal from the Rengali
Head to reduce the number of NMRs by implementing the VSS.
To reduce extra manpower, the VSS was introduced. The Scheme
was not published in any newspaper for the general public. Witness
C states that he does not know the applicants personally. He did not
say which applicant was paid how much wages. He cannot say
without referring to the application and acceptance letter, from
which date the applications were accepted. In Exhibit ‘G’, neither
Shri R.C. Kuntia nor Shri D.N. Padhi has signed although their
D names are there. He does not know the witnesses who had signed
in the applications in B Series. All the applicants signed in the
presence of the Executive Engineer, in Exhibit B series. Then, he
again says, he cannot say in whose presence the applicants signed
in Exhibit B Series. He cannot say who has given the application
form to the applicants in Exhibit B Series. He denies that signatures
E of the applicants were obtained forcibly.
OPW2-Management Witness No.2, is the Manager of a
Division. He joined as Manager on 16.04.2002. Prior to this, he
was working as the Deputy Manager with the Corporation. While
he was working as SDO, 63 NMRs were working under him. To
F his knowledge, now, 21 NMRs were working under the appellants.
Other 42 persons have separated themselves by obtaining VSS.
By the time the VSS was introduced. The objective of the Scheme
was widely circulated. The applicant took the application form
for VSS after signing on a sheet of paper.
G He states it to be incorrect that signatures were taken
forcibly.
In cross-examination, he states as follows:
He came to Rengali in the year 1999. He has no personal
acquaintance with the 42 applicants. He cannot say if any high-
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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 329
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

level discussion was made or not. The information was notified A
on the office board. The VSS Notification was made in English.
All the NMRs were not conversant with English. The Notification
was not published in Oriya. The condition of VSS was incorporated
in the application form and the applicants and other NMRs were
not given the Scheme for their information separately. At present,
B
he cannot say as to from which date applicants started receiving
application forms. He has not assisted the applicants in filing the
application form. He can identify witnesses who have signed the
application form of the applicants. Then, he says, he cannot say
who is Sahdev Raut, in what capacity he had signed. Below the
signature of the witnesses, their designation and date have not C
been given. He has no knowledge about the pendency of the case
in the Supreme Court. He has no knowledge about the withdrawal
of the application by AW1. He says, it is not a fact that the
signatures of the applicants were taken forcibly giving impression
that their services will be regularized.
D
(Emphasis supplied)
THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
54. The documentary evidence, which is produced by the
applicants, is as follows:
E
a. The OER (Transfer of Undertaking, Assets, Liabilities,
Proceedings and Personnel) Scheme Rules, 1996;
b. The Order passed by the High Court in O.J.C. No. 2420 of
1989, which we have already adverted to;
c. The letter written by the first applicant dated 01.06.2000, which F
we have already extracted;
d. The Gazette Notification dated 01.04.1996 regarding change
over from the Government.
55. As far as documentary evidence of the appellants is concerned,
they are as follows: G

Exhibit ‘A’ is the Notification dated 27.04.2000 constituting the
Recommending Committee. It also contains the Scheme itself.
Exhibit ‘A/I’ is the Notification dated 17.06.2000 indicating that
the VSS will be enforced for a period of six days from 19.06.2000
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330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A to 24.06.2000. Exhibit ‘A/II’ is the Notification dated 28.01.2001
indicating that the VSS will be enforced for a period of one month
from 30.01.2001 to 01.03.2001. Exhibit ‘B Series’ are the
applications made by the applicants. Exhibit ‘C’ is acceptance of
the VSS application which is seen marked with objection. Exhibit
‘D’ is the order authorizing the AGM to accept the applications.
B
Exhibit ‘E Series’ are the payment sheets showing payment of
the legal dues and ex gratia in account payee cheques. Exhibit
‘F’ is letter dated 15.04.2000 by the President of the Union seeking
discussion, inter alia, about enhanced amount of VRS by NMR
employees. Exhibit ‘G’ purports to be the Minutes of the
C Discussion held between the Management and the Union on
20.05.2000 (marked with objection). Exhibit ‘H’ is again letter
dated 27.04.2000 containing points for facilitating the smooth
implementation of the Scheme. Exhibit ‘J’ purports to be the
acknowledgment of VSS of NMR employees, Sub-Division II.
Exhibit ‘K’ purports to be the Office Order dated 13.06.2000
D
relieving the applicants.
FINDINGS OF THE LABOUR COURT
56. The Labour Court found that the application under Section
33A of the Act is maintainable. This is on the basis that, had the VSS
E been in the true sense, there would not have been any illegality. It is
found that the applicants have challenged the Scheme as illegal and the
applications were obtained by misrepresentation. On that basis, it was
found that the application was maintainable. Thereafter, the Labour Court
goes through the evidence and has recorded the following findings:

F “9. I have gone through the evidence of witnesses
examined on either side so also the documents exhibited. There
was no demand from the side of the complainants nor there was
any proposal from the side of the officials for introduction of
Voluntary Separation Scheme or Voluntary Retirement Scheme.
Similarly the SDO and the Executive Engineer of OHPC have
G never recommended for reducing the staff strength. Admittedly
Voluntary Separation Scheme was not published widely for the
information of NMRs and therefore it cannot be exported that the
NMRs signed the Voluntary Separation Scheme applications
knowing its content and consequences. On a reference to Ext.3 it
H is clear that A.W.1 though submitted application for Voluntary
G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 331
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

Separation Scheme either under pressure or under a wrong notion A
he has withdrawn the same on 1.6.2000 but the application of Sri
Sahoo was not returned back and he was given the Voluntary
Separation Scheme. Therefore I am of the considered view that
the Voluntary Separation Scheme was not the choice of the
complainants but it was thrust upon the complainants and therefore
B
amounts to refused of employment to the guise of Voluntary
Separation Scheme.
10. In view of the discussions made above, the action of
the management opposite parties in implementing the Voluntary
Separation Scheme forcibly or by misrepresentation is illegal and
unjustified. The complainants are entitled to be reinstated in service C
and are deemed to be continuing in service from the date of the
Voluntary Separation Scheme was implemented. The management
opposite parties have paid certain amount to the complainants
being the benefits under Voluntary Separation Scheme. The
complainants will be eligible to get 70% (seventy percent) back D
wages and the amount already paid by the management to the
complainants towards the Voluntary Separation Scheme benefit
shall be adjusted. The Award shall be implemented by the opposite
parties within one month from the date of its Notification for
publication.”
E
57. The substance of the findings is contained in paragraph-9
(extracted above). It is found that there was no demand from the
applicants. There was no proposal from the officials for introduction of
the Scheme. The SDO and the Executive Engineer of the Corporation
never recommended for reducing staff strength. Admittedly, the Scheme
was not published widely for the information of NMRs. Reference is F
made to the application made by AW1, which we have extracted. On
this finding, the Labour Court finds that the Scheme was not the choice
of the applicants but it was thrust upon the applicants. This amounted to
refusal of employment in the guise of the Scheme. On this basis, the
relief was granted. The relief consisted of directing reinstatement in G
service and the applicants were deemed to be working continuously in
service from the date of the Scheme being implemented. Noticing that
certain amounts had been paid to the applicants and directing that the
applicants would get 70 per cent of the back-wages, the amounts were
directed to be adjusted.
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332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A 58. It may be necessary to notice one development which took
place in the High Court. In the High Court, when application was made
under Section 17B of the Act, the applicants were directed to deposit
the amount which they received. 28 applicants deposited the amount
which they received under the Scheme. It is not disputed that the said
amounts are with the appellants.
B
THE JUDGMENT IN O.J.C. NO. 2420
59. In the first place, we must notice the judgment of the High
Court of Orissa rendered in O.J.C. No. 2420 of 1989. In the same, the
Court, inter alia, held as follows:
C “The petitioner represents a large number of N.M.Rs.
who were employed in Rengali Hydro Electric Project and the
like projects. Presently, they are under the Energy Department of
the Government of Orissa. The prayer of the petitioner union is to
direct the opposite parties to regularize the services of the N.M.R.
D employees and to pay them emoluments equal to those of regular
employees discharging the same nature of work.
We need not traverse the legal ground as the same has
been duly taken note of in a recent decision of this court in Balaram
Sahu-v-State of Orissa, 74(1992) CLT 367 and following what
E was stated in that judgment the facts of the two cases being similar.
We direct regularization of those members of the union who have
served continuously for a period of five years by today. The
opposite parties shall find out with reference to Annexure-7 or
any other document available to them as to which of the members
of the petitioner-union have completed five years of continuous
F service by today. It may be pointed out here that in Annexure-7,
details have been given about 281 (though the last serial number
is 280 in Annexure-7, Shri Das states that sl. No. 114 was
mentioned twice by mistake) persons. Learned counsel states that
details of 85 workmen represented by the petitioner-union who
G have been transferred to different divisions could not be made
available to the court. …”
(Emphasis supplied)
60. The court went on, no doubt, to consider the pay to be given to
the NMR workers. The court proceeded to hold “there was no reason
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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 333
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

for discriminating the NMR employees from other regular employed A
persons”.
THE JUDGMENT IN CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7342-7343 OF 1993
61. The Civil Appeal, which was carried against the same, was
finally decided by this Court in State of Orissa and others v. Balaram
Sahu and others11. The judgment was rendered on 29.10.2002. From B
the perusal of the said judgment, we find that this Court did not deem it
fit to interfere with the judgment of the High Court as such. This is what
this Court said:
“14. For all the reasons stated above, the appeals are allowed and
the orders of the High Court are set aside insofar as the pay equal C
to that of the regular employed staff has been ordered to be given
to the NMR/daily-wager/casual workers, as indicated above, to
which they will not be eligible or entitled, till they are regularized
and taken as the permanent members of the establishment. For
the period prior to such permanent status/regularization, they would D
be entitled to be paid only at the rate of the minimum wages
prescribed or notified, if it is more than what they were being paid
as ordered by this Court in Jasmer Singh case [(1996) 11 SCC
77 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 210]. There will be no order as to costs.”
(Emphasis supplied) E
62. Thus, the judgment, insofar as it related to the direction to
regularize the members of the writ petitioners’ union, became final on
29.10.2002.
63. The judgement of the High Court was dated 28.10.1992. Thus,
we proceed on the basis, therefore, that the applicants, were members F
of the writ petitioners’ union in O.J.C. No. 2420 of 1989, who became
entitled under the judgment of the High Court which was affirmed by
this Court as regards the direction for regularization provided they had
served continuously for a period of five years as on 28.10.1992, i.e., the
date of the judgment of the High Court.
G
64. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, in fact, a
Scheme was floated to effectuate regularization as ordered by the court.
It appears to be their case that the appellants also floated the VSS.

11
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334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A 65. Going by the judgment of the High Court in O.J.C. No.2420
of 1989, those members of the writ petitioners’ union who served
continuously for a period of five years till 28.10.1992 (date of judgment)
were entitled to regularization as the High Court had directed
regularization. They had indeed acquired a legal right. This was
undoubtedly subject to the lis pending in this Court. A period of five
B
years continuous service prior to 28.10.1992 would mean those employees
who were members of the writ petitioners’ union before the High Court
in O.J.C. No. 2420 of 1989, would be employees who were appointed
on or before 27.10.1987. In fact, going by the deposition of applicants, it
would appear that AW1 claimed to be working since 1988. This means
C AW1 apparently was not one who was covered by the direction for
regularization by the High Court as he was working from 03.06.1988.
He would complete five years only by 02.06.1993. Though, in the
application, there is reference to O.J.C. No.1527 of 1991, in his deposition,
he refers only to O.J.C. No.2420 of 1989. No doubt, as far as AW2 to
AW4, going by the dates given, which we have already indicated, if they
D
had worked continuously from the dates, they would be covered by the
order of the High Court for regularization. We are considering the VSS
which was introduced during the pendency of the litigation before this
Court. This means that while they had acquired a right under the direction
of the High Court, the sword of Damocles over-hanged them in the
E form of the uncertainty confronting them as the direction in their favour
could be either confirmed or overturned by this Court.
66. In other words, the direction in their favour had not become
final. We have stated this only to highlight that if the VSS was floated
and it was found sufficiently attractive, it would not be unnatural for
F them or unfair to them to take advantage of the same. In this regard, the
appellants have projected before us that out of the 281 NMRs and
Contingent Khalasis who opted for the Scheme, the Corporation accepted
the applications for 271 workers. It is only the 90 applicants, it is pointed
out, who have made a somersault and sought to resile from the applications
which were made by them.
G
67. The application under section 33A of the Act was filed after
several months from the date of receiving the ex gratia payment. It is
also the case of the appellants that there was a letter from the President
of the Workers’ Union of 15.04.2000, which was before the circulation
of the Scheme, requesting for enhancing the amount for VRS for the
H
G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 335
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

NMR workers. There are Minutes of the discussion held on 20.05.2000 A
between the Management and the representatives of the Union. The
Minutes indicate that the issue relating to the VSS, which was taken up
for discussion, was – “(1) Enhanced amount of VSS for the NMR
employees”.
68. It may be true that the Notification dated 27.04.2000 was B
published in English. So were the further Notifications dated 17.06.2000
and 28.01.2000.
69. There is no dispute that the applicants have been favoured
with an amount of Rs.1,25,000/- which is the amount which is
contemplated under the Scheme besides other amounts. These amounts C
have been paid by cheques into the accounts of the applicants. The
applications which have been produced before us appear to be witnessed
by two witnesses. This is as per the terms of the Notification which
contemplates that the application must be signed by two witnesses. So
also, in regard to the payments which are effected, the authorization
appears to be supported by the signatures of two witnesses. D

70. No doubt, as far as this aspect is concerned, the applicants do
not dispute that they have received the payments. In fact, they will not
be in a position to establish that they have not received the payments.
They would brush aside the payments on the basis that they were paid
some amounts which they thought they were entitled to on the basis that E
they were being regularized. A sum of Rs.1,25,000/- plus other benefits
was paid to all the applicants. This amount happens to be also the amount
which was contemplated under the VSS.
71. None of the applicants have a case that the signatures in the
applications have not been appended by them. They do not appear to F
have a case about the witnesses as such except as we have noticed in
the evidence. It may be true that one applicant out of the 90 has written
a letter purporting to withdraw. It is noteworthy that other 89 applicants
had not made any application seeking to withdraw. In the application
filed by one worker (First Applicant), which we have extracted, he would G
state that he was threatened and coerced and, being afraid, he was
made to sign the application for VSS against his wish. He never intended
to take the VSS and he was told that he would be forced to dire striats.
No doubt, his application is dated 01.06.2000, which is the very next
date of the making of his application. It may be remembered that AW1
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336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A was not a person who was entitled even to the benefit of the order
passed by the High Court as he had not completed five years as on the
date of the judgment. There can be no similarity between a case of
threat or coercion on the one hand and fraud.
72. The manner in which fraud was perpetuated, the exact nature
B of the fraud and person or persons by whom the fraud was perpetuated,
are found missing in the pleadings, as noticed by us. As far as the first
applicant is concerned, the prevarication in his case is palpable and
discernible from the somersault that he carried out in the pleading in the
application in comparison with his case in the letter, which he wrote
seeking to withdraw from the Scheme, on 01.06.2000, wherein the case
C was built around alleged threat and coercion. It may be noticed that
coercion is another element which is antithetical to free consent and is
separately dealt with under Section 15 of the Contract Act. He minces
no words after employing the expression “threat, coercion”, when he
declared that being afraid, he was made to sign the VSS against his
D wish. He was threatened with being forced into dire straits unless he
signs the application. Conspicuous by its absence, in his letter dated
01.06.2000, is even the faintest whisper about fraud of any kind. This is
the application dated 01.06.2000. It must be noted it is on the very next
day after he made the application claiming the VSS on 31.05.2000. The
application under Section 33A of the Act, on the other hand, came to be
E filed much later, i.e., on 19.04.2001, after several months. In the pleading,
in paragraph-9 of the application, as to who defrauded amongst the
authorities, is not pleaded. It must be noted that the persons arrayed in
the application are the General Manager (Electrical); Manager
(Electrical); Maintenance Division; Manager (Electrical), Protection and
F Control Division; Director (HRD) of the Corporation. It is not even
mentioned as to who amongst them committed the alleged act of fraud.
No doubt, the fraud could be committed by either the opposite parties or
anyone action at their behest. If so, it should have been pleaded. There
is no such plea forthcoming. The substance of the plea is that for
regularization, which we gather, on a liberal reading of the application,
G being one under the Act and bearing in mind also the need to be not far
too strict, enmass signatures of workers were taken on certain papers
and by showing undue influence. The pleas of fraud and undue influence
are distinct and separate. It will be noticed that the case of coercion and
threat does not make its appearance in the pleading.
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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 337
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

73. Coming to the oral evidence, AW1, as noticed by us, states A
that he and other applicants were given to understand that their services
will be regularised and signatures were taken on the VSS form. He
further says that his signatures and that of the other applicants were
taken by appellants forcibly giving an impression that their services will
be regularised. As has been noticed by us, there is no case of force
B
which is used in paragraph-9 of the application, which constitutes the
sole pleading.
74. Passing in to AW2, he would say that the appellants gave
them an impression that their services would be regularised and, at the
first instance, their signature was taken on a blank paper and subsequently
on a form. Subsequently, he came to know that it is meant for the Scheme C
and he drew attention of the authorities (There is no mention about before
whom he ventilated his objection. No written document is forthcoming).
He would state that the signatures were obtained at the Divisional Level
giving the same impression. In cross, he says he has no knowledge about
VSS prior to his refusal of employment. It is further stated that it is not D
a fact that the signatures of the applicants were not taken forcibly and
fraudulently by the appellants. This is about all that AW2 has to say. The
inconsistency between “fraudulently” and “forcibly” is self-evident and
“forcibly” is not vaguely pleaded.
75. AW 3 would state that with the instigation of the higher E
authorities, their signatures in the VSS were taken forcibly. In the similar
way, the signatures of all the applicants were taken. No doubt, he speaks
about the notice not being published nor it being circulated amongst the
workers. It was not published in any local newspaper. In cross-
examination, he would state that it is not a fact that he and other applicants
were not refused employment forcibly nor the condition of service F
changed. On conspectus of his evidence, his deposition is only to the
effect that the application of AW3 and other applicants were secured
forcibly. This is completely incompatible with the case of fraud which is
pleaded and there is no pleading for force being used as we have noticed.
76. Coming to the last witness AW4, he would state that their G
signature was taken on an application and three to four blank papers.
They were given to understand that their services would be regularised.
But in cross-examination, he would state that the Executive Engineer
and HR have compelled him and others to sign. The complete
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338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A prevarication is palpable and does not require any elucidation. This would
qualify as a case where the pleading does not match up to the
requirements of the case. The state of the evidence, which is adduced,
makes matters even worse.
77. A perusal of the documentary evidence, produced by the
B applicants, would show that they have nothing to do about establishing
the case set up by the applicants. On the other hand, the protest letter
dated 01.06.2000 sent by the first applicant completely demolishes the
case as pleaded in the application. It is noteworthy that apart from the
first applicant, none of the 89 other applicants have registered their protest
about the VSS. Though there is mention about a letter sent to the
C Conciliation Officer, it is not brought on record.
78. As against this, the appellants have produced a wealth of
documentary evidence before the Labour Court. Exhibits ‘A’ to ‘K’ were
produced. They included the applications which were signed by the
applicants and two witnesses; the VSS Scheme itself; the document
D evidencing the authorisation of payments of the amounts under the VSS
Scheme; the Charter of Demand before the Management for discussion-
Exhibit ‘F’. The Minutes of the Discussion of the meeting which was
held on 20.05.2000. The Minutes would indicate that regularisation of 43
NMR workers out of total of 343 was to be considered in terms of the
E Scheme for regularisation of the NMR workers after the VSS/VRS
Scheme, is implemented in respect of 300 workers. This is item no.1.
The next item no.2 dealt with enhanced amount of VSS for NMR
employees. After a detailed discussion, it was mutually decided that this
was not possible.

F 79. Item nos. 3 and 4 would show that it was decided that 43
NMR employees will be regularised on the basis of skill and qualification,
seniority in terms of regularisation of NMR workers.
80. Though there was a direction by the High Court to direct all
the employees of the writ petitioners’ union, the matters stood challenged
G before this Court in Civil Appeal and as on date when VSS Scheme was
floated and the regularisation scheme also was enforced, this Court had
not yet rendered its judgment. Upholding the direction to regularise, the
decision of this Court was rendered only in the year 2002.
81. Having regard to the materials, we would think, therefore,
that the applicants have failed to plead and prove, and on the yardstick
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ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

of it being a case of no evidence, the Award became infirm and was A
liable to be interfered with. At any rate, the findings, which have been
rendered by the Labour Court, which is to the effect that it was not the
choice of the applicants and was thrust upon the complainants amounting
to refusal of employment, is completely insupportable both in law and on
facts. The finding that there was no demand from the side of the
B
complainants for the introduction of the VSS is completely irrelevant, as,
as an employer, it was certainly open to devise such policy which was in
the best interest of the Corporation. Validity of the Scheme did not depend
upon the Scheme having its origin in a demand by the workmen. The
finding that there was no proposal for the Scheme or recommendation
for reducing the staff strength was wholly irrelevant. It is the factum of C
the Scheme being propounded, in fact and implemented elsewhere as
well, which should have been considered by the Labour Court.
82. We noticed that in paragraph-9 of the application after stating
about getting the signatures enmass on certain papers under the pretext
of regularisation and by showing undue influence of regularisation that D
since the projects were temporary and they are to be regularised in the
Corporation in regular cadre, the old job will come to an end and a new
job in the Corporation would start afresh for which workmen without
understanding the implication of the application, have signed on such
application. From the evidence which consists of the testimony of AW1
to AW4, as far as this aspect is concerned, there is no evidence at all. It E
is true, in the response of the appellants, it has been pleaded in paragraph-
8 that a Scheme has been displayed on the notice board and the same
has been widely circulated for information of all concerned. However,
the witness for the appellants, in evidence, has deposed that the VSS
was not published in any newspaper. It is stated that it is not published in F
any newspaper for the information of the general public. He also does
say that it is not notified in the Gazette either by the Government or by
the Corporation. The second witness for the appellants also states that
implementation was notified on the Office Notice Board. It was made in
English and the NMRs were not conversant with English. Nothing was
published in Oriya. We have also undoubtedly taken note of the deposition G
of AW1 to AW4 which appears to project the case of non-publication of
the Scheme. In this regard, we must notice the following features:
1. The applicants themselves lay store by the judgment of the
High Court in the earlier Writ Petition O.J.C. No.2420 of 1989.
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340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A Therein, the petitioner was the Rengali Power Projects
Workers’ Union.
2. Apparently, the applicants claimed to be members of the said
Union. AW1, in fact, in his deposition, also refers to the order
passed in O.J.C. No. 2420 of 1989 and that the appellants did
B not comply with the direction of the High Court and appeal is
pending in this Court. Therefore, applicants must be understood
as being members of the Union. They must also be treated as
aware of the pendency of the civil appeal in this Court.
83. It is pertinent to note, in this regard that there is evidence
C (OPW1), to show that before implementation of the VSS, discussion
took place on 10.04.2000 and 15.04.2000. Most importantly, Exhibit ‘F’
is a letter sent by one Mr. R.C. Kuntia dated 15.04.2000, written to the
Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the appellant-Corporation that he
stood elected as the President of the Union. They had some important
problems to be discussed with the Management. He requested for a
D date and time to discuss the problems. Under the heading “Agenda of
the Discussion”, Item No.2 was “Enhance the amount of VRS for the
NMR employees”. This document was, in fact, marked without any
objection through OPW1. The discussions took place on 20.05.2000.
Item no.2 was about enhancing amount of VSS for NMR workers. It
E was decided, after a detailed discussion that it was not possible. Therefore,
the only finding possible is that the Union to which the applicants belonged,
wanted the VSS amount to be enhanced. This aspect has not been
considered at all by the Labour Court. It is true that the document was
marked as Exhibit ‘G’ with objection. In the cross-examination of the
witness, through whom Exhibit ‘G’ was marked, there is no suggestion
F that such a discussion did not take place or the discussion did not relate
to the enhanced payment under the VSS. But it is true that OPW1 admits
that in Exhibit ‘G’, the two Office Bearers have not signed though their
names are appearing. However, there is no cross-examination about
discussion taking place prior to implementation. Therefore, this would,
G at any rate, show that the applicants, who were members of the Union,
were fully aware of the VSS. There is no case for them that they were
misled or defrauded by their own Union Leaders. A perusal of the Award
would show that apart from stating that Exhibits ‘A’ to ‘K’ were marked
on behalf of the appellants and Exhibits ‘1’ to ‘4’ were marked on behalf

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G.M., ELECTRICAL RENGALI HYDRO ELECTRIC PROJECT, 341
ORISSA v. SRI GIRIDHARI SAHU [K. M. JOSEPH, J.]

of the applicants, there is no discussion about these documents at all. A
Thus, this is a case where documentary evidence adduced by appellants
is ignored by the Labour Court.
84. The finding that it cannot be accepted that the NMRs signed
knowing its contents and consequences, amounts to nothing short of a
perverse finding. The pleading and the evidence, does not support in the B
least, such a finding. On the other hand, the weight of evidence should
have been borne in mind by the Labour Court as completely eliminating
the possibility. It is surprising that the Labour Court should find solace in
the letter written by the first applicant dated 01.06.2000 to find that he
submitted the application either under pressure or under wrong notion.
In fact, the very concept of wrong notion is missing in the letter dated C
01.06.2000(See paragraph 17 for the letter). The Labour Court appears
to be oblivious also to the fact that there is only one such letter. Even
taking it at its face value, there is no letter written by any of the other 89
applicants. The Labour Court also lost sight of the fact that the applicants
were favoured with amounts under the Scheme. By way of cheque the D
amounts stood credited in their accounts. The application is moved only
after several months of receiving the benefits.
85. We are, therefore, of the clear view that no case was made
out before the Labour Court for invoking Section 33A read with Section
33 of the Act. In the case of Writ of Certiorari, no doubt, the Court also E
bears in mind that it is not axiomatic, or that upon a finding of illegality, a
court is bound to interfere. The court may still exercise its discretion and
decline jurisdiction unless there is manifest injustice. Bearing in mind
this principle also, we are inclined to think that the appellants have made
out a case of manifest injustice if the Award is allowed to stand. Large
sums were spent by a Public Sector Corporation in seeking to trim its F
work force. The workers voluntarily on our finding, accepting the terms
of the Scheme, receiving the benefits, thereunder, and got separated.
Implementing the Award would mean reinstatement of the workers and
that too with 70 per cent back-wages, when there was absolutely no
warrant for the same. G
86. There is only one aspect which remains. During the pendency
of the Writ Petition filed by the appellants in the High Court, 28 applicants
deposited the amount which they have received from the appellants so
that application under Section 17B of the Act could be pursued. This
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342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 12 S.C.R.

A amount must be directed to be returned to the concerned workmen who
had made the deposit and we also feel that the amount should be returned
with interest.
87. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the
High Court is set aside. The Award passed by the Labour Court is set
B aside and the application filed by the applicants is dismissed. However,
the appellants will return the entire amount deposited with them by the
28 applicants with interest at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from the
date of deposit till the date of payment. The amount shall be returned
back with interest as above to the applicants concerned within a period
of two months form the date of receipt of copy of this judgment.
C
88. There shall be no order as to costs.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.

D

E

F

G

H