Holding

A sub‑tenant who can demonstrate the landlord’s written consent and written notice, as evidenced by the attested letter, is entitled to the protection of Sections 17 and 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 and cannot be evicted under the landlord’s decree.

Summary

The appellant, Giradhari Lal & Sons, occupied premises as sub‑tenants of M/s Om Prakash & Co., which itself was the tenant of the landlord, Balbir Nath Mathur. The landlord obtained an ex parte eviction decree against the tenant, and the appellant sought protection under Sections 17 and 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming that the landlord had given written consent to the sub‑tenancy and had been notified of it. The Court examined the statutory requirements that the landlord’s consent and the tenant’s notice must be evidenced in writing, and held that the letter attested by the landlord satisfied both conditions. Consequently, the appellant was deemed a protected sub‑tenant and could not be evicted under the landlord’s decree. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, upheld the sub‑tenant’s protection, and dismissed the landlord’s claim for eviction.

Issues considered

The appellant is a sub‑tenant; does he qualify for protection under Sections 17 and 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958?
Has the landlord given prior written consent to the sub‑tenancy and received written notice as required by the Act?
Is the letter attested by the landlord sufficient evidence of consent and notice?
Can the landlord’s ex parte eviction decree be enforced against the sub‑tenant?

Legislation cited

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 17, s. 18
Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959s. Rule 21, s. Rule 22

Subjects

sub‑tenantDelhi Rent Control Actevictionlandlord consentstatutory interpretationsections 17 and 18rent controlleasesub‑letting

Judgment

383

A
GIRDllARI LAL & SONS
v.
BALBIR NA1'B llA1'llllR & ORS •.

FEBRUARY 26, 1986
B
ro. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND v. KHALID, JJ,]
...
~ ~
DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958:

Sections 17 & 18 - 'Sub-tenant' when entitled to protec-
tion against eviction - Consent of landlord to the sub-tenancy
and notice of creation of sub-tenancy to be evidenced in c
writing-letter of sub-tenancy - Attested by landlord - Whether
sufficient.

INTERPRETATION QF STATUTES : ·

.... Ascertain
Statute - Interpretation of - Primary duty of court -
intention of legislature - Actual or - imputed -
D

Thereafter interpret statute so as to prom::>te and advance its
object and purpose by supplementing the written word if
necessary.

The respondent-landlord, Balbir Nath Mathur had let out E
the demised premises to a firm M/s. Om Prakash & Co., whose
three partners were close relations of the respondent-land-
lord. The tenant-firm in turn leased out the premises to the
appellant-firm. A letter executed by the tenant-firm and
attested by the respondent land-lord was passed on to the ·
y appellant-firm had confirmed the lease and further undertook F
to pay to the appellant-firm as damages a sum calculated at
the rate of Rs.2,500 per month for the unexpired period of the
.lease if the appellant-firm had to vacate the premises before
the expiry of the lease period of two years. Simultaneously,
the appellant-firm also executed a letter addressed to the
respondent-landlord, in which, after referring to the lease of G
the premises in their favour, it was stated that they would
pay a sum of Rs.8,400 per annum aa donation to the trust of
•. 1'.__ which respondent-landlord and others were trustees, . if they
i19· stayed on in the premises after the expiry of the period of
lease. By a letter dated June 10, 1975 the tenant-firm had
H.
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 s.c.R.

A
demaruled payment of arrears of rent from appellant-£ irm. This ;,..
letter was signed by the respondent-landlord himself on
behalf of the tenant-firm.

The respondent-landlord obtained an !!!. parte decree for
eviction against the tenant-firm and one of its partners. In
B
the execution proceedings, the appellant-firm, in whose occu-
pation the premises were, filed an objection petition before
the Rent Controller under s.25 of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958. The objection petition was rejected by the Rent Control- i'. '<"
ler and his order was confimed by the Rent Control Tribunal
as well as by the High. Court.
c In appeal to this Court it 11as contended on behalf of
the appellant-firm/sub-tenant : (1) that they were not sub-
tenants but the direct tenants of respondent-landlord as he
himself and negotiated the lease and inducted them into
possession; (ii) that even if they were sub-tenants only, they
D
were entitled to the protection of sections 17 and 18 of the ~
Act; (iii) that the decree obtained by the respondent-landlord
was a collusive decree and that a fraud had been played upon •
the Court to get rid of the appellant-firm and (iv) that there
was consent in writing by the landlord to ~he sub-tenancy, as
well as notice in writing to the landlord of the sub-tenancy
within the meaning of sections 17 and 18 of the Act and,
E
therefore, they were entitled to be protected against
eviction.

Allowing the appeal,

BBLll : (By the Court)
F
The appellant/sub-tenant is clearly entitled to the ~
protection of s. 17 and 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958
and he cannot, therefore, be evicted in execution of the
decree obtained by respondent-landlord against tenant-respon-
dent. (396 F]
G
(Per Qlhmappa lleddy, .J.)

1. The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is primarily devised
to prevent unreasonable eviction of the tenants and sub- .,,/; •
tenants from demised premises and unreasonable enhancement of
H
GIRDHARI LAL v. B.N. MATHUR 385

A
rent. Showing an awareness of the problems of sub-tenants,
the Legislature enacted ss. 17 and 18 for their protection.
[395 C-D; E-F]
2. The Legislature while offering protection to a
sub-tenant who has been inducted into possession by a landlord
has limited the protection to the sub-tenant who can establish B
the consent of the landlord by documentary evidence to which
the landlord and the tenant or the sub-tenant are parties. So

-·
it is provided that the previous consent of the landlord has
' to be in writing and that a notice in the prescribed manner
has to be given to the landlord by the tenant or the
sub-tenant. The essence of the requirement, therefore, is that
the consent of the landlord to the sub-tenancy and the notice c
of the creation of the sub-tenancy have to be evidenced by
writing. The writing is to be such as to indicate clearly the
consent of the landlord to the creation of a sub-tenancy and
his knowledge of the particular sub-tenancy after its
creation. The writing relating to the consent and the writing
relating to the knowledge (notice) may be by different D
documents or they may telescope into the same document.
[395 H; 396 A-<:]

3. There is no magical form in which the consent is to
be given nor any charmed form in which the notice is to be
sent. The essence of the matter is that the consent to the E
sub-tenancy and the notice of the sub-tenany in respect of the
premises 1111st be evidenced by written consent of the landlord
and the tenant or the sub-tenant. [396 ~]

Where, as in the instant case, the agreement or the
letter of the sub-tenancy in respect of the demised premises F
is attested by the landlord himself, there can be no question
• that the landlord has given his previous consent and that he
has notice in writing of the sub-tenancy in respect of the
particular premises. The requirements of sections 17 and 18 of
the Act both as regards to his consent and the notice to him
are satisfied. [396 C-D] G
4. The primary and foremost task of a court in inter-
preting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the legis-
lature, actual or imputed. Having ascertained the intention,
~....,the court 1111St then strive to. so interpret the statute as to
·. ' 'promote and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. H
For this purpose, where necessary the court may even depart
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 1 s.c.R.
A

from the rule that plain words should be interpreted according
to their plain meaning. There need be no meek and 1111te r
submission to the plainness of the language. To avoid patent
injustice, anamoly or absurdity or to avoid invalidation of a
law, the c6urt would be well justified in departing from the
B so-called golden rule of construction so as to give effect to
the object and purpose of the enactment by supplementing, the
written word, if necessary. (391 B-D]

c
11a!i1tins v. ·Gatbercole, 43, English Reports 1129, ec-t
Radio Vision Services v. Farnell Trand Bord, [1971] Ill All
E.R. 230; Seaford Court l!atates Lillited v. Ashor, [1949] 2 All
,
-
E.R. 155; 1luggy Joint Water Board v. Fottit, [1972] 1 A.E.R.
1057; K.P. Vcrgt e v. I.T.O., [1981] 4 S.C.C. 173; State Bank
of Travaocore v. Mohd. M. lhan [1981] s.c.c. 82; Som Prakash
Rathi v. Union of India, [1981] S.C.C. I 449, Rawla Sabba Rao
v. c.1.T., [19561 s.c.R. 577; Gorlndlal v. Market c-t.ttee,
D [1976] 1 s.c.R. 482 and Babaji Kondaji v. llaaik llercbants
Coop. Bank, [1984] 2 s.c.c. 50 relied upon.

(Per Khalid, J.)

In nopnal cases a sub-tenant under the Delhi Rent
E Control Act 1958 can get relief under the provisions of the
Act only if he satisfies the twin conditions in •• 17 viz.
there 1111st be the previous consent to writing by the landlord
of the creation of the sub-tenancy, and a notice in the pres-
cribe manner by the sub-tenant of the creation of the
sub-tenancy to the landlord within one month of the date of
F such creation. It is only when these two conditions are satis-
fied that the consequences mentioned in s. 18 will follow.
[398 B-C]

Normally, s. 17 should be strictly complied with, for
the sub-tenant to get the benefit under s.18. (398 F]
G
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2153 of
1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.9.1980 of the Delhi
High Court in S.A. No. 287 of 1980.
H
M.K. Mukhi, Girish Chandra and Mrs. Sarla Chandra for ...f·-.
the Appellants.
GIRDHARI LAL v. B.N. MATHUR fCHINNAPPA REDDY, J.] 387

A
F.S. Nariman, R.N. Karanjawala, Mrs. Manik Karanajawala,
-( Ejaz Maqbooi, M.L. Lahoty, S.P. Singh, K.P. Gupta and Miss
llelevs Marc for the Respondents.

The following Judgments of the Court were delivered
B
CHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Balbir Nath Mathur obtained an ex-

-,
parte decree for eviction against M/s. Om Prakash & Company
and Kusum Rani, a partner of M/s. Om Prakash & Company in
respect of the ground floor of premises of NQ. 90, Sunder
'
Nagar, New Delhi. Three of the partners of M/s. Om Prakash &
Company, it must be mentioned at the outset, are the sister-
in-law and the two minor daughters of Balbir Nath Mathur c
himself. When Balbir Nath Mathur sought to execute the decree
for eviction, M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons who are in occupation
of the premises filed an objection petition before Rent
Controller, purporting to do so under s.zs'of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958. The objection petition was rejected by the
Rent Controller. The order of the Rent Controller wa8 confirm- D
ed an appeal, by the Rent Control Tribunal and, by the High
Court on further revision. M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons have filed
this appeal with the special leave of this court.

The Rent Controller and the Rent Control Tribunal
concurrently found that Balbir Nath Mathur was the owner of E
the premises, that Om Prakash & Company was the tenant and
that Girdhari Lal &Sons were the sub-tenants under·am Prakash
· & Company. The case of the appellants was that it was Balbir
Nath Mathur that negotiated the lease and inducted them into
possession and that they were not sub-tenants but the direct
tenants of .Balbir Nath Mathur. Even if they were sub-tenants F
• only, they claimed that they were entitled to the protec~ion
of sections 17 and 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. They
' alleged that the decree obtained ·by Balbir Nath Mathur was a
collusive decree and that a fraud had been played upon the
court to get rid of the appellant, M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons.
In view of the concurrent findings that Om Prakash &Company G
was the tenant and M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons were the
. sub-tenants, we accept that finding and proceed to consider
the question whether the appellants "are entitled to the
protection of sections 17 and 18 of the Delhi Rent Control
\ • Act.
H
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] I s.c.a.

A
At the time when the premises was leased by Om Prakash &
Company to M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons a letter executed by Om :>-
Prakash &Company and attested by Balbir Nath Mathur was pass-
ed on to M/s. Girdhari Lal & Sons. By this letter, Om Prakash
& Company confirmed the lease and further undertook to pay to
the appellant as damages a sum calcuiated at the rate of
Rs.2500 per month for the unexpired period of the lease if
B
the appellant had to vacate the premises before the expiry of

-
the lease period of two years Simultaneously M/s. Girdhari Lal
& Sons executed a letter addressed to Balbir Nath Mathur in
which they stated, after ref erring to the lease of the house
in their favour by Om Prakash & Company, that they would pay a
sum of Rs.8400 per annum as donation to the Shree Visheshwar
c· Nath Memorial Public Charitable Trust, a trust of which Balbir
Nath Mathur and others were trustees, if they stayed in the
premises after the expiry of the period of lease. Another
important document to which we may ·make a reference is a
letter dated June 10, 1975 by which Om Prakash & Company
D
demanded payment of arrears of rent from M/s. Girdhari Lal &
Sons. This letter was signed by Balbir Nath Mathur himself on
...
behalf of Om Prakash Company. The contention of the appel-
lants is that there was consent in writing by the landlord to
...
the sub-tenancy, as well as notice and writing to the landlord
of the sub-tenancy within the meaning of sections 17 and 18 of
the Delhi Rent Control Act and therefore the sub-tenants M/s.
E Girdhari Lal & Sons were entitled to be protected against
eviction.

In order to appreciate the contention of the appellant
it is necessary to set out sections 17(1) and 18(1) of the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 :-
F
"17(1) Where, after the commencement of this Act,
any premises are sub-let either in whole or in part
by the tenant with the previous consent in writing
of the landlord t the tenant or the sub-tenant to
whom the premises are sub-let may, in the prescrib-
G ed manner, gave notice to the landlord of the crea-
tion of the sub-tenancy within one month of the
date of such.sub-letting and notify the termination
of such sub-tenancy within one month of such termi-
nation. , r
H (2) .••••••••••••.••••.•....•..•...............••
GIRDllARI LAL v. B.N. MATHUR [CHINNAPPA .REDDY, J.] 389

A
(3) . .••••••.•••••••.•....•••••••••••••••••.•••••
-{
18(1) Where an order for eviction in respect of any
premises is made .under section 14 against a tenant
but not against a sub-tenant referred to in section
17 and a notice of the sub-tenancy has been given B
to the landlord, the sub-tenant shall, with effect
from the date of the order, be deemed to become a
tenant holding directly under the landlord in
• respect of the premises in his occupation on the
same terms and conditions on which the tenant would
have held from the landlord, if the tenancy had
continued. c
(2) ••.•.•• ..•.•• •••••••••· •··•·••••••••••·••• •.• "
Rule 21 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, 1959 provides
that a notice ·of the creation or termination of sub-tenancy
required under s .17 shall be in Form . "E". Rule 22 provides D
that unless otherwise provided by the Act, any .not ice or
intimation required or authorised by the Act to be served on
any person·shall be served (a) by delivering it to the person;
or .(b) by forwarding it to. the person by register~d post with
acknowledgement due. Form "E" provides for a statement of full
particUlars of the demised premises, such as the StFeet, E
municipal ward and house number, nanes of the tenant and the
sub-tenant, details of the portion sublet, rent payable by the
sub-tenant, date of creation of the sub-tenancy, etc.

It may be worthwhile to restate and explain at this state
certain well known principles of Interpretation of Statutes: F
Words are but mere vehicles of thought. They are meant to
express or convey one's thoughts. Generally, _a person's words
and thoughts aie coincidental. No problem arises then, but,
not in frequently, then are not. It is common experience with
most men, that occasionally there are no adequate words to
express some of their thoughts. Words which very nearly
G
express the thoughts may be found but not words which will
.express precisely. There is then a great fumbling for words.
Long winded explan"ations and, in conversation, even gestures
are resorted to. Ambiguous words and words whicli unwittingly
convey more than one meaning are used. Where different
interpretations are likely to be put on words and a question H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ll 986 J 1 s.c.R.
A
arises what an individual meant when he used certain words, he
may be asked to explain himself and he may do so and say that -l-
he meant one thing and not the other. But if it is the
legislature that has expressed itself by making the laws and
difficulties arise in interpreting what the legislature has
said, a legislature can not be asked to sit to resolve those
B difficulties. The legislatures, unlike on individuals, cannot
colll'! forward to explain themselves as often as difficulties of
interpretation arise. So the task of interpreting the laws by
finding out what the legislature lll'!ant is allotted to the ,
courts. Now, if one person puts into words the thoughts of
another (as the draftsman puts into words the thoughts of the
c legislature) and a third person (the court) is to find out
what they meant, more difficulties are bound to crop up. The
draftsman may not have caught the spirit of the legislation at
all; the words used by him may not adequately convey what is
lll'!ant to be conveyed; the words may be ambiguous; they may be
words capable of being differently understood by different
D persons. How are the courts to set about the task of resolving
difficulties of interpretation of the laws? The foremost task • .,
of a court, as we conceive it, in the Interpretation of
Statutes, is to find out the intention of the legislature. Of >-
course, where words are clear and un~mbiguous no question of
construction may arise. Such words ordinarily speak for
E themselves. Since the words must have spoken as clearly to
legislators as to judges, it may be safely presumed that the
legislature intended what the words plainly say. This is the
real basis of the so called golden rule of construction that
where the words of statutes are plain and unambiguous effect
must be. given to them. A court should give effect to plain
F words, not because there is any charm or magic in the plain-
ness of such words but because plain words may be expected to -•
convey plainly the intention of the Legislature to other as y
well as judges. Intention of the legislature and not the words
is paramount. Even where the words of statutes appear to be
prima facie clear and unambiguous it may some times be possi-
G ble that the plain meaning of the words does not convey and
may even defeat the intention of the legislature; in such
cases there is no reason why the true intention of the legis-
lature, if it can be determined, clearly by other means,
should not be given effect. Words are meant to serve and not
to govern and we are not to add the tyranny of words to the I
H other tyrannies of the world. '
•
GIRDHARI LAL v. B.N. MATHUR [CHINNAPPA REDDY, J,] 391

A
-1> Parliamentary intention may be gathered ·from several
sources. First, of course, it llllSt be gathered from the
statute itself' next from the preamble to the statoite' next
from the Statement of Objects and Reasons·, thereafter from
Parliamentary debates, reports of Committees and Commissions
which preceded the legislation. and finally from.all legitimate B
and admissible sources from where there may oe light. Regard
must be had to legislative history too •

..,. \ Once Parliamentary intention is ascertained and the
object and purpose of the legislation is known, it then
becomes the duty of the couct to· give the statute a purposeful
or a functional interpretation. this is what is meant when, c
for example, it is said that measures aimed at social amelio-
ration should receive liberal or beneficient construction.
Again, the words of a statute may not be designed to meet the
several uncontemplated forensic situations that may arise. The
draftsman may have designed his words to meet what Lord Simon
•;. • of Glaisdale calls the 'primary situation'. It will' then D
become necessiry for the court to impute an intention to
1 Parliament in regard to 'secondary situations'. Such 'second-
ary intention' may be imputed in relation to a secondary
situation so as to best serve the same purpose as the primary
statutory intention does in relation to a primary situation.
E
So we see that the primary and 'foremost task of a court
in interpreting a statute is to ascertain the intention of the
legislature, actual or imputed. Having ascetained the inten-
tion, the court must then strive to so interpret the statute
as to promote or advance the object and purpose of the enact-
<!-' t ment. For this purpose, where necessary the court may even F
· depart from the rule that plain words should be interpreted
Y according to their plain meaning. There need be no neek and
mute submission to the plainness of the language. To avoid
patent injustice, anamoly or absurdity or to avoid invalida-
tion of a law, the court .would be well justified in departing
from the so-called golden rule of construction so as to give G
effect to the object and purpose of the enactment by supple-
menting, the written word if necessary.

In an old English case, Hawkins v. Gathercole, 43 English
)--Reports 1129, Turner, CJ., referred to tWo earlier cases
reported by Plowden. In the first case of Stradling v. Morgan, H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1986] 1 S.C.R.

A
the Judges were reported to have said : .)-

"That the Judges of the law in all times past have
so far pursued the intent of the makers of the
statutes, that they have expounded Acts which were
general in words to be but particular, where the
B intent was particular •••••••••••••••••••• ~·········
........ From which cases it apears that the sages
of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite I
contrary to the letter in some appearance; and - "-.. .
those statutes which comprehend all things in the
letter, they have expounded to extend but to some-
c things; and those which generally prohibit all
people from doing such an act, they have inter-
preted, to permit some people to do it; and those
which include every person in the letter, they have
adjudged to reach to some persons only; which
expositions have always been founded upon the
D intent of the Legislature, which they have collect-
ed, sometimes by considering the cause and
necessity of making the Act, sometimes by comparing
one part of the Act with another, and sometimes by
foreign circumstances, so that they have ever been
guided by the intent of the Legislature, which they
E have always taken according to the necessity of the
matter, and according to that which is consonant to
reason and good discretion.

Turner, CJ himself added,

F "The passages to which I have referred have • ..,.
selected only as containing the best summary with
which I acquainted of the law upon this subject. In
determining the question before us, we have
"
therefore, to consider not merely the words of this
Act of Parliament, but the intent of the Legis-
G lature, to be collected from the cause and
necessitx of the Act being made, from a comparison
of its several parts, and from foreign (meaning
extraneous) circumstances so· far as they can justly
be considered to throw light upon the subject." ..--!
H In a forthright pronouncement Goulding, J, said in
Comet Radio Vision Services v. Farnell Trand Borg, (1971] 3
GIRDHARI LAL v. B.N. MATHUR [CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.] 393

[
All E.R. 230. A

" ••• The language of parliament though not to be
extended beyond its fair construction, is not to be
interpreted in so slavishly literal a way as to
stultify the manifest purpose of the legislature."
B
· in Seaford Court Betates Limited v. -Ashor {1949] 2 All
E.R. 155 Lord Denning, who referred to Plowden's Reports
, ·already mentioned by us, said :

''Whenever a. statute comes up for consideration, it
1111st be remembered that it is not within human
powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which C
may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible
to provide for them in terms free from all
ambiguity ••••• A Judge cannot simply fold his hands
and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the
constructive task of finding the intention of
">-· ;
Parliament, and he 11111St do this not only from the D
language of the statute, but also from a
construction qf the social conditions which gave
rise to it and of the mischief which it was passed
to remedy and then he mst supplement the ·written
word so as to give force and life to the intention
of the legislature. Put into homely metaphor, it is E
this : A judge should a8k himself the question how,
if the mak.e rs of the Act had themselves come across
this ruck in the contexture of it they would have
straightened it out? Be aJSt · then do what . they
would have done. A judge should not alter the
material of which the- Act is woven, but he can and F
should iron out the creases."

In Rugby Joint Water Board v. Footttt · [1972] 1 A.E.R.
1057, Lord Simon of Glaisdale said:

"The task of· the courts is to ascertain what was G
the intention of Parliament, actual or to be
imputed, in relation to the facts as found by the
court •••• But on scrutiny of a statutory provision,
it will generally·appear that a given situation was
~ within the direct contemplation of the draftsman as
H
'I

394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19861 i s.c.1
A
the situation calling for statutory regulation:
this may be called the primary situation. As to
this, Parliament will certainly have manifested an
intention -'The Primary Statutory Intention'. But
situations other than the primary situation may
present themselves for judicial decisions
B secondary situations. As regards these secondary
situations, it may seem likely in some cases that
the draftsman had them in conteq>lation; in others
not. Where it seems likely that a secondary
situation was not within the draftsman's
contemplation, it will be necessary for the court
c to impute an intention to Parliament in the way I
have described, that is, to determine what would
have been this statutory intention if the secondary
situation had been within Parliamentary
conteq>lation (a secondary intention)."

D It may not be out of place to ref er here to what Harold
> ·<
Laski said • in his Report of the Conmit:tee on Ministers'
powers:

"The present methods of statutory interpretation
make the task of considering the relationship of
E statutes, especially in the realm of great social
experiments, to the social welfare they are intend-
ed to promote one in which the end involved may
become unduly narrowed, either by reason of the
unconscious assumptions of the Judge or because he
is observing the principles of interpretation
F devised to suit interests we are no longer concern-
ed to protect in the same degree as formerly ••• The
method of interpretation should be less analytical
and more functional in character; it should seek to
discover the effect of the legislative precept in
'
action so as to give full weight to the social
G value it is intended to secure."

In 1981, the Australian Parliament added a new section
15AA(l) to the Acts Interpretation Act, 1901, requiring that
in statutory interpretation "A construction that would promote
the purpose or object" of an Act (even if not ex.pressed in th~ r
H Act), be preferred to one that would not promote that purpose ·,..--·\
GIRDHARI LAL v. B.N. MATHUR [CHINNAPPA REDDY, J.] 395

A
or object. Julius Stone in his 'Precedent And Law - Dynamics
of Common Law Growth' also refers to this provision.

Our own court has generally taken the view that
ascertainment of legislative intent is a basic rule of
statutory construction and that' a rule of construction should B
be preferred which advances the purpose and object of a legis-
lation and that though a construction, according to plain
language, should ordinarily be adopted, such a construction
should not be adopted where it leads to anomalies, injustices
or absurdities, vide K.P. Varghese v. I.T.O. [1981] 4 S.c.c.
173, State Bank of Travancore. v. Mohd. K.Khan [1981] 4 S.C.C.
82, Som Prakash Rathi v. Union of India [1981] 1 s.c.c. 449, c
Rawla Subba Rao v. c.1.T. [1956] s.c.R. 577, Govindlal v.
Market Committee [19761 1 s.c.R. 482 & Babaji Kondaji v. Nasik
Merchants Coop. Bank [1984] 2 s.c.c. so.

Bearing these broad principles in mind if we now turn to
the Delhi Rent Control Act, it is at once apparent that the D
Act is primarily devised to prevent unreasonable eviction of
the tenants and sub-tenants from demised premises and
unreasonable enhancement of rent. In particular, the purpose
of sections 17 and 18 is cl.early to protect the sub-tenants
from eviction where a landlord obtains a decree for eviction
against the principal tenant. In an action for eviction by a E
landlord against the principal tenant; the sub-tenant has no
defence of his own under the ordinary law, even if he has been
inducted into possession with the consent of the landlord. He
has to go with the tenant. He can claim no right to sit in the
premises apart and distinct from the right of the tenant.
, Showing an awarencess of the problems of sub-tenants, the F
legislature enacted sections 17 and 18 for their protection.
~ The protection was afforded to sub-tenants who had been
inducted into possession with the consent of the landlord.
While so extending a protecting hand to the sub-tenants who
had genuinely obtained the consent of the landlord alone
should be entitled to that protection. The legislature wanted G
to prevent persons who had somehow managed to get into
possession, having been inducted into such possession by the
tenant or otherwise from putting forward baseless claims that
they were inducted into· possession with the consent of the
\,landlord. So the legislature while offering protection to a
· sub-tenant who has been inducted into possession by a landlord H
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1986] 1 S.C.R.

A has limited the protection to the sub-tenant who can establish }-
the consent of the landlord by documentary evidence to which
the landlord and the tenant or sub-tenant who can establish
the consent of the landlord by doccmentary evidence to which
the landlord and the tenant or sub-tenant are parties. So it
is provided that the previous consent of the landlord has to
be in writing and that a notice in the prescribed manner has
B to be given to the landlord by the tenant or the sub-tenant.
The essence of the requirement, therefore, is that the consent
of the landlord to the sub-tenancy and the notice of the
creation of the sub-tenancy have to be evidenced by writing.
The writing is to be such as to indicate clearly the consent
of the landlord to the creation of a sub~tenancy and his
c knowledge of the particular sub-tenancy after its creation.
The writing relating to the consent and the writing relation
to the knowledge (notice) may be by different documents or
they may telescope into the same document. Where, as in the
present case, the agreement or the letter of the sub-tenancy
in respect of the demised preml,ses is attested by the landlord
D himself, there can be no question that the landlord has given
his previous consent and that he has notice in writing of the
sub-tenancy in respect of the particular premises. The
requirements of secs. 17 and 18 both as regards to his consent
and the notice to him are satisfied. There is no magical form
in which the consent is to be given nor any charmed form in
E which the notice is to be sent. As we said, the essence of the
matter is that the consent to the sub-tenancy and the notice
of the sub-tenancy in respect of the premises llPJSt be evidenc-
ed by writing signed by the landlord and the tenant or the
sub-tenant. In this view of the matter, the appellant in the
present case is clearly entitled to the protection of secs. 17
F 8nd 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act and he cannot, therefore,
be evicted in execution of the decree obtained by Balbir Nath
Mathur ai>:ainst Om Prakash & Company. We do not consider it
necessary to embark tnto a discussion of the two cases cited
before us Jagan Rath Vo Abdul Aziz A.I.R. 1973 Delhi p.9 and
lilrari t.a1 Vo Abdul Gbafar I.L.R. 1974 1 Delhi 45.
G
During the pendency of the appeal in this court, an order
was made to the effect that from January 1, 1985 onwards, the
appellant should deposit a sum of Rs.3,600 every month out of
which the respondent would be entitled to draw out a sum of,_ ~
Rs.1,800 only. On behalf of the appellants, it was also
H
GIRDHARI LAL v. B.N. MATHUR [KHALID, J.] 397

A
-( undertaken that the suit filed by them against the resoondents
for fixation of fair rent would be withdrawn by them. We are
infor11>'d that the suit has not yet been withdrawn. We declare
that the suit filed by the appellant for the fixation of fair
rent shall stand dismissed as withdrawn.. We further direct
that with effect from January 1, 1985 onwards, the rent for B
the premises shall be Rs.3,600 per month and it will be so
paid and adjusted. ·The amount· now in deposit may be drawn out
by the respondents. The appeal is allowed in the manner
indicated above. Th.ere will be no order as to costs.

KHALID, J. I have gone through the Judgment prepared by
·my learned brother. I agree with the conclusion that the C
appeal has to be aU-owed.

We have before us two parties, both affluent. No tears
need .be shed either for the one or the other. The tenant
before us, or to be precise the sub-tenant, is a firm which -
does not deserve any sympathy from us and that for an D
excellant reason. They had given an undertaking before this
Court that they would withdraw the suit filed by them for
fixation of fair rent. This undertaking they did not respect
till now, obviously with the oblique motive of compelling the
landlord to get the rent reduced and at the same time walk
away with an order from this Court avoiding eviction. Left to E
myself, I would have declined relief to the appellants or at .
least directed them to pay a sum of Rs.5,000 every month as
rent. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this
case, where the conduct of the landlord is anything but
wholeso11>', I agree with my learned brother in the order passed
by him allowing the appeal. But, I . would like to make my F
position clear regarding the scope and purpose of section 17
and 18 of the Act.

The normal rule is that all rights created by a tenant
disappear along with the disappearance of his tenancy unless
there are special satisfactory safeguards for the sub-tenants. G
A sub-tenant has no independent existence de-ilors the tenant
who inducted him into possession. In the Act before us a sub-
tenant is given a special right, not available to him under
the general _law' but that right is circumscribed by specific
conditions laid down in section 17. We have chosen· tb rescue
the appellants before us only because of the hide and seek H
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1986] 1 S.C.R.
A
conduct displayed by the so-called tenant and the so-called
land-lord in this case. The facts speak for themselves. Even a
man who runs can see that the so-called tenant in this case 1a
the alter ego of the so-called land-lord. There is a total
identification between the two. It is their attempt to over-
reach the appellants by dubious lll!thods that has, in fact,
B imperilled their case, and it is for this reason that the
appellants get relief from us, even though strict adherence to
the conditions imposed under section 17 is abeent.

In normal case a sub-tenant under the Act can get relief
under the provisions of the Act only if he sat-isfies the twin
c conditions ~aid down in section 17, viz., that there must be
the previous consent in writing by the land-1 ord, of the
creation of the sub-tenancy and a notice in the prescribed
manner by the sub-tenant of the creation of the sub-tenancy to
the land-lord within one month of the date of such creation.
It is only when these two conditions are satisfied that the
D consequences mentioned in section 18(1) will follow. I should
not, therefore, be understood to hold the view that, as a
general rule, in all cases where the sub-tenant some-how
secures the signature of the land-lord in some co111111nication
relating to tenancy, a consent , in writing satisfying the
requirements of the section is to be assumed. In this Ca&•h
E Messrs Om Prakash & Company and Balbir Nath Mathur hav., been
hand in gloves with one another to defeat the appellants, It ..
is the attestation by Balbir Nath Mathur on behalf of Messrs
Om Prakash & Company in the letter dated June 10, 1975, that
has found favour with us to assume consent in writing in the
peculiar facts of the case. This, according to me, is an
F exceptional case with facts peculiar to its awn. Normally,
section 17 should be. strictly complied with, for the
sub-tenant to get the benefit under section 18. •

A.P.J. Appeal allaired·