Holding

Amendment of the claim under the CPC removes the pre‑amended Section 25 limitation, allowing compensation above the original claim; the enhanced solatium and interest under Sections 23 and 28 apply, but Section 23(1‑A) does not apply as the case falls outside the scope of Section 30(1).

Summary

The Ghaziabad Development Authority acquired about 6,200 sq. yards of land in 1964‑67. The original award fixed the market value at Rs 2 per sq. yard; claimants sought reference and claimed Rs 20 per sq. yard, later amended to Rs 100 per sq. yard under the CPC. The Reference Court awarded Rs 40 per sq. yard with 15% solatium and 6% interest. After the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 amended Sections 25, 23 and 28, the High Court enhanced the market value to Rs 85, solatium to 30% and interest to the new rate, and granted an additional amount under Section 23(1‑A). The Supreme Court examined (1) whether compensation could exceed the original claim despite pre‑amended Section 25, (2) whether the enhanced solatium and interest apply, and (3) whether Section 23(1‑A) benefits apply. It held that the CPC amendment allowing the claim to be altered removes the bar of Section 25, permitting higher compensation; the enhanced solatium and interest apply because the awards fall within the retrospective window of Section 30(2); but Section 23(1‑A) does not apply as the case is outside the ambit of Section 30(1). Consequently, the appeals were partly allowed, denying the benefit of Section 23(1‑A) while otherwise dismissing the appeals.

Issues considered

Whether claimants can receive compensation exceeding the amount originally claimed under pre‑amended Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act after amendment of the claim under the CPC.
Whether the enhanced solatium and interest rates under Sections 23 and 28, as amended by the 1984 Act, apply to awards made before the amendment but within the period specified in Section 30(2).
Whether the additional amount under Section 23(1‑A) of the amended Act is applicable to pending proceedings initiated before the amendment.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 18, s. 19, s. 23(2), s. 25, s. 28, s. 30(1), s. 30(2), s. 4(1), s. 53, s. 6, s. 9
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984s. 23, s. 23(1-A), s. 25, s. 28, s. 30(1), s. 30(2)

Subjects

Land acquisitionCompensationAmendment of claimSection 25SolatiumInterestRetrospective effectSection 23(1-A)Civil Procedure Code

Judgment

A GHAZIABAD DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
v.
ANOOP SINGH AND ANR.

JANUARY 23, 2003

B [K.G. BALAKRISHNAN AND P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 :

Section 25 {prior to Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 68of1984) and
C Section 53-Compensation-Whether can be awarded over and above the
claimed amount-Award passed prior to the effective date ofamended Section
25-Amendment of the claim under CPC allowed-Held, though pre- ~
amendment Section would be attracted in the case, but in the instant case it
does not get att;acted in view of the amendment of the claim as CPC is
D applicable to the proceedings under the Act-Code a/Civil Procedure, 1908.

Sections 23(2) and 28 (as amended by Land Acquisition (Amendment)
Act, 1984, Section 23(1-A) (as inserted by Land Acquisition Amendment Act,
1984); Sections 30(J)(a),(b) and 30(2)-Applicability ofthe amended provisions
to pending proceedings-Held, in the/acts of the case, Sections 23(2) and 28
E are applicable as the dates of award passed by the Collector as well as the
Reference Court fall within the time span specified in Section 30(2/-Section
23(1-A) is applicable to pending proceedings only when the cases/all within
the ambit of Section 30(1)(a) and (b)-Jn the/acts of the case, not applicable
since the case does not fall within the ambit of Section 30(1)(a) and (b).

F In land acquisition proceedings, claimants being dissatisfied with the
compensation amount, filed application for reference claiming therein
compensation at the rate of Rs. 20 per sq. yard. After the case was
referred to Reference Court, claimants filed a petition for amendment of
the claim, under CPC seeking fixation of compensation at the rate of Rs.
G 100 per sq. yard and the application was allowed. Reference Court
determined compensation of the rate of Rs. 40 per sq. yard and awarded
solatium at 15% and interest at 6%.

Subsequent to passing of award Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,
1984 was passed whereby Sections 25, 23 and 28 were amended. Section
H sn
G.D.A. v. ANOOP SINGH 523

25 was substituted so as to remove the bar against the award of A
y compensation in excess of what was claimed. Sections 23 and 28 enhanced
the rates of solatium and interest.

In appeal of the claimants, High Court enhanced the market value
to Rs. 85 per sq. yard and directed 30% solatium and interest at enhanced
rate prescribed by amended Section 28. It also awarded an additional B
amount u/s 23(1-A). Appeal of the appellant-authority was dismissed by
High Court. Hence the present appeals.

Partly allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. In the instant case, the award was passed by the Land
c
Acquisition Officer and the Reference Court earlier to the effective date
of substitution of Section 25 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Hence, the
limitation on the power of the Court to award compensation as enjoined
by the pre-amended Section would be attracted. However, there is a
formidable impediment for the appellant to take shelter under the pre- D
existing Section 25. On a petition filed by the claimant, the application
wherein compensation was claimed at Rs. 20 per square Yard was allowed
to be amended by an order of the Reference Court. By virtue of Section
53 of the Land Acquisition Act, the provisions of CPC shall apply to all
proceedings before the Court unless they are inconsistent with anything E
contained in the Act. There is no bar under the Land Acquisition Act to
file a petition for amendment of the claim under the Land Acquisition Act
to file a petition for amendment of the claim application in regard to the
quantum of compensation claimed as there is no provision in the Land
Acquisition Act which is inconsistent with the power to allow amendment.
When once this amendment is recognized and taken note of, it is obvious F
that the bar under Section 25 does not get attracted. Legality or propriety
of the order permitting amendment was neither specifically challenged
before the High Court nor a specific ground taken that it was contrary to
Section 25. At this stage, the appellant cannot be permitted to assail the
correctness of the order permitting amendment. [526-H; 527-A-Fl G
Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal. [20001 7 SCC, relied
on.

2.1. In the present case, the dates of the award of the Collector and
the award made by the Reference Court, both fall' within the time span H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A specified in Section 30(2) of the Act The error committed by the Reference
Court in granting solatium and interest at the rates specified in tile old 'r
Sections 23 and 28 was rightly set right by the High Court by awarding
solatium and interest at the enhanced rates. [528-Hl

Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, [19891 2 SCC 754, followed.
B
K.S. Paripoornan (11) v. State of Kera/a and Ors., (199511 SCC 367,
relied on.

2.2. Section 23(1-A) would be applicable only to those cases which
C fall within the ambit of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 30
of the Amending Act. The respondents are not entitled to the benefit of
additional amount under Section 23(1-A) as the case does not fall within
the ambit of either Clause (a) or Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section
30 of the amending Act.

D K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kera/a & Ors., (1994] 5 SCC 593, relied
on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5101 of
1996.

E From the Judgment and Order dated 5.2.1993 of the Allahabad High
Court in F.A. No. 169 of 1985.

WITH

C.A. No. 5102/96.
F
M.N. Krishnamani and Sudhir Kulshreshtha with him, for the Appellants.

Dushyant A. Dave, Mrs. Divya Roy, Jawahar Singh, Mrs. Vanita
Bhargava and Ms. Bina Gupta with him, for the Respondent.

G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

P. VENKAT ARAMA RED DI, J. In these appeals by Special leave
preferred against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in a First Appeal,
two questions arise for consideration : ( 1) whether the respondents land holders
H could claim and get compensation under the Land Acquisition Act over and
G.D.A. v. ANOOP SINGH [P. VENKATARAMA REODI, J.) 525
•
above what they claimed in an application seeking reference to Civil Court A
..., and (2) whether the respondents are entitled to the statutory benefits under
Sections 23 and 28 as amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act
of 1984?

An extent of two bighas and I biswa equivalent to 6,20 I sq. yards
situated in the village of Jatwara Kalan of Ghaziabad District was acquired B
under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, starting with the publication
of Notification under Section 4(1) on 18.8.1962. The acquisition was for the
purpose of implementation of a scheme for planned development of Ghaziabad
Municipal Area taken up by the then Improvement Trust, Ghaziabad - the
appellant, being its successor. The declaration under Section 6 was made on
27th October, 1964, possession was taken on 22.12.1964 and the award was
c
passed by the Land Acquisition Special Officer on 26.6.1967. The market
K value was fixed by him as low as Rs. 2 per sq. yard, evaluating it as agricultural
land. Being dissatisfied with the same, an application was filed by the claimants
seeking reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. In that
application, compensation was claimed at the rate of Rs. 20 per sq. yard. D
Though the application is said to be ante dated in collusion with the then
Land Acquisition Officer, there is no evidence to that effect. After the case
was referred to the court of District Judge at Ghaziabad, the claimants filed
)- a petition for amendment of the application dated 11.7.1967 seeking fixation
of market value at Rs. I 00 per sq. yard instead of Rs. 20. The same was E
allowed. The Reference Court by its judgment dated 31.5.1984 determined
the market value at the rate of Rs. 40 per sq. yard and also awarded solatium
at IS per cent and interest at 6 per cent on the amount of compensation from
the date of taking possession till the date of payment. Shortly thereafter, the
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (Act 68 of 1984) was enacted by the
Parliament which, inter alia, amended Section 25, Section 23 and Section 28. F
~ By the latter two Sections, the rates of solatium and interest were enhanced
and the benefit of additional amount of 12 per cent was also conferred.
Section 25 was substituted so as to remove the bar against the award of
compensation in excess of what was claimed pursuant to the notice issued
under Section 9. Section 25 of the Act came into force from 24.9.1984. The
G
amendment of two provisions viz., Sections 23 and 28 were given limited
retrospective effect as mentioned in Section 30 of the amendment Act.
_.,
The claimants preferred an appeal in the High Court praying for further
enhancement of compensation. The appellant herein also filed appeal
questioning the enhancement of compensation by the Civil Court. The High H
526 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] I S.C:R.

A Court by the impugned judgment dated 05.2.1993 allowed the appeal of the
claimants partly by enhancing the market value to Rs. 85 per sq. yard, based T
on the judgment in a comparable case. The High Court directed solatium to
be awarded at 30 per cent, and interest at the enhanced rates prescribed by '-
the amended Section 28. The High Court also awarded an additional amount
under Section 23 (l-A) at 12 per cent per annum on the market value
B determined by it commencing from 25th April, 1962 till the date of taking
possession of the land. It may be stated that the appellant also filed an appeal
_),.
questioning enhancement by the Reference Court. The appeal filed by the
appellant was consequentially dismissed. It is against this judgment that these
two appeals are preferred by the Ghaziabad Development Authority.
c For the purpose of resolving the first question, we may refer to Section
25, before and after its amendment. As per the original Section 25, "when the
applicant had made a claim to compensation pursuant to any notice given ~
under Section 9, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed
the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the Collector
D under Section 11 (Emphasis supplied)". We ;1eed not refer to the other two
sub-Sections. By Act 68 of 1984, Section 25 was substituted by the new
Section 25 which reads as follows:

"The amount of compensation awarded by the Court shall not be less
than the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11."
·-i
E
Construing the new Section 25, this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal, [2000] 7 SCC Page 756 observed thus:

"Section 25 before its substitution by Act 68 of 1984, mandated the
court not to award compensation exceeding the amount so claimed by
F the landowners and not to be less than the amount awarded by the
~
Collector. This very clearly limits awarding of compensation within
the amount claimed. On the facts of the present case it is not in
dispute that the award itself was given on 27-12-1977 and even
proceeding pursuant to referring order, was concluded on 28-2-1981,
G i.e., much prior to the aforesaid amending Act. Thus, on the facts of
this case, it is unamended Section 25 to be applicable and not the
amended section. In view of this, the peripheral limitation on the
court awarding the compensation, would equally apply to the High )-
Court exercising its power as the first appellate court."

H It was then emphasized in paragraph 9 that the enhancement by the
G.D.A. v. ANOOP SINGH [P. VENKATARAMA REDD!, J.) 527

High Court could only be to the extent the landowners claimed. A
As in the above case, in the instant case too, the award was passed by
the Land Acquisition Officer and the Reference Court earlier to the effective
date of substitution of Section 25. Hence, the limitation on the power of the
Court to award compensation as enjoined by the pre-amended Section would
be attracted. However, there is a fonnidable impediment for the appellant to B
take shelter under the pre-existing Section 25. On a petition filed by the
claimant, the application dated J I. 7.1967 wherein compensation was claimed
at Rs.20 per square yard was allowed to be amended by an order of the
Reference Court passed in the year 1983. It is to be noted that by virtue of
Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil C
Procedure shall apply to all proceedings before the Court unless they are
inconsistent with anything contained in the Act. In the light of this provision,
the High Court rightly held that there is no bar under the Land Acquisition
Act to file a petition for amendment of the claim application in regard to the
quantum of compensation claimed as there is no provision in the Land D
Acquisition Act which is inconsistent with the power to allow amendment.
Th< effect of allowing the amendment is to substitute the figure of Rs.20 by
Rs. I 00 per square yard. When once this amendment is recognized and taken
note of, it is obvious that the bar under Section 25 does not get attracted.
Whether this amendment could have been permitted in the face of the
unamended Section 25 has not been put in issue before the High Court in E
specific tenns. Even in the S.L.P. we found, in vain, any ground questioning
the order allowing the amendment. No doubt, a party has right to challenge
a non appealable order in an appeal against the decree as laid down in Rule
IA of Order 43. But, the fact remains that the legality or propriety of the
order pennitting amendment was neither specifically challenged before the F
High Court nor a specific ground taken that it was contrary to Section 25. At
this stage, the appellant cannot be pennitted to assail the correctness of the
order permitting amendment. If that be so, the first contention based on the
pre-existing Section 25 has to be necessarily rejected.

The second question i.s no longer res integra as it is concluded by G
authoritative pronouncements of this Court. In Union oflndia versus Raghubir
Singh, (1989] 2 SCC 754 the question arose before the Constitution Bench
whether the claimants were entitled to solatium at 30% of the market value
irrespective of the date on which the acquisition proceedings were initiated
or the date on which the award was passed. Interpreting Section 30(2) of the H
528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) I S.C.R.

A Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act 68 of 1984, the Constitution Bench
observed thus:

"In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to be clear that the
award made by the Collector referred to here is the award made by
the Collector under Section 11 of the parent Act, and the award made
B by_ the Court is the award made by the Principal Civil Court of Original
Jurisdiction under Section 2.3 of the parent Act on a reference made
to it by the Collector under Section 19 of the parent Act. There can
be no doubt that the benefit of the enhanced solatium is intended by
Section 30(2) in respect of an award made by the Collector between
c April 30, 1982 and September 24, 1984. Likewise the benefit of the
enhanced solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to the case of an
. award made by the Court between April 30, 1982 and September 24,
1984, even though it be upon reference from an award made before
April 30, 1982."

D It was further clarified

" .......to our in ind it must necessarily intend that the appeal to the
High Court or the Supreme Court in which the benefit of enhanced
solatium is to be given must be confined to an appeal against an
E award of the Collector or of the Court rendered between April 30, ~.'
1982 and September 24, 1984".
The intention behind the Section 30(2) was stressed in the following
words:

F ".....Parliament intended that the benefit of the enhanced solatium
should be made available, albeit to a limited degree, even in respect
of acquisition proceedings taken before that date. It sought to effectuate
that intention by enacting Section 30(2) in the Amendment Act."
In the present case, both the award made by the Collector under Section .-
I
·G 11 as well as the award passed by the Civil Court on reference fall within the
two termini indicated in Section 30(2) as interpreted by the Constitution
Bench of this Court. The award of the Collector was on 26.6.1967 and the .
award made by the Reference Court was on 31.S.1984. Hence, both these
dates fall within the time span specified in Section 30(2) and reiterated by
H this Court. The error committed by the Reference Court in granting solatium
G.D.A. v. ANOOP SINGH (P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, J.] 529

and interest at the rates specified in the old Sections 23 and 28 was rightly A
set right by the High Court by awarding solatium and interest at the enhanced
rates. Though, in Rar;hubir Singh 's case (supra), this Court was concerned
with the percentage of the solatium payable under Section 23; the same
principle would equally apply to the rate of interest payable under Section
28. Both Section 23(2) as well as Section 28 are referred to in the same sub- B
Section which was construed in Raghubir Singh 's case (supra). What applies
to solatium is equally applicable to interest. This position has not been disputed
before us and cannot be disputed in view of the legal position declared by a
three Judge Bench of this Court in [1995) I SCC 367.

The next aspect which needs to be considered is whether the benefit C
under Section 23(1A) could be extended to the claimants. Sub-Section (IA)
of Section 23, inserted by Act 68 of 1984 and made effective from 24.9.1984
provides for payment of an amount calculated at the rate of 12% per annum
of the market value for the period commencing on and from the date of
publication of the notification under Section 4(1) till the date of the award of D
the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land whichever is earlier.
This amount is in addition to the market value of the land ·acquired. The
question of applicability of Section 23(1A) to the pending proceedings came
up for consideration before another Constitution Bench in KS. Paripoornan
v. State of Kera/a & Ors., [1994) 5 SCC 593. Agarwal, J. speaking for the
majority, observed thus: E
" ..... .Jfsub-Section (I-A) of Section 23 is construed in the light of the
provisions contained in sub-Section (I) of Section 30 of the amending
Act there is no escape from the conclusion that Section 23(1-A), by
itself, has no application to proceedings which had commenced prior F
to the enactment of the amending Act and the applicability of the said
provision to pending proceedings is governed exclusively by sub-
section (I) of Section 30 of the amending Act."

In paragraph 75, the legal position was succinctly stated as follows:

" ..... Merely because sub-Section (I) of Section 30 only refers to award G
made by the Collector while sub-Section (2) of Section 30 also refers
to an award made by the Court as well as the order passed by the
High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against such award does
not mean that Section 23(1-A) was intended to have application to all
proceedings which were pending before the civil Court on the date of H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003) 1 S.C.R.

A the commencement of the amending Act. The difference in the
· phraseology in sub-Sections (I) and (2) of Section 30 only indicates
the limited nature of the retrospectivity that has been given to
provisions contained in Section 23(1-A) under Section 30(1) as
compared to that given to the provisions of Sections 23(2) and 28
under Section 30(2). The limited scope of the retrospectivity that has
B
been conferred in respect of Section 23( 1-A) under sub-Section ( 1) of
Section 30 does not lend support to the contention that the scope of
fJ such retrospectivity should be enlarged by reading such further
retrospectivity·into the provisions of Section 23( 1-A). For the reasons
aforementioned we are of the view that in relation to proceedings
c which were initiated prior to the date of the commencement of the
amending Act Section 23(1~A) would be applicable only to those
cases which fall within the ambit of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-Section
(1) of Section 30 of the amending Act.

xxx xxx xxx xxx
D
There is, therefore, no scope for extending the ambit of retrospective
operation of sub-Section ( 1-A) of Section 23 beyond the limits
specified in Section 30(1) of the amending Act so as to apply it to all
proceedings initiated prior to the date of coming into force of the .
amending Act which were pending before the Civil Court on reference
E
under Section 18 of the principal Act irrespective of the date on
which the award was made by the Collector. For the reasons
aforementioned we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in Union
of India v. Zora Singh, [1992) I SCC 673 that sub-Section (I-A) of
Section 23 would apply to all proceedings pending in the reference
F Court on the date of commencement oftl~e amending Act iITespective
of the date on which award was made by the Collector. In our opinion,
the provisions of Section 23(1-A) of the principal Act and Section
30(1) of the amending Act have been correctly construed in Union of
India v. Filip Tiago, [1990) I SCC 277 to mean that the obligation
G to pay additional amount in respect of proceedings initiated before
the date of commencement of the amending Act is confined to the
matters covered by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-Section (I) of Section
30 of the amending Act and we endorse the said view."

In the light of this ruling, the respondents are not entitled to the benefit
H of additional amount under Section 23(1-A) as the case does not fall within
G.D.A. v. ANOOP SINGH (P. VENKATARAMA REDDI, J.) 531
the ambit of either Clause (a) or Clause (b) of sub-Section (I) of Section 30 A
of the amending Act. To this extent, the judgment of the High Court which
was rendered prior to the decision in Paripoornan 's case (supra) cannot be
sustained.

In the result, the appeals are allowed to the limited extent of denying
the benefit of Section 23(1-A) to the respondents/claimants. In other respects, B
the appeals stand dismissed with no order as to costs.

K.K.T. Appeals Partly allowed.

>