GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND ORS.versusINDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION

                GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND ORS.                                 A
                             v.
                 INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIA T!ON

                          AUGUST 23, 2005
                                                                             B
           [S.B. SINHA AND DR. AR. LAKSHMANAN, JJ.]

      Interpretation of Statutes-Effect of the expression "Substitute"-
Government notification introduced an incentive schenie exempting payment
of additional duty for export and import-Subsequent notification added
certain places for the purpose of exemption by substituting words in the     C
previous notification-Respondents claimed benefit for the period between
both the notifications-Retrospective effect not given to the subsequent
notification and the benefit of exemption was denied-Writ petition filed
in the High Court against the denial of benefit-Writ petition allowed-
On appeal, Held; an exemption notification must be construed having regard   D
to the object and purport sought to be achieved-"Substitute" ordinarily
would mean "to put (one) in place of another"; or "to replace"-Neither
any substantive right was taken away nor any penal consequence was
imposed by the subsequent notification as only an obvious mistake was
sought to be removed - An exemption notification should be liberally
construed when a person is eligible to obtain benefits, therein-The          E
subsequent notification could have been said explicitly if it was intended
to have prospective effect-Where a statute is passedjor the purpose of
supplying an obvious omission in a former statute, the subsequent statute
relates back to the time when the prior Act was passed-Customs Tariff
Act, 1975-Section 3-Words & Phrases.                                         F
    . Government of India by its notification dated 7.4.1997 introduced
an incentive scheme with regard to the export and import in terms of
the Duty Entitlement Pass Book Scheme (DEPH). The notification ex-
em pied payment of additional duty leviable under Section 3 of the
Customs Tariff Act with effect from 1.4.1997. However, Guntur was not        G
mentioned in the said notification, which was later added by the noti-
fication dated 27.11.1997, substituting the words of the previous noti-
fication. The respondent made a representation so that the notification
dated 27.11.1997 covers the period between 7.4.1997 and 27.11.1997,
which was denied as it was not possible to grant retrospective effect to     H
                                  859
    860                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   the same. The respondent filed a writ petition, questioning the rejection
    of the representation, and the same was allowed. Hence this appeal.

         Appellants contended that the notifications dated 7.4.1997 and
    27.11.1997 providing for exemption from payment of additional custom
B   duty must be strictly construed; and that a subordinate legislation
    containing exemption from payment of duty would only have a prospec-
    tive operation.

          Respondents contended that by reason of the import policy for the
    period 1997-2002, the Union oflndia sought to simplify the procedure
C   for grant of exemption basing the same on the quality of goods exported
    on freight on board and as Guntur Railway Station had all along been
    an Inland Container Depot there was no reason as to why the said place
    should have been excluded from the purview of the aforementioned
    notification; that having regard to the representation, the ministry of
D   Commerce, director General of Foreign Trade and the Tobacco Board
    had requested the Ministry of Finance to pass appropriate orders so as
    to enable the exporters of Inland Container Depot, Guntur to avail the.
    facilities or' DEPB Scheme; and that in relation to the exporters of
    embroidered silk garments, made-ups and fabrics, the Government had
    given the benefit with retrospective effect.
E
          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

          HELD : 1. An exemption notification must be construed having
    regard to the object and purport, which the same seeks to achieve. An
F   expression used in a statute should be given its ordinary meaning unless
    it leads to an anomalous or absurd situation. (866-A-Bj

         Commissioner of Central Excise, Chandigarh-I v. Mahan Dairies,
    [2004) 1 l SCC 198; Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand and
    Others, [2005) 4 SCC 272, relied upon.
G
          2. The word "substitute" ordinarily would mean, "to put (one) in
    place of another"; or "to replace". No substantive right has been taken
    away nor any penal consequence has been imposed by the amendment as
    only an obvious mistake was sought to be removed thereby. When a person
H   is held to be eligible to obtain the benefits ofan exemption notification, the
        GOVERNMENT OF INDIA v. INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOC!A TION 861

    same should be liberally construed. [866-F; 866-H; 867-A]                     A

         Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition pg. 1281; Callins English
    Dictionary, referred to.
r

         3.1. Had the intention of the Government been only to extend the
    said benefit only to the exporters from any other seaport, airport or         B
    inland container depot, recourse to the proviso appended to clause 2 (iv)
    of the notification dated 7.4.1997 could have been taken. But by reason of
    the notification dated 27.11.1997, one 'sea port' and 'six inland container
    depots' were added. The last two words in the category of seaport, namely,
    "Tuticorin and Vishakhapatnam" were substituted by the words C
    "Tuticorin, Vishakhapatnam and Kakinada. Similarly the last two words,


-   namely, Ludhiana and Hyderabad" in the category of inland container
    depot were substituted by the words "Ludhiana, Hyrlerabad, Nagpur,
    Agra, Faridabad, Jaipur, Guntur and Varanasi. It is not a case where
    some other seaports or inland container depots were added for the purpose D
    of extension of the benefit but the newly added seaports or inland container
    depots were made a part of the original notification. The Union of India
    while making a subordinate legislation had advisedly used the word
    "substitution" in place of the word "addition". The object and purport of
    the subsequent notification was to grant the same benefit which had been
    granted to the exporters who were registered at the other seaports, airports E
    or inland container depots as specified in the notification dated 7.4.1997
    but also to those exporters, who had been exporting from such seaports
    or inland depots as specified in the amended notification dated 27.11.1997.
                                                        [867-G-H; 868-A-B-C]

          3.2. If the Central Government intended to extend the benefit to        F
    the members of the Respondent-Association only with prospective ef-
    fect, it could have said so explicitly. Such a benefit could also have been
    extended by taking recourse to the proviso appended to clause 2 (iv) of
    the notification dated 7.4.1997. Therefore, it on1y intended to rectify a
    mistake, which would have retrospective effect and retroactive operation.     G
    [868-D-E]

         Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Ors., (2004] 8 SCC I, followed.

        Ramkanali Colliery of ECCL v. Workmen by Scey. Rashtriya Colliery
    Mazdoor Sangh and Another, (2001] 4 sec 236, relied upon.                     H
    862                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A        4. Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious
    omission in a former statute, the subsequent statute relates back to the
    time when the prior Act was passed. [870-E]

         Attorney General v. Pougette, (1816) 2 Price 381        146 ER 130,
B   referred to.

         5. The doctrine of fairness is considered to be a relevant factor for
    construing a statute. Where the effect of a beneficent statute was sought
    to be extended keeping in view the fact that the benefit was already
    availed of by the agriculturists of tobacco in Guntur, it would be highly
C   unfair if the benefit granted to them is taken away, although the same
    was meant to be extended to them also. The statute need not be given
    retrospective effect by express words, for such purposes but the intent
    and object of the legislature in relation thereto can be culled out from
    he background facts. The Respondents were not ineligible from obtain-
D   ing the, benefit. Once they are held to be eligible for obtaining the
    benefit, the amended notification being an exemption notification should
    have received the beneficent construction. [870-F-G-H; 871-A]

        6. Interpretation of the Executive should receive due consideration
    but doctrine of "Contemporanea Expositio" cannot be invoked in the
E   present case. [871-B:q

         Collector of Central Excise, Bombay-I and Another v. Mis. Parle
    Exports (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 345 and H M Bags Manufacturer v.
    Collector of Central Excise, (1997) 11 SCC 696, distinguished.

F        7. Registration at the inland container depot was to remain valid
    for a period of 12 months only and in that view of the matter too the
    Central Government could not have intended to deprive the Respond-
    ents herein who were agriculturists from the benefit of the aforemen-
    tioned notification dated 7.4.1997 only for a limited period, viz., between
G   7.4.1997 and 27.11.1997. [872-C-D)

         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION              Civil Appeal No. 5196 of
    2005.

        From the Judgment and Order dated 30.1.2004 of the Andhra Pradesh
H   High Court in W.P. No. 21674 of 2002.
    GOVERNMENT OF INDIA v. INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION [SINHA,!.]         863

     B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General, Heman! Sharma, P. Parmeswaran,      A
and Shreekant N. Terdol for the Appellants.

    L. Nageswar Rao, G. Ramakrishna Prasad, K.P. Kaylashamatha Pillai,
and Mohd. Wasay Khan for the Respondent.
                                                                                 B
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     S.B. SINHA, J. : Leave granted.

      Interpretation of the expression "substitute" falls for determination in
this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 30.01.2004            C
passed by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ
Petition No.21674 of 2002.

     Shorn of all unnecessary details, the fact of the matter is as
under :
                                                                                 D
      The Respondent herein is an Association of the cultivators of tobacco.
An incentive scheme was introduced by the Government oflndia in the year
1997 as regard export and import in terms of the Duty Entitlement Pass Book
Scheme, whereby and whereunder 2% incentive was provided out of the
export carried from the notified container depots. 'Guntur' was not men~         E
tioned in the notification dated 7.4.1997 issued pursuant to or in furtherance
of the said policy decision which came into force with effect from 1.4.1997.
In terms of the said notification exemption was granted from payment of
additional duty leviable under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act to those
who had been issued a Duty Entitlement Pass Book by the Licensing                F
Authority. Sub-clause (iv) of Clause (2) of the said notification states :

         "(iv) The said Duty Entitlement Pass Book shall be valid for twelve
               months from the date of issue, for import and export only, at
               the port of registration which shall be one of the sea µorts at
               Mumbai, Calcutta, Cochin, Kandla, Mangalore, Marmgoa,             G
               Chennai Nhava Sheva, Paradeep, Tuticorin and
               Visakhapatnam, or any of the airports at Ahmedabad,
               Bangalore, Mumbai, Calcutta, Coimbatore, Delhi, Jaipur,
               Varanasi, Srinagar, Trivendrum, Hyderabad and Chennai or
               any of the Inalnd Container Depots at Bangalore, Coimbatore,      H
    864                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A                  Delhi, Gauhati, Kanpur, Pimpri (Pune), Pitampur (Indore),
                   Moradabad, Ludhiana and Hyderabad.




B
                           Provided that the Commissioner of Customs may by
                   special order and subject to such conditions as may be speci-
                   fied by him, permit imports and exports from any other sea
                                                                                     -
                   port, airport, inland container depot or through a land customs
                   stations;"

          Indisputably upon representation made by the Respondent-Associa-
    tion, an amendment to the said notification was made on or about 27 .11.1997,
C   the relevant portion whereof is as under :

             "(a) for the words "Tuticorin and Vishakhapatnam", the words
                  "Tuticorin, Vishakapatnam and Kakinada" shall be substi-
                  tuted; and"
D
             (b)   for the words "Ludhiana and Hyderabad", the words "Ludhiana,
                   Hyderabad, Nagpur, Agra, Faridabad, Jaipur, Guntur and
                   Varanasi" shall be substituted."

          The Respondent made a representation before the appropriate authority
E   to the effect that the said notification dated 27.11.1997 would also cover
    the period from 7.4.1997 to 27 .11.1997 being clarificatory in nature. The
    Central Government, however, rejected the said representation made by the
    Respondent !n terms of its letter dated 23.8.2001, stating :


F            "3. Therefore, exp0rts of tobacco made during the period 1.4.97
             to 26.11.97 cannot qualify for DEPB Scheme because it would
             mean granting retrospective effect to the said customs Notification
             which is not permitted in law.

            4. In this regard, I would also like to draw your attention to the
G           letter of even number dated 10.1.2000 of my predecessor wherein
            similar views were expressed."

         A writ petition was filed by the Respondents herein questioning the
    said order before the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The same was allowed
H   by reason of the impugned judgment, holding :
    GOVERNMENT OF INDIA v. INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION [SINHA, J.] 865


        ",, ... .In the said notification the place Guntur was not included and       A
        subsequently by an amendment to the said notification condition
        (iv) was amended and the place ofGuntur was introduced by way
        of substitution. The word substitution would connote that the Gov-
        ernment intended to give benefit to the imports and exports from
        Guntur and if really the Government wanted to introduce and give              B
        benefit to the imports and exports from Guntur from 27.11.1997
        they could have issued a separate notification which would operate
        as prospective in nature, but the notification dated 27.11.1997 was
        only by way of substitution, Since the legislature intended to give
        retrospective benefit to the exports and imports from Guntur, the
        said notification dated 27. 11. l 997 was issued by substitution ........ "   c
     Mr. B. Dutta, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on
behalfofthe Appellant(s), would submit that the notifications dated 7.4.1997
and 27.11.1997 providing for exemption from payment of additional custom
duty must be strictly construed. Relying on Commissioner o/Central Excise,            D
Chandigarh-Iv. Mahaan Dairies, [2004] 11 SCC 798, the learned counsel
would contend that a subordinate legislation containing exemption from
payment of duty would only have a prospective operation.

       Mr. L. Nageshwar Rao, t(le learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
 of the Respondent, on the other hand, would urge that by reason of the               E
 import policy for the period 1997-2002, the Union of India only sought to
 simplify the procedure for grant of exemption basing the same on the quality
 of goods exported on freight on board and as Guntur Railway Station had
 all along been an Inland Container Depot; there was no reason as to why.
·the said place should have been ~xcluded from the purview of the afore-              F
 mentioned notification.

      The learned counsel would contend that having regard to the represen-
tation made by the Respondent-Association, the Ministry of Commerce,
Director General of Foreign Trade in the Tobacoo Board had requested the
Ministry of Finance to pass appropriate orders so as to enable the exporters          G
of Inland Container Depot, Guntur to avail the facilities of DEPB Scheme.
It was submitted that in relation to the exporters of embroidered silk gar-
ments, made-ups and fabrics, the Government had given the benefit with
retrospective effect, as would appear from the letter of Ministry of Finance
dated 20 .12200 I.                                                                    H
    866                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A        An exemption notification, it is trite, must be construed having regard
    to the object and purport which the same seeks to achieve.

          It is also well-settled that an expression used in a statute should be
    given its ordinary meaning unless it leads to an anomalous or absurd
B   situation.

        In Mahaan Dairies (s.upra), a Division Bench of this Court
    observed:

                  "8. It is settled law that in order to claim benefit of a Noti-
c           fication a party must strictly comply with the terms of the Notifi-
          • cation. If on wordings of the Notification the benefit is not available
            then by stretching the words of the Notification or by adding words
            to the .Notification benefit cannot be conferred ... "

D        A similar view has been expressed by a Division Bench of this Court
    in Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand and Others, [2005) 4
    sec 272, in which one of us was a party, stating :
             "42. Eligibility clause, it is well settled, in relation to exemption
             notificatior. mu~t be given a strict meaning."
E
         However, the question which arises for consideration in this case is as
    to what would be the effect of the subsequ~nt notification.

          The word "substitute" ordinarily would mean "to put (one) in place of
p   another"; or "to replace". In Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, at page
    1281, the word "substitute" has been defined to mean "To put in the place
    of another person or thing". or "to exchange". In Collins English Dictionary,
    the word "substitute" has been defined to mean "to serve or cause to serve
    in place of another person or thing"; "to replace (an atom or group in a
    molecule) with (another atom or group)"; or "a person or thing that serves
G   in place of another, such as a player in a game who takes the place of an
    injured colleague".

         By reason of the aforementioned amendment no substantive right has
    been taken away nor any penal consequence has been imposed. Only an
H   obvious mistake was sought to be removed thereby.
     GOVERNMENT OF INDIA v. INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCJATION [SINHA, J.] 867

      There cannot furthermore be any doubt whatsoever that when a person          A
is held to be eligible to obtain the benefits of an exemption notification, the
same should be liberally construed.

     The notification dated 7.4.1997 is an exemption notification whereby
and whereunder the export and import policy of the Union of India was              B
implemented. Exemption from payment of additional duty leviable under
Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, was to be granted to an exporter,
provided he possessed a Duty Entitlement Pass Book which was valid at the
ports of registration specified therein.

      The proviso appended to sub-clause (iv) of clause (2) of the notifica-       C
 tion dated 7.4.1997 empowers the Commissioner of Customs to permit
 imports and exports from any other seaport, airport, inland container depot
 or through a land customs station.

       The Commissioner of Customs has advisedly not exercised its juris-          D
 diction under the proviso appended to sub-clause (iv) of clause (2) of
 notification dated 7.4.1997. By reason of the notification dated 27.11.1997,
 the only amendment made was the words "Tuticorin and Vishakhapatnam"
 were substituted by the words "Tuticorin, Vishakhapatnam and Kakinada",
 which are 'seaports' and the words "Ludhiana and Hyderabad" were sub-
 stituted by the words "Ludhiana, Hyderabad, Nagpur,"Agra, Faridabad,              E
 Jaipur, Guntur and Varanasi" which are 'inland container depots'.

      It is not in dispute that 'Guntur' was one of the inland container depots.
 It is also not in dispute that such duty exemption had all along been granted
 for export from 'Guntur'. In terms of the policy decision, the tobacco            p
 exporters had filed blue shipping bills which having not been accepted and
 they had no option but to file normal white shipping bills, as tobacco was
 a perishable item.

       Had the intention of the Government of India been only to extend the
  said benefit only to the exporters from any other seaport, airport or inland     G
  container depot, recourse to the proviso appended to sub-clause (iv) of
  clause (2) of the notification dated 7.4.1997 could have been taken. But by
, reason of the notification dated 27.11.1997, one 'sea port' and 'six inland
 container depots' have been added. The last two words in the category of
 seaport, namely, "Tuticorin and Vishakhapatnam" had been substituted by           H
    868                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   the words "Tuticorin, Vishakhapatnam and Kakinada. Similarly the last two
    words, namely, Ludhiana and Hyderabad" in the category of inland con-
    tainer depot had been substituted by the words "Ludhiana, Hyderabad,
    Nagpur, Agra, Faridabad, Jaipur, Guntur and Varanasi. It, therefore, cannot
    be said to be a case where some other seaports or inland container depots
    have been· added for the purpose of extension of the benefit but the newly
B
    added seaports or inland container depots had been made a part of the
    original notification. The Union of Tndia while making a subordinate leg-
    islation had advisedly used the word "substitution" in place of the word
    "addition". The object and purport of the subsequent notification issued by
    the Union of India was, thus, to grant the same benefit which had been
C   granted to the exporters who were registered. at the other seaports, airports
    or inland container depots as specified in the notification dated 7.4.1997 but
    also to those exporters, who had been exporting from such seaports or inland
    depots as specified in the amended notification dated 27.11.1997.

         If the Central Government intended to extend the benefit to the mem-
D
    bers of the Respondent-Association only with prospective effect, it could
    have said so explicitly. Such a benefit could also have been extended by
    taking recourse to the proviso appended to sub-clause (iv) of clause (2) of
    the notification dated 7.4.1997. It may, therefore, be safely concluded that
    by reason of the amended notification, the Central Government only in-
E   tended to rectify a mistake and, thus, the same will have retrospective effect
    and retroactive operation.

         In Ramkanali Colliery ofECCL v. Workmen.by Secy., Rashtriya Colliery
    Mazdoor Sangh and Another, [2001] 4 SCC 236, a Division Bench of this
    Court observed :
F
             " ..... What we are concerned with in the present case is the effect
             of the expression "substituted" used in the context of deletion of
             sub-sections of Section 14, as was originally enacted. In Bhagat
             Ram Sharma v. Union of India, this Court stated.that it is a matter
G            of legislative practice to provide while enacting an amending Jaw,
             that an existing provision shall be deleted and a new provision
             substituted. If there is both repeal and introduction of another
             provision in place thereof by a single exercise, the expression
             "substituted" is used. Such deletion has the effect of the repeal of
             the existing provision anc\ also provides for introduction of a new
H
    GOVERNMENT OF rNDIA '· rNDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION (SINHA, J.]           869

        provision. In our view there is thus no real distinction between            A
        repeal and amendment or substitution in such cases. If that aspect
        is borne in mind, we have to apply the usual principles of finding
        out the rights of the parties flowing from an amendment of a
        provision. If there is a vested right and that right is to be taken away,
        necessarily the law will have to be retrospective in effect and if such     B
        a law retrospectively takes away such a right. it can no longer be
        contended that the right should be enforced. However, that legal
        position, in the present case, does not affect the rights of the parties
        as such.".

      In Zile Singh v. State ofHaryana & Ors., (2004] 8 SCC I wherein the           C
effect of an amendment in the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 by Act No.15
of 1994 whereby
              ,. the word "after" was substituted by the word "upto" fell
for consideratibn; wherein Lahoti, C.J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench
held the said amendment to have a retrospective effect being declaratory in
nature as thereby obvious absurdity occurring in the first amendment and            D
bring the same in conformity with what the legislature really intended to
provide was removed, stating :

             "23. The text of Section 2 of the Second Amendment Act
        provides for the word "upto" being substituted for the word "after".
        What is the meaning and effect of the expression employed therein           E
        - "shall be substituted"?

             24. The substitution of one text for the other pre-existing text
        is one of the known and well-recognised practices employed in
        legislative drafting. 'Substitution' has to be distinguished from           F
        'supersession' or a mere repeal of an existing provision.

             25. Substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier
        provision and its replacement by the new provision (See Prir.ciples
        of Statutory Interpretation, ibid, p.565). If any authority .js needed
        in support of the proposition, it is to be found in West U.P. Sugar         G
        Mills Assn. v. State ofU.P., State o/Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwa/,
        Koteswar Vitia/ Karnath v. K. Rangappa Baliga and Co. and
        A.L. V.R.S.T Veerappa Chettiar v. S. Michael. In West U.P. Sugar
        Mills Association case a three-Judges Bench of this Court held that
        the State Government by substituting the new rule in place of the           H
    870                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A            old one never intended to keep alive the old rule. Having regard
             to the totality of the circumstances centring around the issue the
             Court held that the substitution had the effect of just deleting the
             old rule and making the new rule operative. In Mangilal Pindwal
             case this Court upheld the legislative practice of an amendment by
             substitution being incorporated in the text of a statute which had
B
             ceased to exist and held that the substitution would have the effect
             of amending the operation of law during the period in which it was
             in force. In Koteswar case a three-Judge Bench of this Court
             emphasized the distinction between 'supersession' of a rule arid
             'substitution' of a rule and held that the process of substitution
c            consists of two steps : first, the old rule is made to cease to e'>ist
             and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place."

          We are not oblivious of the fact that in certain situations, the court
    having regard to the purport and object sought tc be achieved by the
D   legislature may construe the word "substitution" as an "amendment" having
    a prospective effect but such a question does not arise in the instant case.

          There is another aspect of the matter which may not be lost sight of.
    Where a statute is passed for the purpose of supplying an obvious omission
    in a former statute, the subsequent statute relates back to the time when the
E   prior Act was passed [See Attorney General v. Pougette, (1816) 2 Price 381
      146 ER 130]

          The doctrine of fairness also is now considered to be a relevant factor
    for construing a statute. In a case of this nature where the effect of a
F   beneficent statute was sought to be extended keeping in view the fact that
    the benefit was already availed of by the agriculturalists of tobacco in
    Guntur, it would be highly unfair if the benefit granted to them is taken
    away, although the same was meant to be extended to them also. For such
    purposes the statute need not be given retrospective effect by express words
    but the intent and object of the legislature in relation thereto can be culled
G   out from the background facts.

         The question has furthermore to be considered having regard to the
    language and object discernible from the statute read as a whole. The
    Respondeni. were not ineligible from obtaining the benefit. Once they are
H   held to be eligible for obtaining the benefit, the amended notification being
    GOVERNMENT OF INDIA v. INDIAN TOBACCO ASSOCIATION [SINHA, l.] 871

an exemption notification should receive the beneficent construction.             A
     It is not a case where the Respondents, like the cases of Mahaan
Dairies (supra) and Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (supra) were ineligible from
claiming the benefit. The subsequent notification, thus, should receive a
beneficent construction,
                                                                                  B
      The learned Additional Solicitor General relied upon Collector of
Central Excise, Bombay-! and Another v. Mis. Parle Exports (P) Ltd.,
[1989] l SCC 345 for raising the contention that the interpretation of the
Executive should receive due consideration. It is not a case where the
doctrine of 'Contemporanea Expositio' can be invoked. The order relied            C
upon by the learned counsel has been impugned by the Respondents by
filing the writ petition. It, therefore, cannot be said that by reason thereof
the notification had been constructed on administrative side.

     In Mis Parle Exports (supra), it was observed:
                                                                                  D
        "17 ... The notification must be read as a whole in the context of
        the other relevant orovisions. When a. notification is issued in
        accordance with power conferred by the statute, it has statutory
        force and validity and, therefore, the exemption under the notification
        is as if it were contained in the Act itself. See in this connection
        the observations of this Court in Orient Weaving Mills (P) ltd. v.
                                                                                  E
        Union of India. See also Kai/ash Nath v. State of UP. The principle
        is well settled that when two views of a notification ar _, possible,
        it should be construed in favour of the subject as notification is part
        of a fiscal enactment. But in this connection, it is well to remember
        the observations of the Judicial Committe~ in Caroline M Armytage         F
        v. Frederick Wilkinson that it is only, however, in the event of there
        being a real difficulty in ascertaining the' meaning of a particular
        enactment that the question of strictness or of liberality of construc-
        tion arises. The Judicial Committee reiterated in the said decision
        at p. 369 of the report that in a taxing Act provisions establishing
        (sic enacting) an exception to the general rule of taxation are to be
                                                                                  G
        construed strictly against those who invoke its benefit. While in-
        terpreting an exemption clause, liberal interpretation should be
         imparted to the language thereof, provided no violence is done to
        the language employed. It must, however, be borne in mind that
        absurd results of construction should be avoided."                        H
    872                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A      · The ratio of the said decision, therefore, runs counter to the submission
    of the learned counsel.

         Reliance was also placed by the learned Additional Solicitor General
    on H.M. Bags Manufacturer v. Collector of Central Excise, [1997] 11 SCC
    696 wherein having regard to the use of the expression "henceforth" the
B   order of the Board was held to h·ave a prospective operation. The said
    decision, therefore, has no application in the present case.

         Furthermore, registration at the inland container depot was to remain
    valid for a period of 12 months only and in that view of the matter too, it
C   cannot be said that the Central Government intended to deprive the Re-
    spondents herein who were agriculturists from the benefit of the aforemen-
    tioned notification dated 7.4.1997 only for a limited period, viz., between
    7.4.1997 and 27.11.1997. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the High         (


    Court cannot be said to have committed any error in arriving at the afore-
D   mentioned conclusion.

        For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the High
    Court has not committed any error in passing the impugned judgment. The
    Appeal is dismissed.  Nocosts.

E A.Q.                                                         Appeal dismissed.